1 2

3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE

9 10 JUSTIN BAKER, CASE NO. C25-1989JLR 11 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 12 THE EMERALD CONDOS et al., 13 Defendants.

I. INTRODUCTION Before the court are four motions filed by pro se Plaintiff Justin Baker: (1) a motion for a preliminary injunction (MPI (Dkt. # 9)); (2) two motions for United States (“U.S.”) Marshal service of the summons and complaint (MMS1 (Dkt. # 10); MMS2 (Dkt. # 17)); and (3) a motion to appoint counsel (MAC (Dkt. # 11)). Defendants Joe Majewski, CWD Group, and Zach Page (collectively, “Defendants”) have not appeared in this action. (See generally Dkt.) Being fully advised, the court DENIES as moot Mr.

Baker’s motions for U.S. Marshal service and motion for a preliminary injunction and DENIES Mr. Baker’s motion to appoint counsel.

II. BACKGROUND This case arises from a housing dispute between Mr. Baker and Defendants. (See generally Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) (Dkt. # 15).) Mr. Baker is a disabled person who, since May 2025, has resided at the Emerald condominiums (the “Emerald”)— formerly a defendant in this case. (SAC at 3; see Compl. (Dkt. # 5) at 2.) Mr. Majewski and Mr. Page are employed by CWD Group and manage the Emerald’s

homeowner’s association (the “HOA”). (SAC at 3.) Mr. Baker alleges that the Emerald and CWD Group are retaliating against him because (1) he filed a complaint with the City of Seattle asserting that the Emerald overcharged him fees; and (2) he filed a complaint with the City of Seattle Department of Construction & Inspections (“SDCI”) about the habitability of the Emerald. (Id. at 3-4 (describing the nature of the complaints

Mr. Baker made to SDCI).) Mr. Baker also alleges that he and Defendants entered into several disputes pertaining to Mr. Baker’s purported noncompliance with building policies. (See id. (describing disputes pertaining to Mr. Baker’s alleged noncompliance with recycling and trash disposal policies).) Mr. Baker contends that the Emerald’s staff have responded to his filing of reports with the City by “stalking and harassing” him and

by surveilling him by “taking photos and videos[.]” (Id.) Mr. Majewski and Mr. Page enforce HOA policies for the Emerald. (Id. at 5.) Mr. Baker alleges that he informed Mr. Majewski and Mr. Page of his disabilities as well as his inability to comply with some HOA policies pertaining to physical tasks, and requested accommodations. (Id.) He asserts that the HOA created “bylaws that discriminate against [him]” and acts to enforce such laws. (Id.) For example, Mr. Baker

alleges that he requested and was denied a parking spot at the Emerald for his physical therapist who periodically visits the Emerald for appointments. (Id.) Mr. Baker filed his original complaint on October 15, 2025. (See Compl. (Dkt. # 5).) He filed the operative second amended complaint on December 2, 20251. (See SAC; see also 11/19/25 Min. Order (granting Mr. Baker leave to amend).) Mr. Baker raises claims against Defendants for (1) defamation, 28 U.S.C. § 4101; (2) violations of

Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) regulations; (3) violations of the FHA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3617; (4) violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12203, 12181, 12182; and (5) disclosure of personal information, 15 U.S.C. § 6802. (See generally SAC.) Mr. Baker seeks (1) $80 million U.S. dollars or the maximum allowable damages for punitive, treble, and compensatory damages, (2) injunctive relief,

and (3) an order that Defendants be monitored for at least 24 months to prevent further unlawful acts and to ensure a non-hostile environment at his home. (See SAC at 25.) On November 10, 2025, Mr. Baker moved for a preliminary injunction, in which he seeks assistance with a transfer from his current condo unit that he resides in to a different condo unit within the same building. (See generally MPI.) He asserts that

1 Mr. Baker’s second amended complaint is 26 single-spaced pages and is not “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [Mr. Baker] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. 21 P. 8(a)(2); (see generally SAC). The court declines to “piece together the basis of [his] claim[s].” Baker v. Avenue5 Residential, No. C24-01862JHC, 2025 WL 1207666, at *3 (W.D. 22 Wash. Apr. 25, 2025) (citation omitted). former defendant Sea to Sky Management and the current Defendants may have been unlawfully withholding the new condo unit in retaliation for reporting alleged housing

violations. (See MPI at 2.) III. ANALYSIS Mr. Baker is a pro se litigant proceeding in this litigation in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (See 10/15/25 Order (Dkt. # 4) (granting Mr. Baker IFP status).) A court must dismiss at any time an IFP complaint that is (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Additionally, because Mr. Baker is proceeding pro se, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants. See, e.g., Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997). The court first reviews Mr.

Baker’s claims pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) and then, for any surviving claims, reviews the substance of his motions. A. Mr. Baker’s claim for defamation is dismissed. Mr. Baker alleges a claim for defamation under 28 U.S.C. § 4101. (See SAC at 6.) The Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act

(the “SPEECH” Act) is a 2010 federal law enacted to protect American authors, journalists, and publishers from libel tourism. See 28 U.S.C. § 4101. The statute generally makes foreign defamation judgments unenforceable in U.S. courts unless they comply with U.S. free speech and due process protections. Id. The SPEECH Act does not confer a private right of action. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101, 4102; see also Baker, 2025 WL 1207666 at *2 (dismissing with prejudice Mr. Baker’s claim for defamation under 28

U.S.C. § 4101 for failure to state a claim). Thus, the court dismisses Mr. Baker’s claim for a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 4101 with prejudice. B. Mr. Baker’s claim for disclosure of personal information is dismissed. Mr. Baker alleges a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 6802, a section of the U.S. code that pertains to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and limits how financial institutions can disclose consumers’ nonpublic personal information to nonaffiliated third parties. (SAC at 7); see

15 U.S.C. § 6802. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act does not confer a private right of action. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802. Thus, the court dismisses Mr. Baker’s claim for a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 6802 with prejudice. C. Mr. Baker’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act are dismissed.

1. Retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 12203 Mr. Baker alleges a claim for retaliation in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203. (See SAC at 7.) To state a claim for retaliation under the ADA, Mr. Baker must show (1) a statutorily protected activity, (2) a materially adverse action, and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203. Mr. Baker does not set forth allegations of this nature against Defendants in the

second amended complaint. (See generally SAC; see also, e.g., id. ¶ 63 (setting forth such allegations against a former defendant).) Although Mr. Baker alleges that CWD Group retaliated against him for reporting to SDCI his building’s issues with water temperature, he does not allege facts showing that he opposed a statutorily protected activity. (See generally SAC; see also id. ¶¶ 29-32 (alleging that the issue with the water temperature was a general building issue that impacted “residents on floors 10 through 15

for several weeks”).) Thus, the court concludes that he fails to state a claim for a violation of the ADA for retaliation and dismisses his claim with prejudice. 2. Public Accommodation, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, 12182 Mr. Baker also alleges a violation of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, 12182. (See SAC at 7.) These sections of the U.S. code prohibit discrimination against individuals with disabilities in places of public accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182.

To prevail on a Title III discrimination claim, Mr. Baker must show that (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) Mr. Baker was denied public accommodations by the defendant because of his disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a)-(b); see also Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007)

(setting forth the requirements to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12182). Title III defines “places of public accommodation” as private entities that own, operate, or lease facilities affecting commerce and fall into one of 12 categories. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7); see also Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (clarifying that “places of public accommodation” are “actual, physical places where

goods or services are open to the public, and places where the public gets those goods or services”). Mr. Baker’s claims all relate to disputes arising from his tenure at his personal residence. (See generally SAC.) Because Mr. Baker does not allege that any of the Defendants own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation, his claim under 1 Title III of the ADA fails as a matter of law. Thus, the court dismisses Mr. Baker’s claim 2 for a violation of Title III of the ADA with prejudice.

3 D. Mr. Baker’s claim for violations of the Fair Housing Act is dismissed in part.

4 1. Refusal to rent, making housing unavailable, discriminatory advertising, misrepresentation of availability, and blockbusting, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (c)-(e)

Mr. Baker alleges a violation of the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), for refusal to rent and for making housing unavailable. (See SAC at 6.) This provision of the FHA makes it unlawful to refuse to sell, rent, or otherwise make unavailable a dwelling to any person based on a protected characteristic. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). Mr. Baker, however, does not allege that Defendants refused to make housing available to him because of his membership in a protected class. (See generally SAC.) In fact, on December 2, 2025, Mr. Baker dismissed from this action the Emerald, which he had alleged committed such a violation.2 (See SAC ¶¶ 26-27, 35 (alleging that a former party to this action unlawfully made housing unavailable to Mr. Baker).) Mr. Baker also reported that he and former Defendant Sea to Sky Management successfully signed a 24-month lease for a new unit within his building. (See generally 12/2/25 Not.) Thus, Mr. Baker has not

2 On December 2, 2025, Mr. Baker filed a notice of settlement dismissing Sea to Sky Management and a second amended complaint in which he did not name the Emerald as a 20 defendant. (See 12/2/25 Not. (Dkt. # 16); see also SAC.) It is well-established in the Ninth Circuit that “an amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as nonexistent.” Ramirez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015) 21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, defendants named in an original complaint who are not named in an amended or subsequent complaint are deemed “dismissed” 22 from the case without further action. plausibly alleged that Defendants refused to make housing available to him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).

Mr. Baker also alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c), for discriminatory advertising; § 3604(d), for misrepresentation of availability; and § 3604(e), for blockbusting, which is a form of housing discrimination designed to induce sales by creating racial tension and exploiting fears about neighborhood decline. (See SAC at 6.) To state a claim for discriminatory advertising, Mr. Baker must “‘show that the defendant made, printed, or published a discriminatory notice, statement or advertisement.’” Baker,

2025 WL 1207666, at *4 (citing Green v. California Ct. Apartments, LLC, No. C07- 0334MJP, 2008 WL 681835, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2008)). To state a claim for misrepresentation of availability, Mr. Baker must show that (1) Defendants falsely represented that a dwelling was not available for inspection, sale, or rental, (2) the dwelling was actually available, and (3) Defendants made the false representation

because of Mr. Baker’s protected characteristic. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d). To state a claim for blockbusting, Mr. Baker must show that (1) Defendants acted for profit, (2) Defendants induced or attempted to induce a person to sell or rent a dwelling, and (3) such inducement was based on representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood of persons of a particular protected class. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e).

Mr. Baker makes no allegations of the nature proscribed by 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c)-(d) against Defendants in his second amended complaint. (See generally SAC.) Thus, the court dismisses his claim for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (c)-(e) with prejudice.

2. Coercion, 42 U.S.C. § 3617 Mr. Baker also alleges a claim for coercion in violation of the FHA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 3617. (See SAC at 7.) To state a claim for coercion, Mr. Baker must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) Defendants subjected him to an adverse action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Baker, 2025 WL 1207666, at *3 (citing Slaughter v. Valley View I LLP, No. C23-1360JLR, 2023 WL 6461058, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2023)). Although Mr. Baker plausibly asserts that he filed complaints with various municipal authorities, he attributes any resulting

adverse actions to a former defendant, rather than one of the instant Defendants. (See SAC at 3-4 (describing Mr. Baker’s complaints with various authorities); see, e.g., id. ¶¶ 21, 23, 37 (alleging that a former defendant subjected Mr. Baker to an adverse action).) Mr. Baker makes only conclusory statements about retaliation by Defendants. (Id. ¶ 21, 46, 66-67); see Baker, 2025 WL 1207666, at *3 (dismissing Mr. Baker’s claim

for coercion for failure to state a claim). Thus, Mr. Baker fails to state a claim for coercion against Defendants and the court dismisses this claim with prejudice. E. Mr. Baker’s claim for violations of Fair Housing Act regulations is dismissed in part. 17 1. Fair Housing Act Poster, 24 C.F.R. § 110.10 18 Mr. Baker alleges a violation of the FHA regulation requiring persons in the 19 business of selling or renting dwellings to post and maintain a Fair Housing Poster at 20 their place of business. (See SAC at 6.); see also 24 C.F.R. § 110.10. This regulation, 21 22 however, does not confer a private right of action.3 See id. Thus, the court dismisses his claim with prejudice.

2. Other Prohibited Sale and Rental Conduct, 24 C.F.R. § 100.70 Mr. Baker alleges a violation of the FHA regulation pertaining to prohibited sale and rental conduct. (See SAC at 6.) This regulation prohibits “steering,” which is conduct that restricts housing choices or makes housing unavailable based on a protected characteristic. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.70. To state a claim for steering, Mr. Baker must show (1) prohibited conduct occurred, (2) because of Mr. Baker’s protected

characteristic, and (3) injury. See id. Mr. Baker makes no allegations of this nature against Defendants in the second amended complaint. (See generally SAC.) Thus, the court dismisses his claim with prejudice. 3. Voluntary Self-Test Privilege, 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.144, 100.145 Mr. Baker alleges violations of FHA regulations pertaining to the scope and

potential loss of an evidentiary privilege related to voluntary self-tests conducted by residential real estate lenders. (See SAC at 6.) These regulations do not create obligations for the general public, but rather apply to the specific entities engaged in fair housing compliance testing. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.144, 100.145. These regulations, however, do not confer a private right of action. See id. Thus, the court dismisses these claims with prejudice.

3 Failure to display the Fair Housing Poster as required is deemed prima facie evidence 21 of a discriminatory housing practice. See 24 C.F.R. § 110.30. An aggrieved party may file a complaint with the Housing and Urban Development’s Office of Fair Housing and Equal 22 Opportunity. Id. 4. Design and Construction Requirements, 24 C.F.R. § 100.205 Mr. Baker alleges a violation of the FHA regulation pertaining to design and

construction requirements for new multifamily dwellings constructed after March 1991. (See SAC at 6.) This regulation applies to the “person or persons who designed or constructed the housing facility[,]” such as developers, builders/contractors, and architects/designers, and sets forth requirements for covered buildings to provide accessible “public and common use areas[,]” doorways, entrances, environmental controls, bathrooms, and kitchens. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(a), (c). Although Mr. Baker

contends that the Emerald’s trash room is not accessible “because disabled individuals are required to go up several stairs to access the room[,]” he has not alleged facts sufficient to show that Defendants “designed or constructed the housing facility” or are otherwise liable for the building’s purportedly inaccessible design. See id.; (see also SAC ¶ 45). Mr. Baker also asserts that “[t]he Emerald delayed repairs and failed to repair

scalding hot water for residents . . . for several weeks, and [Mr. Baker] was burned [as a result.]” (See SAC ¶ 29.) Here, Mr. Baker’s claim fails because the Emerald is no longer party to this action and therefore Mr. Baker cannot plausibly allege that the hot water issue is covered by this regulation. See generally 24 C.F.R. § 100.205(c). Thus, the court dismisses this claim with prejudice.

5. Discriminatory Advertisements, Statements and Notices, 24 C.F.R. § 100.75 20 Mr. Baker alleges a violation of the FHA regulation prohibiting discriminatory 21 advertisements, statements and notices. (See SAC at 6.) This regulation makes it 22 1 unlawful to make, print, or publish any notice or advertisement for the sale or rental of a 2 dwelling that indicates a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on a protected

3 characteristic. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.75. Mr. Baker does not set forth allegations of this 4 nature against Defendants in the second amended complaint. (See generally SAC.) 5 Thus, the court dismisses his claim with prejudice. 6 6. Discriminatory Representations on the Availability of Dwellings, 24 C.F.R. § 100.80 7 Mr. Baker alleges a violation of the FHA regulation that prohibits making 8 discriminatory representations regarding the availability of dwellings. (See SAC at 6.) 9 This FHA regulation expressly bars anyone involved in selling or renting dwellings from 10 providing inaccurate or untrue information about housing to individuals based on their 11 protected status. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.80. Mr. Baker does not set forth allegations of this 12 nature against Defendants in the second amended complaint. (See generally SAC; see 13 also, e.g., id. ¶¶ 8, 26 (alleging that a former defendant temporarily made housing 14 unavailable to Mr. Baker), ¶ 35 (alleging that CWD Group did not make repairs to the 15 building as quickly as Mr. Baker thought possible).) Thus, the court dismisses his claim 16 with prejudice. 17 7. General Prohibitions Against Discrimination Because of Handicap, 24 18 C.F.R. § 100.202

19 Mr. Baker alleges a violation of the FHA regulation prohibiting discrimination 20 based on handicap in housing. (See SAC at 6.) To state a claim for discrimination, Mr. 21 Baker must show (1) he was qualified to rent or buy a dwelling, (2) an adverse action 22 pertaining to the procurement of housing occurred, and (3) that Defendants were motivated by Mr. Baker’s handicap status. 24 C.F.R. § 100.202. Mr. Baker does not set forth allegations of this nature against Defendants in the second amended complaint.

(See generally SAC.) Thus, the court dismisses his claim with prejudice. F. Leave to Amend Having reviewed Mr. Baker’s second amended complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), the court concludes that the following claims survive: (1) violation of FHA regulations pertaining to (i) discrimination, 24 C.F.R. § 100.65; (ii) reasonable accommodations, 24 C.F.R. § 100.204; (iii) prohibited interference, coercion, or

intimidation, 24 C.F.R. § 100.400; (iv) quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment, 24 C.F.R. § 100.600; and (2) discrimination in the sale or rental of housing under the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f). The court orders Mr. Baker to file a third amended complaint addressing only these surviving claims that complies with the requirement that his complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The court puts Mr. Baker on notice that its grant of leave to amend pertains only to the surviving claims enumerated above. The court will not consider any newly added claims or defendants. This ruling is without prejudice to any motion to dismiss Defendants may wish to file in the future. G. Mr. Baker’s motion for preliminary injunction is denied as moot.

On November 10, 2025, Mr. Baker filed a motion for a preliminary injunction petitioning the court for assistance with obtaining a new residential lease. (See generally MPI.) Because Mr. Baker later filed a notice of settlement informing the court that this issue is now resolved, the court denies Mr. Baker’s motion for preliminary injunction as moot. (See 12/2/25 Not.)

H. Mr. Baker’s motions for service by the U.S. Marshal are denied as moot. Mr. Baker’s motions for service by the U.S. Marshal are denied as moot because the court has ordered Mr. Baker to file a third amended complaint. These denials are without prejudice to filing a third motion for service by the U.S. Marshal after he files his third amended complaint. I. Mr. Baker’s motion to appoint counsel is denied.

Mr. Baker requests that the court appoint counsel. (See MAC at 1.) In civil actions for damages, appointment of counsel is permitted only for “exceptional circumstances,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Baker v. Wash. State Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., No. C25- 2302LK, 2025 WL 3534209, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 10, 2025) (citing Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Courts evaluate two factors when determining whether to appoint counsel: “(1) the likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court concludes that Mr. Baker’s submissions do not support appointing

counsel. Mr. Baker vaguely states that he has “contacted [hundreds] of resources and law offices, and nobody has time[.]” (See MAC at 2.) Mr. Baker, however, makes no argument as to the likelihood of success on the merits of his claims, and this case does not appear to present the types of legally or factually complex issues that would preclude 1 Mr. Baker from adequately articulating his claims pro se. (See id.) Thus, the court 2 denies Mr. Baker’s motion to appoint counsel.

3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 For reason of the forgoing the court ORDERS as follows: 5 (1) The court DISMISSES with prejudice Mr. Baker’s claims for: 6 a. defamation, 28 U.S.C. § 4101; b. disclosure of personal information, 15 U.S.C. § 6802; 7 c. retaliation under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203; 8 d. violation of Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, 12182; 9 e. violation of the FHA for refusal to rent, making housing unavailable, discriminatory advertising, misrepresentation of availability, and 10 blockbusting, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (c)-(e); 11 f. coercion under the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3617; and 12 g. violation of the FHA regulations pertaining to the following: i. FHA Poster, 24 C.F.R. § 110.10; 13 ii. steering, 24 C.F.R. § 100.70; 14 iii. voluntary self-test privilege, 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.144, 100.145; 15 iv. design and construction requirements, 24 C.F.R. § 100.205; v. discriminatory advertisements, statements, and notices, 24 C.F.R. 16 § 100.75; 17 vi. discriminatory representations on the availability of dwellings, 18 24 C.F.R. § 100.80; and vii. general prohibitions against discrimination because of handicap, 19 24 C.F.R. § 100.202. 20 (2) The court ORDERS Mr. Baker to file an amended complaint that complies 21 with this order and Rule 8(a) by Tuesday, January 13, 2026. Failure to fully 22 comply with this order may result in sanctions including and up to the dismissal of the case.

(3)The court DENIES as moot Mr. Baker’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. # 9). (4) The court DENIES as moot Mr. Baker’s motions for U.S. Marshal service (Dkt. ## 10, 17). (5)The court DENIES Mr. Baker’s motion to appoint counsel (Dkt. # 11).

Dated this 2 3rd day of December, 2025. A 10 JAMES L. ROBART United States District Judge