MEMORANDUM OPINION

The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an agency in the legislative branch created in 1921.1 Often referred to as “Congress’s investigative arm,” GAO monitors public

expenditures and functions as a permanent auditor on behalf of Congress. The Plaintiff in this case, America First Legal Foundation (America First), sued to compel disclosure of GAO’s records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. GAO moves to dismiss, arguing that as an agency in the legislative branch, its records are not subject to FOIA. The Court agrees and dismisses this case.

BACKGROUND

A. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)

“GAO is an independent agency within the legislative branch that exists in large part to

serve the needs of Congress.” Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 844 (1983); see also The Reorganization Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-263, § 7, 59 Stat. 613, 616 (Comptroller General and is permitted to disregard GAO’s recommendations made under either avenue. Id. § 3554(c)(3), (e).

But GAO must report failures to comply with its recommendations to Congress and indicate

whether it thinks corrective legislation or other congressional action is needed to “preserve the integrity of the procurement process.” Id. § 3554(e)(1)(B).

Finally, if GAO determines that congressionally authorized funds are being misappropriated by the Executive Branch under the Impoundment Control Act, it may file an explanatory statement informing Congress of the situation. ^[2] U.S.C. § 687. If Congress does not take any action related to that appropriation within 25 days, GAO is given “tacit approval” by statute to file a legal action challenging that executive impoundment on behalf of the legislative branch. Rogers v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 39, 50 (1987), aff’d, 861 F.2d 729 (Fed. Cir. 1988)

(characterizing 2 U.S.C. § 687).

GAO is headed by the Comptroller General of the United States. 31 U.S.C. § 702(b). The President selects the Comptroller General from a list of at least three names provided by a

congressional commission, which includes the Speaker of the House, the President Pro Tempore, and the leadership from both chambers. Id. § 703(a). The Comptroller General serves for a term

of fifteen years, id. § 703(b), and is removeable only by impeachment or a joint resolution of Congress, id. § 703(e). Under these statutes, “the Comptroller General and the GAO function virtually as a permanent staff for Congress.” Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 746 n.11 (1986)

(Stevens, J., concurring).

B. Factual Background

The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The Court also takes “judicial notice of public records from other court proceedings.” Lewis v. Drug

Enf’t Admin., 777 F. Supp. 2d 151, 159 (D.D.C. 2011).

In March 2023, America First submitted a FOIA request to GAO seeking certain records in GAO’s possession. Compl. ¶¶ 13–14, ECF No. 1. In May 2024, long after the time limit normally applicable in FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6), GAO responded to the request and stated that it is not subject to FOIA but instead applies its own disclosure regulations in 4 C.F.R. Part 81.

Compl. ¶¶ 16–17. Those disclosure regulations provide that “[w]hile GAO is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. [§] 552), GAO’s disclosure policy follows the spirit of the act consistent with its duties and functions and responsibility to the Congress. Application of this act to GAO is not to be inferred from the provisions of these regulations.” 4 C.F.R. § 81.1(a).

Pursuant to those regulations, GAO withheld any responsive records as exempted “materials that

are part of the deliberative process.” 4 C.F.R. § 81.6(j). Compl., Ex. ^[4], at 2, ECF No. 1-4. Thus, GAO largely denied America First’s FOIA request. Id.

C. Procedural Background

After exhausting its administrative remedies, America First brought this lawsuit alleging that GAO failed to comply with FOIA’s disclosure requirements. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 68–73. GAO moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that FOIA does not apply to it. Mot., ECF No. 9. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. See Opp’n, ECF No.

11; Reply, ECF No. 12.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

Courts “must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). But courts need not accept as true “a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation,” nor an “inference[] . . . unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.’” Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478

U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

DISCUSSION

GAO moves to dismiss this action under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis that FOIA does not apply to the agency. America First argues that GAO is subject to FOIA either directly, 5 U.S.C.

§ 552, or through GAO’s native statute, 31 U.S.C. § 704. Since GAO is a legislative agency, the Court agrees that America First lacks statutory standing to compel FOIA disclosure under either statute. Accordingly, the Court grants GAO’s motion.

A. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (FOIA)

FOIA requires “each agency” to make its records available to the public, subject to certain enumerated exceptions, and provides a cause of action in federal court to compel disclosure of such “agency records.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)–(b). For FOIA, an

“agency” as defined in [5 U.S.C. § 551(1)] includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or any independent regulatory agency[.]

Id. § 552(f)(1). Thus, FOIA’s definition of an agency covers two categories: (1) those agencies

encompassed by the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) definition of an “agency” in § 551(1), and (2) any other agencies referenced in the catch-all list of § 552(f)(1). Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 878–79 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

First, FOIA’s definition “cross-references” and encompasses the APA’s definition of an agency in 5 U.S.C. § 551(1), Dong, 125 F.3d at 878, which extends to “each authority of the Government of the United States . . . but does not include . . . the Congress,” 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).

And “the Congress” for purposes of this definition excludes the “entire legislative branch,”

exempting legislative-branch agencies. Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (emphasis omitted) (citing Ethnic Emps. of Libr. of Cong. v. Boorstin, 751

F.2d 1405, 1416 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).

Second, § 552(f) also has a catch-all list “to encompass entities that might have eluded the APA’s definition in § 551(1).” Dong, 125 F.3d at 879 (quoting Energy Rsch. Found. v. Def.

Nuclear Facilities Safety Bd., 917 F.2d 581, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). The list includes any

“establishment in the executive branch of the Government,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(f), and extends FOIA coverage to any entity “belonging to the executive branch,” Dong, 125 F.3d at 880. And it also

makes FOIA applicable to “independent regulatory agencies” that have an “uncertain constitutional status . . . vis-à-vis the executive branch” because they are tasked by Congress with executive functions while having officers unremovable by the President. Id. at 880 n.3 (citations omitted). But the list does not include any “entity clearly outside the executive branch.” Id. at 879

(Smithsonian not included).

Based on this two-part definition, FOIA has long been understood to exclude “documents

of legislative[-]branch agencies.” Cause of Action v. Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin., 753 F.3d 210, 212 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission records not included); see also

Boorstin, 751 F.2d at 1416 n.15 (“[T]he Supreme Court noted that the Library of Congress is not

an agency under the Freedom of Information Act.” (characterizing Kissinger v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 145 (1980))). And both the Supreme Court and the D.C.

Circuit have found time and again that “GAO is a legislative[-]branch agency.” Chennareddy v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Merck & Co., 460 U.S. at 844 (“GAO is an independent agency within the legislative branch.”); Chen v. GAO, 821 F.2d 732, 737 n.6

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“GAO is generally recognized as a part of the legislative branch.”); Cause of Action, 753 F.3d at 214 (identifying the “Government Accountability Office” as a type of legislative agency not subject to FOIA).

This authority makes clear that GAO, as a legislative-branch agency, is not subject to

FOIA’s disclosure requirements. See Cause of Action, 753 F.3d at 214. America First nonetheless argues otherwise, relying on arguments grounded in: (1) an alternate reading of FOIA’s statutory text, (2) the Title 5 statutory scheme, (3) the structure and powers of GAO, and (4) novel interpretations of the governing case law. None of these arguments carries the day.

“independent establishment” includes both an “establishment in the executive branch” and “the Government Accountability Office”). So this argument is unavailing.

America First then suggests without much elaboration that GAO is an “independent regulatory agency.” Opp’n 6. But the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence on § 552(f) precludes such a reading. See Dong, 125 F.3d at 879; Cause of Action, 753 F.3d at 212. In Dong, the D.C. Circuit

looked to Supreme Court precedent regarding independent regulatory agencies to inform the meaning of that term in § 552(f). See id. at 880 n.3 (first citing Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S.

349, 353 (1958); and then citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 687–92 (1988)). And the Supreme Court has explained that an “independent regulatory agenc[y]” is one that acts “free from day-to-day supervision of either Congress or the Executive Branch.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.

1, 140–41 (1976) (emphasis added). Whereas a legislative agency answerable to Congress (like

GAO) “may not be entrusted with executive powers” at all, Synar, 478 U.S. at 732, independent regulatory agencies can exercise some “‘executive’ . . . functions that typically have been undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch,” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691; see also id. at

689 n.28. This is because, unlike legislative agencies whose leaders are answerable to or removable by Congress alone (again, like GAO), the exercise of such power by independent regulatory agencies does not pose a “dange[r] of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions” since its members also have greater independence from congressional removal. Id. at 693–94

(quoting and distinguishing Synar, 478 U.S. at 727). Dong explains that it is only the latter regulatory agencies with an “uncertain constitutional status . . . vis-à-vis the executive branch” that

Congress captured in § 552(f). 125 F.3d at 880 n.3 (citing Wiener, 357 U.S. at 353; Morrison, 487

U.S. at 687–92). Under this precedent, GAO is plainly not an “independent regulatory agency” under § 552(f).

But that is not the end. Congress recently confirmed that its understanding of the term

“independent regulatory agencies” is consistent with Dong in the Administrative-Pay-As-You-Go

Act of 2023, Pub. L. 118-5, § 262(2), 137 Stat. 31, 31, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 551 note. For that

part of Title 5, the statute instructs that an “independent regulatory agenc[y]” is as “defined” in the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5). Id. And that definition includes a long list of “independent regulatory agenc[ies]” like “the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, [and] the Consumer Product Safety Commission.”

44 U.S.C. § 3502(5).2 The definition also has a catch-all that adds “any other similar agency

designated by statute as a Federal independent regulatory agency or commission.” Id. Importantly, this definition does not reference any of the entities that Congress instead designates as “agencies of Congress.” 2 U.S.C. § 601(e) (Congressional Budget Office, GAO, Library of Congress). So

Congress’s most recent Title 5 enactment seems to confirm Dong’s understanding—that an independent regulatory agency does not include an “entity clearly outside the executive branch.”

Dong, 125 F.3d at 879.

In sum, since GAO is in the legislative branch and outside the executive branch, it is neither an “establishment in the executive branch of the Government” nor an “independent regulatory agency” under 5 U.S.C. § 552(f). See Cause of Action, 753 F.3d at 212.

general ones—especially when dealing with a complex statutory scheme); Antonin Scalia & Bryan

A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 227 (2012) (when a statute includes a definition, “judges apply [such] text-specific definitions with rigor”).3

America First next turns to legislative history, noting that the definition of “agency” in the APA “was supposed to have substantially the same meaning” as the Federal Reports Act of 1942 and the Federal Register Act of 1935. Opp’n 8–9. But as America First admits, the Federal Reports

Act explicitly excluded GAO from its coverage while the Federal Register Act did not. Opp’n. 9.

So it is unclear how that inconsistent legislative history provides any insight into whether GAO is an agency under the APA. Meanwhile, the APA’s legislative history clearly states that “the word

‘agency’ is defined in the Act ‘by excluding legislative, judicial, and territorial authorities.’” Wash.

Legal Found., 17 F.3d at 1449 (citation omitted); see S. Rep. No. 752 at 196 (1945). So the APA’s legislative history does not provide America First any support either. Id.

America First also points to other instances in Title 5 where the term “executive agency” is used. See Opp’n 14 (listing provisions). But these examples do not overcome the plain reading of FOIA. For instance, America First notes that the definition of an “agency” in 5 U.S.C. § 902 textually excludes GAO, suggesting that Congress “knew how to exempt GAO from covered

‘agencies’ when it wanted to.” Id. But an “agency” in that provision expressly includes “an

Executive agency or part thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 902(1)(A). So § 902 demonstrates only that Title 5 includes GAO as an “Executive agency”—a proposition that neither party disputes. Reply 3. It provides little insight into whether GAO is an “agency” as defined by FOIA. Indeed, all of the provisions in Title 5 upon which America First relies refer to an “Executive agency.” See 5 U.S.C.

§§ 902(1)(A), 3330(a), 306(f), 2302(a)(2)(C), 3132(a)(1), 3345(a), 4301(1), 4701(a)(1), 5342(a)(1); Opp’n 14. Far from supporting America First’s statutory argument, this demonstrates that Congress knew how to use the term “Executive agency” and chose not to do so in FOIA. See

Allina Health Servs. v. Price, 863 F.3d 937, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

Finally, America First makes a similar argument relying on 5 U.S.C. § 415(a)(2), which defines a “federal entity” as “an entity in the executive branch” but expressly excludes GAO.

Opp’n 13–14. The exclusion, America First argues, “would be superfluous if GAO would not otherwise be within the sweep of the definition.” Id. at 13. But again, this definition says nothing about whether GAO is an “agency” within the reach of FOIA under § 552(f).4

At bottom, the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly recognized that under § 552(f), an entity cannot be an “agency” for FOIA purposes if it is in the legislative branch. See Cause of Action, 753 F.3d at 212; cf. Dong,125 F.3d at 879; Wash. Legal Found., 17 F.3d at 1449. And the Supreme Court

and D.C. Circuit have both concluded that GAO is in the legislative branch. See Merck & Co., Inc., 460 U.S. at 844; Chennareddy, 935 F.2d at 319. That is dispositive.

First, the Comptroller General is not an executive officer. “Congress has consistently viewed the Comptroller General as an officer of the Legislative Branch.” Synar, 478 U.S. at 731.

America First acknowledges Synar but asks the Court to disregard it because it “did not consider

GAO’s status for Title 5 or FOIA purposes.” Opp’n 21. America First is wrong. Nothing in Synar

suggests that the Supreme Court intended to limit its holdings in such a manner. To the contrary, the Court surveyed the relevant landscape and decisively concluded that Congress views the Comptroller General “as an agent of the Congress” and “part of the legislative branch.” Synar, 478

U.S. at 731 (collecting statutes). To the extent America First intends to challenge the constitutional underpinnings of binding Supreme Court precedent, this is not the appropriate vehicle to do so.

Second, it makes no difference whether GAO exercises some executive functions. America

First spends a substantial portion of its brief detailing what it views to be GAO’s executive powers.

See Opp’n 22–37. For its part, GAO takes issue with America First’s characterization of its powers.

Reply 9–10. But even assuming that GAO impermissibly exercises executive power, Synar, 478

U.S. at 732, that does not transform GAO into an “agency” subject to FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(f).

The fact remains that FOIA excludes legislative branch agencies from its reach. See Cause of Action, 753 F.3d at 212. And again, the Court is bound by precedent concluding that GAO is a legislative agency. To the extent America First is arguing that GAO is unconstitutionally exercising executive powers, the appropriate remedy would be a constitutional challenge—seeking to either invalidate that grant of authority or alter removal protections. See Synar, 478 U.S. at 735.

17 (quoting 103 F.4th 830, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2024)). Not so. In Medical Imaging, the court considered whether the Library of Congress is subject to the APA when sued for violations of the Copyright

Act and Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA). 103 F.4th at 836–37, 840. In that context, the court disregarded its past precedents interpreting § 551(1) as “dict[a]” because those “precedents

. . . considered only whether the APA was applicable by its own terms.” Id. at 840. Since the court held that the Copyright Act and DMCA independently authorized APA review, there was no need to consider the APA’s general definition in § 551(1). See id. at 840–41. But nothing in that opinion suggested that the APA’s definition of an agency in § 551(1) extends to a legislative agency. See id. at 836 (stating the Library “fail[ed] to account for the fact that Congress can provide for APA review of the DMCA regulations by statute, regardless of whether the Library is an ‘agency’”).

Again, D.C. Circuit precedent establishes that GAO records, as “documents of [a] legislative[-]branch agenc[y],” need not be disclosed under FOIA. Cause of Action, 753 F.3d at

212. And this alone is enough to dismiss America First’s FOIA claim.

B. 31 U.S.C. § 704 (GAO Native Statute)

Finally, America First argues that GAO is subject to FOIA through its native statute, which provides that, “[t]o the extent applicable, all laws generally related to administering an agency apply to the Comptroller General.” 31 U.S.C. § 704(a); Opp’n 10–11. But this argument suffers from two flaws.

First, assuming FOIA is a law “related to administering an agency,” the statute only

requires GAO to apply its requirements “[t]o the extent applicable.” 31 U.S.C. § 704(a). And, in this case, GAO applied its own “disclosure policy,” which it determined “follows the spirit of [FOIA] consistent with its duties and functions and responsibility to the Congress.” 4 C.F.R. §

81.1(a). Since GAO is not subject to FOIA directly, the relevant question is whether that disclosure complied with § 704(a). But America First did not bring such a challenge; its Complaint alleges only a failure to comply with FOIA. See Compl. ¶¶ 17–22; 68–73. So any challenge to GAO’s compliance with § 704(a) is not before the Court. See Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 6

(D.C. Cir. 2019) (“Mentioning an argument ‘in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones’ is tantamount to failing to raise it.” (quoting Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 200 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005))).

Second, even assuming the Court could consider such an argument, America First has not identified a relevant cause of action. Because GAO is a legislative-branch agency, it is not subject to judicial review under FOIA, Cause of Action, 753 F.3d at 212, or the APA, Boorstin, 751 F.2d at 1416 n.15; see also Pond Constructors, Inc. v. GAO, No. 17-cv-0881, 2018 WL 3528309, at 1*

(D.D.C. May 30, 2018) (APA suit cannot be brought against GAO because it is “an entity within the legislative branch”). And America First has not alleged another cause of action permitting it to enforce § 704. Compl. ¶¶ 68–73. So America First’s argument fails for this reason, too.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9.

A separate order will issue.