ACCEPTED 15-24-00120-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 1/14/2025 6:14 PM No. 15-24-00120-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN In the Fifteenth Court of Appeals 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS Austin, Texas 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk

State of Texas, Appellant, v. Harris County, Texas, et al., Appellees.

On Appeal from the 165th District Court, Harris County, Texas Cause No. 2024-63919, Hon. Ursula Hall, Presiding Judge

Brief of Appellees

Of Counsel: Christian D. Menefee Harris County Attorney Grant B. Martinez Justin P. Tschoepe Jonathan G. C. Fombonne Lily E. Hann Deputy County Attorney & First Assistant Yetter Coleman LLP State Bar No. 24102702 811 Main Street, Suite 4100 [email protected] Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 632-8000 Office of the Harris County Attorney 1019 Congress, 15th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 274-5101

Attorneys for Appellees

Identity of Parties & Counsel

Appellant State of Texas

Trial and Appellate Counsel Ken Paxton Brent Webster Ralph Molina James Lloyd Kimberly Gdula William D. Wassdorf William H. Farrell (lead counsel) Office of the Attorney General P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Austin, Texas 78711 Phone: (512) 936-1700 Fax: (512) 474-269 [email protected]

- ii - Appellees (“Harris County”) Harris County, Texas Harris County Commissioners Court Harris County Public Health Lina Hidalgo, in her official capacity as Harris County Judge Rodney Ellis, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Harris County Precinct 1 Adrian Garcia, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Harris County Precinct 2 Tom Ramsey, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Harris County Precinct 3 Lesley Briones, in her official Capacity as Commissioner of Harris County Precinct 4 Leah Barton, in her official capacity as Interim Executive Director of Harris County Public Health Trial and Appellate Counsel Christian D. Menefee Jonathan G.C. Fombonne Tiffany S. Bingham Christopher Garza Eleanor Matheson Ryan Cooper Edward D. Swidriski III Office of the Harris County Attorney 1019 Congress Plaza, 15th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 274-5101 Fax: (713) 755-8924 Grant B. Martinez Justin P. Tschoepe Lily E. Hann Yetter Coleman LLP 811 Main Street, Suite 4100 Houston, Texas 77002 Phone: (713) 632-8000 Fax: (713) 632-8002 - iii - Table of Contents Identity of Parties & Counsel ................................................................................. ii Index of Authorities ..............................................................................................vii Record References ................................................................................................ xv Statement of the Case .......................................................................................... xvi Issues Presented ..................................................................................................... 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 2 Statement of Facts ..................................................................................................3 Statement of Procedural History ............................................................................ 8 Standard of Review ............................................................................................... 11 Summary of the Argument .................................................................................... 13 Argument.............................................................................................................. 15 I. The Final Judgment Mooted the Temporary Injunction Order, which this Court Need Not and Should Not Review. ............................................ 15 II. The Attorney General Lacked Authority to Represent the State in this Case in the Trial Court. .............................................................................. 16 A. Texas law did not authorize the Attorney General to represent the State in the district court in this case. .......................................... 17 Introduction

Any honest reading of the 1876 Constitution requires dismissal of this lawsuit, the Attorney General’s latest unsanctioned attempt to halt Harris County’s poverty- alleviation work. First, the 1876 Constitution deliberately reduced and expressly

limited the Attorney General’s representation of the State in the trial courts and the Legislature has never enlarged that authority to include ultra vires suits against political subdivisions. In fact, the Attorney General has previously agreed that his authority to institute lawsuits in trial courts on behalf of the State is so limited. His

brief cites no constitutional provision or statute authorizing him to represent the State in this case. So, the trial court properly struck his pleadings.

Second, and in any event, Harris County’s Community Prosperity Program

does not violate the Gift Clause—either under its original understanding when the 1876 Constitution was drafted, or under the Supreme Court’s recently reaffirmed precedent. Following that court’s constitutional concerns with a prior poverty-

alleviation program based on a perceived lack of “public control over the funds,” In re State, 2024 WL 2983176, at *3, the County’s new program includes additional controls and public benefits throughout. The State’s arguments against the new program rely primarily on bald assertions and fail to reckon with the record.

For these reasons and several others, the Court should affirm.

Statement of Facts

State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds

The federal government has provided Harris County with nearly $1 billion in pandemic-relief funds. Federal regulations expressly allow Harris County to use those funds for “cash assistance” to “households and individuals” at or below 300%

of the poverty limit as part of “[r]esponding to the negative economic impacts” of the pandemic. 31 C.F.R. § 35.6(b)(3)(ii)(A)(1).

As recently as September 2023, the federal government reiterated that it

“[r]ecogniz[es] that low-income households often experience deeper challenges recovering financially from a natural disaster.”1

Uplift Harris

In 2023, after considerable study, the Harris County Commissioners Court approved the Uplift Harris program “to address economic inequality and insecurity

for low-income households most affected by the pandemic.” 3.RR.^[6]; see 3.RR.5-22, 24-25. Under Uplift Harris, selected Harris County residents would receive

$500 monthly cash payments with few strings attached for 18 months. In re State, 2024 WL 2983176, at *1. Recipients would be chosen by lottery from among

1 U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Coronavirus State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds: Interim Final Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 64986, 64994 (Sep. ^[20], 2023).

applicants with income below 200% of the federal poverty line who either live in the top 10 poorest zip codes or participate in a particular Harris County public health program called ACCESS. Id.; 2.RR.10-11; 3.RR.^[6], 8, 24.

Throughout 2023, Harris County and its contractors worked to implement

Uplift Harris. Participants expected the first round of assistance in April 2024.

The Supreme Court Weighs in on Uplift Harris

In April 2024, the Attorney General sued. Having failed to obtain relief in the trial court or the Fourteenth Court, he petitioned the Supreme Court for relief. The Supreme Court, exercising its authority under Rule 52.10, granted the motion for temporary relief and prohibited all Uplift Harris payments until further order of that

Court. In re State, 2024 WL 2983176, at *1.

The Supreme Court’s order granting a stay offered a “preliminary”

assessment of the merits but conspicuously focused on one issue. Id. at *3. The Court reasoned that the State “raised serious doubt that the Uplift Harris program can satisfy the ‘public control’ requirement of this Court’s Gift Clause precedent.”

Id. at *4. That precedent requires that “a government in Texas that desires to dole out public funds must, among other things, ‘retain public control over the funds to ensure that the public purpose is accomplished and to protect the public’s investment.’” Id. at *3 (relying on Tex. Mun. League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v.

Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 74 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex. 2002)); see id. at *4 (“It appears there will be no public control over the funds after they are disbursed.”).

Harris County Creates the Community Prosperity Program

Harris County was eager to ensure its poor residents received relief, so, instead of awaiting a final resolution of the Uplift Harris litigation, it developed a new

program with tighter controls to address the Supreme Court’s concerns: the Community Prosperity Program (the “Program”). 2.RR.^[10], 5.RR.84, 88, 99. The Program is modeled on public benefits programs such as TANF and SNAP.^[2]

2.RR.20-21, 43, 57. It uses federal funds to deliver $500 a month for 18 months to

1,850 participants; and, unlike Uplift Harris, it significantly restricts where and on what participants may spend the funds. ^[2].RR.^[11], 30, 41; 5.RR.84, 88, 99.

The Community Prosperity Program achieves the same goals as Uplift Harris, and the participants remain the same, but it functions differently. ^[5].RR.84, 99;

2.RR.9-10. It has three new, strict controls. These limit “what the funds can be spent on,” restrict “the way that the funds are administered,” and provide increased

“insight” into how the funds are spent to guarantee more oversight. ^[2].RR.^[19]. The 2 “TANF provides cash payments to help families pay for food, clothing, housing and other essentials.” Texas Health and Human Services, TANF Cash Help, available at https://www.hhs.texas.gov/services/financial/cash/tanf-cash-help; 2.RR.^[21]. SNAP gives low- income households funds to buy food. Texas Health and Human Services, SNAP Food Benefits, available at https://www.hhs.texas.gov/services/food/snap-food-benefits; 2.RR.^[21].

controls differentiate the Program from Uplift Harris and address the Supreme

Court’s concerns.

First, participants agree that they will only use the funds for “basic needs” in a signed contract. ^[2].RR.^[20]; 5.RR.111.

Second, to enforce that contractual restriction, participants must make purchases with a reloadable debit card that functions only at vendors serving basic needs. ^[2].RR.19-20, 30, 56-57; 5.RR.99, 106-07, 111. Harris County mandated these restrictions in its amended contract with its vendor GiveDirectly.^[3] 2.RR. 24-26;

5.RR.88, 99.

Third, participants’ account data is shared with GiveDirectly and the County, which have authority to audit by requesting additional documents from participants.

2.RR.^[20], 31, 35-37, 54; 5.RR.99, 111 (“Recipients will also consent to . . . [s]hare transaction-level spending data with GiveDirectly and Harris County Public

Health.”). These audit procedures are being designed “in response to the State of Texas’ concerns over a lack of controls in the previous program.” 2.RR.66.

In addition, the Community Prosperity Program retains three important controls from Uplift Harris. It exercises control on the front end by setting and enforcing eligibility criteria. ^[2].RR.10-11, 35, 37-40; 5.RR.99,105, 111; see also 4.RR.85-

86.4 Additionally, Harris County releases funds to GiveDirectly in $5 million increments to “ensure that the program is being implemented with fidelity.”

2.RR.17-18, 28; 5.RR.93. Finally, a participant who does not comply with the Program’s terms will be removed. ^[2].RR.36, 81; 5.RR.99, 108.

Payments under the Program were originally expected to begin in January 2025. 2.RR.34, 36. Due to this litigation—and the injunction issued by this

Court—the start date will be delayed. ^[2].RR.42-43.

Statement of Procedural History

Although Harris County specifically designed the Community Prosperity

Program to ameliorate this Court’s constitutional concerns, the Attorney General continues to object to Harris County helping the poor. He sued to enjoin the Program.

In September 2024, the State filed a petition alleging that the Program runs

afoul of article III, § 52(a) (the “Gift Clause”) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Texas Constitution. CR.7-26. It requested injunctive and declaratory relief.

CR.24.

Harris County responded to the petition, opposing the request for injunctive

relief and filing a plea to the jurisdiction. CR.80-469. Harris County showed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction: (1) because the program is constitutional and the State has no viable ultra vires claim; (2) because the State failed to connect any

prospective, allegedly illegal acts to any particular defendant; and (3) because the Attorney General is not lawfully authorized to represent the State in the district court in this case. CR.95-122.

The trial court denied the motion for a temporary injunction and granted the plea to the jurisdiction. CR.471-74.

While the trial court maintained plenary jurisdiction, Harris County filed a motion to show authority under Rule 12.5 The motion argued that the Attorney

General lacked constitutional or statutory authority to prosecute this case in the district court and requested that the trial court strike the Attorney General’s pleadings. CR.489-500; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 12.

After another hearing, the trial court granted the Rule 12 motion and signed

an Amended Final Judgment, which replaced its prior order on the plea to the jurisdiction. App. ^[1] (CR.539-40). In the Amended Final Judgment, the Court

ordered: “Unless a person who is authorized to prosecute this case on behalf of the State appears by November 25, 2024, . . . all pleadings filed in this action by the Attorney General purportedly on behalf of the State are stricken.” App. ^[1]. It also granted the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed all claims and all parties for lack of jurisdiction. App. ^[1].

No person authorized to prosecute this case on behalf of the State appeared, so the Attorney General’s pleadings have been struck.

The Amended Final Judgment is the judgment on appeal. Br. ^[13].

On December 6, this Court entered an order enjoining Harris County “from distributing funds under the Program during the pendency of this appeal or until further order.” Harris County’s motion to vacate the injunction remains pending.

- 10 - Standard of Review The “burden is on the plaintiff to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). “A jurisdictional plea may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both.” Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018). “When a jurisdictional plea challenges the pleadings, we determine if the plaintiff has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. The “analysis begins with the live pleadings.” Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150. “If, however, the plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we must move beyond the pleadings and consider evidence when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues, even if the evidence implicates . . . the merits of a claim.” Alamo, 544 S.W.3d at 770-71. For such pleas, “the standard of review mirrors that of a traditional summary judgment: ‘[I]f the plaintiffs’ factual allegations are challenged with supporting evidence necessary to consideration of the plea to the jurisdiction, to avoid dismissal plaintiffs must raise at least a genuine issue of material fact to overcome the challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction.’” Id. at 771 (footnote omitted). The “trial court must rule on the plea as a matter of law if the evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question.” Klumb v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2015). - 11 - “Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, and we review a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo.” Ex Parte City of Irving, 2024 WL 5172273, at *3 (Tex. App. [15th Dist.] 2024, no pet. h.) (citations omitted). - 12 - Summary of the Argument As a threshold issue, the State is focused on the wrong order: the final judgment mooted the temporary injunction order, so it is not before the Court. For all—or even one—of the reasons outlined below, the Court should affirm the final judgment. First, the Attorney General lacked the authority to represent the State in the district court. The 1876 Constitution expressly limited the Attorney General’s authority in the district courts to specific cases not relevant here. Although the Legislature can create new causes of action in favor of the State and authorize the Attorney General to prosecute such cases in the trial courts, it has not done so for ultra vires claims. The Attorney General cannot point to any constitutional or statutory authority to bring this suit for the State in the district court, so that court properly struck the pleadings and dismissed the suit. Second, the State failed to carry its burden to establish the trial court’s jurisdiction over any appellee. The Harris County governmental entities retain their governmental immunity against ultra vires claims. For the remaining appellees, government officials, the State did not plead the essential standing element of traceability. The trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over any appellee independently required it to dismiss the suit. - 13 - Third, the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the State has no viable ultra vires claim that the Community Prosperity Program is unconstitutional. The Program complies with the Gift Clauses for three reasons: (1) the Gift Clauses do not apply to relief to the poor; (2) even if they did, the Program satisfies the Gift Clauses under the controlling test set out by the Supreme Court last year; and (3) the Program is independently authorized by another constitutional provision (art. III, § 52-a). The Program additionally complies with the Equal Protection Clause because Harris County acted rationally in distributing funds to achieve multiple rational public purposes. Finally, on appeal, the State has abandoned its allegation in the trial court that the Program lacked statutory authorization, so the issue is not before the Court. The State’s lack of a viable ultra vires claim independently required the trial court to dismiss all claims. For all these reasons, the Court should affirm. - 14 - Argument I. The Final Judgment Mooted the Temporary Injunction Order, which this Court Need Not and Should Not Review. The State presents two issues for appellate review, but only one is properly before the Court. The trial court’s order denying the temporary injunction was mooted by the entry of final judgment, so it is not reviewable on appeal. Thus, the only issue appropriate for this Court’s consideration is whether the trial court correctly granted Harris County’s plea to the jurisdiction and sworn motion to show authority under Rule 12. A temporary injunction provides interim relief prior to a final judgment. See Harley Channelview Props., LLC v. Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, 690 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2024) (a temporary injunction is “intended to preserve the status quo until final judgment”). Once a final judgment is entered, no live controversy remains about the decision to grant or refuse such interim relief. See Roswell v. Cleaver-Brooks Sales & Serv., Inc., 2020 WL 897101, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). So, when “a trial court renders a final judgment . . . the temporary[-]injunction order becomes moot.” WCJ Assets, Ltd. v. US Trinity Bridgeport, LLC, 2023 WL 4115398, at[*11] (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, no pet.); see also Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. 2020). In - 15 - Bonsmara, the Supreme Court observed that, at the end of the case, “appeals of some interlocutory orders—such as temporary injunctions—become moot because the orders have been rendered moot by subsequent orders,” i.e., the final judgment. Id. at 395 (cleaned up). As a result, “temporary injunctions . . . can be the subject of interlocutory appeals but not of appeals from final judgments.” Id.; see also Isuani v. Manske-Sheffield Radiology Grp., P.A., 802 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1991) (discussing temporary injunctions and mootness). Because the order on the temporary injunction is moot and cannot be the subject of this appeal from a final judgment, Harris County’s brief focuses on why the trial court correctly struck the Attorney General’s petition and granted the plea to the jurisdiction. II. The Attorney General Lacked Authority to Represent the State in this Case in the Trial Court. The Attorney General “exercises only those powers authorized by the Constitution or statute.” City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466, 470 & n.25 (Tex. 2007) (Brister, J.); accord Webster v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 2024 WL 5249494, at[*10] (Tex. Dec. 31, 2024) (recognizing attorney general’s “authority comes from the Constitution and from statutes”). No statute or constitutional provision authorized the Attorney General to represent the State in this case in the district court. The appellant’s brief does not cite any. That is dispositive. - 16 - Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 12 provides a mechanism (a sworn motion) for challenging attorneys’ authority to represent a party in court. The burden is on the challenged attorney: “At the hearing on the motion, the burden of proof shall be upon the challenged attorney to show sufficient authority to prosecute or defend the suit on behalf of the other party.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 12. When the attorney fails to meet that burden, the trial court must strike the pleadings: “Upon his failure to show such authority, the court shall refuse to permit the attorney to appear in the cause, and shall strike the pleadings if no person who is authorized to prosecute or defend appears.” Id. That is what happened here. CR.489-501, 507-09, 537-40.6 This Court should affirm the final judgment’s striking the petition and dismissing the claims brought by the Attorney General. A. Texas law did not authorize the Attorney General to represent the State in the district court in this case. The Attorney General’s lack of authority is evident from the plain text and history of the Constitution, Supreme Court decisions, and statutes.

TAB 1

FI LED Manlyn Burgess District Clerk

Time: JOV 2 5 2024 CAUSE NO. 2024-63919 Deputy STATE OF TEXAS, IN THE DISTRICT COURT Plaintiff, at the time of imaging

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Court refuses to

permit the Attorney General and attorneys working for his office from appearing on behalf of the State of Texas in this Court in this case. Unless a person who is authorized to prosecute this case on behalf of the State appears by November 25, 2024, it is further ORDERED that all pleadings filed in this action by the Attorney General purportedly on behalf of the State are stricken.

IT IS THEREFORE FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUGED, and DECREED that Harris

County Defendants’ Plea to the Jurisdiction is GRANTED and all parties and all claims are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. All costs shall be borne by the party incurring them.

This Order is Final and Appealable.

23rd SIGNED this day of November, 2024 P’m‘

JUDGE PRESIDING

TAB 2

THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE 3. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

Sec. 52. RESTRICTIONS ON LENDING CREDIT OR MAKING GRANTS BY POLITICAL CORPORATIONS OR POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS; AUTHORIZED BONDS; INVESTMENT OF FUNDS. (a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, the Legislature shall have no power to authorize any county, city, town or other political corporation or subdivision of the State to lend its credit or to grant public money or thing of value in aid of, or to any individual, association or corporation whatsoever, or to become a stockholder in such corporation, association or company. However, this section does not prohibit the use of public funds or credit for the payment of premiums on nonassessable property and casualty, life, health, or accident insurance policies and annuity contracts issued by a mutual insurance company authorized to do business in this State. (b) Under Legislative provision, any county, political subdivision of a county, number of adjoining counties, political subdivision of the State, or defined district now or hereafter to be described and defined within the State of Texas, and which may or may not include, towns, villages or municipal corporations, upon a vote of two-thirds majority of the voting qualified voters of such district or territory to be affected thereby, may issue bonds or otherwise lend its credit in any amount not to exceed one- fourth of the assessed valuation of the real property of such district or territory, except that the total bonded indebtedness of any city or town shall never exceed the limits imposed by other provisions of this Constitution, and levy and collect taxes to pay the interest thereon and provide a sinking fund for the redemption thereof, as the Legislature may authorize, and in such manner as it may authorize the same, for the following purposes to wit: (1) The improvement of rivers, creeks, and streams to prevent overflows, and to permit of navigation thereof, or irrigation thereof, or in aid of such purposes. (2) The construction and maintenance of pools, lakes, reservoirs, dams, canals and waterways for the purposes of irrigation, drainage or navigation, or in aid thereof. (3) The construction, maintenance and operation of macadamized, graveled or paved roads and turnpikes, or in aid thereof.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsection (b) of this Section, bonds may be issued by any county in an amount not to exceed one-fourth of the assessed valuation of the real property in the county, for the construction, maintenance, and operation of macadamized, graveled, or paved roads and turnpikes, or in aid thereof, upon a vote of a majority of the voting qualified voters of the county, and without the necessity of further or amendatory legislation. The county may levy and collect taxes to pay the interest on the bonds as it becomes due and to provide a sinking fund for redemption of the bonds. (d) Any defined district created under this section that is authorized to issue bonds or otherwise lend its credit for the purposes stated in Subdivisions (1) and (2) of Subsection (b) of this section may engage in fire-fighting activities and may issue bonds or otherwise lend its credit for fire-fighting purposes as provided by law and this constitution. (e) A county, city, town, or other political corporation or subdivision of the state may invest its funds as authorized by law.

(Feb. ^[15], 1876. Amended Nov. ^[8], 1904; Subsecs. (a) and (b) amended and (c) added Nov. ^[3], 1970; Subsec. (d) added Nov. ^[7], 1978; Subsec. (a) amended Nov. ^[4], 1986; Subsec. (e) added Nov. ^[7], 1989; Subsecs. (a), (b), and (c) amended Nov. ^[2], 1999.) (TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISIONS for Sec. 52: See Appendix, Note 1.)

TAB 3

THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE 3. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS

Sec. 52-a. PROGRAMS AND LOANS OR GRANTS OF PUBLIC MONEY FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution, the legislature may provide for the creation of programs and the making of loans and grants of public money, other than money otherwise dedicated by this constitution to use for a different purpose, for the public purposes of development and diversification of the economy of the state, the elimination of unemployment or underemployment in the state, the stimulation of agricultural innovation, the fostering of the growth of enterprises based on agriculture, or the development or expansion of transportation or commerce in the state. Any bonds or other obligations of a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state that are issued for the purpose of making loans or grants in connection with a program authorized by the legislature under this section and that are payable from ad valorem taxes must be approved by a vote of the majority of the registered voters of the county, municipality, or political subdivision voting on the issue. A program created or a loan or grant made as provided by this section that is not secured by a pledge of ad valorem taxes or financed by the issuance of any bonds or other obligations payable from ad valorem taxes of the political subdivision does not constitute or create a debt for the purpose of any provision of this constitution. An enabling law enacted by the legislature in anticipation of the adoption of this amendment is not void because of its anticipatory character.

(Added Nov. ^[3], 1987; amended Nov. ^[8], 2005.)

TAB 4

THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE 4. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Sec. 22. ATTORNEY GENERAL. The Attorney General shall represent the State in all suits and pleas in the Supreme Court of the State in which the State may be a party, and shall especially inquire into the charter rights of all private corporations, and from time to time, in the name of the State, take such action in the courts as may be proper and necessary to prevent any private corporation from exercising any power or demanding or collecting any species of taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage not authorized by law. He shall, whenever sufficient cause exists, seek a judicial forfeiture of such charters, unless otherwise expressly directed by law, and give legal advice in writing to the Governor and other executive officers, when requested by them, and perform such other duties as may be required by law.

(Feb. ^[15], 1876. Amended Nov. ^[3], 1936, Nov. ^[2], 1954, Nov. ^[7], 1972, and Nov. ^[2], 1999.) (TEMPORARY TRANSITION PROVISIONS for Sec. 22: See Appendix, Note 1.)

TAB 5

THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE 5. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Sec. ^[21]. COUNTY ATTORNEYS; DISTRICT ATTORNEYS. A County Attorney, for counties in which there is not a resident Criminal District Attorney, shall be elected by the qualified voters of each county, who shall be commissioned by the Governor, and hold his office for the term of four years. In case of vacancy the Commissioners Court of the county shall have the power to appoint a County Attorney until the next general election. The County Attorneys shall represent the State in all cases in the District and inferior courts in their respective counties; but if any county shall be included in a district in which there shall be a District Attorney, the respective duties of District Attorneys and County Attorneys shall in such counties be regulated by the Legislature. The Legislature may provide for the election of District Attorneys in such districts, as may be deemed necessary, and make provision for the compensation of District Attorneys and County Attorneys. District Attorneys shall hold office for a term of four years, and until their successors have qualified.

(Feb. ^[15], 1876. Amended Nov. ^[2], 1954.)

TAB 6 Art. Ill, § 50b-1, 51 merely authorizing the bonds and stating their purpose. (See the Author's Comment on Secs. 49-b and 49-c.)

Sec. 50b-l. ADDITIONAL STUDENT LOANS. (a) The Legislature may provide that the Coordinating Board, Texas College and University System, or its successor or successors, shall have authority to provide for, issue and sell general obligation bonds of the State of Texas in amount not to exceed Two Hundred Million Dollars ($200,000,000) in addition to those heretofore authorized to be issued pursuant to Section 50b of the Constitution. The bonds authorized herein shall be executed in such •form, upon such terms and be in such denomination as may be prescribed by law and shall bear interest, and be issued in such installments as shall be prescribed by the Board provided that the maximum net effective interest rate to be borne by such bonds may be fixed by law. (b) The moneys received from the sale of such bonds shall be deposited to the credit of the Texas Opportunity Plan Fund created by Section 50b of the Constitution and shall otherwise be handled as provided in Section 50b of the Constitution and the laws enacted pursuant thereto. (c) The said bonds shall be general obligations of the state and shall be payable in the same manner and from the same sources as bonds heretofore authorized pursuant to Section 50b. (d) All bonds issued hereunder shall, after approval by the Attorney General, registration by the Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, and delivery to the purchasers, be incontestable and shall constitute general obligations of the State of Texas under this Constitution. (e) Should the Legislature enact enabling laws in anticipation of the adoption of this Amendment such acts shall not be void because of their anticipatory nature.

History • At the time Section 50b-1 was added in 1969, there remained available for issuance some $46 million of the original $85 million authorized by Section 50b, and projections indicated that the $46 million would be sufficient to carry the student loan program only through 1971.

Explanation An additional $200 million in bonds was authorized, but, unlike Section 50b, which limited the interest rate to 4 percent, this section is more realistic in that it permits the coordinating board and legislature to set interest rates for the new bonds. (See also the Explanation of Art. III, Sec. 65.)

Comparative Analysis No other state constitution contains a provision resembling this section.

Author's Comment See the Author's Comment on Section 50b.

Sec. 51. GRANTS OF PUBLIC MONEY PROHIBITED; EXCEPTIONS. The Legislature shall have no power to make any grant or authorize the making of any grant of public moneys to any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporations whatsoever; provided, however, the Legislature may grant aid to indigent and disabled Confederate soldiers and sailors under such regulations and limitations as may be deemed by the Legislature as expedient, and to their widows in indigent circumstances under such regulations and limitations as may be deemed by the

230 Art. Ill, § 51 Legislature as expedient; provided that the provisions of this Section shall not be construed so as to prevent the grant of aid in cases of public calamity.

History This grants prohibition dates from the 1875 Convention. (But see the History of Sec. ^[6] of Art. XVI for a related prohibition in earlier constitutions.) The section as originally adopted consisted of the words up to the first semicolon plus the proviso at the end concerning public calamities. The original 1876 Constitution contained an exception to the grants prohibition in the form of a section authorizing the legislature to provide small pensions to indigent soldiers who fought for independence from Mexico, to indigent signers of the Declaration of Independence of Texas, and to their widows remaining unmarried. (This was Sec. 55 of Art. XVI which was repealed for obvious reasons in 1969.) In 1894, the first of many welfare amendments was adopted. It provided that the legislature could "grant aid to the establishment and maintenance of a home for indigent and disabled Confederate soldiers or sailors who are or may be bona fide residents .... " No more than $100,000 a year could be granted for this purpose. (See the following Author's Comment for a discussion of this curious provision.) Four years later a second Confederate amendment was adopted. Without a great deal of historical research it is not possible to be sure what was happening, but one can speculate that the Confederate home was inadequate and that Confederate veterans were moving to Texas to get into the home. The amendment limited aid to indigent and disabled Confederate soldiers and sailors "who came to Texas prior to January 1st, 1880." The amendment also authorized direct "aid" to individuals in addition to "aid" for establishment of a home, but, naturally, "no inmate of said home" could receive any other aid from the state. Various other restrictions showed up. Direct grants were not to exceed $8 a month. Covered under these grants were veterans "who are either over sixty years of age, or whose disability is the proximate result of actual service in the Confederate army for a period of at least three months." Widows also were covered for direct aid but only if (a) "in indigent circumstances," (b) "never re-married," (c) bona fide residents prior to March 1, 1880, and (d) married to such soldiers or sailors "anterior"(!) to March 1, 1866. The amendment put an annual ceiling of $250,000 for the "purpose hereinbefore specified," but went on to include a ceiling of $100,000 for the veterans' home. It is not clear whether the $100,000 was included in the $250,000 or was in addition to it. This new grant program lasted for six years. In 1904 another amendment was adopted. This one increased the maximum from $250,000 to $500,000 but preserved the $100,000 for the veterans' home in the same ambiguous wording. A new group of widows was allowed in. The magic marriage date was changed from March 1, 1866 to March 1, 1880; the same date as the residency cut-off. Three years later an effort was made to get wives, widows, and "women who aided in the Confederacy" into the veterans' home. Although the words "under such regulations and limitations as may be provided by law" were retained, somebody thought it necessary or appropriate specifically to authorize the legislature to "provide for husband and wife to remain together in the home." The amendment increased the annual maximum from $100,000 to $150,000. (This change leads one to believe that the ceiling amount was in addition to the ceiling for the "purpose hereinbefore specified" since no change was made in that ceiling.) The amendment lost by the close vote of 41,079 to 43,732. This was a special election at which four other amendments were voted upon,.all defeated by Art. Ill, § 51 margins of three to one or greater. This was obviously a " coat-tail" phenomenon, for three years later the same amendment was adopted by a vote of 113,549 to 28,534. This was at a general election at which no other amendments were considered. (See Marburger, p. 16.) This new deal lasted only two years. In 1912 a new amendment was adopted. This one removed the ceilings and the $8 a month maximum and substituted the power to levy a property tax, "in addition to all other taxes heretofore permitted by the Constitution of Texas," not exceeding 5¢ on the $100 valuation for the purpose of creating a "special fund for the payment of pensions." (This would seem to mean that the special fund was not to be used to maintain the veterans' home and that there was no limit on how much could be spent on the home. But at this late date, who knows what the amendment meant?) The amendment changed the date of arrival in Texas from January 1, 1880 for men and March 1, 1880 for widows to January 1, 1900 for both sexes. The magic marriage date was also moved to "anterior" to January 1, 1900, but young widows were excluded-no one born "since 1861" could qualify as a widow. (Any widow under age 50, therefore, was considered "young.") The amendment also expanded the definition of soldier to include those who for at least six months during the War between the States either served in the Texas militia or in "organizations" for the protection of the frontier against Indian raids or Mexican marauders. The minimum pension age of 60 and the definition of "disabled" were dropped. Finally, for no apparent reason, the public calamity proviso was dropped. Things remained unchanged until 1924, but only because amendments went down to defeat in 1919 and again in 1921. The two defeated amendments and the successful one in 1924 were identical except for one date-the 1917 proposal would not have let a widow be born after 1866 whereas the other two retained the original "after 1861." (There were idiosyncratic variations among the three versions in the usual bad punctuation of Texas amendments.) There were four substantive changes: (1) the residency and marriage date was moved from 1900 to 1910; (2) the minimum six months' service requirement in the militia and frontier organizations was dropped; (3) the levy was made 7¢ instead of 5¢ and changed from an authorization to a direct levy with legislative power to decrease the tax; and (4) the public calamity proviso was reinstated. The next amendment was adopted in 1928. It simply dropped the residency and marriage dates and deleted the prohibition against pensions for "young" widows. A 20-year-old woman could now marry an 80-year-old veteran and feel secure that she could qualify for a pension-if she were in indigent circumstances, of course. Things remained the same in Section 51 until 1968, but only in the sense that the words of the section remained unchanged. Evidently, the special Confederate fund grew too large. For five years beginning in 1943, the levy was reduced from 7¢ to 2¢. (See Anderson and McMillan, Financing State Government in Texas, at p. 54.) In 1947, Section 17 of Article VII was adopted. The first paragraph thereof "amended" Section 51 by levying a 2¢ tax but with legislative authority to reduce the tax. Evidently, the Confederate fund still continued to generate too much money, for in 1954 Section 51-b of this article was added. It "amended" Section 51 by killing off the special fund, in effect, but directed that the pensions continue to be paid. (See Explanation of Sec. 51~b.) In 1958, Section 66 of Article XVI was added. It "amended" Section 17 of Article VII by directing payment of Texas Ranger pensions from the special Confederate fund. (This appears inconsistent with killing off the fund in the preceding paragraph. Presumably the drafter forgot that the "fund" as such had been abolished.)

232 Art. Ill, § 51 In 1968, the current version of Section 51 was adopted. Simultaneously, Section 1-e of Article VIII was adopted. It "amended" both Section 51 and Section 17 of Article VII. Among other things, Section 1-e kills the 2¢ tax as of December 31, 1976, and directs that, if in the meantime the legislature establishes a new trust fund for Confederate veterans, Texas Rangers, and their widows, the 2¢ tax is to be dropped forthwith .

Explanation Section 51 is three things and at one time was four things. First, and principally, it is a limitation on the power of the state, acting through the legislature, to dispense money. Second and third, the section contains two exceptions to that limitation-Confederate pensions and aid in case of a public calamity. Fourth, from .1912 to 1947, the section contained an operative exception to a different limitation-the power of the state to raise money by levying a tax on property. {This is all very confusing. Section 51 contained the words of the exception until the 1968 amendment, but Section 17 of Article VII took over the tax in 1947.) Prohibitions on grants and loans for private purposes came into state constitu- tions in the 19th century as a reaction principally against giving away the public domain to builders of railroads, canals, 'and other "internal improvements." These giveaways had usually been obtained by gross corruption of ·legislatures. The reaction to this was so strong that the resulting prohibitions were frequently cast in extremely restrictive language. This was the case in 1875; the convention not only used harsh language, it kept saying the same thing over and over again. (In addition to Sec. 51, there are Secs. 50 and 52 of this article, Sec. ^[3] of Art. VIII, Sec. ^[3] of Art. XI, and Sec. ^[6] of Art. XVI. Moreover, Secs. 44, 53, 54, and 55 of this article are analogous prohibitions flowing from this same reaction.) The problem with these extreme formulations is that they soon get in the way of all sorts of governmental action that is arguably for a public purpose but looks like a "grant." The Texas story of these sections over the last hundred years has been one of extreme rigidity in some areas, considerable inconsistency in others, and general confusion across the board. Fortunately, over the past 20 years the courts have been pointing the way toward clearing up the confusion by a simple rule: if the grant is for a public purpose the grant is constitutional. Although this is now the principal controlling rule, it is appropriate to discuss another rule that has been used to avoid the prohibition and can continue to be used. The thrust of the new rule is to say that there are ."good" grants, those for a public purpose, and " bad" grants, those for a private purpose. Another approach is to distinguish between a grant and what appears to be but really is not a grant. The formal rule is that a grant is not a grant if the state receives a "quid pro quo." This can be easily illustrated if, as in some state constitutions, the word "gift" is substituted for "grant. " If one says "You're a nice person, I'll give you ten dollars," one has made a gift. But if one says "You're a nice person, I'll give you ten dollars if you'll whitewash the fence," one has made a promise that is enforceable if the person whitewashes the fence. Although the verb "give" is used in both cases, the verb has distinct meanings. Likewise, there is a difference between a statute that "grants" a pension to veterans because they served in the armed forces and a statute that promises to "grant" a pension to employees who work for the state for a specified minimum number of years. If the "grant" is announced in advance and requires something in return, there is a quid pro quo and the "grant" has become something else. The only clear instance of judicial reliance on this "quid pro quo" rule is the landmark pension case of Byrd v. City of Dallas discussed in the Explanation of Art. Ill, § 51 Section 48a of this article. There the commission of appeals made it clear that a pension plan announced in advance is part of the employee's compensation. There are other cases that can be brought under either the "quid pro quo" or the "public purpose" rule, but only because of the fuzzy way in which the court discussed the issue. Consider, for example, Weaver v. Scurry (28 S.W. 836 Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ). A state law authorized counties to pay cash bounties for the killing of predatory animals. The court upheld the statute against an attack based on Sections 51 and 52, stating that the bounty was a proper means "by which the public calamity wrought by these animals is to be averted." This is to say that there is_no "grant" because the government got something in return. (It should be noted that this one-page opinion succeeded in confusing everything. Note the words "public calamity" in the quotation, presumably a reference to the public calamity exception in Sec. 51. Moreover, the court cited Sec. ^[23] of Art. XVI as bringing "the enactment within the scope of legislative powers." This might imply that Sec. ^[23] created an exception to Secs. 51 and 52.) An even more obscure case is Housing Authority v. Higginbotham (135 Tex. 158, 143 S.W.2d 79 (1940)). This case involved an attack, on multiple constitu- tional grounds, on a state statute authorizing subsidized housing for the poor. The court set out at length the legislative declaration of necessity and relied upon the declaration's assertion that slum clearance would cut down disease and crime and in other ways benefit the entire state. This declaration was used to support the "public use" necessary to justify exercising the power of eminent domain. Later in the opinion the court disposed of the grants-and-loans argument thus: "It necessarily follows from the above holding that the law is not violative of Sections 52 and 53 .. . . " (135 Tex. at 168, 143 S. W.2d at 86. Presumably the court meant Secs. 51 and 52.) There is no way of telling whether the court meant that the benefits to the state were a quid pro quo or that a grant is not a grant if it is for a public purpose. At first blush this appears to be logic chopping of the worst sort. What difference does it make whether a general benefit to the state is called a "quid pro quo" that takes a grant out of the "giveaway" class or is called a "public purpose" and thereby makes the grant constitutional because it is not for a private purpose? In a practical sense there is no difference. As a matter of logical constitutional interpretation there is a profound difference. Sections 3 of Article VII and 6 of Artide XVI prohibit spending for a private purpose. If one follows the standard rule that drafters of legal documents mean what they say, Sections 51 and 52 prohibit grants to private individuals whether for a private or a public purpose. Otherwise, the sections are redundant. The "quid pro quo" rule permits one to use the public purpose as if it were consideration for the grant, thus making the action analogous to a contract and taking it out of the giveaway category. Be all this as it may, Sections 50, 51, and 52 are now to be applied as if they read: "No grant or loan may be made to any person, etc., for a private purpose." There is a line of cases that permits one to reach this conclusion. The first is Bexar County v. Linden, a case which has only the remotest rational connection with Section 51. (The case is discussed in the Explanation of Sec. ^[1] of Art. XI.) In the course of the opinion the supreme court said: "The giving away of public money, its application to other than strictly governmental purposes, is what the provision is intended to guard against" (110 Tex. 339, 344, 220 S. W. 761 , 762 (1920)). The next significant case was, paradoxically, the clear-cut "quid pro quo" pension case of Byrd v. City of Dallas. In the course of developing the argument that a pension plan is part of compensation, the court said: " . . . , if it is a part of the compensation of such employee for services rendered to the city, or if it be for a public purpose, then clearly it is a valid exercise of the legislative power." (118

-234 Art. Ill! § 51 Tex. 28, 36, 6 S.W.2d 738, 740 (1928) (emphasis added).) Subsequent cases that seem to support this new "public purpose" rule include Davis v. City of Lubbock (160 Tex. 38, 326 S. W.2d 699 (1959)); State v. City of Austin (160 Tex. 348, 331 S.W.2d 737 (1960)); and Harris County v. Dow/earn (489 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ . . App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ refd n. r. e.) ). Actually, the attorney general is principally responsible for taking the cited cases and drawing the new rule from them. In one recent letter advisory, he said: "Expenditures for a true public purpose do not violate Article III, Section 51 of the Constitution... , even when a private agency is used to achieve the purpose" (Tex. Att'y Gen. Letter Advisory No. 6 (1973)). And again:" ... Section 52 does not prohibit the grant of funds or property or credit for a public purpose" (Tex. Att'y Gen. Letter Advisory No. 9 (1973)). (See also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. Nos. H-120 (1973); M-391 (1969); C-584 (1966); C-530 (1965).) Under the new rule, the question is, of course, whether the grant or loan is for a public purpose. In a sense this is no more than asking whether the public benefit is too remote, indirect, or general to serve as a "quid pro quo." In 1973 the attorney general refused to approve an issue of revenue bonds by the City of McAllen for the purchase of land to be used for industrial development. (In 1968 an amendment permitting this had been defeated. See the History of Sec. 52.) The city sought leave to file a mandamus action to compel approval of the bonds, but the supreme court overruled the city's motion (City of McAllen v. Hill, No. B-4315, 17 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 128). In a 1974 opinion on an analogous proposal, the attorney general discussed his earlier refusal to approve the McAllen revenue bonds and concluded: ". . . it is not considered a public purpose within this legal context, when municipal credit is used to obtain for the community and its citizens the general benefits resulting from the operation of a private industry." (See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. H-357 (1974).) The question raised in Opinion No. H-357 was whether a city could give a promissory note to the United States for surplus land under terms that precluded the city from ever being liable on the note. The note was to be paid off out of rents received for the use of, or proceeds from sales of, the land. As in the case of McAllen, the land would be used for industrial purposes. The attorney general's conclusion was: "It is not constitutionally permissible for a city. to purchase land for future industrial development by means of a promissory note to be paid out of revenues generated by the land without recourse to the city when the benefit to the public from such a purchase is such benefit as may be derived from the attraction of new industry." It is fair to speculate whether opinions such as this would be forthcoming if the constitution contained no "grants and loans" prohibition. Would it be so clear that a lending of municipal credit in order to further the general well-being of the community and to increase the city's tax base was not for a public purpose if the constitution were silent about whom the credit was extended to? Obviously, what is a public purpose is a matter of judgment. Even under the new rule that any grant or lending of credit is constitutional if the grant or loan is for a public purpose, it seems likely that Sections 50, 51, and 52 will have some influence on the person trying to make a judgment about whether a public purpose is involved. To put it another way, old habits are hard to break; people frequently look at problems the same way that they always did. Consider, for example, the attorney general's advice concerning a bill that would indemnify members, officers, and employees of the legislature against financial loss arising out of a claim based on negligence or other acts resulting from the maintenance of order in the legislature. The attorney general said: " Our Constitution prohibits grants of public moneys to an individual in Sec. 51 of Article III. If the state itself is liable for the loss, indemnification would be valid but if there is no liability upon the part of the State Art. Ill, § 51 as where a claim is barred by governmental immunity, the use of public money to pay a claim owed by an individual is a gift or donation in violation of the Constitution." (Tex. Att'y Gen. Letter Advisory No. 33 (1973). See also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. H-70 (1973).) This sounds like the workmen's compensation problem all over again. (See the History of Sec. 59 of this article.) Indemnification becomes a grant because the state may assert the comnion law rule of sovereign immunity. (See the following Author's Comment.) But the real problem is that the attorney general apparently forgot his earlier statement: "Expenditures for a true public purpose do not violate Article III, Sec. .51 of the Constitution." It can certainly be argued convincingly that a public purpose is served if the state tells its employees that they may carry out their duties without fear of financial loss. The public interest is not served if employees are afraid to do their job for fear that they will be sued and that their employer will not pick up the tab. (See also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. H-15 (1973) where the attorney general implies that a death benefit payable to the beneficiaries of a deceased county employee would be a prohibited grant under Sec. 52. There is no discussion of public purpose.) There remains the question of the meaning of the new "public purpose" rule as it applies to grants to municipal corporations-a term which, in effect, means any local government. In the normal sense of the terin, a grant by the state to a county, a city, a school district, or any other political subdivision could hardly be for a "private purpose." Presumably, the new statement of the rule equates "public purpose" with "state purpose." In other words, the state can grant money to a local government engaged in activity of interest to the state, but not for activity of interest only to the local government. For example, a grant to a city for a sewage treatment plant might be for a state public purpose whereas a grant to the same city to buy a privately owned public utility might be considered a "private" purpose. (But see the following Author's Comment.) Finally, this new equating-of Section 51 with public purposes leavesthe public calamity exception out in left field. Since a public calamity is a public purpose par excellence, the exception has withered away. But then the exception apparently is really only an exception to Section 6 of Article VIII, which limits appropriations to two ·years. In Dallas County v. Mccombs, the supreme court disallowed a five-year state grant of state ad valorem taxes to counties during the Great Depression. The ground was the violation of Section 6 of Article VIII. Other instances of long-term grants of such taxes were distinguished because they were for real public calamities whereas in the case before the court the legislative declaration of calamities was too general to qualify under Section 51. (135 Tex. 272, 140 S.W.2d 1109 (1940).)

Comparative Analysis About half the states have a grants and loans prohibition. Some of the states have added exception,s, usually in terms of aiding the poor. Two of the newest constitutions, Illinois and Montana, omit the earlier restrictions, both of which were aimed directly at aid to railroads. The new Louisiana Constitution preserves the prohibition with a typical set of exceptions. Neither the Mode/State Constitu- tion nor the United States Constitution has a comparable provision.

Author's Comment One wonders whether the 1894 amendment mentioned above is the first Critz theory amendment. (See Author's Comment on Sec. 62 of Art. XVI.) In the light of Section 2 of Article XI calling for the establishment of county poor houses and farms, there could hardly have been any doubt that the state had the power to

236 · Art. Ill, § 51-a operate. a poor house for Confederate veterans. One can only conclude that the amendment was a device to get public approval of the program. Once the unneces- sary provision got into the constitution, every change would naturally follow the same route. It was suggested earlier that a grant to a municipal corporation to buy a private public utility might be considered for a "private purpose." Actually, the problem of grants to municipal corporations should be considered a problem of general versus local laws. If the state offered grants to any and all municipalities that wished to carry out some local "proprietary" function, there would be no need to argue that a private purpose was involved. (For "proprietary functions," see Explanation ofSec. ^[1] of Art. XI.) If the grant were only to cities with populations between 192,567 and 192,569, the better approach would be to strike down the law as local rather than say that. it was a grant for a private purpose. In any event, revenue sharing is now "in." A Section 51 prohibiting grants to local governments is a restriction whose time has gone. It was also suggested that, notwithstanding the new "public purpose" broom, the "grants and loans" muddle has not been wholly swept away. The recent letter advisory discussed earlier (Tex. Att'y Gen. Letter Advisory No. 33) demonstrated that the sovereign immunity doctrine is stronger than "public purpose." If the state abandoned sovereign immunity there would be no Section 51 problem. To indemnify a public officer or employee for acts for which his employer, the government, is not liable would be spending money for a "private" purpose. But a law that indemnifies the officer or employee for acts for which the government would be liable if'it were to waive its immunity is in effect an indirect waiver of immunity and an expenditure for a public purpose. It must be conceded that an agency of the state has no authority to carry liability insurance to cover a tort which is not covered by the Tort Claims Act, for that would be thwarting the legislative policy not to waive immunity. But even here, it is not appropriate to rely on Section 51. The vice is not a grant for a private purpose but an unauthorized administrative act. On this basis the attorney general's opinion cited previously (Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. H-70 (1973)) is undoubtedly correct; his reliance on Sections 51 and 52 is subject to question. If the legislature specifically authorizes liability insurance for an act for which the government could be held liable absent sovereign immunity, Sections 51 and 52 are red herrings diverting attention from the real issue of indirect waiver of sovereign immunity. (See also the Author's Comments on Sec. 59 of this article. and Sec. l of Art. XI.) Assuming that today Section 51 means simply that money can be spent only for a public purpose, then the section should be dropped. A requirement that public money be spent for public purposes is reasonable. It is not reasonable to state the requirement several different ways, especially if one of the ways is literally saying something else. (For an exposition of the more traditional distinction between "public purpose" and "grants and loans," see Willatt, "Constitutional Restrictions on Use of Public Money and Public Credit," 38 Texas Bar J. 413 (1975).)

• Sec: 51-a. ASSISTANCE GRANTS AND MEDICAL CARE FOR NEEDY AGED, DISABLED AND BLIND PERSONS, AND NEEDY CHILDREN; FED- ERAL FUNDS; SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS. The Legislature shall have the power, by General Laws, to provide, subject to limitations herein contained, and such other limitations, restrictions and regulations as may by the Legislature be deemed expedient, for assistance grants to and/or medical care for, and for rehabilitation and any other services included in the federallaws as they now read or as they may hereafter be amended, providing matching funds to help such families and individuals attain or Art. Ill, § 52 prohibition in the original section. Be all this as it may, the effect of the Collingsworth opinion is to make the earlier flat statement true in fact. For Collings- worth concludes (a) that the original Section 52 did not prohibit issuing bonds for purposes for which counties and other local governments could spend money and (b) that the 1904 amendment broadened rather than restricted· that preexisting power. Thus, Collingsworth leaves the lending prohibition with only its natural grammatical meaning. Subsection (a). Although this subsection is the "local" version of Sections 50 and 51, the Explanation of Section 51 covers both "grants" and "loans" as such, whether the government involved is the state or a local unit. Thus, that explanation covers this subsection. Subsection (b). This subsection is part of the constitutional tax structure and can be understood only after a review of the tax sections, particularly Section 9 of Article VIII. (See History and Explanation of that section.) The primary original purpose of the subsection was to provide additional means for raising capital funds for water and for roads. With the adoption of Section 59 of Article XVI in 1917, the water power of Subsection (b) became almost but not quite obsolete; there are still some Section 52 water districts around. To avoid duplication of coverage, the constitutional problems of water districts will be discussed under Section 59 of Article XVI. Road districts are a different matter. They still exist and will continue even though the state long ago took over many county roads for the state highway system. (There is a long story concerning the takeover of county roads but the problems involved do not arise from Section 52. The leading cases are Robbins v. Limestone County, 114 Tex. 345, 268 S.W. 915 (1925), and Jefferson County v. Board of County and District Road Indebtedness, 143 Tex. 99, 182 S.W.2d 908 (1944).) Road districts are not "special districts" in the technical sense of an independent unit of government with fiscal and administrative power to provide particular services. A road district is a "body corporate" that can sue and be sued (Horn v. Matagorda County, 213 S.W. 934 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted)), but it exists solely as a geographical unit for the purpose of determining who is to vote and to be taxed for a bond issue for road construction. The issuing of the bonds, the levying of the tax, and the construction of roads are handled by the county commissioners court. Subsection (b) authorizes a road district covering more than one county, but the legislature has authorized only whole counties so to combine to form a road district. (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 778a (1964). See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 0-4214 (1941).) Since the road district exists in practice only as a money-raising unit, the judicial gloss on Subsection (b) is limited substantially to questions concerning bond issues. For example, the proceeds of a bond issue must be used for the roads that the election specified would be built. (Fletcher v. Howard, 120 Tex. 298, 39 S.W.2d 32 (1931).) Although the section speaks of "macadamized, graveled or paved roads," "paved" has been interpreted loosely to cover almost anything that makes a road reasonably permanent. (Aransas County v. Coleman-Fulton Pasture Co., 108 Tex. 223, 191 S.W. 556 (1917); Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 0-3652 (1941).) Bond money of a road district that includes a city may be spent on city streets that are part of a highway system (see City of Breckenridge v. Stephens County, 120 Tex. 318, 40 S.W.2d 43 (1931)); but a city may issue its own bonds for city streets that are part of the highway system. Such bonds are not subject to the limitations of Subsection (b). (Se-e Lucchese v. Mauerman, 195 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1946, writ refd n.r.e. ), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 812 (1947).) It must be kept in mind at all times that Section 9 of Article VIII and Art. IV, § 22 Constitution. At the 1875 Convention the delegates added the duty to authenticate publi- cation of the laws and added a sentence fixing his salary at $2,000 annually. There was an effort to make the office elective and extensive debate about the amount of his salary but none on the deletion of "elect" following "Governor" in the 1869 phrase. (See Debates, pp. 162-63, 166, 256-57.) In 1936 an amendment increased the salary for the office to $6,000 annually, and in 1954 an amendment removed the constitutional limitation on salary, but a companion amendment prohibited the legislature from setting the salary at less than $6,000. (See Art. III, Sec. 61.)

Explanation With one exception, this sectiori is self-explanatory. The peculiar wording about the tenure of the office suggests that a governor who succeeds to the office when vacant can select his own secretary of state. That construction was more plausible under the earlier constitutions, when the tenure was the "term of service of the Governor elect," but there is no indication that the 1875 delegates intended to make a change, for if they had, it easily could have been clearer.

Comparative Analysis Most states have a constitutional secretary of state. A majority make it an elective office, and two provide for filling it by a joint .vote of the legislature. Almost all states'provide that the duties of the office ar~ to be prescribed by law, and a substantial percentage provide some constitutional duties ranging from ex officio membership on boards to attending to the governor, council, and legis- lature. There is no secretary of state provided by the Model State Constitution.

Author's Comment Constitutional debate about the secretary of state usually involves the necessity of making it a constitutional office. The Author's Comment on Section 16 points out that two states have made the officer who performs the duties of the.secretary of state the successor to the governor. Unless the secretary of state performs this rol~, however, there seems little justification for maintaining his constitutional status.

Sec. 22. A TIORNEY GENERAL. The Attorney General elected at the general election in 1974, and thereafter, shall hold office for four years and until his successor is duly qualified. He shall represent the State in all suits and pleas in the Supreme Court of the State in which the State may be a party, and shall especially inquire into the charter rights of all private corporations, and from time to time, in the name of the State, take such action in the courts as may be proper and necessary to prevent any private corporation from exercising any power or demanding or collecting any species of taxes, tolls, freight or wharfage not authorized by law. He shall, whenever sufficient cause exists, seek a judicial forfeiture of such charters, unless otherwise expressly directed by law, and give legal advice in writing to the Governor and other executive officers, when requested by them, and perform such other duties as may be required by law. He shall reside at the seat of government during his continuance in office. He shall receive for his services an annual salary in an amount to be fixed by the Legislature.

History The 1845 Constitution created the constitutional office of attorney general in the judicial article. He was appointed by the governor, with advice and consent of

352 Art. IV,§ 22 the senate, to a two-year term, and his duties and salary were prescribed by statute. An amendment in 1850 made the office elective, and the 1861 Consti- tution retained the 1845 language and the 1850 amendment. • In the 1866 Constitution the office remained in the judicial article. He was elected to a four-year term, required to reside in the capital and perform duties fixed by law, and received, . in addition to perquisites, an annual salary fixed at $3,000 that could not be "increased or diminished during his term of office." The 1869 Constitution moved the office into the executive article and provided that it be filled by appointment of the governor with senate confirmation. Again, the attorney general had to reside in the capital and served for four years. In addition to the duties required by law, he was to "represent the interests of the State in all suits or pleas in the Supreme Court in which the State may be a party; superintend, instruct, and direct the official action of the district attorneys so as to secure all fines and forfeitures, all escheated estates, and all public moneys to be collected by suit; and . . . when necessary, giving legal advice in writing to all officers of the government. .. . " (See Tex. Const. Art. IV, Sec. ^[23] (1869).) Only the 1869 Constitution imposed qualifications (same as the governor) on the office. The 1876 Constitution again made the office elective and reduced its term to two years. The attorney general's compensation was an annual salary of $2,000 "besides such fees as may be prescribed by law; provided, that the· fees which he may receive shall not amount to more than two thousand dollars annually." The delegates to the 1875 Convention without much debate added lengthy instructions to the attorney general about corporate charters and illegal corporate actions or charges. (See Journal, p. 295; Debates, pp. 163-64.) In 1936 an amendment increased the attorney general's salary to $10,000 and deleted the fee provisions. In 1954 another amendment adopted the present language on compensation while a companion amendment prohibited the legis- lature from setting the salary at less than $10,000. {See Art. III, Sec. 61.) A 1972 amendment increased the term of the office to four years.

Explanation The provisions of this section regarding the attorney general's term of office, residence, and compensation are simple and straightforward. If the powers and duties of the office had been left to be prescribed by law, Section 22 would have caused few problems. Since some powers and duties were included, however, the meaning of the section has been a continuous source of litigation and speculation. One of the first questions to arise involved the relationship between the attorney general and the county and district attorneys. Article V, Section 21, provides that the county and district attorneys " shall represent the State in all cases in the District and inferior courts," and this section requires the attorney general to "representthe State in all suits and pleas in the Supreme Court." Presumably, the draftsmen intended the local state's attorneys to handle trials and the attorney general to handle appellate work. If that was so, Section 22 was incomplete because the constitution directed no one to appear for the state in the court of appeals, which appeared in the 1876 Constitution as it was originally adopted. (The court of criminal appeals and courts of civil appeals replaced the court of appeals in 1891. See the History of Art. V, Sec. ^[1].) Apparently, the Committee on the Executive Department, whose report the convention considered and finally adopted four days before the Committee on the Judicial Department had even reported (Journal, pp. 375, 406), anticipated that the judiciary article would provide only one appellate court-'-a supreme court-as had been the case in all the prior state constitutions. (See the History of Art. V, Sec. ^[1].) In fact , the report of Art. IV,§ 22 the Committee on the Judicial Department provided only for the supreme court. (Journal, pp. 406-22.) The convention added the court of appeals during floor debate more than 20 days after final adoption of the executive article (Journal, p. 640), and apparently no one remembered to go back and add the court of appeals to this section. • Shortly after adoption of the constitution, Justice Stayton, who had been a delegate to the 1875 Convention, stated for the supreme court that indeed the constitution divided responsibility for representing the state with the attorney general to appear before the supreme court and county and district attorneys to appear in trial courts. (The legislature could determine who would represent the state before the court of appeals.) This constitutional division of a~thority was mandatory, and a statute could not authorize the attorney general to file suit in behalf of the state without express constitutional authorization. (State v. Moore, 57 Tex. 307 (1882).) Such a division of authority proved impracticable, however. As a supreme court opinion in a later case pointed out (see following citation for Brady v. Brooks), county and district attorneys are elected locally and they are elected primarily to perform their principal function-prosecution of criminal cases. Their independence of any statewide authority made it impossible to apply a uniform policy in the initiation (or defense) of suits on behalf of the state. Perhaps for those reasons the legislature ignored Moore and continued to direct the attorney general to sue on behalf of the state to collect delinquent taxes, recover state lands, etc. Finally, in Brady v. Brooks (99 Tex. 366, 89 S.W. 1052 (1905)) the supreme court ruled that the phrase in Section 22 directing the attorney general to "perform such other duties as may be required by law" empowers the legislature "to create causes of action in favor of the state, and to make it the exclusive duty [of the attorney general] to prosecute such suits" in trial as well as appellate courts. Since Brady the courts have emphasized repeatedly that the attorney general may be given trial duties when the legislature creates a new or additional cause of action. (See Smith v. State, 160 Tex. 256, 328 S.W.2d 294 (1959); Maud v. Terrell, 109 Tex. 97, 200 s.w. 375 (1918).) The Brady rule that the attorney general may appear for the state in trial court only to enforce a new cause of action in favor of the state has not been explored further. No reported opinion has ruled that a cause of action the attorney general sought to enforce pursuant to a statutory authorization was an old or preexisting one that is to be enforced exclusively by county and district attorneys. One case, however, ruled that the attorney general may not be given exclusive authority to prosecute criminal offenses, but the court declined to decide whether he may be authorized to prosecute crimes in instances in which local state's attorneys refuse to prosecute. (See Shepperd v. Alaniz, 303 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1957, no writ).) In practice, the Moore-Brady rule that the trial-appellate division of powers in this section and Article V, Section 21, is exclusive has been ignored. The attorney general frequently appears for the state at the trial level, sometimes without statutory authorization, and district and county attorneys usually appear before the supreme court in appeals of cases they handled in trial court. The ,attorney general's constitutional powers respecting private corporations have also required judicial clarification. Soon after adoption of this constitution the supreme court ruled that the attorney general's supervisory powers over private corporations authorize him to institute and maintain suit to prevent or redress illegal acts by private corporations even in the absence of a statute and that his power to do so is exclusive and may not be exercised by or given by law to the county and district attorneys. (State v. Paris Ry., 55 Tex. 76 (1881); State v. International & G.N.R. Co., 89 Tex. 562, 35 S. W. 1067 (1896). Prior to Brady, this

354 Art. IV,§ 22 was the attorney general's only constitutional authority to appear in trial court.) The attorney general may not sue a corporation when only private rights are involved, however; injury to the public generally must have occurred or be imminent. (State v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 81 Tex. 530, 17 S.W. 60 (1891).) Thus if a public utility seeks to charge unreasonably high rates, the attorney general may, at least in the absence of governmental regulation of rates, institute suit to prevent imposition of the unreasonable rates. (State v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 526 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1975).) This section and Article V, Section 22, in defining who may represent the state, are exclusive. The legislature may not authorize a private citizen to maintain suit on behalf of the state (American Liberty Pipe Line Co. v. Agey, 167 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1942), affd,,141 Tex. 379, 172 S.W.2d 972 (1943)). More importantly, the legislature may not authorize another state, county, or district office or agency to employ attorneys to represent its and, hence, the state's interest in court unless the agency's attorney acts as a subordinate to and with approval of the attorney general or a county or district attorney. (Maud v. Terrell, 109 Tex. 97, 200 S. W. 375 (1918).) Perhaps because the caseloads in some instances have become too burdensome for the state's attorneys and their staffs, the legislature occasionally authorizes other attorneys to represent the state in court (presumably as a special assistant state's attorney), if the attorney general or a local state's attorney approves. (See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7335a.) The legislature has created an office of state's attorney, appointed by the court of criminal appeals and independent of the constitutional state's attorneys, to represent the state before the court of criminal appeals. (See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1811.) Presumably, the legislature concluded that it could do so because this section mentions only appearances for the state before the supreme court. An early case stated that the attorney general may act only if he has constitutional or statutory authority to do so. (Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State, 68 Tex. 526, 4 S.W. 865 (1887) (Stayton, J.). See also Garcia v. Laughlin, 155 Tex. 261, 285 S. W.2d 191 (1955); State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, writ refd w.o.m. ).) Several attorneys general have contended, however, that the office has inherent, common-law powers (e.g., Shepperd, "Common Law Powers and Duties of the Attorney General," 7 Baylor L. Rev. ^[1] (1955)), and gratuitous statements in a few early decisions support the contention (e.g., Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 22 S.W. 1048, 1052 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893)). In fact, the attorney general has been representing the state on the assumption that he has common-law authority to do so in federal habeas corpus proceedings, for example. (See Taylor, "Modernizing the Powers of the Attorney General of Texas," 36 Texas Bar J. 51 (1973).) The issue has not yet been decided by the courts. It is not inconceivable that the courts ultimately may decide that the office has implied or common-law powers to represent the state in situations in which the constitution and the statutes are silent. Yet the Brady case and the express constitutional requirement that county and district attorneys represent the state in trial courts appear to be insuperable obstacles to any implied power to institute or defend suits in state courts. The attorney general's constitutional duty to render advisory opinions has caused no problems. Indeed, the constitutional duty has been supplanted by broader statutory responsibilities (Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4399).

Comparative Analysis The attorney general is a constitutional officer in most states and is elected in about half. In one state he is appointed by the supreme court to an eight-year term, Art. IV,§ 22 His term of office is usually the same as the governor's, and his duties are usually prescribed by law, although several states also prescribe some duties in the constitution. Only a few constitutions require the attorney general to be an attorney. The Model State Constitution does not mention a chief law officer.

Author's Comment It is because of the excessive detail about the duties of the attorney general (and of the county and district attorneys) that this section has caused so much litigation. If the 1875 Convention had abandoned the 1869 Constitution's specifi- cation of duties and returned to the form of the first three state constitutions, which left all the attorney general's duties to be prescribed by law, a century of jurisdictional clashes with local state's attorneys probably would not have occurred. Moreover, if the 1875 Convention's Committee on the Executive Department had paid closer attention to the effect of the changes it was making it might have foreseen the unworkability of divided authority to represent the state. The 1869 Constitution directed the attorney general to represent the state before the appellate court, but it also gave him supervisory power over local state's attorneys in most civil cases. (See the History of this section.) Thus the 1869 division of authority made sense. At least in theory, the cases the attorney general handled on appeal had been tried by his subordinates. The committee probably was displeased , with the theoretical subordination of local state's attorneys to the attorney general, but their retention of the 1869 Constitution's division of authority without any central supervision over the local trial attorneys undoubtedly created as many problems as it solved. It may have appeared convenient to delegates who had come long distances to the convention, probably on horseback over poor or nonexistent roads, to let the attorney general stay in the capital and the local state's attorneys stay in their localities, but had the delegates questioned the need for preserving that convenience in the constitution, particularly in light of the change they made in the status of the local state's attorneys, they might have elected to return to the .language of earlier constitutions. Traditionally, the primary state function of county and district attorneys has been the prosecution of criminal cases. The connotations of the label "district attorney" should be sufficient to preserve that function. If the constitution must expressly divide authority to represent the state, however, it should go no further than to specify the local state's attorneys' criminal responsibilities. Section 22 also illustrates the importance of convention procedures in deter- mining the content of the convention's proposal. The task of drafting a constitution probably cannot be handled successfully without dividing its parts among several committees. Usually there are committees on the executive article, the legislative article, the judiciary, local government, etc. The product of each committee, however, is part of a single document, and all its parts must mesh. Close coordination between committees is imperative, but even this is not enough. It was not the lack of committee coordination that led the 1875 Convention to overlook inclusion of the court of appeals in this section; that court was written into the judicial article during floor debate after the executive article had been finally approved. Final approval of each article should await preliminary approval of all articles, and the convention ~hould prescribe some procedure for detecting the impact of a change made in one article on other articles and for making the necessary modifications prior to final approval.

TAB 7

FILED 22-0224 4/7/2022 4:52 PM tex-63382247 SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS BLAKE A. HAWTHORNE, CLERK

No. 22-0224

In the Supreme Court of Texas Warren K. Paxton, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Texas; Shawn Dick, in his official capacity as Williamson County District Attorney, Defendants-Appellants, v. Isabel Longoria; Cathy Morgan, Plaintiffs-Appellees.

On Certified Questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

Ken Paxton Judd E. Stone II Attorney General of Texas Solicitor General

Brent Webster Lanora C. Pettit First Assistant Attorney General Principal Deputy Solicitor General State Bar No. 24115221 Office of the Attorney General [email protected] P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Beth Klusmann Tel.: (512) 936-1700 Assistant Solicitor General Fax: (512) 474-2697 Cody C. Coll Assistant Attorney General

Counsel for the Attorney General of Texas speech, but it prevents the Court from prematurely resolving the question based on the record before it. ^[13]

III. The Attorney General Cannot Seek Civil Penalties Under Texas Election Code Section 31.129. The last question certified by the Fifth Circuit is whether the Attorney General can bring a suit for civil penalties under Texas Election Code section 31.129. Longo- ria, 2022 WL 832239, at *7. That answer will inform but not determine whether Plaintiffs’ suit against the Attorney General is barred by sovereign immunity, as he must have “some connection” to enforcement in order to avoid dismissal under Ex parte Young.14 Because the Legislature did not explicitly grant the Attorney General

the authority to seek these particular penalties on behalf of the State, the answer to the third certified question is “no”—though that does not mean that the Attorney General entirely lacks means to enforce section 276.016.

A. Under the Texas Constitution, the Attorney General requires legislative authorization to represent the State in a state trial court. The Texas Constitution generally splits the duty of representing the State be- tween the Attorney General and the district and county attorneys based on the court

in which an action will be pursued. Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22; id. art. V, § 21. District and county attorneys “shall represent the State in all cases in the District and inferior courts in their respective counties.” Id. art. V, § 21. The Attorney General’s consti-

tutional duties include representing the State in this Court and in certain trial-court actions involving corporations and charters. Id. art. IV, § 22. He may also “perform such other duties as may be required by law.” Id.

Under this Court’s jurisprudence, the “other duties” clause permits the Legis- lature to assign other duties to the Attorney General that may include representing the State in trial court, notwithstanding the general assignment of that duty to the district and county attorneys. El Paso Elec. Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 937 S.W.2d 432, 438 (Tex. 1996); see also, e.g., Brady v. Brooks, 89 S.W. 1052, 1055 (Tex. 1905) (noting the district and county attorneys’ constitutional duties do not deprive the Legisla-

ture of “the authority to empower the Attorney General to bring suits on behalf of the state”). Giving the example of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.103, the Court has explained that “[w]hile there is no general statute authorizing the Attorney General to represent the State and its agencies in district court, the Legislature has provided for such representation in particular types of cases.” El Paso Elec. Co., 937 S.W.2d at 438-39. 15

Under this precedent, when the Legislature wants the Attorney General to be able bring a cause of action on behalf of the State, it typically must explicitly authorize the Attorney General to do so. “[I]t is clear that when the Legislature creates a new

or additional cause of action in favor of the State it may also constitutionally authorize the Attorney General to prosecute such cause of action in both the trial and appellate courts of the State.” Smith, 328 S.W.2d at 295 (emphasis added). But this Court has generally required a clear statement that “expressly authorized the Attorney Gen- eral, as well as any District or County Attorney, to institute and prosecute the statu- tory suit thus created.” Id. at 294-95; Brady, 89 S.W. at 1053 (examining a statute

stating that “[t]he Attorney General is authorized and required upon request by the Comptroller, to bring suit in the name of the state”). Because “magic words” rules are disfavored, it may be possible that the overall statutory context will permit the Attorney General to bring suit without express au- thorization. For example, in an unrelated context, this Court has found that while sovereign immunity can typically be waived only by extremely clear language, it can also be waived “on rare occasions” based on a larger statutory framework demonstrating that “the Legislature has clearly and unambiguously waived sover- eign immunity.” Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tex. 2003). But the Court made clear that the standard for showing such a waiver absent “magic words” is quite high. The Attorney General is unaware of any cases where this Court has explained

when (if ever) statutory context can authorize the Attorney General to bring suit in state trial court absent an express grant of authority. But the Austin Court of Appeals has applied not dissimilar factors to those set out in Taylor to find authorization for the Attorney General to pursue a cause of action for civil penalties under section 242.065 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. State v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 981 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). In partic- ular, the court found authorization from the overall role of the Attorney General in the statutory scheme as well as a provision that required the Attorney General “to cooperate in any legal proceeding requested by” the defendant department. Id. at

511-14 (citing Tex. Health & Safety Code § 242.073) (emphasis omitted). Absent such clear evidence of legislative authorization, this Court has typically found that such authorization was lacking. For example, in Day Land & Cattle Co. v.

State, neither the Attorney General nor the district attorney had authority to bring suit for the cancellation of land patents at the time the Attorney General filed such a suit. ^[4] S.W. 865, 867 (Tex. 1887). The Court stated that “it would be difficult to hold that either of them had the implied power resulting from the general grants of power or imposition of duties” and that “no power ought to be exercised for which warrant is not there found.” Id. The Legislature, however, subsequently passed a law retroactively approving such suits by the Attorney General, and the Court concluded that “the suit must stand as though the attorney general and district attorney had express authority to institute and maintain it.” Id. at 867-68. More recently, the San Antonio Civil Court of Appeals considered a statute that did not explicitly give the Attorney General the authority to seek removal of a county

officer in a nepotism case. State ex rel. Downs v. Harney, 164 S.W.2d 55, 57-58 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1942, writ ref’d w.o.m.). It concluded that, because the statute did not mention that the Attorney General could bring such actions, he was prohibited from doing so—even though he was permitted to seek similar relief in quo warranto proceedings. Id. at 58. This Court later approved that decision, stating that “had such holding been incorrect we could not have failed to have granted the writ on such an important law question.” Garcia v. Laughlin, 285 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. 1955).

B. The Legislature has not clearly authorized the Attorney General to represent the State in seeking civil penalties under section 31.129 in trial courts. While the Attorney General is involved in various capacities in Texas’s elec- tions, the Legislature has not clearly authorized him to bring a claim in a trial court for civil penalties under section 31.129. Section 31.129 itself is silent on who may en- force its substantive requirements. More generally, the Election Code “delineates between the authority of the Secretary of State and local officials” and leaves rela-

tively little role for the Attorney General in directly enforcing its terms. Tex. Demo- cratic Party, 978 F.3d at 179. Although the Attorney General frequently represents the Secretary of State in election-related litigation, and the Secretary can refer a vio- lation to the Attorney General for enforcement, Tex. Elec. Code § 31.005(c), there is no provision in the Election Code similar to that in Evangelical Lutheran, which requires the Secretary “work in close cooperation” with the Attorney General “throughout any legal proceedings requested by the department.” Tex. Health &

Safety Code § 242.073(a); see also Evangelical Lutheran, 981 S.W.2d at 512 (discuss- ing Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 242.073, .320). This silence is telling as the Legislature has demonstrated that it is well aware of how to assign a duty to the Attorney General. Indeed, elsewhere in S.B. ^[1] itself, the Legislature assigned the Attorney General the duty to collect a different civil penalty. See Tex. Elec. Code § 18.065(f). That language would have been unnecessary if the Attorney General had the inherent or implicit authority to bring suit on behalf of the State. Because section 31.129 does not expressly permit the Attorney General to sue for civil penalties, it is unlikely that this is an “other duty” given to the Attorney

General by the Legislature. The answer to the third certified question, therefore, is “no”—at least so far as it applies to initiating a claim for civil penalties under section 31.129 in trial court.

C. The Attorney General retains authority to enforce Texas election laws by other means and in other circumstances. The lack of authority to bring civil penalties under section 31.129 does not, how- ever, mean the Attorney General is without any authority to enforce provisions of the Election Code. In specifying the remedies available for violation of the anti-solic- itation provision, S.B. ^[1] preserved pre-existing remedies not once but twice. See S.B.

1 § 7.04 (codified at Tex. Elec. Code § 276.016(f) (noting that the criminal remedy is “cumulative” and that a violation “is subject to injunctive relief or mandamus as provided by this code”)); id. § 8.01 (codified at Tex. Elec. Code § 31.130 (specifying that an official-capacity action “including an action for a writ of mandamus” be brought against the officer in his official capacity)). This preservation of remedies

was made in the context of this Court’s decision in Hollins, which allowed the Attor- ney General to use an ultra vires action to rein in election officials who intended to violate the law. See generally 620 S.W.3d 400. Moreover, the Election Code has long provided for proceedings to “compel the performance of any duty imposed by law in connection with the holding of an election or a political party convention” directly in this Court under Texas Election Code section 273.061(a). By preserving that as an available remedy, the Legislature presumptively intended the Attorney General to retain some enforcement role—albeit in a highly discretionary context—because the Attorney General is the government actor empowered to represent the State in this

Court. Tex. Const. art. IV, § 22. 16 With respect to criminal violations, the Attorney General retains the authority to investigate violations of election laws, Tex. Elec. Code §§ 31.006(b), 273.001(a),

and may assist a local prosecutor or be deputized by one to bring criminal charges, 16 That authority would also presumptively require the Attorney General to repre- sent the State on appeal from a suit brought by a county or district attorney for civil penalties under section 31.129. But the Attorney General does not understand that to be the thrust of the Fifth Circuit’s question since it would not allow him to initiate enforcement actions as required under Ex parte Young. See, e.g., Tex. All. for Retired Ams. v. Scott, 28 F.4th 669 (5th Cir. 2022).

Stephens, 2021 WL 5917198, at[*10] . He can also seek an injunction or mandamus at the request of the Secretary of State if a person refuses to abide by an order of the Secretary and is impeding the right to vote. Tex. Elec. Code § 31.005. And there remain specific provisions of the Election Code that identify the Attorney General as having authority to bring suit. E.g., Id. §§ 18.065(f), 34.005(a), 122.0911(c). But

because that language is not present in section 31.129, it does not grant him the au- thority to seek the civil penalties that section provides.

Prayer The Court should answer the Fifth Circuit’s questions as follows:

1. No, VDRs are not “public officials” under Texas Election Code section 276.016.

2. “Solicits” requires importuning or strongly urging someone to submit an application for a mail-in ballot and does not include merely providing information.

3. No, the Attorney General is not a proper official to seek the specific penalties authorized by Texas Election Code section 31.129, but he may enforce the anti-solicitation provision through other means.

Respectfully submitted.

Ken Paxton Judd E. Stone II Attorney General of Texas Solicitor General

Brent Webster /s/ Lanora C. Pettit First Assistant Attorney General Lanora C. Pettit Principal Deputy Solicitor General Office of the Attorney General State Bar No. 24115221 P.O. Box 12548 (MC 059) [email protected] Austin, Texas 78711-2548 Tel.: (512) 936-1700 Beth Klusmann Fax: (512) 474-2697 Assistant Solicitor General

Cody C. Coll Assistant Attorney General

Counsel for the Attorney General of Texas TAB 8 or were or were cared cared forfor by by family, family, friends, friends, or charity.^ These or charity. conclusions. These conclusions,

1 ^Several w riters coming Several writers c o m in g from persp ectives as modernization from such diverse perspectives m od ern ization theory or Marxist M arxist political p olitical economy econom y pursue this them theme. e. For a general statement, statem ent, see R othm an ((11971). Rothman 9 7 1 ) . For specific sp ecific statements sta te m e n ts on secu rity of on the security o f the aged in O lso n ( 11982) the past, see Olson 9 8 2 ) and Achenbaum A c h e n b a u m ((11983). 9 8 3 ).

4 i8 Quadagm Jill S. Quadagno

while understandable given the lack of detailed information regarding either the either the extent extent or or adequacy adequacy of of support support for for older older people people in in the past,^2 the past, are curious in are curious in their their romanticism, romanticism, and and perhaps perhaps reflect reflect more more thethe views views of twentieth-century reformers, haunted by the discovery of old age pauperism, than of pauperism, than of actual research findings. actual research findings. Given Given the the existing existing evidence evidence of of old-age dependency from old-age dependency from thethe earliest earliest years years of the colonial of the period, colonial period, it seems apparent that no generalizations about the adequacy of care for the for dependent aged the dependent aged inin the the past past should should be made without be made without some some more detailed attention more detailed being directed attention being directed toward toward the history of the history of old-age old-age security and the care provided older people under the poor law. Throughout the Throughout the past past 400 400 years, years, old-age old-age security security has has been transformed been transformed from a locally financed and administered system of care to a massive, bureaucratic, national program of income maintenance. Yet, as we shall see, some of the same conflicts over eligibility for aid that threatened the sense of community in the colonial era are still present in contemporary contemporary programs programs forfor the the aged. aged. In this this paper paper II will will trace trace the the development of various forms of economic support for older people, beginning with those that evolved from the English Poor Law, showing how poor law precedents were maintained in welfare policy even when welfare became a national rather than just a local issue.

The English Poor Law

The first The first English English poor poor relief relief laws, laws, which which date date back back toto 1535 1535 (around (around the time the time ofof the the decline decline ofof the monasteries), were the monasteries), were concerned concerned primarily primarily with providing with providing modes modes of of punishment punishment forfor beggars who increased beggars who increased asas the number the number of landless laborers of landless laborers and and cottagers cottagers rose. rose. The The Elizabethan Elizabethan Poor Law Poor Law ofof 1601 1601 represented represented aa major major turning turning point point inin the the history histor}^ of welfare in that it recognized state responsibility for the indigent. It distinguished distinguished between between the the able-bodied and and the impotent poor poor and declared that declared that it was the it was the duty duty ofof the community to the community to help help the the indiYiduals individuals who could who could not not help help themselves. themselves. Further, Further, every every citizen citizen enjoying enjoying thethe

2 *Demos ((1978) 1978) asserts chat that ·'many ' many elderly New Englanders retained a substantial capacity for work, ordinary forms of social intercourse." work. for public service, for ordin.try intercourse, ” Yet Yee much of his evidence could have more negative connotations. He cites numerous examples of older people performing arduous. arduous, probably pare-time part-time tasks, such as mowing salesalt water grass or hauling grist to co the local mill, and he also finds that chat it was common for tor older men co to withdraw from public office.

From From Poor Laws to Pensions 4 19

advantages of advantages of government government was was obliged obliged to to contribute contribute to the relief relief of of those in those in distress distress by by payment payment of of aa compulsory compulsory tax tax levied levied by by each each parish parish for the for care of the care of its its own own poor, the first poor, the first public public tax ever levied tax ever levied forfor that that purpose. While charging kin with responsibility for the care of their aged parents aged parents and and grandparents, grandparents, the the law law also also recognized recognized that that this this duty duty might not be fulfilled. Thus, it provided for the establishment of ‘‘convenient dwellings" ··convenient dwellings” for the old and infirm, whereas workhouses were to be built for the able-bodied poor, poor. A later addition to the poor law was the Act of Settlement of 1662, which required every person to have a settled domicile within 40 days and be enrolled in some fixed community. community. Each recent settlement cancelled aa previous cancelled previous one,one, and and paupers paupers who who could not prove could not prove settlement settlement in a given community were often sent off to other areas where they or perhaps some relative had established settlement. Instead of simplifying administration, the settlement administration, settlement acts acts only only increased increased thethe problems problems of of administering the poor law, as administrators and poor relief recipients attempted to determine settlements (Quadagno 1982). The hallmark The hallmark of of the the poor law was poor law local autonomy, was local autonomy, and and byby 1832 1832 the poor law was administered through 15,000 independent parishes. Gradually, due Gradually, due to to aa series series of of abuses abuses and and inequities inequities in in thethe assessment assessment of the of the rates, pressures for rates, pressures for reform arose. In reform arose. 1834 aa bill In 1834 for the bill for the amendment amendment of the poor law was brought before Parliament. After extensive debate, debate, it was passed it was passed with overwhelming support. with overwhelming support. The The key philosophical issue key philosophical issue was how to to return "able-bodied" “able-bodied” paupers to to a condition of economic and moral and moral independence. independence. This This was was accomplished accomplished by by implementing “workhouse test" the twin principles of the "workhouse test” and "less “less eligibility eligibility.'. ., The term "less term “less eligibility" eligibility” referred referred toto the belief that the belief that the the condition condition of of the the pauper relieved pauper relieved should should bebe worse worse thanthan thethe condition condition of of thethe poorest, poorest, independent, self-supporting independent, self-supporting laborer. laborer. Outdoor Outdoor reliefrelief was was to to be be reduced, reduced, and the and the "able-bodied" “able-bodied” poor poor were were to to be be incarcerated incarcerated in in workhouses. workhouses. order to In order to apply apply thisthis policy policy on on aa uniform uniform basis basis throughout throughout the the country, aa permanent country, central authority, permanent central authority, the the Poor Poor Law Law Commission, Commission, was established to to direct the system. Independent parishes were to be consolidated into unions, and relief was to be administered by relieving officers under the direction of an elected board of guardians. Although Although poverty poverty was generally considered was generally considered an an indication indication of of individual individual failure, calling for rebuke and stern treatment, the philosophy toward to the aged was somewhat more ameliorative. The report of relief to 1834 concluded, "We “We find that even in places distinguished in general

420 420 Jill S. Quadagno

by the most by the most wanton wanton parochial parochial profusion, profusion, thethe allowances allowances to to the the aged aged moderate” (quoted in Quadagno 1982). While some and infirm are moderate" argued that argued that continued continued support support of the aged of the aged by by the the parish parish would further would further erode familial erode familial ties, ties, the the commission commission determined determined that that parish support parish support for the aged was necessary because the English working classes were totally deficient totally deficient inin natural natural filial filial affection. affection. Thus, Thus, it it became became general general policy to policy to continue continue to to allow allow small small amounts amounts of of out-relief out-relief to to the the aged aged without specific concern about pressuring children to contribute (Webb and Webb 1909). In 1847 the Poor Law Commission became the Poor Law Board, and this board was subsequently absorbed into the new Local Government , Board in 1871. The Local Government Boards Board's jurisdiction encompassed the poor law under aa broader the broader spectrum spectrum of of social social support, support, usurping usurping local authority local authority further further andand placing placing poor poor law law administration administration more more clearly under the clearly under the jurisdiction jurisdiction of of the the central central government. government. Almost immediately after its creation, the Local Government Board and and its its inspectorate launched aa campaign inspectorate launched against outdoor campaign against outdoor reliefrelief in in anan attempt to return the poor law to the principles of 1834. The 1871 “Circular on "Circular on Outdoor Outdoor Relief," Relief,” which which was was one one ofof the the first first policy policy rec- rec- ommendations of ommendations of the Local Government the Local Government Board Board in in regard regard to to the poor the poor law, condemned the out-relief system and suggested -that 'that all applications for relief be more carefully scrutinized with an increased reliance on on the workhouse as the workhouse as aa test test of of destitution. destitution. NewNew stress stress waswas placed placed on on getting contributions from kin, for it was implied that if the aged were confronted were confronted with with thethe workhouse, workhouse, their their relatives relatives would would come come forward forward and maintain them (Webb and Webb 1910). The circular The circular was was accompanied accompanied by by an an administrative administrative change change thatthat emphasized implementing deliberate policy rather than allowing decisions about relief about relief to be dependent to be dependent on on temporary statutes and temporary statutes and whims whims of of local local authorities. Steady authorities. pressure was placed Steady pressure placed onon boards boards of of guardians guardians to to reduce out-relief in spite of the fact that the sick and aged made up at least half and perhaps as much as three-quarters of the adult population receiving population receiving our-relief.' out-relief.^ There There was increased concern was increased concern withwith record-keeping, and tables showing the amount of relief given by

-^ Law returns were not tabulated by ,1ge ~Although Poor law age until 1890, there was a separate category termed "aged '‘aged and infirm.” infirm ... According co to the Poor Law Commission’s annual Law Commission's annual reports, reports, over over half half of of the the adult adult paupers paupers on on outdoor outdoor least as early relief were aged and infirm from at lease 1840 (Rose 19--:-_n. earlr as I~~O 19^2). The Webbs ((1910) 1910) had estimated an even higher highl'r figure.

From Poor From Poor Lau·s Laws to to Prmions Pt>2sions 421 each union each were published union were published and and circulated. circulated. Unions Unions that gave dispro- that gave portionate amounts portionate amounts were were he held Id accountable, regardless of the proportion of aged of aged in in the population. This policy This policy remained remained in in effect (with great effect (with great regional variation in administration) administration) until until the 1890s when the 1890s when the the first first return of paupers by age was age was made (Collins 1965). made (Collins 1965). Reformers' Reformers’ arguments arguments were supported by the by the data data gathered gathered by by Charles Charles Booth Booth (1891, (1891, 1894) on the condition of the of the aged aged poor, showing that poor, showing that the average rate the average rate ofof pauperism among those aged those aged 6565 and and above above waswas over over 2929 percent percent and and in in many districts over 50 percent. 50 percent. In In the mid-1890s, two the mid-1890s, two Royal Royal commissions commissions were organized to investigate to investigate the the condition condition of the aged of the aged poor. Testimony presented by by witnesses witnesses at at the the hearings hearings of the Royal Commission on the Aged Poor indicated Poor indicated that policy implementation varied tremendously from that policy union union to co union, union, withwith some some relying largely on relying largely on out-relief out-relief while others only only provided provided reliefrelief in in the the workhouse. workhouse. Even Even where out-relief was provided systematically, provided systematically, the the amount amount given given was was meager, and many older people older people lived lived in in total total destitution. destitution. ThoseThose granted granted out-relief out-relief often often found found the the experience experience of of having having to apply degrading, to apply degrading, and and many others in need in need made made no no application application for for relief relief for for fear of being fear of being denied denied outright or of or of being being "offered “offered the the house" house” (Quadagno (Quadagno 1982). The commission's commission’s findings combined findings combined with with pressure pressure from Parliament led to from Parliament to a reversal of poor law poor law policy policy in in regard regard to to relief relief ofof the the aged. aged. In 1896 a circular was issued was issued from from the Local Government the Local Government Board Board that extended liberal that extended liberal outdoor relief outdoor relief to to the deserving aged the deserving aged poor, poor, those those whowho had been "of “of good character, thrifty character, thrifty according according to to their their opportunities, opportunities, and generally in- dependent in dependent in early early life" life” (Circular (Circular of of 11th 11th July July 1896). 1896). This This policy policy shift coincided shift coincided with with aa general general trend trend in in the the poor poor law system toward law system toward greater specialization greater specialization of of care care and and differentiation differentiation of of paupers paupers into into categories. categories. In spite In spite ofof the the liberalization liberalization of of relief relief policy, policy, the the issue of filial responsibility remained responsibility remained aa concern. concern. The The 1895 1895 Royal Commission on the Aged the Aged PoorPoor readread into into the the hearings hearings a quotation from the 1834 report regarding report regarding the the neglect neglect of of kin kin by the working classes. The issue was also was also apparently apparently aa concernconcern among among individual individual unions. unions. For For example, in 1905 the in the Fulham Fulham Board Board of of Guardians Guardians felt felt it necessary to formally specify that specify sons and that sons and unmarried unmarried daughters daughters of sufficient means were of sufficient responsible for responsible for the maintenance of the maintenance of aged aged and and infirm infirm parents: parents:

Legitimate children Legitimate children (sons (sons,, whether whether married married or or single, single, and daughters, if unmarried) if unmarried) are are bound bound toto maintain maintain their their parents when unable parents when to unable to work through sickness or work through sickness or other cause. . . It is only relatives of

422 422 Jj ill S. Quadagno

sufficient ability sufficient ability who who are are liable, liable, and and proof proof of of ability ability is is required by required by justices before an order can be made (Wall 1977).

In 19 0 9 , owing In 1909, owing inin large large part part to the active to the active intervention intervention ofof organized organized labor, most labor, most older older people people were were effectively effectively depauperized depauperized withwith the the im- im- plementation of plementation of the the Old Old Age Age Pension Pension Act, Act, although although substantial substantial nwnbers numbers remained in remained in poverty. poverty. Under Under the Old Age Age Pension Pension Act, Act, every every person of British of British nationality nationality whowho had had resided resided atat least least twenty twenty years years in in the the United Kingdom was entitled to to a pension at age 70. Excluded were those whose incomes exceeded £31 10s., those who "habitually failed to work . . . according to ability, opportunity and need for the to maintenance of themselves and those legally dependent on them," them,” lunatics, prisoners, and lunatics, and those those receiving poor relief relief (Gilbert (Gilbert 1964- 1964- 19 6 5 ). National pensioners were removed from the jurisdiction of the 1965). poor poor law authority and law authority and transferred transferred to county councils to county councils that administered that administered pensions through the post office. In 1911 the pauper disqualification was removed, and state income maintenance was extended ro to even the poorest the poorest agedaged (Collins (Collins 1965). 1965). Although the amount of the pension granted was meager (5s. a week), it was it was significant significant in that it in that it spelled spelled the demise of the demise of local control of local control of the the support of the aged. It depersonalized income maintenance and shifted that responsibility from the local community to to the state bureaucracy. This shift This shift represented represented aa major major break with tradition break with tradition inin that that funding funding was moved from local rates to national taxation, and eligibility was based on based on universal universal rather rather than than particular criteria. particular criteria.

Relief under the Early Colonial Poor Law

English settlers in the American colonies brought with them the Elizabethan concept Elizabethan concept that that giving giving public public relief relief to to those those who who could could not not support themselves, support themselves, or or secure secure support support from from relatives, friends, or relatives, friends, or private private philanthropy, was aa proper philanthropy, was proper function function of of local local government. government. WithWith only only one exception, one exception, every every community community in in the the Plymouth Plymouth andand Massachusetts Massachusetts Bay Colonies provided for relief in the initial stages of settlement and subsequently administered relief as a regular town function.~ function.^ As early

1 ^The exception was the town of Taunton in Plymouth Colony which was cited for not providing relief during the 1650s (Lee 1982). Ocher Other regions were not as quick to establish poor laws. Both Boch North and South Carolina in were slow to pass poor law legislation and, although poor laws existed in Virgina, they often were not implemented (Wisner 1970).

From Poor Lau·s From Laws to to Pensions 423

as 164 as 1647, 7, at the first session of its colonial legislature, Rhode Island announced the announced the poor poor lawlaw principles principles that that stressed, stressed, mostmost importantly, importantly, public responsibility public responsibility for for the the poor. poor. Public Public responsibility responsibility for for thethe poor poor was buttressed was buttressed by by thethe other other principles principles of of English English poor law— local poor law-local responsibility, family responsibility, family responsibility, responsibility, and and thethe residency residency requirement requirement of legal of legal settlement. settlement.^ The proper objects of relief were the aged, infirm, or insane, who were separated from their means of support and also from a household, and various arrangements were made to care for the needy, including providing light providing light employment, employment, giving giving provisions provisions and and aa pension, pension, and and boarding with boarding with aa relative relative or or neighbor neighbor at at town town expense expense or or care care in in an an almshouse, the almshouse, the first first of of which which waswas erected erected in in Rensselaerswick, Rensselaerswick, New New York, in 1657 (Axinn and Levin 1982). One common solution to old age dependency was to assign the person's person’s property over to the community in exchange for care for life, usually through some boarding arrangement. For arrangement. For example, example, in in 1660 1660 the the case case of of Mr. Mr. Burrowes, Burrowes, aa resident of resident of Providence, Providence, Rhode Rhode Island Island,, was considered at was considered at thethe town town meeting because meeting because of of his his need need ofof relief relief through through "age “age and and weakness'· weakness” (Creech 1936). (Creech 1936). Mr. Mr. Burrowes Burrowes was was moved moved into into the the home home of of aa townsman townsman who had who had been been found found willing willing to to take take care care ofof him, him, andand his property his property and possessions and possessions were were turned turned over over to to the the town. town. Similarly, Similarly, William William Baker petitioned the free inhabitants of Portsmouth, Rhode Island, to take to take his his sheep sheep in in return return for for care. care. TheThe town town meeting meeting granted granted his his request and request and bargained bargained with with "Hinory “Hinory Pearcey" Pearcey” to to provide provide "diat“diat and and lodgin’’ for lodgin" for aa year year for for £8. £8. Sometimes Sometimes the the sense sense ofof communal communal responsibility responsibility was taken was taken quite quite literally, literally, andand aa rotation rotation system system for for boarding boarding was was established among established among members members of of the the town. town. In In 1687 1687 the the town town meeting meeting of Hadley, of Hadley, Massachusetts, Massachusetts, voted voted that that the the widow widow Bald Baldwin win bebe removed removed from house from house to to house house "to “to such such asas are are able able toto receive receive her" her” and and "remain “remain aa fortnight fortnight in in each each family" family” (Kelso (Kelso 1922). 1922). The decline The decline of of Joseph Joseph Patchin Patchin can can be be documented documented throughthrough the the changing responses changing responses of of the the Fairfield, Connecticut, town Fairfield, Connecticut, town meetings meetings to to his needs. his needs. InIn 1673 1673 the the records records indicate indicate that that "Goodman “Goodman Patchin Patchin is is to to continue his continue his worke worke aboutabout thethe meeting meeting house." house.” EightEight years years lacer later due due to his "weaknes to “weaknes and age" age” Joseph Patchin applied to the townsmen townsmen.,

^Actually, 5 local administration Actually, local administration of of relief relief was was not not implemented implemented immediately. immediately. Initially, in Initially, in Plymouth Plymouth thethe town town meeting meeting shared shared responsibility responsibility for for relief relief with with colony officials colony officials and and it it wasn't wasn’t until until 1649 1649 that that the the town town inhabitants inhabitants delegated delegated the cask the task to to their their selectmen. selectmen. The The pattern pattern was similar in was similar in the the Bay Bay Colony Colony (lee (Lee 1982). 1982).

424 Jill S. Jill S. Quadagno Quadagno

“desiring his owne estate may mayntayne him as far as it will reach." "desiring reach.” Just one year later it is apparent that his health had deteriorated still further, and further, and it it is is now “old Patchin" now "old Patchin” thatthat the the town refers to town refers to when when it it provides Thomas provides Thomas Bennet Bennet with £13 for with £13 for aa year's year’s food food and and lodging lodging (Pumphrey and (Pumphrey and Pumphrey Pumphrey 1961).1961). Other Other older older people people received similar received similar consideration in Fairfield. Thus, assistance to the aged was flexible and might and might shiftshift from finding work from finding work forfor an an ailing ailing man man to to providing providing food and lodging when deteriorating health made employment impossible. impossible. Although it is difficult to make any accurate assessment regarding the proportion of older people receiving relief, in Plymouth, Mas- sachusetts where sachusetts where thethe population population grewgrew from from 500 500 to about 700 to about 700 between between 1630 1630 and 164 1645, 5, 5577 cases of relief were recorded, and many of the relief recipients were relief recipients were old. old. Similarly, Similarly, in in Watertown, Watertown, Massachusetts, Massachusetts, 21 individuals received relief between 1660 and 1675, and most was given given to older people, to older people, usually usually widows widows and and widowers widowers (Lee (Lee 1982). 1982). If no generalization no generalization about about the the extent extent ofof support support can can be drawn, it be drawn, it is is still still readily apparent readily apparent that some older that some older people people in in every every colonial colonial town town had had no family no family members members either either willing willing oror able able toto provide provide support support andand that that relief to the aged was one of the more common functions of poor relief. It relief. It also also appears appears that that the concept of the concept of family family responsibility responsibility was was applied liberally as best fit the needs of individual family members and was and was associated, associated, at at this this stage, stage, with with economic factors rather economic factors rather than than any punitive any pun1t1ve intent. In these In these early early years years ofof the the colonial colonial period, period, administrators administrators of of relief relief to the to the needy needy were were neighbors neighbors in in small small communities, communities, and and the the concept concept of family of family governance governance reigned, reigned, as as seen seen byby the the frequency frequency withwith which w^hich boarding boarding was was used used asas aa means means forfor relieYing relieving thethe aged. aged. Yet, Yet, as as early early as 1617, as 1 6 1 7 , British British poor poor law officials began law officials began the the practice practice ofof dumping dumping their their undesirables— vagrants, paupers, undesirables-vagrants, and conYicts-upon paupers, and convicts— upon the colonies.^6 the colonies.

6 ^There is a lively debate regarding the extensiveness of chis this practice. Campbell Gmapbell (1959) argues that chat most British immigrants co to the colonies were from from the middle ranks of British society. Galenson (1978) challenges her conclusions that boys released directly from parish authorities, and and cites evidence chat and men released from jails where they had been confined for debt or vagrancy, comprised aa good portion of the immigrants. Georgia w..is was founded by men debtor’s released from debtor's prison (Wisner 1970). Regardless of who is correct this debate, the perceptions of the colonises in chis colonists that dumping undesirables undesirables was a common British practice caused them to act as if it were true.

From Poor Laws to Pensions From 425

As a means of protecting themselves against this British practice and as aa way as way ofof maintaining maintaining religious religious and and moral moral solidarity solidarity within within the the community, the community, the colonies colonies established established laws laws regulating regulating thethe terms terms under under which a resident might attain inhabitancy. This was accomplished through a procedure termed "warning “warning out,,. out,” which was based on the belief that each town was a corporation that had the right co to choose whom it admitted to permanent residency. The purpose of warning was to free the town of any obligation to provide relief, and once warned an individual might become an inhabitant to all intents and purposes except for the right to receive support (Benton 1911). One of One of the the basic basic reasons reasons forfor denying denying settlement settlement to to aa stranger stranger was was likelihood of early dependency, and older people were among those at risk. at risk. This This was was recognized recognized in in an an order order passed passed in in 1680 1680 inin Portsmouth, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, which declared "that “that if any children, or older person shal be sent or come from one town to another, to school, or to nurs .. .. . . if if such such shal shal stand stand inin need need ofof relief, relief, they they shal shal be be relieved relieved at at the the charge of the Town, from whence they came and do belong; and not by the town, to which they are sent" sent” (Benton 1911). Thus, even though they though they might might need need aid, aid, older older people people whowho were were not not town town residents residents were were given given nono special special consideration consideration and,and, inin fact, fact, were were even even perceived perceived as a threat. This was demonstrated in the case of John Harmon, "a “a decriped decriped man," man,” whowho hadhad no no established established clear clear inhabitancy. inhabitancy. In In 1680 1680 the Massachusetts towns of Taunton and Plymouth disputed which was was liableliable for for the the support support of of John John Harmon. Harmon. The The dispute dispute continued continued for for twotwo years years until until the the court court finally finally ordered ordered thatthat "the “the towne towne of of Taunton Taunton shall receive and entertaine him for the space of one whole yeer, and Plymouth then to take him for one whole yeer; and soe to be kept from yeer from yeer to to yeer" yeer” (Kelso (Kelso 1922). 1922). This This waswas aa practical practical but but hardly hardly humane humane solutionsolution and and illustrates the difficulty illustrates the difficulty ofof determining determining just who just who the town’s town's poor were.

The Impact of Social Change 1n in the Eighteenth Century

In the late seventeenth century, a series of colonial wars uprooted hundreds who came pouring into the cities and towns needing relief. These paupers were not familiar citizens who had earned the right to be maintained by the community but neither were they disreputable strangers who could easily be warned away. In 1701 Providence,

TAB 10

R48!ťԖ R΃ V2ϺԖ %‘7%ѫ͖Ԗ hԖѠ΄ǝjԖ ʵԖ ȯГԖ 1WàŽľԖ Ԗ #Ԗ ZǞǟbĝ#ʽŦԖ ı#ĻԖ !Ԗ (* -Ԗ̨Ԗ Ԗ Ԗ Sς!Д!Ԗ !΅ĞƫЕkԖ σ!ԖùԖ ʾΆƢ ZŧIJ!Ԗ Ԗ ÝĊԖ ̞%MԖ ɵòɳԖ¨¦ʃŨԖƬԖ IԖ Xϻ;ԖōԖ Ԗ ̲Ԗ WǠԖ Ԗ Z˟ - CMԖ ¨§ɡɴ¦¨ɩԖ ɪññ§ʈkԖ ʇ#! ԖϼԖ ›Ԗ Ԗ Ԗ τ- MԖ ¦ZZ‘!ũԖ 0υ%›Ԗ ȽjԖ ȺȰȷÑԖ * **

* ȟ̩0 -έ- 0ϛ ƭɽԖ˧+îĺϛ ɢW2¾OԖ ϛ ʁ 0ϛ ˠԖ Κ̪͌ϛ %ϛ f3̫1͍mɏγ #;Ԗ Ԗ Ԗ γjԖ !Ԗ -RԖ 1 #Ԗ -!Ԗ !G̩Ԗ ɁԖ °1Ԗ !Ԗ 68Ԗ EԖ %#ċԖ ĄԖ !Ԗ φ!ԖCL ɂMԖ Xr‡ÒԖ ƮԖ ɠԖ # Ԗ% !Ԗ"Ԗ Ԗ Ԗ!ԖĆWǡԖ ԖZЖ0 #ÃяԖ 9Ԗ FԖ6ǰơǢù·#­Ԗ EԖ ʌӄ-kԖ ČĭԖ ­ĭ»Ԗ bΈ!jԖ ʍ Ԗ 0 ѡŪԖ ˡ»GԖ ĞǣΉΊԖ úԖ K% !kԖ cԖ 0Ԗ ºL-͕̪!Ԗ 41)Ԗ EԖ D1Ԗ ͉K7e7-Ԗ %Z #ŒԖ !#ӝ [; % OԖ Ѣ8l ‹Ǥ2 #%Ԗ Ԗ ѣԖ Z-1Ԗ Ԗ #Ԗ 6% #CԖ !#¿#1 OԖ 8ϢԖ š-΋4Ԗ cԖ %īǥ#ѐ#ʿğԖ bԖ Ԗ Ͻ#! !Ԗ K4Ԗ pΌ!Ԗe͊Ԗ°1Ԗ ɍԖ -Ԗ6¼#!ԖEԖT 8Ԗ ūԖ!Ԗ4KԖ µԖ Ԗ ϣ- Ԗ6¼17Њ!Ԗ"ԖK8Ԗ Ԗ-RRԖ̟%ԖĄԖ #Ԗ6LúK#%MԖ § ԖžU ŸԖ bԖ΍-8WBĠԖɎԖ Ԗ č!Ԗ vңӞ 7%Ԗ Ԗ 4% !ŬԖ ЗԖ ĝ˕Ԗ [Ԗ eԖ Ԗ 0̠%OԖ DԖ Í ;Ԗ #˝ӟ IԖ s 04Ԗ ɑ 6Ԗ Ԗ ˀǦ#%ǧԖƷԖ Ԗ ͋Ԗ ˁğxǨ 7ӸɔԖ χ!Ԗ #Ԗ1 ӹԖ -R4Ԗ"Ԗ Ԗ C-4#!Ԗ #DԖ R8jԖ ʶEԖ Ԗ Ƀ%͌‘Ԗ 1 GN#ĮԖ EԖ PԖ 6#!ˢ “Ԗ-Ԗ Ѥ8!ёmԖ Xr‡ƯԖ íÓԖ ɶԖ 9ɷɸԖ 1-Ԗ 80Ԗ ȪŊԖ 6ψԖ Ԗ "͍Ԗ K% Ɵ!Ԗ vLђĿ5%ˣԖ ưԖEԖ Ԗ 61•Ԗ ό!Ԗ ʁK1 Ԗ ô Ԗ Ћ?¡4͎Ԗ #iġԖ 87 #Ԗ 8 Ԗ ! IԖE ԖeĐ1Ԗ EԖǩÞ%Ԗ4%ѥĎ Ԗ Ύ01e7Ԗ K4ԖcĀԖ˓PĬ!ԖC͏!kԖ ˔Ԗ Ԗ %#ʖ Ԗ ĘҤ #%Ԗ Ԗ Ԗ 1W2 ӌԖ %QэԖǪǫԖ !Ԗ ƱԖ 8Ԗ h Ώ1 5€Ԗ ˆr‡mԖ ȱÓԖ )*²£ [#%Ԗ; Ԗ Ԗ 6-%Ԗ8ԖKRԖbG ԖL±R ŊԖԖ_ԖĬʠΐƠ “Ԗ%!Ǭß% Ԗ Ԗ ύDZ#!δ-ŭԖ #Ԗ ̡1 Ԗ "Ԗ 61ǭÞ !Ԗ cԖ Ͼ}ˤ Ӡ Ԗ Ԗ -Ԗ !Ԗ ²Q»jԖ #Ԗ Ԗ !7 ш% Ԗ %QЙľԖ EԖ [ƲԖ 6ŽZ˥Ԗ %Ѧà[OԖ ʡ!©ԖԖȾz#%ѧďԖ [ӺԖ ѓ44Ԗ C-% Ԗ ĎԖ ;°1ʗ–Ԗ -!Ԗ bԖ - 0Ԗ ˦!¼!Ԗ͐ω­-Ͽ-cΑԖ Ԗ ΒЌ97Ԗ Ԗ Ϥ̢˂Ԗ ÎEԖ ʹҥѨĐӻԖ ɛԖ ̳Ԗ Ѐ%ԖD]Ԗ#Ԗ #Ԗ6L"K͑%MԖ DԖTԖ TԖ ƳԖ ƴԖ ˆr˃mԖ ȴmԖ ʎԖ ²?áєѬ71PԖ EԖ Ԗ İ-%ӼԖ KΓԖ ¬Ԗ %PCļ G Ԗ Ԗ ˧0 Ԗ ӴԖ6Gʢ1ʘԖ 85 ̴7Ԗ 5Ԗ n ʙ6%ĽƵ5’Ԗ %W2ϊ ±ӽOɄԖ -!Ԗ ʕ9¢ǮԖ zԖ 68ИԖ ѩԖ ͿԖƶ-KRʚԖ ʴPԖ Ԗ %ϋӖ%kԖ oƩ͔ Ԗ Ԗ 8# Δɕ9ǘW2ѪԖ õѕ1ǯō± ӍŮԖ EԖ ̰!Ԗ c̵-C#?2Ԗ Ԗ ΀6Ԗ ĀԖ İ-%OԖ Ԗ EԖ 66I1˨iԖ - ÔԖ ˩Ԗ *6Ԗ %?2ŽĿÇԖ Ԗ 8˪Ԗ %Ԗ Æ͒c5 !OԖ ѭКԖ %Ž5Ԗ 1͓ P®Ԗ 7Ԗ https://www.newspapers.com/image/49664747/ Downloaded on Jan 13, 2025

im- The next lmsiness waa tl;e lurtbcr con- aisc sideration of the LegiBlaU ve depnrtml:JlL; in- the queatino being oo the amendment to ll Section fifty-one, "that the Legislature and shllll not grllot money, public hrnds, or h1ch anything of value." Mr. Stoclrdllle spoke against the amend - out ment, and told the Convention bow the e ord West had 90/fered for wllot of railroads, the wbilo at the &lime time .hey bad always paid their full share ol taxes, and 888isted enu- lll the aupport of the 11overoment equal to Jevy aay othPr aection. lee- Mr. King made an able and eloquent ap- peal against the amendment. lle aaid it king had been the p{)licy of the State to grant lJeaf a.id to works nf inr.emal improvcmc11t, aud th t. now, wbeo tbtl \Vest is still lucking Lbe bat convCJ1icoces Lhllt olhcr sections po ""85, it dop- is now coolly proposed to crn•b out the 1Jriociµle of gra.ntiDJ,!' ai«i to works of inter- tiog nal improvement. ^[11]., ssh) be "ould btLY fur io &II e11rnes1U0<1S nod kiodnC88, nod with- ti te.n out m"8oiog it 11>1 s menace, tb•t if this .~ policy ,. o:re 1mn-ncd 1 the $tat,, wuul<I be t by divide,!. Tho w.,.t bud euJicred long • ords enough, and hid people were restleos. He the lo\'ed Texas with all the devotion or his heart., and would be pained beyond mu - 0 ·1 .. ure, ,f this great and ~lonous State, with 1c1·. 0 d i •,er hallowed memories of the put, were di\ idcd. He deaircd to sound the alarm in sub- nme, and prt:vo:ot, if po88ible, 11t1ch a. sad c11111struphe. n., WIMI pa1ued to know that uiis amcndmuu, wu iGtruduCtld by a momhtll' from the wcet (Mr. Arnio). He had li•tened atwutively tu the sddreBB of Mr. McCormick on yeaterday, t o hear him ad.,•oce a s10gle &rl{umcut in •Up1>0rt of tbt: s amendmen~. .Mr. D.LroeU bad 111\id thut 001 a singlt: l'1lilroMI h11d been built by State aict. Ile Ile ()fr. Kiog) would venture the llS•c rtiou t ID that not a siuJ'IC ruilroad bad 1,,..,u b11ilt in ally, tbi,. SL3to witb .. ut such aid. may r. Lynch followed Mr. King. He eaid c (ore, you e&n t>tke our llllld, a.nd 1~11vc us out of The the advantage you po15<,a , but you CIUl ugh, ocver take from us th" bnllow,d memories t. of the Goliad od the Alamo, where Travis sub- and his '60 comradea foll io dcf nse of tbeit the blessed Texa,. CAD· Mr. McCormick eaid be appreciated the king honesty 11f the mcrubera who had µreceedt:d tac- him, but be ua a member Crum t he t weat, opposed to •~naud~ng the public domain on railroada, but desired it should be ginn to public o0boola. Ile uked mcm- b ·rs to be not at all alarmf!d ,rt the "bloody hirt" held ov...- u.eir i......i l>y I.be mem- bers who bad prect:ded billl.. Weat~m Texu was u l'Jy I any 01ber pc-rt1on ol tlie tate, aud b d no idea of Mt:venog the "Lone tar'' with all her gn:at &nd 11Iorioo1 p t and I.be bal.loweu mmuoriea of we t lr. Lockett · d he represented an hon• est and generous people, who desired to extend all the benelltl! po 'ble to the wen. He aid thia bad n a compact oot cen the «: an,t west, and could not, in good faith, be broken. Mw>y of hia coll "el from the t !lad trneled nearly. all lhe Dlize to get here. Jte bad COllll to · Stat~ aboai \ euty yean aiDce, an, had trneled ly all the way by nlil, but i\ ..... 81lch a nil . . Joe did DO\ deaiJ'e to ua~el by again-it wu a rail pruiog atage out of \be mud at nearly enry t.ep. The propoaldoa of -... cCormlek to gi.,. tbe pu he ii to WM a aobterfage. .1111,. 1oGna • epoke acaiM I.Jae am d- • t. Be aaid railroaJa had t-a a bl iDf to the SCMe. 'flleJ. bad bf h\ IWllll· r- 1111d .enled up pi th bad n 1 ut iL liarrea WUte. Weni Juda l in Talue by the adnnt of railrollil 1 Would th and collec\or ta..Ja dj ot to n.ilioadl at the ame pric,: h Id wlore Uni railroaJ came f O lllr.

Puri,osc Is call ed aid-p,·a11er. Cowell. Blackstone. AJr'-giln, n. An Instrument rescmbllng a musktt, Intention ; schemo. A.td'an�e, n. [O. Fr. aiclance.] Al d . [Rare. J -ihn'er, n. One wh o alms, directs, o r p oints. to discharge bullets by tho cl11Stic force of tho air, The me11n11 o.nd aidances 111upplicd by tha Suprome! R�on. bn' • comp ressed C:olendge. A Ie ss , a. With out n1m ; as, an aimless ll fc . into o. me - e ss-l y.^[1]. adv. Wi th out nfm, o r pu112 osc . • .iltd'ant, a . [Fr. aitlm1.t, p. pr. of ai<ler, t o l1 c lp. ] 4fm'l (4 ) \ n. [.1rr . air, Pr. air, aire, Sp. aire, Pg. ar, talllc gl obe Helping ·, helpful ·, su£ plylng nld. [ Rare.] Sha1:. Air It. aria, nlr and tuno, Lat. ai!r, Gr. d�• air.] b mean s � g) (SByn o p., § 130) ' n. ; f 0 n c on - Ald1- de-eamp (iid ' e - k• un � 1. Tho fluid w hich we breathe, o.riuJ whfcb sur• r de .c11m , fr om aide, Ah-1!Un. p l. AIDS-DE-CAMP. [Fr. a-l c, 1_ n o fficer rounds th o earth ; th e atm osphc1·e. It Is Invisible , "._ dc nse . , cnmp .] (M•!. sc - nsslstnnt, and cmn r, fficer to assis t ?it! In his mill- ln o d oro us, Insipid, transparent, co mp 1·c ss l bl o , clas - a.u.·'- hold'er, "• 1. A.n Instrument for holding air, lccted bf n gene ra o tic, and po nd crable. for the purp ose of counter acting the pressure of a tnr7. dutit;- de crenslng column of mercury• Dffl:y. 1171"" Ily tho ancient philosophers, ai,· wn rc--'cd ti'"u as A.Id er, n. Onc who h cI ps ; nn ass I atnn t or auxIl l n ry. o n clement ; but modcni sclcnco bas showne that 2. A. gnsometer. con - Alr'-hol n . 1. A J Hcl lcss j wi h ut aid. Tennyson. fl Aid'le ss, a . t o e, 1ole t o admit or dlschn""" - �- air. T ,._td'•mii ; ° 'Jo1·, " · 'he ndj ut.nnt f a reg1m en t • [ Ob s. ] slsts essentially or two gnsos, oxygen nnd nitrogen, tn the proportion of 20.81 pnrts of the former to 76.9'J of t h e 2. (Fuun<ling. ) A. b o lo or cavity I n o. casting, pro•

Al'gret , .lt-grettc'J ! A.l'gre , ?I. See EAGRE . n. [F r. aig1•ette, a s o rt o f wl1ltc h�cro n , wfth a l o ng an d s en d er tuft o f ,cath - latter; or, by weight, ot 23.01 oxygen, and 79.10 nit rogen , ��ccd by bubbles of o.l r in th e liquid metal. bcuctoth a o um ns . Tb °,.,.oxygo11 J e th o v llnl portion, �-'l-ly, adv. In nn airy man n er• rdolnngl trt011D e11 1s 11ccc 88 8., 10 dll11u 10 11 _ .iUr'l-ness, n. 1. Th e stnte or quality of bolng nlry; ra I s n cn d ; a tu ft b11 n ch1 o f feathe rs ; dim . . A. pn rtlcnlar st.a te o f th o atm o sphere, ns r e- o pe n ness or exp o sure to th o nlr; ns, the airiness of e on t or rnti o n cut ofi"}, Fr. Pr ov. o f 1,eron (wl�h t11e ospl . sp c c ts heat, cold, m ois ture, and t ho like, o r as affec t- a co u ntry-sent. eoro11, P r . aig r on, Sp. air 01 !, O. F�. hai r 0 !•• It . Ing th e sc'!sntl on \i ns, a sm oky air, o. damp air, th e 2: Lightness of spirits ; gaycty ; levity ; as, the agllironc from 0, Il. Gor. lleigir, hl!lgro, hl!l{lero, mo rn in g air, &c. airiness of young pe rs o ns •. Ice!. 11egri, A.-S. l&ige r e. l 3. Any ai!rlform b ody ; n gas ; as, oxygen was for- Ah-1lng , ?I. ^[1]. A wnlk or ride In tho open nlr; a r. ( Ormt/1.) Tho smaU white heron ; - comm only mc rly called vital ai,·. short cxcul'Sl on . co.llcd egret. 4. Alr In m otl o u ; n light breeze ; n gentle wind . 2. .A n e xp o sure to al r1 or to a fire, for wll?Ttllng or 2. (Bot. ) A feathery crown of seed. See EGRET. Let vornol airs through trembling oalora piny. Pope. � �lrylng, &c. ; as, th o airi11g of lln c11, or of a room. ^[3]. A plnmc or an or nament for the head c o mposed A>r'-Ji\ck'et 11. A jacket having air-tight cells, or of fe ath e rs, o r of preci o us sto nes, I n tho form of o. 5 • U ttcranc c nb road ; publ! cIt tak cn air. " Y u fa; vo It air b� orc me:'' a s , n 8t ory h ne � DnJ1le11. cavities wlilch c an be flll cd with air, to render per- so ns bu oy ant I n swimming. h eron's c!"cet. 6 • H c nco , i°n t cgn llll gcn c c ; auvl c c ; m, orm ntl o n . .£.tr11 A.f' til- l iitte' (iVgll-l� t •), n. [Fr. Se o .AGLET.J e ss1 a. No t open t o a frco curre nt of Rl r ; want- f. A. point or tng at the end of a fringe o r Ince. [ Obs.] Bacall. I ug frcsn air' or communIcatI on wI th ope n nlr':. . us. ) A m11slcnl tlt o ugl1t expressed ln o. A! ·1I ". (Mil.) (a.) A. "' t.agged p o int h anging il from rn th 7 (Ill pl cnelug and symmetrical successi on of single t ones ; r Ing 11• A thoulthtlcss , gny pcrsou. ) 0w. Illid 61, ouldor upon the breast , In some m l ttory un orme rare .] /• Slight airlings." • Jo11so11. o ~~ form, with Its etobles and other buildings. Ne have the wotry fowla a cerlaln granu, granufar nppcarance. crlmc-1 and If they .see Just cirnsc. them 10 ftnd bUls or f.o- s,,,,,.,,-. Griln'ft-lar-ly, adt1. In a grnnulor form. a .11 rllctment agillnst thcm 1 to be prcscnt<'"d to t.he cvurt; - c4.lled iilso grand ilJ.quut. bom;ier. - Grand pia.no-Jorte Wherein lo rel!. :Nor burnt Che /INffO<,DOJ' boned the mllkln,:-m;~.:..,,..... Griln'O-liite, ti. ,. [imp. & f· p. GRANULATED; lllllli (d/u,.) • pecollor ,pcelc• of the pin no-forte, In ,vlilch tbe Griin'ger, n. .A farm-steward or bttlllff. Holland. JJ.pr. &t1b. n. 011.ANDLATINO. [Fr. gra,mle1·. Sec \fires Or .srrinJrs nrc gcn<'!rnJJ.r lripiicntt•d, JncrcasJng 1be Gra-nlf'er-oils, a. [Lat. gra11ifer, from g_ran1tm, GRANULE.] ~c;;;;.;-;::c'll'of~~ic.tllc cJ1lcf mcrub<,r or hcud of tile groin, and ferre, to beor; Fr. gra1l(fere.] Bearing 1. To form Into groin• or smnU masses; no, to seed& l!ko grain. Humble. granulate powder or sugar. Syn.-Mognlficent; sobllmo; mnjcsllc; dli:mlncd ; Griln'l-f&rm, a. (Lot. franum , grain, nnd furma, 2. To raise In small aoperitlce; to mnkc rough on clented : stately; august ; Jl-Ompous ; lofty: o:rnltcd : form; Fr. granifvrme. Formed like groins of the surfnce. /lay. noblc.-GRA~D, .M.AG~"lFIC&S1, St:1u,nr1::. Grand, Jn ref- com. .Loudon. Gri1n'ii-liitc, ti. i. To collect or bo formed Into ... b,1< ;~!~ ~:1,~j Ria;~~~ l~O tai.nt:;1~~do;r~1 5IJ~r

!°,3in\~ ;;;~,l[;~~gtl;;~ . :1~d\\'~~ts~-;~ i,~~~;~n~~ th i,~ ~-~RS l~~.1~ 1 Griin'lte (grlln'it), n. [Fr. grsnit, It. granito, Sp. gralns; na 1 cnlle Juice [7f'rinulate., Into engnr. granido, from Lot. gru,iu,111 grain, It. gr,mitoj G•·iln'ii-latoc, I a. l. Consisting of, or rescm- graln;y, grained, p. p. of gramre, to make grolny. Griin'ii•lii'ted, I bUng, grnlne. ^[11] nd elevating. A cntnrn.ct is 9rand; a rich nnd ,·nricd (Geol.) .A crystolllnc, unstratified rock, consisting 2. Having DUDlCrous omoll elovnlloos, ne sl1a- lllnd.scapo Is ma!]nijicen,; nn o,·crh n.n.1-:r11g precipice Js o! quartz, feldspar, and mica, and present.Ing neu- green. llrande. ^[1],lfJ/i1n'- 11 Grandeur ndmit~ of dc-~rcc.s and muUlflca- ally a whitish, grayish, or flesh-red color. It difl'cre G•iin'ii-lii'tlon, n. [Fr. gran11lation.] Tho net of lfon,; but mag11/fice11ce Is that which hoa nlrcndy rcnchcd from gneiss In not hovlng tbc mica In planes, and forming Into groins; os, the gra11ulati.on of powder the highest degree of ,upenorlty naturally b<,Jonglng to therefore In being destitute of a schletoec structure. nnd sugar· Ure. u,e ob)ect lo question." Criwb- ;:;;r- Granite ta one of tho motamorpWc rocks, like Suppurati~• gra1'ulali•n. (Ph11#ol.) (a.) The dc,•cl- Gd.n' dam, n. (Ji'r. {lf'and, grrz,ule, and dame. Seo- gnelsa and mica sclllst. n ta o.Jso regarllcd as a true 1g. opment of cells fl"om the cft'us!on of n mw snr61cc whlch auprr, aod D.uu;;.J .A.n old woman; spoelftcally,_a neous rock. £Jana.. forma small grain-like protuberances nnd pustules. It grandmoLhcr. Shak. Gneiuoid uranit8, llTDnfte In which the mien ha• tmccs serves to 1111 np the cnvlty ond unite tho sides. (b.) Tho Griind'ellild, n. A son'• or daughter'• child; a of a regular arrangement. _ Grap/Ii,; granU•, grnnlto act or proccsa of •uch development. T111ly. child lo the •econd degree of deacont. Griintl1d!1ugb 1ter (-d&w 1tcr), n . '.!.'ho daughter of a""" or dnughlcr. :;~~!~!r'lfc1~~:zq~~:~,:,~~.:;;:1 3Y,~ w, to appear, In a transverse sectlon, Ukc orlontnl chnmc- 1~;Jd~~~f;; 6 1f~~:11:-I dl~~·!t[v':.n~ii'..~.~la':.!!~~ir!i~~~~lt~J A little grn n; a smnll pnrUclc. Grn11-dee', "· [Sp. gra1Ule. See GaANI>.] .A man of elev.tied rt1nli or station; a nobl eman. ^[1]:n Spain, a nobleman or the first rank, w ho hos the king's 1~1 :~:r!~-~~~uf:8";~';.~~~\: 1; 1 Ing bomblen<le as well as ltllcn. {~~~: G~~~-:~:::.t}•~lr~f g~[jn{(~~:~le and Lnt. Gra-nil'l.l-f3rm, a. [Eng. grmmle and Lnt.form11, len,c to be covered In hie presence. Griin'l-tel, n. [It.granitrllo and grrinltella, dlmln- form.] (Min.) Having 011 lrregulnr granular etruc- Gn.n-dce'•llJp, n. The milk or estate of a gran- utlvc• of granito; Fr.9ranitelle. See supra.] ( Geol.) turo. dee. . Swinburne. A binary, granitic compound contolmng two eon- Grltu1tt-lltc, n. [Eng. granule nn<l Gr. .\{So,, Grlin,l'eilr (grlnd 1Y1Jr), n . \Fr., from grancl. See stltuent parte 1 11B qunrtz and feldspar, or qunrtz ond stone.] (Geol. ) .A whltfo!i, gr:mnlar rock, conslst- GRAND, ] The qual!ty ot be ng grand; \'tl8tncse of oborl ornornolende • .[Obs.] Jiirwan. Ing of feldopar Bn<l qunrlz lntimnlcly mlxcct;- •ho; ,pfcndor of appearance; clc~at.lon of thought Gra-nIVle, I [Fr it" ] It le eomet.lriies co.lied wMte-stone, lepty11itc, and or c1prc,,lon; nobtlltf of aet!on. Gra-nlt'le-al, I a. · · gran "]tie. e1'rlte. or hu~:; : 11~t:c:11,!~g;~;{eur and moje1Uo how Slmk. 1. Like gronlto In composition, color, &c.; hav- Gmu'ii-loils, a. fFr. gr_anulere:i:, Pr.gramdos, Sp. Ing tbc noture of granlto ; ee, graniti,c texture. granuloao, granilloso, l~ granelloso.] Full of B;'n.-Su~Umity; majesty; atatclrneas; nugueb1eH; Iollincs,. 2. Conelat.log of granite ; as, {lf'anll.i,c moun- groins ; obonndlng · Sec S1;"u,11n. tolne. with granular sub- · . ' ~ Gran -,U.-•t-ty, n. ago; lo_og llfc. ( Ob•. fLot. grand-dluitaa.] Great G••a-nlt11-f1-eii1tloni.. n . [Eng. granite and Lnt. Glanville. .[aceret to moke.] The art or process of being Griipe1 n. [Fr.grappe, etoncee. ,, , Gn.n--<le'voits, a. [L"o~ g ran,1teuu8, from qrmulia, formea Into grnnlte. Humble. O. l!t l'rov. Fr. grand! nnd a,ii,m1 llfet.lmc, age.] Of groat nge; Gra-nlt't-f6rm., a. [Eng. granite and Lat,forma, crape, It. grappo, ,, long-I vcd. [ Ob-1,J Railey. form .] ( Geol.) Resembling granite In etructurc or groppolo, D. grappe, ~'ff"\~) Grlnd 11/i1ther, 11-. .A fniher's or mother's !other; shape. Humble. krappe, o!Ued to It. 'J \'\,~ an nncc•tor In the next degree abo ve the father or Griln'l-tlne, n. [Fr. grrinitin. See GRANITE.] ,qrappa, Pr. & Sp. mother In llncnl ascent. ( Geol.) A rock containing three species of mlnerolo, grapri, a cramp-Iron, Grl11d'fli1 ther-ly, "· Having the ago or manner 8 ome of which differ from thooc which compose fcrroomtche~ _ n Hgrn_p10ln0gr'. Oh grondfar.hcr; klud; benignant; complacent. grnnlto, as qunrtz 1 fcldopor, and ohorl. Kirwan. v lif wu • ~r'aI1d/1tlhrrlv tort of pctt0ocge. ...¥. HatDthorn,. Grlin'l-totd, a. LFr. gronitoWe, from granit, ond krapfo, hook. Cf. W. Grar-dl1'Je, a, [Lnt. grandlftcw, ; grandls, grnnd, ,lo,,,, Gr. form .] Resembling gr1mlte fn gl'nnulnr grab, cluster, grope, ~ /uwe, to make.] MBklng grcnt. [R.] Balle,J. appearance, even though not Igneous; oo,g,·anitoid crap, gropplc.] gneiss. an.-dll'o•qnen\le, ,._ [It. gmndlloqmmza.J Gra-niv'o-roils, a, [Lat. granum, grain, ond ~'0- 1. The fruit of tho vino; bnt commonly bThe u,e of lofty words or phr11Bos ; - usually In o rare, to ent greedily; Fr. granitm·e.] Eating o single berry of tho ad ••nee; bom b~ot. Grall;dll'o-qucnt, a. (Lat. grandls, grand, nod grain ; feeding or eubelBtJng on seeds; aa, graiiit:o- vine. lDqu,, to speak.) PompoUA; bombnatlc; grandllo• Griln'na.m., rOUB birds, JJ1•01cne. 2. (Man . ) A mnn- quoue. In. [For grandam.] A grandmother; gy tnmor on the legs G~ll-dll'o-qnoih, a. [Lat. grandlloqutt.s; gran- Grdnt Gmn'ny I a grnndam. [L010.J JJ. Jonson. ofn horoe. fti •ttc; b'l':lod, nod larp!l, to 11pcalc.] Speoldng In o col, ti, t. [imp. & p. p. GRANTED; p .p.-. & t1b. -n. GR.ANTING.] ro. Eng. graunt, Norm. Fr. ^[3]. (.lfil.) Grnpo- shot. Grnp••· Leovos, And ToudrllL Gr°- Y hombn•Ue. graunter, granter, t>. Fr. Qr(l.antcr, g1·at1u11ter, Gt'Q:J>6 of a eannon, tho caacabol or knob nt the butt. ILD d'. -ii•e' (126), a. [Lat. grandu, grand; ll'r. granclwse.] grrinter:., craanter, creanter, cran.tert to promloe, Grii.pe'-h9'n-~'fnth, n. (IJot.) A :plnnt found on yield, Lat. as If cre<lentare, to make ooUevc, from sondy soils 1n Englund; the .Mitsca,, raccmo•mn.

Ing ebrub hnvlng mn11 green flowers and lobed lcnvos, ond bearing a fruit called grapes, growing In ~~f~ ly, "tlv. In o g,-nnd or lot'ty mnnnor; spleo- G • Y, •ubllmoly. tr~•· Th 0 thi ntod or bestowed ; a gift; n clustors. ra~il'm6t1, 1er (-ml!tl1 1er), 11. Tllo mother of • ng gro ar Tho common grnpc-,·lne Is VitiJ ritjfera, nntl ls n ODt • fulhcr or motbe,· boon. d I nnth·c of Central Asfn. Another vnrlcty Is that ylcltllng 3. (Law.) A transfer of property by deo or wr t-- n small seedless grnpc commonly cnlle<I Zt111/e ciwrt1 11 t1 Gbiwd•-ncph 1c w (-n~f'yn), n. The grandson o!a Ing· ospeclo.lly, nn appropriation or convcyonce 'J'hc northern FtJ:r-grap• ts the v. Lal>n1&rn, lh>mwhlch; G !:')lbc,r or slswr. mnde by the government; oa, a grant of land. by cuJtlvotlon, hns come tho l<abel/a vorlety. 'J'hc •out h- ~~n11 cu, n. Grandeur; grcntncea wlth bMuty; p,-- Formerly In English lnw, tho term wne spocltl• crn Fo:r-urape, or ,llusct1dine, Is tho V. 1ntlpim11. 'l'he Gr-:;-,,• , ccnoc. _ Woluuton. cnlly npplle<I to ironsfcra of lnoorpol'col 1,0.-c<lllnmonts, Frost-urape Is J~ co,•d(fo/ia, which hns ,·cry fmi,rnnt Otu11d un\lc, "· 'I"ho grnndclnughtcr of a brother cJ<pcctont cstntos, nnd Jotters-potent th,m J?Ovcmmonc : flowers, nn<I rlpono niter tho early frosts; whence tho r a 81 er. tmd such Is !ti! present nppllcatlon In somo or the Uulted nnmc. fllrl, rude, P\Uh; ,, 1, 0 , lll_o nt; " aa •; "h 88 sh; 11, eh, 88 k; t QII J, g 48 In g,et; I 48 z; ll as gz; n as fa Hoger, link; th ao In thiue. .H .

lie opini on i · fr ncrly iu farnr heir mo,eu1e r1 tt1, La tlm; far of tlte ;:tahli:;lrn1 11 t 0t a 1 our andy te rni 'f' h~ m11de le reet ! pp_v. rlt .Y lwv doue 11 11 mi ·l·hict. farm . Th re 1u·e ol c 01-se dif, J10ulcl at nil time - .rences 1,t opiuion re:?erdin!? IT 1.1 -Tue n rther , w11t 11 r 1· thee '.t.-, loc:\lion. When the tacts in th t. exp te fur a not wni uutil rob- the premi.;es ar tully de,·elopcd. arrived yt'@ter- m1,0irt <l fore t:ili- w thiuk, it Will be found thut u clock in the at - ing warniug. The police have , llme other fellow or foll ow tern n: no rigl:t to- nrr t tLeru trn I l1tH·e a place be r they are anx- Tm: B ~EB ac·.lrnnw1edg c.Jetected in me r:i c:dity a I ious to di:-J e of to the connty tbe r i.Jt ot an i 1vit!ltion t rhe ~encrally have ru ney and at a. ~ d roaud price. The attend & .Keg li11 Ball, aiven b_v <.'anuot he urreeted uuder th vricc al'"'r cd to liave heen puid .Bras ~ L11J ~ 27. . 0. M. ,agra11t law. · ta.rm cowiderfog --------- T • t ur t 11e L ew1s t W as'hin t;11 011 T~ ·d y e,e- its proximity t town, wa · 11inl"I next. From T u~ 1 ay'11 u .. 11y. lli. T. DWYK& h not exh rbitant. No ucti n P .utTY.-There was a ~ociul w ~ tnken by the coo rt in r ~ard therinl! and conve ati o par- work on hi new tu ti w n (' 1 011 to the tutnre e:;tdhli hment of a t · he r siden of ~r. C. R. t. hurlc treet. O(lflllt farm. Meanw!Jile the Ilrl;tt!dlo\•e• 01 Thurod 'v e,•euinlY Dnro-On the oveoinj!' of thirty-fi,re or torty paupers will e> which wa' finely eoioyed l,y all Dec. 19rh near Lamp a, 'fcx .. ntinne to draw their reuular th . e pr eat: M.Rb RF.B~- "'A. Toll, wile of J. U. nllowance from lie county. ^[1]:- Tlic . . . Boulll. G.-The Brazos river Tom ~ rmcrlv of thi3 cit,· . .• .; 011 a iother rise-being nearly grnnd ju_ry would do well t r A'l'URAL LEAF.-Abe Merer examine the pnnper rolls and • e\'eu u-ith it,1 bank . Large has jn' t rc~ived a uew supply ee that th re nmJ no •'crooked •,n. ntities f drift w ti i S&id. of fi.ue natuml 1 Rt. Ln\'ers of paupe1-:;' drawi11g ac.-ip. t b: J a -~ing w11. rend«iog tl.ie weed will tick a pin here. er ." '- Ill ~ hJ· f,•rrs boat · . tr~ WC· J Ju . rJ.J To D T-r.-lfany ot dets trotn the A . &; M. --------- From Wed_ne!lday's Dully. BuT few people were in to~n

Jan 4 1878 Clipped By: lhann923 Jan 13, 2025

Copyright © 2025 Newspapers.com. All Rights Reserved.

TAB 19

Newspapers· The Dallas Daily Herald (Dallas, Texas) · Fri, Jun 15, 1877 · Page 2 by <f)I ancestry· Downloaded on Jan 13, 2025 https://www.newspapers.com/image/50858468/ ARGUMENTS FOR: 1. Recent problems in the state's economy have damaged many private enterprises that are beneficial to the state, causing unemployment and other hardships for the state's citizens and loss of revenue to the state. The proposed amendment would stimulate the state's economy, and the resulting development would increase tax revenue, reduce unemployment, and provide other benefits to the state far outweighing the state's cost. ^[2]. The state's economy is too dependent on the oil industry. The proposed amendment would provide for the diversification of the state's economy and prevent the state from being too dependent on the fortunes of a single industry. ^[3]. Many other states have developed programs of state assistance to private economic development and have benefitted from those programs. The Texas constitutional prohibition on that type of program has put Texas at a competitive disadvantage with those other states in attracting new businesses and clients for existing businesses. AGAINST: 1. The fostering of private business is inherently a private matter. Public funds should not be used to support an enterprise having the purpose of providing a profit for private individuals. Quality businesses of the type the state needs are not the type that need handouts from the state. ^[2]. The state is currently suffering massive shortages of public funds. What money the state has should be used to fund more essential government functions. The proposed amendment contemplates programs that are not essential government functions and that are of questionable benefit to the state, and thus are luxuries that the state cannot afford. ^[3]. Abusive public giveaways of state funds to private businesses are the specific reason that the constitutional prohibition on gifts and grants to those businesses was originally adopted. There is no reason to assume that those abuses are less likely to occur now than they were when the prohibition was adopted in 1876. The proposed amendment does not provide adequate safeguards against those abuses.

TAB 24

THE TEXAS CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE 1. BILL OF RIGHTS

Sec. ^[3]. EQUAL RIGHTS. All freemen†, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services.

(Feb. ^[15], 1876.) † The language of this provision is identical to the language of the official legislative measure that originally proposed the provision. A digital image of the original text of the official enrolled measure can be found here.

Automated Certificate of eService This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system. The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.

Andrea Mintzer on behalf of Jonathan Fombonne Bar No. 24102702 [email protected] Envelope ID: 96225578 Filing Code Description: Brief Not Requesting Oral Argument Filing Description: Brief of Appellees Status as of 1/15/2025 7:19 AM CST

Case Contacts

Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status

Yetter Coleman [email protected] 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT

Christopher Garza 24078543 [email protected] 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT

Edward Swidriski 24083929 [email protected] 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT

Jonathan Fombonne 24102702 [email protected] 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT

Grant Martinez [email protected] 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT

Christian Menefee 24088049 [email protected] 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT

Ryan Cooper 24123649 [email protected] 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT

William Farrell [email protected] 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT

Andrea Mintzer [email protected] 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT

Eleanor Matheson 24131490 [email protected] 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT

Nicole A.Myette [email protected] 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT

Lily Hann [email protected] 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT

Marisa Mata [email protected] 1/14/2025 6:14:55 PM SENT