U.S.DISTRICT COURT ERMONT DISTRICT OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 126 FEB 26 PM 3:34 DISTRICT OF VERMONT CLERK HEYLIN JULESMY CABRERA- ) HEPUTY CLERK LOPEZ, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) V. ) Case No. 2:26-cv-00017-cr ) PATRICIA HYDE, in her official capacity as) Field Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs _ ) Enforcement, Boston Field Office; TODD M. _ ) LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting ) Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs ) Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM, in her official __ ) capacity as Secretary of U.S. Department of _) Homeland Security; DONALD J. TRUMP, in _ ) his official capacity as President of the United ) States; PAMELA BONDI, in her official ) capacity as U.S. Attorney General; CAROLYN ) RILEY, in her official capacity as ) Superintendent, Chittenden Regional ) Correctional Facility; DAVID W. JOHNSTON, ) in his official capacity as Vermont Sub-Office _) Director of Immigration and Customs ) Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal ) Operations; and PETE R. FLORES, in his ) official capacity as Acting Commissioner for __ ) U.S. Customs and Border Protections, ) ) Respondents. ) OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. ^[1]) On January 26, 2026, Heylin Julesmy Cabrera-Lopez (‘Petitioner’) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (the “Petition’’), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in the District of Massachusetts. Two days later, on January 28, 2026, Petitioner’s case was transferred to

this court. Named as respondents are Patricia Hyde, in her official capacity as Acting Boston Field Office Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”’); Todd M. Lyons, in his official capacity as Acting Director of ICE; Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States; Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity as United States Attorney General; David W. Johnston, in his official capacity as Vermont Sub-Office Director of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations; Pete R. Flores, in his official capacity as Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) (collectively, “Federal Respondents”); as well as Carolyn Riley, in her official capacity as Superintendent of the Chittenden Regional Correctional Facility. On January 30, 2026, Petitioner moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to prevent her removal from the District of Vermont pending her habeas proceedings. (Doc. 11.) On February 3, 2026, Federal Respondents opposed the Petition and the motion for a TRO. (Doc. 16.) On the same day, the court held a hearing on the motion for a TRO and granted it. (Doc. 17.) At the hearing, the court noted that it lacked sufficient information to rule on the Petition and requested supplemental briefing. Petitioner filed a supplemental brief on February 11, 2026, (Doc. 19), and Federal Respondents filed a supplemental brief on February 17, 2026. (Doc. 23.) Petitioner is represented by Andrew K. Pelcher, Esq., and Robin N. Nice, Esq. Federal Respondents are represented by Assistant United States Attorney Lauren Almquist Lively. Carolyn Riley is represented by Debbie H. Stevens, Esq. ^[1]. Factual and Procedural Background. Petitioner is a citizen of Nicaragua who entered the United States on or about July 3, 2022. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection through Eagle Pass, Texas. Petitioner was subsequently taken into custody and granted humanitarian parole

on or about July 25, 2022. Petitioner’s humanitarian parole was valid for one year.' See Doc. 19-2. On or about July 25, 2022, Petitioner was given a notice of custody determination, stating that “[p]ursuant to the authority contained in section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act” (“INA”), otherwise known as 8 U.S.C. § 1226, “you will be: ... [rleleased . . . JuJnder other conditions.” (Doc. 19-3 at 1.) Petitioner was also given a notice to appear (“NTA”), dated July 25, 2022, charging her with removability. On the NTA, DHS did not check any box to indicate whether Petitioner was “an arriving alien[,]” or “‘an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled[,]” or whether Petitioner “ha[d] been admitted to the United States, but [was] removable[.]” (Doc. 16-1 at 1.) Thereafter, Petitioner resided and worked in South Portland, Maine. On September 25, 2024, more than two years after entering the United States, Petitioner submitted an application for asylum at the Chelmsford, Maine Immigration Court because she “was given incorrect advice that she could not apply for asylum until she had her first immigration court hearing[]|” and was “not aware of the one-year filing deadline and filed as soon as possible under the circumstances.” (Doc. 19 at 3, 4 3.) “Around the end of 2024,” Petitioner was arrested for and pled guilty to driving without a license and driving under the influence of alcohol. (Doc. 19-1 at 2, § 9.) On February 4, 2025, Petitioner was again charged with driving without a license.” On January 20, 2026, ICE officers obtained a warrant for Petitioner’s arrest, which was issued “pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the [INA] and part 287 of title 8, Code of Federal Regulations[]” and based on probable cause that Petitioner “is removable from

' Federal Respondents claim that Petitioner was granted humanitarian parole “for two months— with her parole expressly expiring on September 4, 2022.” (Doc. 23 at 2.) However, the preliminary parole authorization granted Petitioner parole “por un afio[,]” meaning for one year. (Doc. 19-2 at 1); see id. (“Your parole authorization is valid for one year from the date shown on this notice [, 07/25/2022,] and automatically terminates upon your departure or removal from the United States, or at the end of the one year period[.]”) (translated). * The parties do not clarify whether Petitioner was convicted of this charge.

the United States.” (Doc. 19-6 at 1.) On the same day the warrant was issued, ICE officers arrested Petitioner in South Portland, Maine, as she was driving to work. At some point after her arrest, Petitioner was incarcerated at a correctional facility in Massachusetts and subsequently transferred to the Chittenden Regional Correctional Facility in South Burlington, Vermont. On February 12, 2026, Petitioner requested a custody redetermination in immigration court pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1236. The immigration judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner’s request as follows: Pursuant to [8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)], the [c]ourt lacks jurisdiction to consider [Petitioner]’s request for redetermination of custody status because [Petitioner] is present in the United States without admission. Matter of Yajure[]Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The [c]ourt is cognizant of the [d]istrict [c]ourt order in Guerrero-Orellana v. Moniz; however, as per the Supreme Court decision in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 (1974) ...a declaratory judgment, “though it may be persuausive, . . . is not ultimately coercive.” Further, the [] [d]istrict [c]ourt in Guerrero- Orellana v. Moniz did not vacate or stay the Board [of Immigration Appeal]’s decision in [] Matter of Yajure[|Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), or enjoin the [i]mmigration [c]Jourts’ reliance on that decision. Accordingly, the [c]ourt finds that, at the present time, it remains obligated to follow the precedential decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals. (Doc. 21-2 at 1) (alteration adopted) (emphasis supplied). I. Conclusions of Law and Analysis. A. Standard of Review. “Congress has granted federal district courts, ‘within their respective jurisdictions,’ the authority to hear applications for habeas corpus by any person who claims to be held ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3)). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention[.]” Kapoor v. DeMarco, 132 F.4th 595, 610 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting JNS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Whether Petitioner Is Comparable to an Individual Detained Without a Warrant. Petitioner contends that she is “entitled to an official and timely custody determination, which would then allow [her] to request a custody redetermination as provided by law.” (Doc. 19 at 6.) To the extent, Petitioner’s argument is based on statutes and regulations governing warrantless arrests of noncitizens, that argument is without merit. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), a noncitizen arrested without a warrant “shall be taken without unnecessary delay for examination before an officer of the Service having authority to examine aliens as to their right to enter or remain in the United States[.]” For “{d]isposition of cases of aliens arrested without warrant[,]” pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 287.3(d), determination will be made within 48 hours of the arrest, . .. whether the alien will be continued in custody or released on bond or recognizance and whether a notice to appear and warrant of arrest . . . will be issued.” Neither 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)’s nor 8 C.F.R. 287.3(d)’s protections apply to Petitioner, who was arrested pursuant to a warrant. C. Whether Petitioner Is Detained Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) or § 1226(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) provides that “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). Section 1225(b)(1) applies to noncitizens “who [are] arriving in the United States” or otherwise “designated by the Attorney General” and “determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)Q), (b)(1)(A)Gii) (1); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (citation omitted). An “[ajrriving alien” includes “an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1.2. Section 1225(b)(2) applies to

noncitizens who are “seeking admission” and “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Applicants covered by § 1225(b)(1) are removed “without further hearing or review” pursuant to an expedited removal process unless the person “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution[,]” in which case that person is referred for an asylum interview. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). Applicants covered by § 1225(b)(2) are placed in full removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. The Supreme Court has interpreted both § 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) as “mandat[ing] detention of applicants for admission until certain proceedings have concluded.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297. Whereas Section 1225(b) “authorizes the [g]overnment to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country[,]” Section 1226 “authorizes the [g]overnment to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings[.]” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis supplied). Section 1226(a) establishes a discretionary detention framework for noncitizens arrested and detained “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Pending the removal decision, the Attorney General may: (1) “continue to detain the arrested alien”; (2) “release the alien on... bond”; or (3) “release the alien on . . . conditional parole[.]” Id. at §§ 1226(a)(1)-(2). “Critically, under 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1), a noncitizen detained under § 1226 may appeal an ‘initial custody determination,’ including the setting of bond, to an immigration judge.” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2025). An exception exists for noncitizens “who meet certain criminal and inadmissibility criteria[,]” not implicated in this case, who are subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c). Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 221 (D. Mass. 2025); see also 8 US.C. § 1226(c). As a noncitizen “present in the United States who has not been admitted|[, |” Petitioner is an “applicant for admission[]” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). The question before the court is whether Petitioner is also an “arriving alien” under § 1225(b)(1) or “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2) such that she is subject to mandatory detention.

The Coalition for HIR court utilized Jbragimov’s reasoning to support its conclusion that parolees are not considered “arriving aliens”: Even worse for [the djefendants, Jbragimov described parole as “a means by which the government allows aliens who have arrived at a port-of-entry to temporarily remain in the United States pending the review and adjudication of their immigration status.” 476 F.3d at 134 (emphasis added). Under that construction, while a parolee remains “legally unadmitted,” they “have arrived”—i.e., their arrival is complete, whereas their admission is not. Jd. That reading is consistent with the statute’s distinction between aliens who have been “admitted” and those who have been “paroled.” Id. at 91-92. This court finds Coalition for HIR’s reasoning persuasive and finds that, like the petitioner in Jbragimov, “an ‘arriving alien’ is one who is in the process of reaching the United States[,]” Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3314420, at[*20] (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025), not a person like Petitioner who had resided here for several years prior to her detention in January 2026. Even if Petitioner’s status reverted back to “that which [s]he held at the time [s]he was paroled into the United States[,]” [bragimov, 476 F.3d at 137, in her NTA, Petitioner was not classified as an “arriving alien.” (Doc. 16-1 at 1.) To the contrary, she was detained and released under § 1226. See Doc. 19-3 at 1. For the foregoing reasons, the court finds Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(1) because she is not an “arriving alien.”

2025).° This definition applies even if a noncitizen was previously granted parole which has since terminated or expired. See Hernandez Lazo v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 303430, at[*11] (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2026) (“[Parolee] cannot be ‘seeking admission’ because he clearly is not presenting himself at the border and was not recently apprehended just after entering this country.”); Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at[*22] (“Although [parolee] is an applicant for admission, she clearly is not presenting herself at the border and was not recently apprehended just after entering, and thereby is not ‘seeking admission’ under Section 1225(b)(2).”). In this case, at the time of her detention, Petitioner was not presenting herself at the border and was not apprehended just after entering. Instead, she had been residing in the United States for several years. See Munoz Caraguay v. Larocco, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 294842, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2026) (“[Parolee] is not ‘seeking admission’ because he clearly is not presenting himself at the border and was not recently apprehended just after entering this country. Rather, at the time that ICE detained him on February 1, 2026, [parolee] had been living in the interior of the United States . . . since he was paroled into the country under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) on or around December 22, 2022[.]”). For the reasons stated above, the court finds Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) because she was not “seeking admission” when she was apprehended.

(“Sections 1225 and 1226 are ‘mutually exclusive—a noncitizen cannot be subject to both mandatory detention under § 1225 and discretionary detention under § 1226.’”) (quoting Lopez Benitez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 485).° Section 1226(a) applies to noncitizens arrested “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Petitioner’s arrest warrant was issued pursuant to INA § 236, meaning 8 U.S.C. § 1226, see Doc. 19-3 at 1, further buttressing the conclusion that she is subject to discretionary detention under § 1226(a). See Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at[*24] (“Although not dispositive standing alone, [petitioner]’s arrest on a warrant under Section 1226 supports the conclusion that her detention is governed by Section 1226(a)’s discretionary framework.”’); Iza By His Next Friend Iza v. Larocco, 2025 WL 3712274, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2025) (finding “[t]he conclusion that [petitioner]’s detention is governed by Section 1226(a) is supported by the fact that [petitioner] was arrested on a” warrant which “states that the immigration officer who issued the warrant did so ‘pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the [INA]’ and part 287 of the title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations|]’’). “Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)). Petitioner is thus entitled to a bond hearing but has not received one because the IJ concluded that, in light of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, “the [court lacks jurisdiction to consider [Petitioner]’s request for

See also Ruiz v. Trump, 2026 WL 323254, at *6 (D. Vt. Feb. 6, 2026) (“[S]ince [petitioner] is neither ‘arriving in the United States’ or ‘seeking admission,” he is not subjected to mandatory detention pursuant to either Section 1225(b)(1) or 1225(b)(2). [Petitioner]’s detention needs to be evaluated under Section 1226(a).”); Hernandez Lazo v. Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2026 WL 303430, at[*12] (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2026) (‘The termination of [petitioner]’s [temporary protected status] in September 2025 does not change the fact that he was a noncitizen who had been residing in the interior of the United States for decades at the time that ICE detained him, thereby firmly placing his detention under Section 1226(a).”); Cabrera Martinez v. Marich, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3771228, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2025) (finding that, “because ‘any other applicant for admission residing in the United States for more than three years would be detained under [s]ection 1226,’ . . . the previously paroled noncitizen also would be held under that section[]”).

redetermination of custody status because [Petitioner] is present in the United States without admission.” (Doc. 21-2 at 1.) Although Petitioner “requests that this [c]ourt consider granting her immediate release,” and some courts have adopted that approach under similar circumstances, see, e.g., Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420, at[*32] , this court has found a bond hearing is the appropriate remedy for § 1226(a) detainees, rather than immediate release. See, e.g., Lopez v. Trump, 2025 WL 3264151, at *6 (D. Vt. Nov. 17, 2025) (“The injury in this case is that [petitioner] has not been provided an opportunity to have a bond hearing in immigration court, as required by § 1226(a). The appropriate relief is therefore to provide her with such a hearing.”). In her Petition, Petitioner asserts a Fifth Amendment due process claim. IJs are generally not authorized to consider constitutional claims. See Ozturk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th 382, 400 (2d Cir. 2025) (“[N]either the IJ nor the [Board of Immigration Appeals] has ‘jurisdiction to decide constitutional issues.’”) (citation omitted). If the court were to order a bond hearing by the IJ, as Petitioner points out, it is by no means guaranteed that a bond hearing will actually take place. See, e.g., Yeferson G.C. v. Easterwood, 2026 WL 207266, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 21, 2026) (finding that, because the IJ denied petitioner’s bond due to a purported lack of jurisdiction, “[t]he IJ’s decision . . . deprived [p]etitioner of a determination on the merits of his bond eligibility, and the ‘bond redetermination hearing’ [p]etitioner purportedly received equates to no bond hearing at all[]”), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 209825 (D. Minn. Jan. 27, 2026). For those reasons, the court finds it would be futile to order another bond hearing before an IJ. See Walizada v. Trump, 2025 WL 3551972, at[*22] (D. Vt. Dec. 11, 2025). Federal Respondents argue that the court should not hold a bond hearing because, “if the [c]ourt were to order bond, it is not clear which entity would process the payment, and a bond determination by the [c]ourt would require it to remain involved with Petitioner’s immigration case if the conditions of her release needed to be altered or she ultimately were ordered removed.” (Doc. 23 at 6-7.) However, this court has held bond hearings previously without issues and had issued conditions of release where warranted.

The court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition to the extent it seeks a review of her detention under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and § 1226 and will set this matter for an individualized bond hearing at which Federal Respondents shall bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community. See Alvarez Ortiz v. Freden, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3085032, at[*12] (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025) (“[C]onstitutional due process requires the government to bear the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is either a danger to the community or a flight risk even at an initial bond hearing under [S]ection 1226(a).”). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (Doc. 1.) SO ORDERED. Dated at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 2e ay of February, 2026.

Christina Keiss, Chief Judge United States District Court