v.
Kelly Hancock, in His Official Capacity as Acting Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas // City of Coppell, Texas; City of Humble, Texas; City of DeSoto, Texas; City of Carrollton, Texas; City of Farmer's Branch, Texas; And City of Round Rock, Texas
ACCEPTED 15-25-00022-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 9/26/2025 7:45 PM No. 15-25-00022-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN In the Court of Appeals 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS For the Fifteenth Judicial District 9/26/2025 7:45:27 PM Austin, Texas CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk
City of Coppell, Texas; City of Humble, Texas; City of Desoto, Texas; City of Carrollton, Texas; City of Farmer’s Branch, Texas; City of Round Rock, Texas, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. Kelly Hancock, Acting Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
On Appeal from the 201st Judicial District Court, Travis County, Texas Cause No. D-1-GN-21-003198; consolidated with D-1-GN-21-003203
AMENDED APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT’S BRIEF
Ken Paxton Kyle Pierce Counce Attorney General of Texas Deputy Division Chief State Bar No. 24082862 Brent Webster [email protected] First Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Tax Litigation Division Ralph Molina P. O. Box 12548 Deputy First Assistant Attorney General Austin, Texas 78711-2548 T: (512) 463-3112 Austin Kinghorn F: (512) 478-4013 Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation Counsel for Appellee/Cross- Steven Robinson Appellant Division Chief, Tax Litigation Division
Oral Argument Requested
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellants/Cross-Appellees: City of Coppell, Texas City of Humble, Texas City of DeSoto, Texas City of Carrollton, Texas City of Farmer’s Branch, Texas
Appellate and Trial Counsel for Appellants/Cross-Appellees: James B. Harris, [email protected] Stephen F. Fink, [email protected] Reed C. Randel, [email protected] Richard B. Phillips, Jr., [email protected] HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP 1722 Routh Street, Suite 1500 Dallas, Texas 75201 (214) 964-9500
Brandon L. King, [email protected] HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP 98 San Jacinto Boulevard, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701
Appellees: City of Round Rock, Texas
Appellate and Trial Counsel for Appellees: Cindy Olson Bourland, [email protected] BOURLAND LAW FIRM, PC P.O. Box 546 Round Rock, Texas 78680
Bryan Dotson, [email protected] Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams, & Aughtry, P.C. 112 East Pecan Street, Suite 1450 San Antonio, Texas 78205 (210) 278-5844 i
Appellee/Cross-Appellant: Kelly Hancock, Acting Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas
Appellate and Trial Counsel for Appellee/Cross-Appellant: Ken Paxton Brent Webster Ralph Molina Austin Kinghorn Steven Robinson Kyle Pierce Counce (lead counsel) [email protected] Peter Berquist [email protected] OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL P.O. Box 12548 Austin, Texas 78711-2548 (512) 463-3112
Former Counsel no longer with Office of the Attorney General: Grant Dorfman (currently employed by the Texas Business Court, Eleventh Division) James Lloyd (currently employed by the Office of the Vice President of the United States) Shawn Cowles (currently employed by Dhillon Law Group, Inc.) Alison Andrews (currently employed by Jackson Walker LLP) Brittney Johnston (currently employed by McLane Deborah Rao (currently employed by the State Office of Risk Management) Matthew T. Kennedy (currently employed by Covenant Clearinghouse, LLC) Ray Langenberg (Specially Deputized trial counsel, currently employed by the Office of the Comptroller of Public Accounts of Texas)
Former Counsel no longer with Tax Litigation Division: Amanda Romenesko (currently employed by the Opinion Committee, Office of the Attorney General of Texas)
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Identity of Parties and Counsel ................................................................................i Index of Authorities ................................................................................................ v Record References .................................................................................................. x Statement of the Case ............................................................................................. x Statement Regarding Oral Argument ...................................................................... x Issues Presented .................................................................................................... xi Statement of Facts .................................................................................................. 1 I. The Parties ......................................................................................... 1 II. Background on Texas local sales and use tax ....................................... 1 III. Promulgation of Comptroller Rule 3.334 .............................................2 IV. Procedural History .............................................................................. 3 Summary of the Argument ...................................................................................... 5 Argument................................................................................................................ 7 I. Rule 3.334 is a valid exercise of the Comptroller’s rulemaking authority because it does not contravene the statutes ..........................8 A. Rule 3.334(a)(9) defines the term “fulfill” as used within the entire rule ......................................................................... 12 B. Rule 3.334(a)(18) defines the phrase “place of business of the seller” as used within the entire rule ................................. 14 C. Rule 3.334(b)(5) clarifies what is and is not a “place of business of the seller.” ............................................................ 17 D. Rule 3.334(c) does not contravene the Tax Code .................... 19 receive the portion of sales tax that the Comptroller collects and then remits back to cities and other local taxing jurisdictions. See Tex. Tax Code §§ 321.203(a), 321.312,
[*1]321.502. The Comptroller promulgated rules that affect consummation determinations of both municipal and county sales taxes. This dispute only involves the consummation provisions of the Municipal Sales Tax Act as found in Texas Tax Code chapter 321, with occasional reference to Chapter 323, the County Sales and Use Tax Act. Most relevant to this dispute is Texas Tax Code section 321.203, which
governs consummation of sale for sales tax in municipalities. III. Promulgation of Comptroller Rule 3.334 On January 3, 2020, the Comptroller initiated rulemaking to update its local sales and use tax rule. 45 Tex. Reg. 98-102 (Jan. [3], 2020). The rulemaking would amend Chapter 34 of the Texas Administrative Code section 3.334 (“Rule 3.334”). Id. Rule 3.334 governs local sales and use taxes, including determinations of where a sale is consummated for local sales tax purposes. The Comptroller stated that the amendments to Rule 3.334 were to clarify provisions concerning, among others: fulfillment, temporary places of business, places of business receiving more than three orders, traveling salespersons, internet orders, and in-person orders. 45 Tex. Reg. 98 (Jan. [3], 2020). It also reorganized Rule 3.334 for clarity and readability. Id. Other changes were made which are not at issue in this appeal. After the notice and comment period, the Comptroller finally adopted the 2020 version of Rule 3.334. 45 Tex. Reg. 3509 (May 22, 2020). The 2020 version of Rule 3.334 was scheduled to take effect on October 1, 2021. The Plaintiff Cities filed suit to halt its implementation. The Comptroller repealed, revised, and reamended Rule 3.334 several times between 2021 and 2024. 1 Only the April 2024 amendment,
[*2]which was adopted in June 2024 (49 Tex. Reg. 4797–808 (June 28, 2024)), is at issue in this appeal. IV. Procedural History
Coppell filed its Original Petition on July 12, 2021. CR 6. Round Rock also filed its Original Petition on July 12, 2021. The cases were consolidated on July 13, 2022. CR 1251. Both Coppell and Round Rock amended their petitions, with the final amendments on September 11, 2024. CR 2396; CR 2437. Between the filing of the Original Petitions and the final trial on the merits, the Plaintiff Cities and the Comptroller agreed to a series of temporary injunctions until the court rendered a
final judgment. CR 121; 123; 1248; 1338; 1340; 1342; 1344; 1745. Each party attempted several summary judgment motions, none of which are subject to appeal.[2] The version of Rule 3.334 that went to trial and is on appeal in this case was initially published on April 19, 2024 (the “April 2024 Notice”) and was adopted on June 28, 2024 (the “June 2024 Order”). 49 Tex. Reg. 2440–57; 49 Tex. Reg. 4797–808.3 The case was called for trial on October 14, 2024, in the 250th District Court
1 Rule 3.334 was amended in September 2022 (47 Tex. Reg. 6158–74 (Sept. 23, 2022)), October
2023 (48 Tex. Reg. 6340–50 (Oct. 27, 2023)), and April 2024 (49 Tex. Reg. 2440-57 (Apr. 29, 2024)). 2 The trial court granted Plaintiff Cities’ Partial Motions for Summary Judgment on August 29,
2022. CR 1336. The order remanded Rule 3.334 to the Comptroller “for revision or readoption through established procedures within a reasonable time.” CR 1337. 3 In this brief, the Comptroller will cite to the Texas Register for the April 2024 Notice and the June
2024 Order for readability. Both are available in the Clerk’s Record and as trial court exhibits in the Reporter’s Record and are included in the Appendix. The April 2024 Notice is at CR 2532–50 and 12 RR 874–91. The June 2024 Order is at CR 2551–62 and 10 RR 301–12.
[*3]of Travis County, Judge Karin Crump presiding. [6] RR 1. After a bench trial on the merits, the trial court took the matter under advisement and rendered a judgment on
December 3, 2024. CR 2797. The judgment was mixed. A portion of the judgment was in favor of the Plaintiff Cities, with the court ruling that:
1. The Comptroller did not substantially comply with the notice requirements under the APA;
2. The Comptroller did not substantially comply with the reasoned justification requirement under the APA;
3. 34 TAC § 3.334(a)(9) contravenes existing statutes by adding a definition at the agency level that the Legislature has not defined in Chapter 151 of the Texas Tax Code and for which Sections 321.203 and 323.203 already provide a detailed statutory scheme for determining where a sale of a taxable item is consummated;
4. 34 TAC 3.334(a)(18), (b)(5), and (c) contravene specific statutory language set forth in Texas Tax Code sections 321.002(a)(3)(A), 321.203, and 323.203; and
5. 34 TAC 3.334(c) [(c)(1) and (c)(2) inclusive] contravenes the statutory schemes for determining where a sale is consummated, under Sections 321.203 and 323.203. CR 2798. It is these five rulings that the Comptroller appeals. The Court made an explicit ruling against Coppell (on an issue it raised separately from Round Rock). CR 2798. The remainder of the judgment was in favor
of the Comptroller, with the Plaintiff Cities being denied all other relief. CR 2798. Both Coppell and the Comptroller moved for the trial court to modify the judgment. CR 2800; 2816. The trial court denied the motions. CR 2840; 2841.
Coppell requested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which it later amended to only Conclusions of Law. CR 2842; 2848. The trial court issued Conclusions of Law on December 30, 2024. CR 2846. The Conclusions of Law are virtually identical
[*4]to the judgment language. CR 2846. Coppell timely filed a Notice of Appeal on March 3, 2025. CR 2854. The Comptroller also timely filed a Notice of Appeal on March 17, 2025. CR 2859. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT This is an appeal of a bench trial where the trial court invalidated and enjoined parts of Comptroller Rule 3.334. The standard of review is de novo. The Comptroller brings five issues, which are divided into three buckets: (1) Rule 3.334 does not contravene the Texas Tax Code; (2) the Comptroller’s rulemaking complied with the APA’s notice requirements; and (3) the Comptroller’s rulemaking complied with the
APA’s reasoned justification requirement. This Court should reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment in favor of the Comptroller. I. The trial court wrongly invalidated four parts of Rule 3.334. An administrative rule is invalid under the APA if it contravenes specific statutory language, runs counter to the objectives of the statute, or imposes burdens inconsistent with the statute. Rule 3.334(a)(9) defines the word “fulfill”, which is
used throughout Rule 3.334 but not used within the statute; the definition is consistent with the statutory language. Rule 3.334(a)(18) defines the phrase “place of business of the seller,” and offers examples of what does not meet the definition.
The definition expounds on the legislature’s partial definition of the phrase, and support for the Comptroller’s definition comes when the statute is read as a whole, not in isolation. Rule 3.334(b)(5) clarifies that a computer that operates an automated shopping cart on a website is not a “place of business” for purposes of sales tax consummation. This rule is well within the Legislature’s broad grant of rulemaking
[*5]authority to the Comptroller. Rule 3.334(c) clarifies that the rule applies to “all sellers engaged in business in Texas.” This comports precisely with the statute’s language and avoids providing special treatment to any sellers. II. The trial court wrongly found that the Comptroller did not comply with the APA’s notice requirements. The APA requires administrative agencies to provide certain notices to the public when considering a rule. Two were at issue in the trial
court: the “Fiscal Note” and the “Adverse Economic Impact Notice” requirements. The Legislature’s intent in requiring these notices was to give interested parties sufficient notice of a rule’s content to permit them to see if they need to participate in the rulemaking process. Whether an agency followed the APA is reviewed under a substantial compliance standard. The Comptroller’s Fiscal Note did more than track the statutory language; it gave data and analysis sufficient to put cities and taxpayers on notice of potential financial implications of Rule 3.334. And the Comptroller demonstrated that compliance to the standard the Plaintiff Cities requested would be impossible. The Comptroller’s Adverse Economic Impact Notice provided everything required by the statute and more; the Plaintiff Cities simply did not like the Comptroller’s conclusions. The Comptroller substantially complied with both the Fiscal Note and Adverse Economic Impact Notice requirements. III. The trial court wrongly found that the Comptroller did not comply with the APA’s reasoned justification requirement. The APA requires administrative agencies to provide a reasoned justification when adopting rules. Substantial compliance is again the standard for review, and the courts are limited to the face of the rulemaking itself. Reasoned justification requires: an agency to summarize the
[*6]factual bases of the rule, demonstrate a rational connection between the factual bases and the rule, and give reasons why the agency disagreed with comments received during rulemaking. The Comptroller satisfied each prong. The Comptroller exhaustively gave the factual bases that lead it to adopt the rule, primary amongst them to provide clarity in how sales tax consummation works. Second, a rational connection will not
substantially comply with the APA if it was arbitrary and capricious. But a review of the Comptroller’s rulemaking record reveals that the rule is a reasonable means to a legitimate objective, and the Comptroller considered only those factors the Legislature required it to consider. And third, the Comptroller gave reasons why it disagreed with each submission opposed to adoption of the rule. The Comptroller demonstrated its substantial compliance with the reasoned justification requirement.
ARGUMENT
“The gravamen of this dispute . . . is [the Comptroller’s] construction of a statute it is charged with administering. The construction of a statute is a question of law [courts] review de novo.” R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future
& Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. 2011).
[*7]I. Rule 3.334 is a valid exercise of the Comptroller’s rulemaking authority because it does not contravene the statutes. The Court should reverse the lower court’s decision and render judgment in favor of the Comptroller because Rule 3.334 is valid in its entirety under the APA. [4]
With a rule validity challenge, the rule is presumed to be valid, and Plaintiff Cities bear the burden of showing it is not. See, e.g., Tex. State Bd. Of Examiners of Marriage & Family Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 511 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Tex. 2017); McCarty v.
Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 919 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ). To establish a rule’s invalidity, the Plaintiff Cities must demonstrate that the challenged provisions (1) contravene specific statutory language; (2) run counter to the general objective of the statute; or (3) impose additional burdens, conditions, or restrictions in excess of or inconsistent with the relevant statutory provisions. Tex. Ass’n of Psychological Associates. v. Tex. State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 439
S.W.3d 597, 603 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.). In analyzing a challenged agency rule, a court must “recognize that the Legislature intends an agency created to centralize expertise in a certain regulatory area be given a large degree of latitude in the methods it uses to accomplish its regulation function.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “[w]hen conferring a power upon an agency, the Legislature also impliedly intends that the agency have whatever powers are reasonably necessary to fulfill its express functions or duties, and the Legislature is not required to include every specific detail or anticipate all [unforeseen]
4 As used herein, “APA” and “Texas APA” refer to the Administrative Procedure Act, codified in Chapter 2001 of the Texas Government Code, which governs rulemaking, contested case procedures, and judicial review of state agency actions. See Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2001.001– 2001.091.
[*8]circumstances when enacting an agency’s authorizing statute.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
An agency’s interpretation of a statute that it is charged with enforcing its entitled to “serious consideration,” as long as the agency’s interpretation is reasonable and “does not contradict the plain language of the statute.” See, e.g., First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Combs, 258 S.W.3d 627, 632 (Tex. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court has explained, “we need not consider whether [the agency’s] construction is the only—or the best—interpretation in
order to warrant our deference.” Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future & Clean Water, 336 S.W.3d at 628. The Plaintiff Cities failed to carry their burden to show that any subsection of Rule 3.334 that the lower court ruled on (1) contravenes specific statutory language, (2) is counter to the statute’s general objectives, or (3) imposes additional burdens, conditions, or restrictions in excess of or inconsistent with the relevant statutory provisions. See Harlingen Family Dentistry, P.C. v. Tex. Health & Human Services Comm’n, 452 S.W.3d 479, 482 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, pet. dism’d); State, Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 131 S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex. App.— Austin 2004, pet. denied). The court below determined that: (1) Rule 3.334(a)(9) contravenes sections 321.203 and 323.203 of the Tax Code which provide for where a sale of a taxable item is consummated; (2) Rules 3.334(a)(18), (b)(5), and (c) contravene “specific statutory language set forth in” sections 321.002(a)(3)(A), 321.203, and 323.203 of the Tax Code; and (3) Rule 3.334(c) contravenes the statutory schemes for determining where a sale is consummated under sections 321.203 and 323.203 of the Tax Code. CR 2846–47. The trial court repeated these rulings verbatim in its Conclusions of
[*9]Law. CR 2846. The trial court then enjoined enforcement of each of the rules and remanded them to the Comptroller for further consideration or correction. Generally, matters of statutory construction are questions of law for courts to decide and, therefore, are subject to de novo review. See Johnson v. City of Fort Worth, 774 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Tex. 1989). When construing a statute, the court’s objective is to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent. Nat’l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen,
15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2000). The court first reviews the statute’s words to discern intent. TGS–NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). An undefined term in a statute is typically assigned its ordinary meaning unless a more precise definition is required or dictated by the context of the statute. Id. The Legislature vests in the Comptroller the authority to adopt rules that do not conflict with the laws of this state, the constitution of this state, or the constitution of the United States for the enforcement of the relevant provisions on the collection of taxes and other revenues. Tex. Tax Code § 111.002. Specifically, as to local sales and use taxation, the Comptroller has the authority to adopt reasonable rules that are consistent with the relevant chapters for the administration, collection, reporting, and enforcement of the chapters. Tex. Tax Code §§ 321.306, 322.203, 323.306. The Legislature did not impose stronger restrictions for the Comptroller to adopt rules, as is seen in some other delegation statutes. Compare Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 62 S.W.3d 833, 835 n.1, 841 (Tex. App—Austin 2001, no pet.), with Tex. Tax. Code §§ 111.002, 151.0595(j), 321.306, 322.203, and 323.306. Thus, so long as the Rules do not conflict with the laws or Constitution of Texas, or
[*10]the United States Constitution, and are consistent with the Texas Tax Code, they should be affirmed by this Court. While “[a]n agency’s rules must comport with the agency’s authorizing statute … the Legislature does not need to include every specific detail or anticipate all unforeseen circumstances.” State Office of Pub. Util. Counsel, 131 S.W.3d at 321 (citing R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Lone Star Gas Co., a Div. of Enserch Corp., 844 S.W.2d
679, 689 (Tex. 1992)). Likewise, “[i]n ascertaining the scope of an agency’s authority, [the court] give[s] great weight to the agency’s own construction of a statute.” Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. 2007) (citing State v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. 1994)). By vesting the Comptroller with the power to make rules and regulations necessary to carry out the enforcement of the provisions of the Tax Code, the Legislature foreclosed the argument that it intended to spell out every detail of tax regulation. See Tex. Tax Code §§ 111.002, 321.306, 322.203, 323.306; State Office of Pub. Util. Counsel, 131 S.W.3d at 321; Dall. Cnty. Bail Bond Bd. v. Stein, 771 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied). Moreover, the Comptroller’s interpretation of the consummation statutes, as the administrative agency charged with enforcing the statutes, is entitled to deference by courts unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the language of the statute. See TGS–NOPEC, 340 S.W.3d at 438. Where there is vagueness, ambiguity, or room for policy determinations in a statute, as there is here, courts defer to the agency’s interpretation. Id. A. Rule 3.334(a)(9) defines the term “fulfill” as used within the entire rule. Rule 3.334(a)(9) defines the term “fulfill,” which is used elsewhere in Rule 3.334. See, e.g., Rule 3.334(c)(1); (c)(7). It also limits the definition by providing what “fulfill” does not mean, such as tracking an order. The challenged portion of Comptroller’s Rule 3.334(a)(9), as adopted in the June 2024 Order, reads:
[*11](9) Fulfill—To complete an order by transferring possession of a taxable item to a purchaser, or to ship or deliver a taxable item to a location designated by the purchaser. The term does not include receiving or tracking an order, determining shipping costs, managing inventory, or other activities that do not involve the transfer, shipment, or delivery of a taxable item to the purchaser or a location designated by the purchaser. 49 Tex. Reg. 2449 (Apr. 19, 2024). Round Rock contended in the trial court that Rule 3.334(a)(9) contravened the Texas Tax Code by “contradicting the language of the Tax Code and its overall purposes and structure.” CR 2465. Round Rock complained that the Legislature did not use the terms “fulfill” or “fulfillment” and the Rule was an attempt by the Comptroller to substitute “fulfill” in place of “consummation,”
because those terms “do not appear in Chapter 321 of the Tax Code. CR 2466. Coppell specifically did not challenge Rule 3.334(a)(9). 5 The trial court rendered judgment that Comptroller Rule 3.334(a)(9) contravened “existing statutes by adding a definition at the agency level that the 5 In Coppell’s Trial Brief, Coppell stated that the offending sections in the 2024 Rule—the only
rule on trial—were 34 Tex. Admin. Code §§ (a)(18), (b)(1)(A), and (c)(7). CR 2683 n.1. The statute is not referenced in Coppell’s live Petition. To the extent the trial court invalidated Rule 3.334(A)(9) on behalf of Coppell, it erred.
[*12]Legislature has not defined in Chapter 151 of the Texas Tax Code and for which Sections 321.203 and 323.203 already provide a detailed statutory scheme for
determining where a sale of a taxable item is ‘consummated’” CR 2798. Rule 3.334(a)(9) does not contravene Texas Tax Code sections 321.203 or 323.203. The Rule is consistent with the statutory language because Texas Tax Code Chapter 321 and 323 do not use the term “fulfill,” thus Rule 3.334 does not redefine or contradict the Tax Code. Instead, Rule 3.334(a)(9) uses “fulfill” as a single-word descriptor for the acts that qualify a location to be a “place of business,” which is consistent with the following language in the Tax Code:
(c-1) If the retailer has more than one place of business in this state and Subsection (c) does not apply, the sale is consummated at the place of business of the retailer in this state:
(1) from which the retailer ships or delivers the item, if the retailer ships or delivers the item to a point designated by the purchaser or lessee; or
(2) where the purchaser or lessee takes possession of and removes the item, if the purchaser or lessee takes possession of and removes the item from a place of business of the retailer. Tex. Tax Code § 321.203(c-1). The text of Rule 3.334(a)(9) also provides examples of specific acts that do not qualify as fulfilling an order and thus will not qualify as consummation under Tax Code section 321.203. 49 Tex. Reg. 4801–02 (June 28, 2024). No direct commentary was made by the Plaintiff Cities or others that took part in the rulemaking process as to the substance of section (a)(9).
The Legislature permits the Comptroller to “adopt rules that do not conflict with the laws of this state.” Tex. Tax Code § 111.002(a). The Supreme Court of Texas has recognized the breadth of that mandate just this past year, writing “when the Tax Code’s directives are not decisive, the Comptroller’s rules may provide
[*13]further guidance so long as they are reasonable and consistent with state and federal law.” GEO Group, Inc. v. Hegar, 709 S.W.3d 585, 591 (Tex. 2025) (citing TGS- NOPEC, 340 S.W.3d at 438). This must include defining terms that are used in rules but not present in statutes, so long as the terms are not inconsistent with the statute itself. See Farm & Ranch Freedom All. v. Tex. Dep’t of Agric., No. 03-23-00459-CV, 2025 WL 994190, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. [3], 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting
that when the Legislature confers power upon an agency, it “impliedly intends that the agency have whatever powers are reasonably necessary to fulfill its express functions or duties,” and thus it “is not required to include in every specific detail or anticipate all unforeseen circumstances when enacting an agency’s authorizing statute.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 3.334(a)(9) provides further guidance for taxpayers to comply with Tax Code section 321.203. The Comptroller’s definition of fulfill is needed to properly administer the statutory language and is based on the Comptroller’s assessment of the clarity needed to administer the controlling statutory provisions regarding receipt of orders. Rule 3.334(a)(9) is thus a reasonable interpretation of the statute and should be affirmed.
B. Rule 3.334(a)(18) defines the phrase “place of business of the seller” as used within the entire rule. Rule 3.334(a)(18) defines the term “Place of business of the seller,” which is used both within the relevant statute and throughout amended Rule 3.334. See, e.g., Tex. Tax Code §§ 321.203(b), (c); Rule 3.334(a)(17), (b), (c). The Plaintiff Cities challenged only the first three sentences of Rule 3.334(a)(18). CR 2433 (Coppell
[*14]Plaintiff’s Fifth Amended Petition Exhibit A); CR 2611 (Round Rock Trial Brief at 2). Those three sentences read:
(18) Place of business of the seller - general definition—A place of business of the seller must be an established outlet, office, or location operated by a seller for the purpose of receiving orders for taxable items from persons other than employees, independent contractors, and natural persons affiliated with the seller. An "established outlet, office, or location" usually requires staffing by one or more sales personnel. The term does not include a computer server, Internet protocol address, domain name, website, or software application. 49 Tex. Reg. 2449-50. The phrase “place of business” is partially defined in Chapter 321:
“Place of business of the retailer” means an established outlet, office, or location operated by the retailer or the retailer’s agent or employee for the purposes of receiving orders for taxable items and includes any location at which three or more orders are received by the retailer during a calendar year. A warehouse, storage yard, or manufacturing plant is not a “place of business of the retailer” unless at least three orders are received by the retailer during the calendar year at the warehouse, storage yard, or manufacturing plant. Tex. Tax Code § 321.002(a)(3)(A). The statute further defines what a place of business of the retailer is not. Tex. Tax Code §§ 321.002(a)(3)(B), (C). The trial court rendered judgment that Comptroller Rule 3.334(a)(18) contravened “specific statutory language set forth in Texas Tax Code sections 321.002(a)(3)(A), 321.203, and 323.203.” CR 2798. Plaintiff Cities contended in the trial court that Rule 3.334(a)(18) contravened the Texas Tax Code because the Comptroller does not have the authority to adopt Rule 3.334(a)(18). CR 2466-67.
[*15]Rule 3.334(a)(18) does not contravene Texas Tax Code sections 321.203 or 323.203. The Rule is consistent with the statutory language because each of the three challenged sentences find support within the statutes. The first sentence tracks the statutory language but adds a qualifier that allows facilities to make “in house courtesy sales without becoming a place of business.” 49 Tex. Reg. 4799. The reference to sales personnel in the second sentence of Rule 3.334(a)(18)
is consistent with the general objectives of the local tax statutes. First, the “sales personnel” language is consistent with the general objectives of the local tax statutes, as the “place of business” definition in Section 321.203 is also used in sales tax permitting requirements. Tex. Tax Code § 321.303; 49 Tex. Reg. 4799. This is important because a sales tax permit is required if a location has sales personnel. See Tex. Tax Code § 151.107. Second, the Comptroller added “sales personnel” language to provide an objective criterion for buyers, sellers, and auditors to consider: If a facility has sales personnel, it is likely a place of business for purposes of the consummation statute; if it does not, then it is likely not a place of business. 49 Tex. Reg. 4798–99. But the language is not absolute. The Rule says that the presence of sales personnel will “usually” elevate a facility to an established outlet, office, or location under the place of business definitions. 49 Tex. Reg. 4798. Finally, the third sentence limits place of business by stating what it is not: “a computer server, Internet protocol address, domain name, website, or software application.” 49 Tex. Reg. 4799. This definition is consistent with the statutory concept that a place of business usually requires personnel to be present—similar to
[*16]how a kiosk is specifically defined as not being a place of business. Tex. Tax Code § 321.002(a)(3)(C). Otherwise, any data center that hosts a computer server could become a “place of business” of any retailer leasing space. Moreover, the plain meaning of “place of business,” both as read by an ordinary person and as defined within the statute, cannot plausibly be read to include an “internet protocol address, a domain name, or a website” as an established outlet, office, or location. 49 Tex.
Reg. 4799. The Comptroller’s interpretation of the relevant statute is that the Legislature did not intend that “the receipt of an order by an automated mechanical devise” without the presence of personnel could make the automated device an “established outlet, office, or location” operated by a retailer. Id. The Comptroller offered further explanations for Rule 3.334(a)(18) in the April 2024 Notice and June 2024 Order, which support its construction of the statute and the promulgation of the Rule. See 49 Tex. Reg. 2446; 49 Tex. Reg. 4799. The Comptroller’s construction of the controlling Tax Code provisions in Rule 3.334 is a faithful embodiment of the plain language of the controlling statutory provisions. The Comptroller’s rule provides for administrative expediency, clarity, and consistency for the agency, taxpayers, and the public regarding the application of the consummation statutes and should be found valid.
[*17]C. Rule 3.334(b)(5) clarifies what is and is not a “place of business of the seller.” Rule 3.334(b)(5) clarifies that for a facility to be a “place of business of the seller” there usually need to be sales personnel present. Importantly, it clarifies that
certain types of computer-operated shopping systems do not qualify as a “place of business of the seller” for consummation purposes. Plaintiff Cities challenged only two sentences of Rule 3.334(b)(5). CR 2434 (Coppell Plaintiff’s Fifth Amended
Petition Exhibit A); CR 2611 (Round Rock Trial Brief at 2). The challenged text of Rule 3.334(b)(5) reads:
A computer that operates an automated shopping cart software program is not an established outlet, office, or location," and does not constitute a “place of business of the seller.” A computer that operates an automated telephone ordering system is not “an established outlet, office, or location,” and does not constitute a “place of business of the seller.” 49 Tex. Reg. 2451. The trial court rendered judgment that Comptroller Rule 3.334(b)(5) contravened “specific statutory language set forth in Texas Tax Code sections 321.002(a)(3)(A), 321.203, and 323.203.” CR 2798. Rule 3.334(b)(5) provides
examples of how the application of Rule 3.334(a)(18)—the place of business of the seller—would work. Rule 3.334(b)(5) does not contravene Texas Tax Code sections 321.203 or
323.203. The Rule stems from similar factual bases as Rule 3.334(a)(18). See infra Part I.B. An agency rule need not be limited to parroting the words of the statute and a rule may impose burdens, conditions, or restrictions that are consistent with the statute. See State Office of Pub. Util. Counsel, 131 S.W.3d at 321 (“the legislature does not ne ed to include e very spe cific de tail or anticipate all unfore see n
[*18]circumstances.”). A rule may articulate requirements that are not explicitly stated within the statute. See Perry Homes v. Strayhorn, 108 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Tex. App.— Austin 2003, no pet.) (“The Comptroller is authorized to adopt rules that clarify and implement the legislation.”); DuPont Photomasks, Inc. v. Strayhorn, 219 S.W.3d 414, 422 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) (noting that courts give “serious consideration” to the Comptroller’s “construction of [an enabling] statute”). That
is precisely what the Comptroller has done here. Moreover, Rule 3.334(b)(5) is consistent with prior Comptroller rules and interpretations of the Tax statutes. See 49 Tex. Reg. 4799. The Rule is consistent with the statutory language because the Comptroller’s recognition of the realities of online orders and their effect on local tax collection does not contravene the specific statutory language, is not counter to the statute’s general objectives, and does not impose additional burdens, conditions, or restrictions in excess of or inconsistent with the relevant statutory provisions. The Comptroller regulated within its rulemaking authority, as evidenced by the extensive commentary on the history and current state of Comptroller regulation. See 49 Tex. Reg. 2440-57; 49 Tex. Reg. 4797-808. D. Rule 3.334(c) does not contravene the Tax Code. The trial court made two separate rulings regarding Rule 3.334(c), finding that it contravened specific Texas Tax Code sections and that it contravened statutory schemes for determining where a sale is consummated. The trial court erred, and this Court should affirm Rule 3.334(c) in its entirety.
[*19]1. The rule clarifies that it applies to “all sellers.” The trial court rendered judgment that Comptroller Rule 3.334(c) contravened “specific statutory language set forth in Texas Tax Code sections 321.002(a)(3)(A), 321.203, and 323.203.” CR 2798. Rule 3.334(c) concerns the application of consummation rules and permits taxpaying entities to determine to which local jurisdiction their sales tax should be sourced. The relevant but controversial preliminary language of Rule 3.334(c) reads:
(c) […] The following rules, taken from Tax Code, §321.203 and §323.203, apply to all sellers engaged in business in Texas, regardless of whether they have no place of business in Texas, a single place of business in Texas, or multiple places of business in Texas. 49 Tex. Reg. 2451. A lengthy set of rules for determining where a sale is consummated then follows. 49 Tex. Reg. 2451-52. But only Rule 3.334(c), (c)(1), and (c)(2) were ruled on by the trial court. CR 2798. Round Rock contended in the trial court that Rule 3.334(c) contravened the Texas Tax Code by applying to “all sellers engaged in business in Texas, regardless of whether they have no place of business, a single place of business in Texas, or multiple places of business in Texas.” CR 2626; 49 Tex. Reg. 2451. Round Rock further argued that taxpayers with a single place of business in Texas are required to receive special treatment under the Tax Code, which states: “if a retailer has only one place of business in this state, all of the retailer’s retail sales of taxable items are consummated at that place of business except as provided by Subsection (e).” Tex. Tax Code § 321.203(b).
[*20]As explained in the June 2024 Order, the Comptroller disagrees with that assertion. First, Round Rock’s claim would ignore that an exception is explicitly within the tax code: “except as provided by Subsection (e).” Tex. Tax Code §§ 321.203(b), (e); 49 Tex. Reg. 4805. However, when the statute is read as a whole, it is clear that the language in section 321.203(b) was not intended to create special rules for retailers with a single
place of business but is merely the first step on a hierarchy of tax sourcing. The remainder of section 321.203 details the further steps a retailer must take in determining where a sale was consummated. When considered in this light, the Comptroller’s Rule 3.334(c) is entirely consistent within that hierarchy, and is consistent with the language of section 321.203(b) and the text of Rule 3.334(c). Further, Rule 3.334 helps determine whether a business in fact is a single place of business or not, which helps determine the applicability of section 321.203(b). If a business has only a single place of business, the sale will be consummated there. Round Rock’s interpretation would lead to an absurd result: sales could be sourced to a city that the customer and the product had no connection to. It would be an absurd result to consummate a sale at a location that has no discrete connection with the sale. Under Round Rock’s interpretation, consider if a reseller had a single place of business in Austin that consists only of a sales office. The reseller has a fully automated shopping website hosted by a server in Brownsville. A customer who lives in Corpus Christi places an order on the website located in Brownsville. The order is then fulfilled and shipped from a third-party manufacturer in Dallas and shipped to the customer in Corpus Christi. The sale being consummated in Austin, a city with
[*21]which the customer did not visit (either in person, by phone, or by internet connection), would be an unreasonable reading of the statute that the Legislature could not have intended—even though the reseller’s only place of business was Austin. Moreover, it would permit sellers to game the system to divert sales tax revenues to certain preferred localities. The Texas Supreme Court has held that one must make the logical inferences necessary to “avoid an absurd or nonsensical result
that the Legislature could not have intended.” Castleman v. Internet Money Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Tex. 2018) (citing Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 338 (Tex. 2017)).
2. The rule is not counter to the statutory scheme of the Tax Code The trial court rendered judgment that Comptroller Rule 3.334(c) [(c)(1) and (c)(2) inclusive] contravened the “statutory schemes for determining where a sale is consummated, under Sections 321.203 and 323.203.” CR 2798. There is no relevant caselaw in Texas courts that helpfully differentiates between when a promulgated rule contravenes specific statutory language versus a statutory scheme. The trial
court did not explain why it made separate findings that Rule 3.334(c) violated specific statutory language under sections 321.203 and 323.203, and the statutory scheme of sections 321.203 and 323.203. Specifically, the Plaintiff Cities offered no argument on this issue at the trial on the merits and thus the trial court erred in holding that Plaintiff Cities met their burden to prove the Rule contravened the statutory schemes for determining where a sale is consummated.
[*22]For the purposes of de novo review, the Comptroller reasserts its arguments above that Rule 3.334(c) did not violate any specific statutory language under Sections 321.203 and 323.203 and thus did not violate the statutory scheme.
3. The trial court improperly overturned language which no party disputed. Comptroller Rule 3.334(c) is a comprehensive rule to determine the local taxing jurisdiction in which local sales and use taxes are due. The Final Judgment enjoined the entirety of Rule 3.334(c). CR 2799. While the Court should reverse the Final Judgment and validate the entire provision, at a minimum the Court should reverse the Final Judgment to the extent that it enjoins portions of the Rule that were not disputed. The language contested by Coppell in the trial court was specifically not invalidated by the trial court. Paragraph (7) states that the location where an order is “received” is the location where an order is “initially received” and that the “location from which a product is shipped shall not be used in determining the location where the order is received by the seller.” 34 Tex. Admin. Code
§ 3.334(c)(7). The trial court’s Conclusions of Law did not invalidate paragraph (7). In fact, the Conclusions of Law specifically validated a similar statement in Rule 3.334(b)(1) regarding distribution centers, and the Final Judgment denied the Coppell’s request to enjoin Rule 3.334(b)(1). CR 2847 (Conclusions of Law); CR 2798 (Final Judgment). The relevant portion of validated Rule 3.334(b)(1) states: “Forwarding previously received orders to the facility for fulfillment does not make the facility a place of business.” 34 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.334(b)(1); CR 2683.
[*23]However, if this Court determines that the trial court did enjoin and remand Rule 3.334(c)(7) as part of the trial court’s overall ruling, then this Court should reverse the trial court and render judgment that that rule is not void or enjoined. II. The Comptroller’s notice complied with the APA. The Texas APA requires an agency to provide public notice of its intent to adopt a rule. Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2001.023, 2001.024. The purposes of the notice
requirements are to inform the public of the contents of the proposed rule and to give persons sufficient notice of the rule’s content to permit them to ascertain whether protection of their interests requires them to request a hearing and participate in the rulemaking. State Bd. of Ins. v. Deffebach, 631 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Whether an agency complied with the notice requirements is reviewed under the substantial compliance standard. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.035(a). Substantial compliance does not mean literal and exact compliance with every requirement of a statute, but simply “compliance with the essential” requirements of the statute. Methodist Hosps. Of Dallas v. Tex. Indus. Acc. Bd., 798 S.W.2d 651, 654 (Tex. App.— Austin 1990, writ dism’d w.o.j.). The questions courts look at to determine substantial compliance is “[d]o the acts tendered in satisfaction of a statutory requirement (1) secure the legislative objectives that underline the requirement and (2) come fairly within the character and scope of each action or thing explicitly required by the statute in terms that are concise, specific, and unambiguous.” Id.
[*24](citing Ronald Beal, The Scope of Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking: The Interrelationship of Legislating and Rulemaking in Texas, 39 Baylor L. Rev. 597, 646–
47 (1987)). The trial court ruled that the Comptroller did not substantially comply with the APA’s notice requirements, but it did not specify which specific statutes the Comptroller violated. CR 2798, 2847. At trial, the Plaintiff Cities alleged that the Comptroller violated the APA by not meeting the requirements of Texas Government Code section 2001.024(a)(4), which requires a fiscal note (the “Fiscal
Note”). CR 2636, 2699. The Fiscal Note must contain certain information when an agency gives notice of a rule. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.024(a)(4). And separately, Round Rock asserted that the Comptroller violated the APA by not meeting the requirements of Texas Government Code section 2006.002, which requires an agency to give special notice when a rule would have an adverse economic effect on small businesses, micro-businesses, or rural communities (the “Adverse Economic Effect Notice”). CR 2638; Tex. Gov’t Code § 2006.002. But the Comptroller’s April 2024 Notice and June 2024 Order substantially complied with both the Fiscal Note and the Adverse Economic Effect Notice.
A. The Comptroller’s Fiscal Note substantially complied with the APA. The APA states that a rule notice must state:
(A) the additional estimated cost to the state and to local governments expected as a result of enforcing or administering the rule; (B) the estimated reductions in costs to the state and to local governments as a result of enforcing or administering the rule;
[*25](C) the estimated loss or increase in revenue to the state or to local governments as a result of enforcing or administering the rule; and
(D) if applicable, that enforcing or administering the rule does not have foreseeable implications relating to cost or revenues of the state or local governments; Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.024(a)(4). The Texas APA makes clear that the Fiscal Note requirement hinges on substantial compliance. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.035(c) (The agency must demonstrate “in a relatively clear and logical fashion that the rule is a reasonable means to a legitimate objective.”); See Nat’l Ass’n of Indep. Insurers v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 925 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex. 1996). Put in the context of the APA notice requirements, agency compliance depends on the public being informed of the proposed rule and on sufficient notice of the contents of the proposed rule as to allow stakeholders to ascertain whether protection of their interests requires them to take part in the rulemaking process. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Patient Advocates of Tex., 136 S.W.3d 643, 650 (Tex. 2004); see Deffebach, 631 S.W.2d at 800–01. The Comptroller clearly complied here, as Plaintiff Cities all participated in the
rulemaking. [1]. The rulemaking record shows substantial compliance. The Comptroller’s April 2024 Notice provides the methodology, procedure, and information needed to attempt an accurate prediction as to the revenue of every local jurisdiction and a comprehensive fiscal impact statement. 49 Tex. Reg. 2440– 57. The Comptroller also engaged in further discussions and responded to Plaintiff Cities’ comments in the June 2024 Order. 49 Tex. Reg. 4799-808.
[*26]The Comptroller’s April 2024 Notice addressed the effect on local jurisdictions regarding revenue and the fiscal impact of Rule 3.334. The Comptroller stated that “some vendors may change their reporting methods, which might positively or negatively affect the tax revenue of particular local tax jurisdictions.” 49 Tex. Reg. 2441. The Comptroller further specified that it “does not have sufficient data on the business operations of each business to identify and quantify
the businesses and transactions that might be affected, and the positive or negative revenue impact on each tax jurisdiction.” Id. Moreover, “reliable estimates of net changes in revenue by individual jurisdictions for the 1,759 local sales taxing jurisdictions that might stem from compliance with the rule cannot feasibly be produced” by the Comptroller. 49 Tex. Reg. 2443. Thus, quantification would be impossible. The Comptroller engaged in a substantial examination of the data that would be required to analyze the estimated costs and loss or increase of revenue to local governments. 49 Tex. Reg. 2442-47. For more than five pages and 5,000 words, the Comptroller examined the claims made by each of the parties to this case and addressed the concerns. See id. In doing so, the Comptroller demonstrated what would be necessary to prepare a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction estimate and addressed how infeasible the Plaintiff Cities’ demands were. The Comptroller provided examples of the impossibility of the task in its April 2024 Notice. Regarding fulfillment centers, the Comptroller noted that “the estimates of the Plaintiff cities and the fulfillment centers in those cities cannot be reliably projected to other cities. The Comptroller does not have data to identify the
[*27]‘fulfillment centers’; in any particular jurisdiction or statewide—it is not a characteristic that is reported to the agency.” 49 Tex. Reg. 2444. Further, “even if [the] agency could identify ‘fulfillment centers’ from its data, the agency could not assume that the fulfillment centers in other cities are sourcing local tax like the Plaintiff cities’ fulfillment centers purportedly are sourcing.” Id. Indeed, the Comptroller determined that “a fulfillment center could reasonably reach a different
conclusion and conclude that it was not automatically a ‘place of business’ for local tax sourcing purposes.” Id. The Comptroller then proceeded to explain in five points why it believes it is reasonable that a fulfillment center could come to a different conclusion than the Plaintiff Cities. Id. The level of detail required on each individual taxpaying entity throughout the entire state makes such a detailed estimate as the Plaintiff Cities demand impossible. As another example, the Comptroller outlined the impracticability of preparing a revenue impact estimate based on individual municipalities or large taxpaying entities, stating that “it would require the audit of Dell and any other vendor from whom the city thinks there will be a revenue loss.” 49 Tex. Reg. 2445. The Comptroller then laid out the analysis it would have to make. First, “a local sales tax audit of Dell would have to examine all the business locations of Dell to determine which, if any, of the locations were ‘places of business’ for local tax sourcing purposes.” Id. Second, “if the comptroller verifies that Dell in fact operated a single ‘place of business’ in Texas, the comptroller would still have to audit the sourcing of Dell’s sales to determine which sales were complaint and which sales were noncompliant with the proposed rule.” Id. Third, “the comptroller would have to
[*28]thoroughly audit Dell and any other vendors from whom Round Rock thinks there will be revenue loss.” Id. Finally, the Comptroller would be “[r]epeating this audit exercise on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis across the state.” Id. The Comptroller also noted that, even with this analysis, “[i]t is also possible that an audit of Dell or other vendors would identify noncompliance with sourcing provisions that are not involved in the disputed rulemaking.” Id.
Rule 3.334 requires taxpayers to review their current sourcing methodology and come into compliance with the specificities of Rule 3.334. The current method by which any individual taxpayer sources is not known to the Comptroller and cannot feasibly be determined by the Comptroller. 49 Tex. Reg. 2444. Thus, the Comptroller thoroughly prepared revenue impact statements and fiscal impact statements that identified and put the public on notice of the factors and components that would go into such assessments. In doing so, the Comptroller substantially complied with the contested notice requirements of Section 2001.024 of the APA. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.024; see Methodist Hosps. of Dallas, 798 S.W.2d at 654. Here, the Comptroller provided notice of potential loss of revenue and fiscal impact, detailed out what information it would need to provide a comprehensive analysis, and further explained why the Comptroller would not be able to provide a detailed analysis. The Comptroller substantially complied with the notice requirements of the Texas APA.
[*29]2. The Fiscal Note requirement should not be read to require more than is possible. The Texas APA does not predicate a standard of impractical specificity. Otherwise, any rule by the Comptroller where a detailed estimate is not feasible
would be voided if challenged in court. Such a precedent delays the uniformity and efficiency in the Comptroller’s responsibility to administer the Texas Tax Code and hinders taxpayers’ understanding and the implementation of the taxing regulations.
Most importantly, the statutory language itself does not require the Comptroller to prepare a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction report on the estimated increased or decreased costs or increases or decreases in revenue as a result of the rule. The notice is not required to be as detailed as that. The Comptroller’s Chief Revenue Estimator made the estimates as required by the statute. See 49 Tex. Reg. 2440–42. The law does not require impossibilities of any person. It is therefore absurd to find that Texas Government Code sections 2001.024 and 2001.035 demand that the Comptroller provide reports that contain data stated with a precision beyond
what is obtainable from what the Comptroller traditionally collects and has, or even taxpayer data which the Comptroller could reasonably collect and analyze. The statute should not be construed as requiring a level of specificity beyond what is
realistically possible. See Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex. 2011). Before the trial court, Plaintiff Cities did not contend that the Comptroller was incorrect in saying it could not ascertain the effect on revenue of the cost to comply with the change in Rule 3.334, or that the Comptroller was incorrect in the information it would need. CR 2636, 2699. Rather, Plaintiff Cities claimed that it is unfair for the Comptroller to regulate in an area it is charged with enforcing, if it
[*30]cannot make an exact estimate in every instance of regulation. Id. But the standard Plaintiff Cities promote and by which the court below decided is not substantial compliance with the Texas APA.
B. The Comptroller’s Adverse Economic Effect Notice substantially complied with the APA Round Rock asserted that the “Comptroller did not follow the procedures that protect small businesses and rural communities from adverse economic effects.” CR 2638. Round Rock specifically complained that the April 2024 Notice “does not include an economic impact statement or regulatory flexibility analysis.” Id. Section 2001.024 of the APA requires that the published notice of a rule include “any other statement required by law,” and that one such “other statement” is that required by Section 2006.002, the Adverse Economic Effect Notice. See Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 2001.024, 2006.002(c); Unified Loans, Inc. v. Pettijohn, 955 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.). Agencies considering adoption of a rule that would have an adverse economic effect on small businesses or rural communities must prepare:
(1) an economic impact statement that estimates the number of small businesses or rural communities subject to the proposed rule, projects the economic impact of the rule on small businesses or rural communities, and describes alternative methods of achieving the purpose of the proposed rule; and
(2) a regulatory flexibility analysis that includes the agency’s consideration of alternative methods of achieving the purpose of the proposed rule. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2006.002(c). Failure to substantially comply with the procedural requirements in Sections 2001.0225 through 2001.034, including Section 2001.024, is grounds to render a rule voidable. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.035(a). The Comptroller followed the Adverse Economic Effect Notice requirements
[*31]found in Section 2006.002(c) of the APA. At the outset, the Comptroller noted that it could not identify and quantify the businesses and transactions that might be affected or the positive or negative revenue impact on each tax jurisdiction. 49 Tex.
Reg. 2448. Then, in a section of its notice titled “Economic impact statement and regulatory flexibility analysis,” the Comptroller gave notice of potential effects to small businesses and rural communities. Id. First, the Comptroller noted that changes in revenue would tend to be “cities with Local Government Code, Chapter 380 agreements involving rebates of local sales and use tax revenues.” Id. Then, the
Comptroller said that many small businesses would not be affected, as a “small business that has all of its operations at a single location in Texas, including sales and fulfillment, is probably reporting local sales tax to the taxing jurisdiction where it is
located, and it will continue that reporting.” Id. Additionally, to address the agency’s consideration of alternative methods of achieving the purpose of the proposed rule, the Comptroller amply detailed the alternatives it considered. Id. The Comptroller
was required to state the grounds for its conclusions, and it did so. See Pettijohn, 955 S.W.2d at 651 (holding that a rulemaking agency must state in the notice some basis in order that interested persons might know and confront that basis in a meaningful way in their comments). The Comptroller provided an economic impact statement and regulatory
[*32]flexibility analysis, explained extensively throughout its notice what information would be needed to make such analysis, and further detailed its commentary and analysis where possible. 49 Tex. Reg. 2448. Thus, the Comptroller has substantially complied with its obligations under Texas Government Code section 2006.002(c) to provide an economic impact statement and regulatory flexibility analysis for small businesses, micro-businesses, and rural communities. Any interested entities were
on notice of the Comptroller’s economic effect analysis and had the opportunity to contribute meaningfully in the rulemaking process, complying with the Legislature’s intent in drafting section 2006.002 of the Texas Government Code. Proper notice was given, and this Court should reverse the trial court and render judgment for the Comptroller.
III. The Comptroller substantially complied with the APA’s reasoned justification requirement. The APA requires an agency to provide a “reasoned justification” when adopting rules. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.033. The statute states that the final order adopting a rule must include a reasoned justification for the rule as adopted consisting solely of:
(A) a summary of comments received from parties interested in the rule that shows the names of interested groups or associations offering comment on the rule and whether they were for or against its adoption; (B) a summary of the factual basis for the rule as adopted which demonstrates a rational connection between the factual basis for the rule and the rule as adopted; and
[*33](C) the reasons why the agency disagrees with party submissions and proposals [. . . .] Id. The trial court held that the Comptroller did not substantially comply with the reasoned justification requirement in adopting Rule 3.334. CR 2847. The trial court did not specify how the Comptroller violated the reasoned justification requirement.
There is no serious contention that the Comptroller did not comply with the first element—the requirement that the agency include in its final order “a summary of comments received from parties interested in the rule that shows the names of interested groups or associations offering comment on the rule and whether they were for or against its adoption . . . .” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.033(a)(1)(A). The Comptroller did just that in its June 2024 Order. 49 Tex. Reg. 4797-808. Therefore, the Comptroller will address the second two prongs of reasoned justification: in section III.A. below, the Comptroller demonstrates that it provided a summary of factual basis that demonstrates a rational connection between the factual
basis and the rule; and in section III.B., below, the Comptroller demonstrates that it gave reasons it disagreed with comments. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.033(a)(1). Once again, the standard for reviewing an agency’s reasoned justification requirement
compliance is substantial compliance. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.033(a)(1); see Reliant Energy, Inc., 62 S.W.3d at 840. An agency rule not adopted in substantial compliance with the APA is voidable. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.035(a); Reliant Energy, Inc., 62
S.W.3d at 840.
[*34]An order adopting a rule will substantially comply with the reasoned justification requirement when it demonstrates “in a relatively clear and logical
fashion that the rule is a reasonable means to a legitimate objective.” Patient Advocates of Tex. v. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 80 S.W.3d 66, 73 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 136 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. 2004) (citing Methodist Hosps. of Dallas, 798 S.W.2d at 657-59). The four corners of the agency’s final notice must present the agency’s justification in a relatively clear, precise, and logical fashion. Reliant Energy, Inc., 62 S.W.3d at 840.
When reviewing an agency order for a reasoned justification, a court should look to the full order. See Lambright v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 157 S.W.3d 499, 504 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.). This includes both the preamble and reply comments. See Patient Advocates of Tex., 80 S.W.3d at 72-74 (discussing how the reasoned justification requirement was met by explanation contained in the preamble). The full April 2024 Notice and June 2024 Order were provided to the trial court as exhibits and are contained in the Appendix to this brief. But the trial court is not to review beyond the rule making record. Lambright, 157 S.W.3d at 504. By requiring an agency to expressly state the reasoned justification for a rule, the Legislature did not intend to create a situation where the underlying factual accuracy of the events, conditions, and circumstances received and relied upon by the agency would be attacked. ARCO Oil & Gas Co., 876 S.W.2d at 480. Instead, courts simply apply an arbitrary and capricious standard in determining whether an agency order has substantially complied with the reasoned justification requirement. Id. at 490-91; see also State Office of Pub. Util. Counsel, 131 S.W.3d at 328.
[*35]A. The Comptroller’s rulemaking record is exhaustive in its factual summary and rational connection The second element in the reasoned justification requirement is that the
agency includes in its final order “a summary of the factual basis for the rule as adopted which demonstrates a rational connection between the factual basis for the rule and the rule as adopted . . . .” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.033(a)(1)(B).
1. The Comptroller summarized the factual bases for the Rule. The Comptroller’s extensive factual support for Rule 3.334 is summarized in the June 2024 Order. 49 Tex. Reg. 4797. But there is little guidance within the APA on how the factual bases for the rule must be summarized. Courts, however, have said that so long as the factual bases can be gleaned from the entirety of the rulemaking, it will be held to substantially comply. Gulf Coast Coal. of Cities v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 161 S.W.3d 706, 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (examining the final order in its entirety and accepting factual basis when provided in summary of comments.). In its June 2024 Order, the Comptroller started by summarizing the background leading to the need to adopt Rule 3.334. See 49 Tex. Reg. 4797-98 (“Summary of the Factual Bases for the Rule – Background”). The Comptroller stated that many of the provisions (which are unchallenged here) of amended Rule 3.334 were promulgated to implement legislative bills or address compliance with a Supreme Court case. 49 Tex. Reg. 4798. Other factual bases are listed throughout the order.
[*36]Importantly, the Comptroller gave factual bases summaries for the parts of Rule 3.334 that were challenged by Plaintiff Cities: Rule 3.334(a)(18), (b)(5), and (c).
See 49 Tex. Reg. 4798, 4799, 4801, 4805, 4807. Below is a list of section headings, each of which contains factual bases in the paragraphs that follow:
• Summary of the Factual Bases for the Rule – Background • Summary of the Factual Bases for the Rule - Subsection (a)(18) - The definition of “place of business of the seller.”
• Summary of the Factual Bases for the Rule - Subsection (b)(5) - A facility without sales personnel is usually not a “place of business of the seller.” • Summary of the Factual Bases for the Rule - Subsections (b)(1) and (c)(7) - Distributions centers, manufacturing plants, storage yards, and warehouses, and when and where an order is “received.” • Summary of the Factual Bases for the Rule - Subsection (c) - Application of the consummation rules. 49 Tex. Reg. 4797-806. The Plaintiff Cities may not like the factual bases summarized, but it is not plausible to contend that the Comptroller did not summarize them. The summary is extensive, appears within the June 2024 Order, and substantially complies with the statutory requirements. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.033(a)(1)(B).
2. The Comptroller demonstrated a rational connection between the factual bases and the rule as adopted. The APA requires that an agency’s reasoned justification must include summarized factual bases for its rule that demonstrate “a rational connection between the factual basis for the rule and the rule as adopted . . . .” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.033(a)(1)(B). An agency substantially complies with the requirement when it explains how and why it reached its conclusion. State Office of Pub. Util. Counsel, 131
[*37]S.W.3d at 327 (citing Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.035(a)). Any question of substantial compliance must be determined solely from the face of the adopting order. Gulf Coast Coal. Of Cities, 161 S.W.3d at 713. In substantially complying with the reasoned justification requirement, the agency only must minimally demonstrate “in a relatively clear and logical fashion that the rule is a reasonable means to a legitimate objective.” Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.035(c); see Farm & Ranch Freedom All., 2025
WL 994190, at *7. A reviewing court examines whether the agency’s explanation of the facts and policy concerns it relied on when it adopted the rule demonstrates that the agency considered all the factors relevant to the objectives of the agency’s delegated rulemaking authority and engaged in reasoned decision-making. See ARCO Oil & Gas Co., 876 S.W.2d at 491. An agency adopting a rule need not demonstrate that its rulemaking decision is the only reasonable or factually defensible policy alternative. Texas Medical Ass’n v. Tex. Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 137 S.W.3d 342, 354 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004). In other words, the Comptroller’s order adopting the Rule should explain how and why the Comptroller reached its conclusion. See, e.g, State Office of Pub. Util. Counsel, 131 S.W.3d at 327; Reliant Energy, Inc., 62 S.W.3d at 840. Thus, the Comptroller needs only to demonstrate that there is a rational connection between the rule and the factual material it has received or otherwise considered, and that the rule was a legitimate and factually defensible choice that complies with the multiple statutory requirements of the code. Id.
[*38]The Comptroller demonstrated a rational connection between the factual basis and the rule as adopted. The Comptroller extensively discussed the factual,
policy, and legal bases for Rule 3.334, based on both the agency’s research and commentary made during the rulemaking process in its final order. The Comptroller’s initial preamble in the April 2024 Notice, bolstered by its additional comments and summary in the June 2024 Order, clearly and exhaustively explain the Comptroller’s reasons for adopting Rule 3.334. Both the notice and the order are abound with demonstrations of the rational connection.
For example, the Comptroller provided a detailed factual summary for the promulgation of Rule 3.334(a)(18). The Comptroller explained that local sales and use taxes are generally sourced to where a sale is consummated. Tex. Tax Code § 321.203; 49 Tex. Reg. 4798. There are a few potential locations to where a local sales tax can be sourced: where the order was received, fulfilled, or delivered to the customer. Tex. Tax Code § 321.203. Sourcing is affected by the manner in which the order is placed, which involves determining where the seller’s “place of business” in Texas is located. Id. The Tax Code defines “place of business of the retailer” in 82 words. Tex. Tax Code § 321.002(a)(3)(A). But “place of business” is a term of art, and many business activities can be conducted at a location without that location becoming a “place of business” for local tax sourcing. The statutory definition for “place of business” sets forth a combination of elements that lead to the Comptroller’s interpretation that one factor indicating whether a location is a “place of business” is the presence of sales personnel. Thus, the Comptroller promulgated Rule 3.334(a)(18), which sets forth additional criteria for determining if a location is a place of business—none of which are inconsistent with the underlying statutory definition. Instead, the additional criteria help taxpayers and the government to
[*39]objectively determine whether a location is a “place of business” which provides clarity and certainty to relatively complicated process of sales tax sourcing. The Comptroller engaged in similarly detailed explanations for the three other challenged rule provisions: Rule 3.334(a)(9) at 49 Tex. Reg. 4801–02; Rule 3.334(b)(5) at 49 Tex. Reg. 4799; and Rule 3.334(c) at 49 Tex. Reg. 4805. Moreover, the Comptroller gave summaries that demonstrate the rational connection for all of
promulgated Rule 3.334 in both the April 2024 Notice and June 2024 Order. The Comptroller’s extensive explanation of the facts and policy concerns relied on in adopting the rule demonstrates that it considered all the factors relevant to the objectives of its delegated rulemaking authority and engaged in reasoned decision-making. Therefore, under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the Comptroller substantially complied with the reasoned-justification requirement of the APA. As noted above, the Comptroller need not demonstrate that its rulemaking decision is the only reasonable or factually defensible policy alternative. Tex. Medical Ass’n, 137 S.W.3d at 354. Rather, the Comptroller needs only to demonstrate that there is a rational connection between the rule and the factual material it has received or otherwise considered, and that the rule was a legitimate and factually defensible choice that complies with the statutory requirements of the code. Id.
[*40]3. The Comptroller’s rational connection was not arbitrary and capricious. Courts review a challenge to the rational connection requirement using an
“arbitrary and capricious” standard and not presuming that facts exist to support the agency’s order. Id. at 353. An agency acts arbitrarily if, in making a decision, it commits any of the following errors: (1) omits from its consideration a factor that the
Legislature intended the agency to consider in the circumstances; (2) includes in its consideration an irrelevant factor; or (3) reaches a completely unreasonable result after weighing only relevant factors. Statewide Convoy Transps. Inc. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 753 S.W.2d 800, 804 (Tex. App.—Austin 1988, no writ); see also Bullock v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 628 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex. 1982) (stating a rule is arbitrary and capricious when it lacks a legitimate reason to support it). The Comptroller will demonstrate its compliance with these standards.
a. The Comptroller considered only the Legislatively mandated factors. An agency’s reasoned justification is arbitrary if in making its rational connection the agency omits from consideration a factor the Legislature intended the agency to consider in the circumstances or includes in its consideration an irrelevant factor. Farm & Ranch Freedom All., 2025 WL 994190, at *7 (citing Lambright, 157
S.W.3d at 505). In determining the factors, courts “consider each substantive element set out in the statute.” Reliant Energy, Inc., 62 S.W.3d at 841. The Comptroller properly considered all legislatively mandated factors and did not consider any irrelevant factors. The Legislature has granted the Comptroller broad discretion in adopting rules related to the Texas Tax Code. See, e.g., Tex. Tax Code §§ 111.002, 151.0595(j), 321.306, 322.203. In considering whether an agency has omitted from its
[*41]consideration a legislatively intended factor, or considered an irrelevant factor, courts have looked to the express mandates from the Legislature. For example, the Third Court found that the Public Utility Commission of Texas’ (“PUC”) statutory mandate was to “protect the public interest to and in the establishment of a fully competitive electric power industry.” Reliant Energy, Inc., 62 S.W.3d 833 at 841. In adopting rules, the PUC was mandated to “make and enforce rules necessary to
protect customers … consistent with the public interest.” Id. at 835 n.1. And the Legislature expressed specifically how the PUC was to adjust certain fuel charges. Id. at 841 (citing Tex. Util. Code § 39.202). If the PUC failed to follow those legislative factors in its rulemaking, it would have failed in its reasoned justification. Id. The Legislature is well equipped to require an agency to explicitly consider certain factors, as they have done with many agencies. For example, at issue in Lambright was a Texas Parks and Wildlife Department rule reducing the shrimping season and expanding nursery areas. Lambright, 157 S.W.3d at 502. The Legislature required Parks and Wildlife to consider six factors before issuing rules regarding the catching, possession, purchase, and sale of shrimp. See Tex. Parks & Wild. Code § 77.007(b)(1)–(6). The Legislature’s grant to the Comptroller is not nearly so limiting. No explicit factors are found in the statutes enacted by the Legislature, as with the PUC or Parks and Wildlife. See, e.g, Tex. Tax Code §§ 111.002, 151.0595(j), 321.306, 322.203, 323.306. To the extent the rule-making delegation does contain factors, they are generally to “adopt rules that do not conflict with the laws of this state or
[*42]the constitution of this state or the United States for the enforcement … and collection of taxes.” Tex. Tax Code § 111.002. More specifically, the grants of legislative authority that the Comptroller cited in the April 2024 Notice and June 2024 Order put the following restrictions on the Comptroller’s rules:
• To “reflect changes in the power of this state to collect taxes and enforce the provisions of this title due to changes in the constitution or laws of the United States and judicial interpretations thereof.” Tex. Tax Code § 111.102(a). • Be “consistent with [Chapter 321] for the administration, collection, reporting, and enforcement of this chapter.” Tex. Tax Code § 321.306. • Be “consistent with [Chapter 322] for the administration, collection, and enforcement of this chapter and for the reporting of taxes imposed under this chapter.” Tex. Tax Code § 322.203. • Be “consistent with [Chapter 323] for the administration, collection, reporting, and enforcement of this chapter.” Tex. Tax Code § 323.306. Those are the only factors the Legislature has required the Comptroller to consider.
For purposes of reasoned justification, the Comptroller need show only that Rule 3.334 does not conflict with the laws or constitution and that they are promulgated for the enforcement and collection of taxes, as articulated in the above statutes. The Comptroller did just that. Its June 2024 Order reflects that the principal policy reason for the adoption of the rule is to provide guidance to taxpayers and auditors regarding the application of the local sales and use tax consummation statutes. 49 Tex. Reg. 4797. The rational connection between the factual basis for the rule and the rule as adopted is amply demonstrated within the June 2024 Order.
[*43]See 49 Tex. Reg. 4801-07. First, it explained how the use of sales personnel is consistent with the general objectives of the local tax statute and detailed why the term “place of business” must be read within the context of the Tax Code and why in the statutory context, the term has a narrower meaning than ordinary usage. 49 Tex. Reg. 4798. The Comptroller next expanded on the controlling statutes’ singular usage of “the place of business.” 49 Tex. Reg. 4802. And the Comptroller explained
how its understanding of the statute, as reflected in the rule, provides clarification regarding the consummation statutes and means they can be applied with greater certainty. Id. Additionally, regarding the treatment of single places of business, the Comptroller explained that its interpretation is reasonable under the controlling statute, and how a conflicting interpretation would lead to no rational connection or sufficient governmental interest in the state’s local taxation scheme. 49 Tex. Reg. 4805. These explanations contained within the June 2024 Order show that the Comptroller not only considered the proper legislative factors, but demonstrated the rational connection between the factual bases and the rule as adopted.
b. The Comptroller did not reach a completely unreasonable result. An agency acts arbitrarily in making a decision if it reaches a completely unreasonable result after weighing only relevant factors. Farm & Ranch Freedom All., 2025 WL 994190, at *7 (citing Lambright, 157 S.W.3d at 505). Courts should avoid striking down agency action unless they feel competent to find that the agency has clearly acted unreasonably. Gerst v. Nixon, 411 S.W.2d 350, 360 n.8 (Tex. 1966). 6 Neither Round Rock nor Coppell offered another explanation for how the
[*44]Comptroller’s rule was a completely unreasonable result. And there is nothing in the four corners of the June 2024 Order that allowed for the trial court to conclude that the Comptroller reached an unreasonable result. Nevertheless, some examples of the reasonableness of the result are offered:
• The Comptroller offered a reason for adoption of the rule as “to provide guidance to taxpayers and auditors regarding the application of the local sales and use tax consummation statutes.” 49 Tex. Reg. 4797. • The Comptroller explained that the “sales personnel” language in its definition of place of business of a retailer is to provide an objective criterion for buyers, sellers, and auditors to consider. 49 Tex. Reg. 4798. • The Comptroller explained how the sales personnel language is consistent with the general objectives of the local tax statute. 49 Tex. Reg. 4799. • The Comptroller explained that broad, every-day usage of the term “place of business” does not include computer servers, Internet protocol addresses, and websites. 49 Tex. Reg. 4799. • The Comptroller explained that its interpretation is practical and will facilitate uniformity and ease of administration for taxpayers and auditors. 49 Tex. Reg. 4799.
6 This language comes from dicta from a footnote in the 1966 Supreme Court of Texas. It is in fact
the court quoting a law review article about the benefits of administrative agency rules. It appears to be the source for the “unreasonable result” line of inquiry. See also City of El Paso v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Tex. 1994) (citing Gerst and stating “An agency’s decision is arbitrary … if the agency: (1) failed to consider a factor the legislature directs it to consider; (2) considers an irrelevant factor; or (3) weighs only relevant factors that the legislature directs it to consider but still reaches a completely unreasonable result.”).
[*45]• The Comptroller concluded that the best way to treat computer servers consistently and coherently is to uniformly recognize that they are not an “established outlet, office, or location” and do not constitute places of business of the seller. 49 Tex. Reg. 4799. “To satisfy the reasoned justification requirement, an agency’s order adopting a rule must explain how and why the agency reached the conclusion it did.” Reliant Energy, Inc., 62 S.W.3d at 839. The four corners rule requires that a reviewing
court consider the adequacy of the agency’s reasoned justification from the rulemaking record itself. Lambright, 157 S.W.3d at 504. Extrinsic material is forbidden. Id. (stating that “[a] reviewing court must confine its search for a reasoned justification to the four corners of the order finally adopting the rule . . . .”). The Comptroller met its obligation to show there is a rational connection between the rule and the factual material it has received or otherwise considered, and that the rule was a legitimate and factually defensible choice that complies with the multiple statutory requirements of the code. See Tex. Medical Ass’n, 137 S.W.3d at 342.
B. The Comptroller gave the reasons why the agency disagrees with party submissions and proposals. As part of its reasoned justification, an agency must outline the reasons why the agency disagrees with party submissions and proposals that were submitted as part of the notice and comment rulemaking procedure. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.033(a)(1)(C). The Comptroller specifically addressed why it disagreed with
each and every party submission and proposal in its June 2024 Order. The Comptroller’s responses are sufficient to satisfy the substantial compliance requirement of the APA. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.035(c). The Comptroller’s responses demonstrate in a clear and logical fashion that the rule is a reasonable means to a legitimate objective. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.035(c). The reasonableness of the responses to all party submissions and proposals is apparent from the face of
[*46]the June 2024 Order. See 49 Tex. Reg. 4797-808. To comply with Texas Government Code section 2001.033, the Comptroller needs only to provide the reasons why the agency disagrees with Round Rock’s comments. Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.033(a)(1)(C); Reliant Energy, Inc., 62 S.W.3d at 843. As outlined above in Part III.A and this Part III.B, the Comptroller provided an extensive reasoned justification as to why it disagreed with the submitted comments,
as well as a reasoned justification for the rule as a whole. Here, the four corners of the agency’s June 2024 Order presents the agency’s reasoned justification in a “relatively clear, precise, and logical fashion.” ARCO Oil & Gas Co., 876 S.W.2d at 492. At trial, Round Rock made claims that the Comptroller did not adequately address its comments. Round Rock asserted that the June 2024 Order did not address its comments requesting a reasoned justification in three specific areas: (1) the APA’s Notice Requirements; (2) the Comptroller’s Authority to adopt the Rule; and (3) Small and Micro-Businesses. CR 2639. The Comptroller responded sufficiently to each comment as demonstrated below, such that this Court should reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment in favor of the Comptroller. First, Round Rock asserted that, “[t]he Comptroller’s inability to comply with the notice requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act means the Comptroller cannot adopt the rule amendments.” CR 2639. As explained in Parts II.A and II.B above, the Comptroller substantially complied with the notice requirements of the APA. The City of Round Rock improperly framed the Comptroller’s detailed and thorough explanation of each notice requirement of the APA as an inability to
[*47]comply. See 49 Tex. Reg. 4808. The Comptroller gave reasons why the agency disagreed with Round Rock’s notice comments. Second, Round Rock claimed “[t]he Comptroller does not have the authority to adopt Rule 3.334(c).” CR 2639. The Comptroller responded with a “statement of the statutory and other authority under which the rule is adopted” detailing Sections 111.002, 321.306, 322.203, and 323.306 of the Tax Code as providing statutory
authority for the Comptroller’s actions. 49 Tex. Reg. 4808. Further, throughout its order detailing the bases on which it has the authority to adopt the provision, the Comptroller explained how the June 2024 Order is within the scope of the controlling statutes. 49 Tex. Reg. 4805. Round Rock’s dislike of the Comptroller’s exercise of its legislatively granted rulemaking authority does not equate to a lack of delegation of rulemaking authority by the Legislature or the Comptroller’s permitted use of this authority. Nor does it show that the Comptroller did not substantially comply with the APA when it made its responses to Round Rock’s comments in the June 2024 Order. Finally, Round Rock argued that the Comptroller did not address its comment that “[t]he addition of (b)(6) does nothing to reduce the adverse economic effects of Rule 3.334 on small and micro-businesses.” CR 2639. The Comptroller responded that it had considered small and micro-businesses in its June 2024 Order. 49 Tex. Reg. 4806-07. The Comptroller explained that it would presume these businesses conducted all their business operations out of a single location. Id. From this record, the Comptroller clearly considered any “adverse economic effects of Rule 3.334 on small and micro-businesses” and took steps in the rulemaking to ameliorate those
[*48]effects. CR 2639. Coppell did not make a specific complaint about the adequacy of the Comptroller’s responses under Texas Government Code section 2001.033(a)(1)(C). See, e.g, CR 2396 (Coppell Fifth Amended Petition); CR 2682 (Coppell Trial Brief ). However, in its trial brief, Coppell complained that the Rule “contradicts the evidence contained in comments” that Coppell submitted to the Comptroller. CR
2693. But the Comptroller responded to the comments made by Coppell and its representatives. 49 Tex. Reg. 4797, 4799, 4804, & 4807. Coppell did complain that it submitted the report of an expert who opined on how websites work. CR 2693. Coppell asserted that the Rule “contradicts this evidence, and is, therefore, unreasonable and arbitrary and capricious.” CR 2693. But it is not necessary that every opining expert agrees with the basis for the rules. To the extent the trial court ruled against the Comptroller on Texas Government Code section 2001.033(a)(1)(C) grounds, the judgment should be reversed. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
In cases involving rule making, the only evidence the reviewing court should consider is the four-corners of the rule itself. That includes the April 2024 Notice and the June 2024 Order. The entirety of both documents were part of the trial
record and are attached in the Appendix. Together, the two notices comprise a lengthy and comprehensive administrative record that show the Comptroller has substantially complied with the APA. This case is far from the sort where an agency hand-waved away its responsibilities to keep the public informed of the reasons for a rule. The thorough and thoughtful analysis engaged in by experts at the
[*49]Comptroller’s office in adopting Rule 3.334 should not be lightly overturned. For the above reasons, Appellee/Cross-Appellant requests that the Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment that Appellee/Cross- Appellant substantially complied with the APA, provided a “reasoned justification” for the rule, and hold that Rule 3.334 is valid in its entirety.
[*50]Certificate of Compliance
This document complies with the typeface requirement of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14- point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the word-count limitations of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i), if applicable, because it contains 13,606 words, excluding any parts exempted by Tex. R. App. 9.4(i)(1), as counted by the computer program used to prepare this document.
/s/ Kyle Pierce Counce KYLE PIERCE COUNCE Certificate of Service I certify that a copy of this document was served on all counsel of record by e- mail and/or e-service on September 26, 2025.
James B. Harris Cindy Olson Bourland [email protected] [email protected] Stephen F. Fink BOURLAND LAW FIRM, PC [email protected] P.O. Box 546 Reed C. Randel Round Rock, Texas 78680 [email protected] Richard B. Phillips, Jr. Bryan Dotson [email protected] [email protected] HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP CHAMBERLAIN, HRDLINKA, WHITE, 1722 Routh Street, Suite 1500 WILLIAMS, & AUGHTRY, P.C. Dallas, Texas 75201 112 East Pecan Street, Suite 1450 (214) 964-9500 San Antonio, Texas 78205 (210) 278-5844 Brandon L. King Counsel for Appellee [email protected] HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP 98 San Jacinto Boulevard, Suite 1900 Austin, Texas 78701 Counsel for Appellants/Cross-Appellees /s/ Kyle Pierce Counce KYLE PIERCE COUNCE
[*51]INDEX OF APPENDICES
Final Judgment ...................................................................................... Appendix A
Conclusions of Law ................................................................................ Appendix B
49 Tex. Reg. 2440–57 (Apr. 29, 2024) (“April 2024 Notice”) .............. Appendix C
49 Tex. Reg. 4797–4808 (June 28, 2024) (“June 2024 Order”)............ Appendix D
[*52]APPENDIX A
12/03/2024 11:08:06 AM Velva L. Price District Clerk Travis County D-1-GN-21-003198 CAUSE NO. D-1-GN-21-003198* (Consolidated with D-1-GN-21-003203)
CITY OF COPPELL, TEXAS, § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CITY OF HUMBLE, TEXAS, § CITY OF DESOTO, TEXAS, § CITY OF CARROLLTON, TEXAS, § CITY OF FARMERS BRANCH, TEXAS, and § CITY OF ROUND ROCK, TEXAS, § § Plaintiffs, § TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS v. § § GLENN HEGAR, in his official capacity § as Comptroller of Public Accounts of § the State of Texas, § § Defendant. § 201ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT § (*Assigned to the 250th District)