Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 379 U.S. 199 (1964). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States, 379 U.S. 199 (1964).
Supreme Court of the United StatesPublished opinionNo. 130Dec 14, 1964

Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. United States

Quick Summary

When the Commission omits requested job protection provisions from its approval orders, it must specifically explain why each provision is included or omitted.

Railway employees challenged Interstate Commerce Commission orders approving a railroad's acquisition of control of another railway, contending the orders did not protect employees under specified sections of a job protection agreement. The District Court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court considers whether the Commission must explain its treatment of those requested protective provisions. The Court holds that where an agency's orders do not address requested labor protections, the matter must be remanded so the agency can state why each provision is included or omitted. The judgment is vacated as to those sections and remanded.

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At page 307cited at this page2 citing cases
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    They contended that AFM’s system was prohibited by the requirement of section 101(a)(3)(B) that a dues increase be approved by “majority vote of the delegates voting at a regular convention.” The Court held that a weighted voting system wa…
At page 200“amend its report and order as necessary to deal with appellant's request that sections 4, 5 and 9 be included as protective conditions, specifically indicating why each of these provisions is either omitted or included.”1 citing case1 citing court quotes it
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Railway Labor Executives’ Association Et Al.
v.
United States Et Al.
130.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 14, 1964.
Published opinion
379 U.S. 199
1964 U.S. LEXIS 64
Clarence M. Mulhollarid, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., James L. Highsaw, Jr., William Gi Mahoney. and William H. King for appellants., Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Philip B. Heymann, Robert B. Hummel and Elliott Moyer for the United States; Robert W. Ginnane and Leonard S. Goodman for Interstate Commerce Commission; and Hugh B. Cox, W. Graham Claytor, Jr., and Richard S. Arnold for Southern Railway Co. et al., appellees.
Per Curiam.
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published
Per Curiam.

This appeal is from a judgment of a three-judge District Court, 226 F. Supp. 521, dismissing appellants’ complaint to set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 317 I. C. C. 557, 729, relating to the Southern Railway Company’s acquisition of control through stock, ownership of the Central of Georgia Railway Company. Appellants, representing railway employees, object that under the Commission’s orders, the employees are not protected as provided by §§ 4, 5,[*200] and 0 of the Washington Job Protection- Agreement. We agree with the suggestion of the Solicitor General that this case should be remanded to the Interstate Commerce Commission for clarification of its orders insofar as they relate to the agreement. For this reason, the motion of the Interstate Commerce Commission to affirm the judgment of the District Court is denied. The motion of intervenor-appellees Southern Railway Company and Central of Georgia Railway Company to defer consideration of the jurisdictional statement is denied. Appellants’ motion to limit the appeal to questions related to §§ 4, 5, and 9 of' the Washington Job Piocection Agreement is granted. The judgment oí the District Court is vacated insofar as it relates to §§ 4, 5, and 9 of the Washington Agreement, and this case is remanded to that court with instructions to remand it to the Interstate Commerce Commission with instructions to amend its reports and orders as necessary to deal with appellants’ request that § § 4, 5, and 9 be included as protective conditions, specifically indicating why each of these provisions is either omitted or included. See United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. Co., 294 U. S. 499, 511.

Vacated and remanded.