MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motions for Default Judgment (the “Motions”) against Defendants Patriot Front, Thomas Rousseau, William Ring, and Jacob Brown (collectively, the “Defaulting Defendants”). (ECF Nos. 187, 188, 189). For the reasons articulated below, the Court will grant the Motions.

I. Factual and Procedural Background A. Factual Background!

BOW) = Patriot Front

*

= UC | -

(ECF No. 31 4 53.) Mr. Noyce and Mr. Dail obscured their faces with masks. (See ECF No. 31953.) As John Doe 1 filmed and illuminated the tunnel with a flashlight, Mr. Dail “removed a can of spray paint” from his backpack and raised it over a sign commemorating Arthur Ashe’s induction into the International Tennis Hall of Fame. (ECF No. 31 {§ 54, 57.)

VM

Ashe was the first ___ ACrTiGcan-hfhmerican man , WMauctedinto the. , WMternationaf Tennis Mall of Fame.

(ECF No. 31 956.) Before Mr. Dail sprayed over the sign, Mr. Noyce, who was wearing a headlamp for additional lighting, advised: “*[S]hake it, it’s not going to spray well if you don’t shake it.”” (ECF No. 31 §§ 55, 57.) Mr. Dail then shook the spray paint, and spray-painted over the sign in white. (ECF No. 31 4] 57-58.)

Halt Dif i

(ECF No. 31 4 58.) Mr. Noyce then removed another can of spray paint from Mr. Dail’s backpack and spray- painted over another sign touting Arthur Ashe’s victory at Wimbledon and stating, “[T]he first African-American male to be ranked #1 in the world.” (ECF No. 31 4 59.)

(ECF No. 3159.) As John Doe 1 continued to film, Mr. Dail and Mr. Noyce continued spraying white paint over several more signs celebrating Arthur Ashe’s historic achievements. (ECF No. 31 § 60, images at 18.) Next, Mr. Dail and Mr. Noyce “removed Patriot Front stencils and cans of spray paint of different colors from the backpack that [Mr.] Dail had been carrying.” (ECF No. 31 4 61.) Working together, Mr. Dail and Mr. Noyce spray-painted in red and blue paint Patriot Front stencils over the now-painted over signs that had celebrated Mr. Ashe’s achievements. (ECF No. 31 4 62.)

(ECF No. 31 § 62.)

(ECF No. 31 § 62.) As Mr. Noyce and Mr. Dail covered the signs with Patriot Front stencils, John Doe 1, who continued to film, provided suggestions and encouragement, stating, for example, “[F]or the next one, y’all can switch colors for the different stencils . . . try to mix it up a little bit.’ (ECF No. 31 4 63.) After Mr. Dail and Mr. Noyce finished adding Patriot Front stencils to the white-washed signs touting Arthur Ashe’s achievements, John Doe | asked: “TY Jou want to get his face or something?” (ECF No. 31 965.) Mr. Dail and Mr. Noyce then approached the mural’s depiction of Arthur Ashe’s face, and John Doe | stated: “F[*****]g n*****"s face.” (ECF No. 31 965.) Mr. Noyce and Mr. Dail then sprayed white paint over two depictions of Arthur Ashe’s face, and sprayed Patriot Front stencils in red and blue paint on top. (ECF No. 31 §{ 67— 70.) Patriot Front kept John Doe 1’s footage of the vandalism for recruitment purposes, prominently featuring it in a video highlighting Patriot Front’s “nationwide acts of vandalism occurring in October 2021.” (ECF No. 31471.) “Patriot Front Network Directors then used this video as part of their efforts to recruit new members.” (ECF No. 31 471.)

31478.) Asa result of the vandalism to the mural, Sealed Plaintiff 1 “lost sleep, had racing thoughts, and felt anxious.” (ECF No. 31 4 80.) Sealed Plaintiff 2, a long-time resident of Battery Park Neighborhood, also felt fear and concern as a result of the vandalism to the mural. (ECF No. 31 {[ 82-84.) Specifically, “Sealed Plaintiff 2 lost sleep and felt anxious, fatigued, and scared as a result of the vandalism.” (ECF No. 31 4 83.) Sealed Plaintiff 2 also worried about the vandalism’s impact on their family. (ECF No. 31 § 84.) “Sealed Plaintiff 2 regularly considered placing their oldest child in therapy as a result of the stress and anxiety [their] child felt because of the vandalism.” (ECF No. 31 4 84.) By the evening of October 21, 2021, “Park officials had painted over... Patriot Front’s insignia with black paint.” (ECF No. 31 § 72.) ares wale eee 7 = ee i me, ji SN Wu Sass i 4 Fay ae , mia iba | | ~~ di 1 | |

is ee pak tee cn? i =. as nee (ECF No. 31972.) “[T]he mural, which had taken months of planning and work to create, was effectively ruined and the Black man it celebrated erased.” (ECF No. 31] 72.) It took many months before full restoration of the mural occurred. (ECF No. 31 4 73.) As a result of the mural’s defacement, both Plaintiffs “and their children substantially curtailed or even eliminated their use of the Park, feeling compelled to avoid the Park’s playground, paths, basketball and tennis courts, and other available amenities.” (ECF No. 31 46.) After the vandalism, Sealed Plaintiff 1 no longer allowed their children to go to the park alone. (ECF No. 31980.) “Sealed Plaintiff 1 also started avoiding the Park at dusk.” (ECF No. 31980.) Sealed Plaintiff 1 also interpreted the vandalism as a warning that Battery Park residents, and those who opposed white supremacy, were not safe. (ECF No. 31 { 76.) Similarly, Sealed Plaintiff 2 no longer allowed “a minor family member to walk their dog near the Park . . . or meet friends [there].” (ECF No. 31 84.) Sealed Plaintiff 2’s family friends also began to “refuse[] to meet Sealed Plaintiff 2 or their family members at the Park, because of the vandalism.” (ECF No. 31 7 85.) After the vandalism, the City of Richmond “locked the tunnel [containing] the mural,” depriving Plaintiffs of its use and making it more difficult for them to access Park amenities. (ECF No. 31 99 81, 82.) “[FJor a period of time in the immediate aftermath of the vandalism, the tunnel connecting the north and south sides of the Park was completely shuttered both day and night.” (ECF No. 31981.) This made it more difficult for Sealed Plaintiff 1 and their neighbors to access the southern area of the Park, where basketball courts and a playground are located. (ECF No. 31981.) Even after the City reopened the tunnel, Sealed Plaintiff 2 and their family continued to avoid going “through the tunnel to make use of [the Park’s] various amenities”—something Sealed Plaintiff 2 and their family had done prior to the vandalism. (ECF No. 31 § 82.)

B. Procedural Background On December 5, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 31.) The Amended Complaint contains three Counts against the Defaulting Defendants: (1) Count I, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), against Defaulting Defendants Patriot Front, Brown, and Ring; Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights Under the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871; (2) Count I, 42 U.S.C. § 1986, against Defaulting Defendants Patriot Front, Rousseau, Brown, and Ring; Action for Neglect to Prevent Interference with Civil Rights Under the Ku Klux Klan of 1871; and, (3) Count III, Virginia Code § 8.01-42.1 against Defaulting Defendant Patriot Front; Civil Action for Racial, Religious, or Ethnic Harassment. (ECF No. 31 at 28, 30, 33.) In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the Defaulting Defendants’ actions deprived Plaintiffs of their rights under state and federal law; injunctive relief enjoining the Defaulting Defendants from future violations of rights guaranteed by state and federal law; compensatory and punitive damages; and interest, attorney’s fees, and costs. (ECF No. 31, at 35.) On January 12, 2023, Plaintiffs returned Mr. Ring’s executed summons to the Court reflecting a service date of January 9, 2023. (ECF No. 54.) On May 30, 2023, Plaintiffs returned Mr. Rousseau’s and Patriot Front’s executed summonses to the Court reflecting a service date of January 5, 2023. (ECF Nos. 89, 90.) On September 11, 2023, Plaintiffs returned Mr. Brown’s executed summons to the Court reflecting a service date of September 5,

3 The Amended Complaint also sought relief against the Settling Defendants. Because Plaintiffs’ Motions do not concern the Settling Defendants, the Court details only the claims asserted against the Defaulting Defendants. ig

2023. (ECF No. 109.) None of the Defaulting Defendant made an appearance or filed a responsive pleading within the time required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The time to do so has expired. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a).‘ On July 24, 2023, Plaintiffs requested that the Clerk of Court enter default as to Patriot Front, Mr. Rousseau, and Mr. Ring. (ECF Nos. 100, 101.) On July 26, 2023, the Clerk entered default as to those Defaulting Defendants. (ECF Nos. 104, 105.) On October 12, 2023, Plaintiffs requested that the Clerk of Court enter default as to Mr. Brown. (ECF No. 114.) On October 26, 2023, the Clerk entered default as to Mr. Brown. (ECF No. 118.) On March 13, 2025, Mr. Ring filed a motion to retract the entry of default against him. (ECF No. 167.) On August 27, 2025, the Court denied Mr. Ring’s motion to retract the entry of default. (ECF No. 181.) On September 24, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their Motions for Default Judgment against the

4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a) provides in relevant part: (a) Time to Serve a Responsive Pleading. Unless another time is specified by this rule or a federal statute, the time for serving a responsive pleading is as follows: (1) Jn General. (A) A defendant must serve an answer: (i) within 21 days after being served with the summons and complaint; or (ii) if it has timely waived service under Rule 4(d), within 60 days after the request for a waiver was sent, or within 90 days after it was sent to the defendant outside any judicial district of the United States. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1). 19

Defaulting Defendants. (ECF Nos. 187, 188, 189.) In their Motions, Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 190, at 23-25; ECF No. 191, at 27-30; ECF No. 192, at 23-26.) Il. Standard of Review A. Default and Default Judgment Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs default judgment. Rule 55(a) provides that “(w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The party seeking entry of default judgment must then “apply to the court for a default judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). A defendant in default “admits the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.” Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 780 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). The Clerk’s entry of default does not itself warrant the Court’s entry of default judgment. See Colleton Preparatory Acad, Inc. vy. Hoover Universal, Inc., 616 F.3d 413, 419 n.6 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that “[e]ntry of default raises no protectable expectation that a default judgment will follow”) (quoting Johnson v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted)). Rather, entry of default judgment is left to the discretion of the trial court. Payne ex rel. Estate of Calzada v. Brake, 439 F.3d 198, 203-04 (4th Cir. 2006). Prior to entering a default judgment, the Court must ensure that: (1) it possesses personal jurisdiction over the defaulting party; (2) it possesses subject-matter jurisdiction over each of the claims; (3) the action is in the proper venue; and, (4) the defaulting party received proper service of process. See Am. Auto. Ass’n v. AAA Auto Glass, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-1072 (CMH/TCB), 2015 WL 3545927, at *1-2 (E.D. Va. June 3, 2015). Before entry of default judgment, the Court must determine whether the allegations in the complaint support the relief sought. Ryan, 253 F.3d at 780. This is so because “[d]efault is a harsh measure because it ignores the merits,” Bogopa Serv. Corp. v. Shulga, No. 3:08-cv-365, 2009 WL 1628881, at *3 (W.D.N.C. June 10, 2009), and “the Fourth Circuit has a ‘strong policy that cases be decided on the merits,’” State Employees’ Credit Union v. Nat'l Auto Leasing, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-663 (JBF), 2007 WL 1459301, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 14, 2007) (quoting United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 453 (4th Cir. 1993)). Mere labels and conclusions declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to relief are not enough. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, “naked assertions’ of wrongdoing necessitate some ‘factual enhancement’ within the complaint to cross ‘the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). B. Jurisdiction and Venue A federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims that arise under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.> Federal courts likewise have subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law where the plaintiff claims a deprivation of their civil rights. 28 U.S.C.

> Section 1331 provides: The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

§ 1343.6 And federal courts may also exercise supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over state-law claims when those state-law claims are sufficiently related to federal claims before the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.’

Section 1343 provides, in relevant part: (a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: (1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42; (2) To recover damages from any person who fails to prevent or to aid in preventing any wrongs mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he had knowledge were about to occur and power to prevent; (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States; (4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(1}H{4).

A court possesses personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state and who has received effective service of process. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).® Venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).?

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (¢)(1)+(4). ® Rule 4(k) states, in pertinent part: (k) Territorial Limits of Effective Service. (1) In General. Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant: (A) who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district is located. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). 9 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) provides, in relevant part: (b) Venue in General.—A civil action may be brought in— (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or 28 U.S.C. §1391(b)(2).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e), a plaintiff may properly serve an individual by, inter alia, following service procedures outlined by state law, by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual personally, or by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or law to receive service of process. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), (2)(A}{C). Rule 4(h)(1)(A), meanwhile, provides that service upon an association may be effected “in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1)” permitting service through state-law means “for serving an individual[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A). Finally, Virginia law provides that service upon an individual, association, or legal or commercial entity may be made upon the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Va. Code § 8.01-329.!° I. Analysis Plaintiffs assert that Defaulting Defendants Patriot Front, Brown, and Ring conspired to deprive them of their civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), (ECF No. 31, at 28); that Defaulting Defendants Patriot Front, Rousseau, Brown, and Ring neglected to prevent interference with their civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986, (ECF No. 31, at 30); and that Defaulting Defendant Patriot Front subjected Plaintiffs to intimidation and harassment motivated by racial animosity in violation of Va. Code § 8.01-42.1, (ECF No. 31, at 33). The well-pleaded allegations in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, deemed admitted as a result of default by the Defaulting Defendants, satisfy the requirements for each of these claims. Therefore, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ Motions against the Defaulting Defendants. A. The Court Has Jurisdictional and Statutory Authority to Render Default Judgment Against Defendants Each of the requirements for entering default judgment against Defendants has been satisfied. See Am. Auto. Assoc., 2015 WL 3545927, at *1—2 (stating that prior to entering a default judgment, a court must ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction over the defaulting party, the action is in the proper venue, and the defaulting party received proper service of process). 1. The Court has Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiffs’ Claims The Amended Complaint asserts under Count I that the Defaulting Defendants, through their meeting on October 12, 2021 and the subsequent defacement of the Arthur Ashe mural, conspired to deprive Plaintiffs “of the equal protection of the laws” in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). (ECF No. 31 § 86-95.) The Amended Complaint further asserts under Count II that the Defaulting Defendants, “ha[d] knowledge . . . [of] the wrongs [the Defaulting Defendants] conspired to be done” contemplated by § 1985(3); that the Defaulting Defendants “ha[d] power to prevent” the commission of those wrongs; and that the Defaulting Defendants “neglect[ed] or refuse[d]” to prevent those wrongs, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. (ECF No. 31 9] 96- 109.) Because Counts I and II arise under federal law, the Court has federal question jurisdiction over these Counts. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343.

Count III of the Amended Complaint arises under Virginia Code § 8.01-42.1,'! which creates a civil cause of action for any person who is subjected to acts of intimidation or harassment motivated by racial, religious, or ethnic animosity. The Amended Complaint asserts that through their conspiracy to deface the Arthur Ashe mural, Defaulting Defendant Patriot Front subjected Plaintiffs to intimidation and harassment motivated by racial animosity. (ECF No. 31 4 110-16.) This state-law claim and Plaintiffs’ two federal-law claims arise from a “common nucleus of operative fact,” namely the Defaulting Defendants’ conspiracy to deface the Arthur Ashe mural. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). As aresult, Plaintiffs’ state-law claims and federal-law claims are “so related . . . that they form part of the same case or controversy,” meaning the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Count III. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court does not exercise its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim. § 1367(c)(1)-(4). 2. The Court has Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defaulting Defendants The Court has personal jurisdiction over all four Defaulting Defendants. “Pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 4(k)(1)(A), a federal court assessing such a jurisdictional issue

' Virginia Code § 8.01-42.1 provides in relevant part: A. An action for injunctive relief or civil damages, or both, shall lie for any person who is subjected to acts of (i) intimidation or harassment, (ii) violence directed against his person, or (iii) vandalism directed against his real or personal property, where such acts are motivated by racial, religious, gender, disability, gender identity, sexual orientation, or ethnic animosity. B. Any aggrieved party who initiates and prevails in an action authorized by this section shall be entitled to damages, including punitive damages, and in the discretion of the court to an award of the cost of the litigation and reasonable attorney fees in an amount to be fixed by the court. Va. Code. § 8.01-42.1(A)}4{B).

borrows and applies the applicable long-arm statute and governing principles from the forum state.” CFA Inst. v. Inst. of Chartered Fin. Analysts of India, 551 F.3d 285, 292 (4th Cir. 2009). “In order for a district court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant pursuant to a state long-arm statute, two requirements must be satisfied.” Jd “First, the forum state’s long-arm statute must authorize the exercise of such personal jurisdiction.” Jd. “Second, if that authorization exists, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state.” Id. a. Standard of Review Virginia’s long-arm statute provides that “[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person’s . . . [t]ransacting any business in th[e] Commonwealth [of Virginia][.]” Va. Code § 8.01-328.1(A)(1). Virginia law defines a “person” as any “individual, his [or her] executor, administrator, or other personal representative, or a corporation, partnership, association or any other legal or commercial entity, whether or not a citizen or domiciliary of th[e] Commonwealth and whether or not organized under the laws of th[e] Commonwealth.” Va. Code § 8.01-328. The Virginia long-arm statute is a “single act” statute, meaning “even a single act of business can confer jurisdiction provided that it is ‘significant’ and demonstrates ‘purposeful activity’ in Virginia.” Prod. Grp. Intern., Inc. v. Goldman, 337 F. Supp. 2d 788, 793 (E.D. Va. 2004) (citing John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., Inc., 211 Va. 736, 740 (1971)). “In defining the term transacting business,” the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has noted that “the purpose of the Virginia long-arm statute is to extend jurisdiction to the extent permissible under the due process clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment. English & Smith v. Metzger, 901 F.2d 36, 38 (4th Cir. 1990). “Because Virginia’s long-arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause, the statutory inquiry necessarily merges with the constitutional inquiry, and the two inquiries essentially become one.” Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 261 (4th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). Accordingly, the inquiry becomes whether the Defaulting Defendants maintain sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state so as not to offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Jnt’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quotation omitted). “The standard for determining the existence of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant varies, depending on whether the defendant’s contacts with the forum state also provide the basis for the suit.” Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 397 (4th Cir. 2003). “Ifthe defendant’s contacts with the State are also the basis for the suit, those contacts may establish specific jurisdiction. . . .[I]f the defendant’s contacts with the State are not also the basis for suit, then jurisdiction over the defendant must arise from the defendant’s general, more persistent, but unrelated contacts with the State.” ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc.,293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 & nn.8-9 (1984)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has adopted a three-part test to determine whether specific personal jurisdiction exists. Reynolds Foil, Inc. v. Pai, No. 3:09-cv- 657 (HEH), 2010 WL 1225620, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 25, 2010) (citing ALS Scan, Inc., 293 F.3d at 712). The Court must consider: “(1) the extent to which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State; (2) whether the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of those activities directed at the State; and[,] (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable.” AZS Scan, Inc., 293 F.3d at 712 (first alteration in original). With respect to the first factor, “no clear formula [exists] for determining what constitutes ‘purposeful availment.’” Reynolds Foil, Inc., 2010 WL 1225620, at *2. The Court, however, may consider whether the defendant maintains offices or agents in the forum state; whether the defendant owns property in the forum state; whether the defendant reached into the forum state to solicit or initiate business; whether the defendant deliberately engaged in significant or long- term business activities in the forum state; whether the parties contractually agreed that the law of the forum state would govern disputes; whether the defendant made in-person contact with the resident of the forum in the forum state regarding the business relationship; the nature, quality, and extent of the parties’ communications about the business transactions; and, whether the performance of contractual duties was to occur within the forum. Consulting Eng’rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 278 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). “If, and only if

... the plaintiff has satisfied this first prong of the test for specific jurisdiction need [the Court] move on to a consideration of prongs two and three.” Id. “The second prong of the test for specific jurisdiction . . . requires that the defendant’s contacts with the forum state form the basis of the suit.” Jd. at 278-79 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A., 466 U.S, at 414). The third prong of the specific jurisdiction test “permits a court to consider additional factors to ensure the appropriateness of the forum once it has determined that a defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business there.” Jd. at 279. Specifically, the Court may consider: “(1) the burden on the defendant of litigating in the forum; (2) the interest of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the shared interest of the states in obtaining efficient resolution of disputes; and, (5) the interests of the states in furthering substantive social policies.” Jd. (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477). b. Analysis The Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over all four Defaulting Defendants. First, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Patriot Front. Applying Virginia’s long-arm statute, the Court finds that Patriot Front is covered by that statute. Patriot Front has “transact[ed] . business” in Virginia, such that the long-arm statute provides the Court with personal jurisdiction over Patriot Front. Va. Code § 8.01-328.1(A)(1). Patriot Front, through Mr. Rousseau, Mr.

!2 Tn neither their Amended Complaint nor their Motions for Default Judgment do Plaintiffs explain what Patriot Front’s legal status is. Plaintiffs suggest that Patriot Front is an unincorporated association, as they argue that they properly served Patriot Front under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)’s provisions for service on associations, (ECF No. 191, at 20), though they do not expressly characterize Patriot Front as an incorporated entity or as an unincorporated association. In either case, the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Patriot Front. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(3) provides that an unincorporated association’s “[c]apacity to... be sued” is determined “by the law of the state where the court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3). Assuming Patriot Front is an unincorporated association, Virginia law provides that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a “person,” Va. Code § 8.01-328.1, which includes “a corporation, partnership, association or any other legal or commercial entity,” § 8.01-328. Virginia’s definition of “person” “is all inclusive, sufficient to bring within the ambit of the statute every natural or fictitious entity capable of performing the acts, such as transacting business, which are made the basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.” Combs v. Dickenson-Wise Med. Grp., 233 Va. 177, 180 (1987). Moreover, courts in this District apply the same personal jurisdiction analysis to unincorporated associations as they do to incorporated entities. See, e.g., Parizer v. AJP Educ. Found., Inc., No. 1:24-cv-724 (RDA), 2025 WL 2382933, at[*12] (E.D. Va. Aug. 15, 2025) (applying minimum contacts test to unincorporated association). Accordingly, the Court’s personal jurisdiction analysis does not hinge on Patriot Front’s legal status.

Brown, Mr. Ring, and the Settling Defendants, conspired to deface the Arthur Ashe mural in Richmond. As part of that conspiracy, Patriot Front sold materials to its members for use in the defacement of the mural. As Settling Defendant Noyce, who took part in the physical defacement of the mural, explained, the stencils used to deface the Arthur Ashe mural “were purchased through the organization,” that is, through Patriot Front. (ECF No. 190-4, at 24:3-18 (emphasis added).) This single act of business is enough to satisfy Virginia’s long-arm statute. Goldman, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 793 (“[E]ven a single act of business can confer jurisdiction provided that it is ‘significant’ and demonstrates ‘purposeful activity’ in Virginia.”); see also Doe v. Mast, 741 F. Supp. 3d 409, 456-60 (W.D. Va. 2025) (finding personal jurisdiction under the Virginia long-arm statute because the defendant “transacted business” in the state through a “sustained course of conduct” to assist others through a conspiracy). The Court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Patriot Front under Virginia’s long-arm statute. Constitutional considerations of due process do not alter the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Patriot Front. As to the first factor in the due process analysis, Patriot Front purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Virginia. Patriot Front maintains “geographical chapters, which it calls ‘networks.”” (ECF No. 31922.) At the time relevant to the suit, Settling Defendant Gancarz was the “Network Director for the region covering Virginia.” (ECF No. 31924.) Mr. Gancarz and the Defaulting Defendants participated in the October 12, 2021 meeting during which Patriot Front members conspired to

prong of the inquiry.”). Other courts examine whether a defendant has truly engaged in a business transaction, such that the Virginia long-arm statute applies. See Ferguson v. Blackwell, No. 1:23-cv-32 (JPJ), 2024 WL 3179175, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 26, 2024) (“Blackwell has not made payments, solicited buyers, or negotiated as part of a business transaction.”). The Court engages in both inquiries here.

deface the Arthur Ashe mural.'* (ECF No. 31 {J 23-29.) Patriot Front ultimately used footage taken of the defacement of the mural “‘as part of [its] efforts to recruit new members.” (ECF No. 31971.) As to the second factor, Patriot Front’s contacts with Virginia form the basis of the suit. Patriot Front’s conspiracy to deface the Arthur Ashe mural constitutes both its contacts with Virginia and the basis of the suit. As to the third factor, Virginia is an appropriate forum. The burden on Patriot Front of litigating in Virginia is low because it maintains a “network” covering Virginia, in which it operates and plans its “activism.” Virginia has an interest in adjudicating the dispute because Virginia residents have suffered harm through the deprivation of their civil rights. As Virginia residents, Plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief supports the propriety of the forum. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have established a prima facie case that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Patriot Front. See Patel v. Patel, No. 1:15cv598 (TSE), 2017 WL

'4 As discussed infra, Section III.B.^[1], Plaintiffs attached exhibits to their Motions that add additional detail concerning what happened during the October 12, 2021 meeting. In depositions attached to Plaintiffs’ Motions, two of the Settling Defendants asserted that during the October 12, 2021 meeting, the Defaulting and Settling Defendants discussed plans to engage in Patriot Front’s “activism” in Richmond, but that they did not discuss defacing the Arthur Ashe mural specifically. (ECF No. 190-3, at 29:16—-30:15, 31:12—23, 34:14-25; ECF No. 190-5, at 25:15-24, 26:22-27:3.) The Amended Complaint, in contrast, states that Defaulting Defendants Brown and Ring were “present for, and participated in, a meeting on or about October 12, 2021, planning the vandalism of the Arthur Ashe mural in Battery Park, Richmond, Virginia.” (ECF No. 31 {J 28-29 (emphasis added).) Even if the Court accepts the characterization of the October 12, 2021 meeting in the attached depositions, its personal jurisdiction analysis would not change. In either scenario, Patriot Front purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Virginia, in that its members conspired to deface something in Virginia. There is no evidence that Patriot Front’s members withdrew from that conspiracy or took steps to prevent it.

5198151, at *3 (E.D. Va. July 31, 2017) (in the context of a motion for default judgment, a plaintiff has the burden to establish a prima facie case that the court has personal jurisdiction over the defaulting parties) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1993)). For all of the same reasons articulated above, the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the other three Defaulting Defendants. Mr. Brown and Mr. Ring participated in the October 12, 2021 meeting, during which Patriot Front members conspired to deface the Arthur Ashe mural. Mr. Rousseau was made aware of this meeting and, despite holding the power to instruct Patriot Front members not to engage in “activism,” he took no steps to prevent it. (ECF No. 190-3, at 35:2—17; ECF No. 190-5, at 13:3—18).) In doing so, Mr. Rousseau, Mr. Brown, and Mr. Ring “transacted business” in Virginia, such that Virginia’s long-arm statute permits the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over each. And the same constitutional considerations that applied to Patriot Front apply to the other three Defaulting Defendants. By participating in this conspiracy, the other three Defaulting Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Virginia; their contacts with Virginia form the basis of the suit; and Virginia is an appropriate forum into which the Defaulting Defendants have reached through their conspiracy and in which Plaintiffs have an interest in obtaining full relief. The Court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Patriot Front, Mr. Rousseau, Mr. Ring, and Mr. Brown. ^[3]. Venue is Proper in this District Venue is proper in this Court over all of Plaintiffs’ claims because “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to” Plaintiffs claims occurred in Richmond, namely the defacement of the Arthur Ashe mural. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). 4. Plaintiffs Effectuated Proper Service of Process on All Defaulting Defendants Each Defaulting Defendant was properly served. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1) provides that service on an association is proper when conducted “in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an individual.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1). Rule 4(e)(1), meanwhile, provides that service on an individual is proper when conducted by “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). The relevant state law provides that “process or notice may be served on any agent of [a party] . . . or on the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia.” Va. Code § 8.01-329(A). Ifa party serves process on the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia, “the party or his [or her] agent or attorney seeking service shall file an affidavit with the court, stating either (i) that the person to be served is a nonresident or (ii) that, after exercising due diligence, the party seeking service has been unable to locate the person to be served.” Va. Code § 8.01-329(B). On January 5, 2023, Plaintiffs served the Amended Complaint and a summons on the Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia along with a proper affidavit. (ECF Nos. 52, 53.) In doing so, Plaintiffs properly served both Patriot Front and its agent, Defaulting Defendant Rousseau. Plaintiffs also served Mr. Rousseau with a copy of the Amended Complaint and a summons by posting both on Mr. Rousseau’s front door. (ECF No. 89.) Plaintiffs also served a copy of the Amended Complaint and a summons on Mr. Brown personally pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2)(A). (ECF No. 109.) And Plaintiffs served a copy of the Amended Complaint and a summons on a Lt. Mattie, an officer at Fayette County Prison, where Mr. Ring was incarcerated at the time of service. (ECF No. 54.)

In doing so, Plaintiffs properly served Mr. Ring pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2)(C), as Lt. Mattie was “authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(C). Accordingly, Plaintiffs properly served all four Defaulting Defendants. B. Plaintiffs’ Allegations, Deemed Admitted, Establish that Plaintiffs Have Stated a Claim Under Counts I through II This Court previously determined that Plaintiffs stated a claim with respect to Counts I through III as applied to the Settling Defendants. (See ECF No. 127.) The Court now examines whether Plaintiffs have properly stated a claim with respect to the Defaulting Defendants. They have. ^[1]. Plaintiffs Have Properly Stated a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 Against Defaulting Defendants Patriot Front, Brown, and Ring in Count One Plaintiffs demonstrate entitlement to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) based on the well- pleaded facts in the Amended Complaint. To state a § 1985(3) claim, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege the following elements: (1) a conspiracy of two or more persons, (2) who are motivated by a specific class- based, invidiously discriminatory animus to (3) deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all, (4) and which results in injury to the plaintiff as (5) a consequence of an overt act committed by the defendants in connection with the conspiracy. A Soc’y Without A Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995)). Regarding element one, to adequately plead a § 1985(3) conspiracy, “the plaintiff ‘must show an agreement or a meeting of the minds by [the] defendants to violate the [plaintiff's] constitutional rights.’” Jd. (alterations in original) (quoting Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1377). “[I]t simply must be shown that there was a single plan, the essential nature and general scope of which was known to each person who is to be held responsible for its consequences.” Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1378 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs allege numerous well-pleaded facts that, taken as true, plausibly allege a conspiracy. Plaintiffs plainly state that Defaulting Defendants Brown and Ring, members of Defaulting Defendant Patriot Front, were “present for, and participated in, a meeting on or about October 12, 2021, planning the vandalism of the Arthur Ashe mural in Battery Park, Richmond, Virginia.” (ECF No. 31 28-29.) During this meeting, these Defaulting Defendants “discussed and planned the vandalization of the Arthur Ashe mural.” (ECF No. 31 50.) Moreover, Patriot Front required Settling Defendant Gancarz, as Network Director, to approve of any large scale mural cover-ups in his region before members initiate them. (ECF No. 31 Settling Defendant Gancarz, in his role as Network Director, was “directly involved in, consulted on, and approved” the vandalism of the Arthur Ashe mural. (ECF No. 31 { 24.) Less than a week after the October 12, 2021 meeting, Settling Defendants Noyce, Dail, and John Doe 1 vandalized the mural with Patriot Front insignia in a similar form used by Patriot Front members across the country. (ECF No. 31 451-71.) Patriot Front prominently featured “[flootage of the vandalism of the Arthur Ashe mural” in a video Patriot Front used “to recruit new members.” (ECF No. 31971.) Finally, pictures of the vandalism as it was occurring are included in the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 31 ff 58-62, 64, 66-67, 69.) Considered together, Plaintiffs have alleged, and the Court assumes as true, ample facts to infer that Defaulting Defendants Patriot Front, Brown, and Ring shared “a single plan” to deface the mural, and these Defaulting Defendants were aware of “the essential nature and general scope” of this plan. See Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1378. In depositions attached to Plaintiffs’ Motions, two of the Settling Defendants asserted that during the October 12, 2021 meeting, the Defaulting and Settling Defendants discussed plans to engage in Patriot Front’s “activism” in Richmond, but that they did not discuss defacing the Arthur Ashe mural specifically. (ECF No. 190-3, at 29:16-30:15, 31:12-23, at 34:14-25; ECF No. 190-5, at 25:15-24, 26:22-27:3.) The Amended Complaint, in contrast, states that Defaulting Defendants Brown and Ring were “present for, and participated in, a meeting on or about October 12, 2021, planning the vandalism of the Arthur Ashe mural in Battery Park, Richmond, Virginia.” (ECF No. 31 {J 28-29 (emphasis added).) On a motion for default judgment, the Court ordinarily treats the facts of the operative complaint as true. To the extent the Court can credit this evidence in the context of a motion for default judgment, the depositions attached to Plaintiffs’ Motions could be read to undermine the facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint.'!° But even if the Court were to credit the events as described in these depositions, Plaintiffs still plausibly allege a conspiracy. “Plaintiffs may hold each Defendant liable for the reasonably foreseeable acts of their co-conspirators.” Sines v. Kessler, 324 F. Supp. 3d 765, 795 (W.D. Va. 2018). In their depositions, Settling Defendants Gancarz and Dail made clear that even if the parties at the October 12, 2021 meeting did not discuss defacing the Arthur Ashe mural, they did discuss defacing something in Richmond in line with Patriot Front’s mission. (ECF No. 190-3, at 29:16—-30:15, 31:12—23, at 34:14-25; ECF No. 190-5, at 25:15-24, 26:22-27:3.) The defacement of the Arthur Ashe mural was a reasonably foreseeable act ultimately undertaken by the Defaulting Defendants’ co-conspirators. Turning to element two—discriminatory animus—the Court concludes that Plaintiffs clearly and plausibly allege the requisite racial animus. To satisfy this element, Plaintiffs must assert that Defendants were “motivated by a specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory

15 The Court commends Plaintiffs for including potentially conflicting information in their Motions so that the Court has a full and complete record,

animus.” A Soc’y Without A Name, 655 F.3d at 346 (citations omitted). The Amended Complaint alleges numerous well-pleaded and plausible facts that support a reasonable inference that racial animus against Black individuals and their supporters animated Defendants’ conduct. Indeed, “Patriot Front is a white supremacist group that calls for the formation of a white ethnostate.” (ECF No. 3141.) The Amended Complaint reports Patriot Front’s mission and white supremacist ideology, including that its “ideology, articulated in its online manifesto, is based on” the belief “that true Americans share a ‘pan-European identity.°” (ECF No. 31 4 12.) “Patriot Front’s members . . . have intimidated communities based on race and sexual orientation. . . across the country” by “defac[ing] murals honoring Black Americans, target[ing] LGBTQ+ events, and destroy[ing] public and private property as part of their campaign to promote their... credo.” (ECF No. 31 2.) Regarding the third element, § 1985(3) “is a purely remedial statute” that provides “a civil cause of action when some otherwise defined federal right—to equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws—is breached by a conspiracy in the manner defined by the section.” Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 376 (1979). The Constitutional right to be free from the badges and incidents of slavery qualifies as a right that can be vindicated via a 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) claim against private actors. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-05 (1971) (explaining that Section 1985(3) creates a statutory cause of action for “victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at depriving [the victim] of the basic rights that the law secures to all free [people]”). The racially motivated deprivation of the right to enjoy a public accommodation—such as that offered in Battery Park—constitutes a denial amounting to a “badge of slavery,” and thus is actionable under § 1985(3). See Fisher v. Shamburg, 624 F.2d 156, 159 (10th Cir. 1980) (concluding that “Congress has declared its intention that a racially motivated interference with one’s right to enjoy places of public accommodation constitutes [ ] a badge of slavery” and § 1985(3) can be used to enforce this right). Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a racially-motived conspiracy whose predominant purpose was to deny them of their right to enjoy the public accommodations offered by Battery Park. Finally, Plaintiffs well plead damages connected to the conspiracy. Plaintiffs plead that the loss of their “legally protected interest” in the form of the vandalism to the mural, they “and their children substantially curtailed or even eliminated their use of the Park, feeling compelled to avoid the Park’s playground, paths, basketball and tennis courts, and other available amenities.” (ECF No. 31 4 6, 80-82.) They also allege emotional injuries. Plaintiffs have alleged cognizable injuries where they have both significantly curtailed or even eliminated their access to the Park and have experienced emotional harm as a result of Defendants’ actions. (See ECF No. 31 { 76, 78, 80— 84.) Asaresult of the vandalism and their resulting safety concerns, both Plaintiffs limited their access to Battery Park. These injuries are directly traceable to Defaulting Defendants’ Patriot Front, Brown, and Ring’s involvement in the conspiracy. Plaintiffs have established the elements necessary to state a claim under Count One. ^[2]. Plaintiffs Have Properly Stated a Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 Against Defaulting Defendants Patriot Front, Rousseau, Brown, and Ring in Count Two __ Plaintiffs demonstrate entitlement to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 based on the well- pleaded facts in the Amended Complaint. To state a § 1986 claim, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege: (1) a § 1985 conspiracy occurred; (2) the defendants had knowledge of the conspiracy; (3) the defendants had the power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of acts pursuant to that conspiracy; and (4) the defendants neglected or refused to act to prevent the conspiracy. See McHam v. N. Carolina Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 1:05-cv-01168, 2007 WL 1695914, at *5 (M.D.N.C. June 11, 2007), aff'd, 250 F. App’x 545 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1295-96 (3d Cir.1994) (setting out elements of § 1986 claim)). As discussed above, Plaintiffs have established a conspiracy under § 1985. And all four Defaulting Defendants had knowledge of the conspiracy. Defaulting Defendants Brown and Ring, members of Defaulting Defendant Patriot Front, attended and participated in the October 12, 2021 meeting at which Patriot Front members discussed engaging in “activism.” Defaulting Defendant Rousseau was made aware of the events of this meeting. All of the Defaulting Defendants had the power to prevent or aid in the prevention of the defacement of the Arthur Ashe mural and neglected or refused to do so. Plaintiffs have established the elements necessary to state a claim under Count Two. ^[3]. Plaintiffs Have Properly Stated a Claim Under Virginia Code § 8.01- 42.1 Against Defaulting Defendant Patriot Front in Count Three Plaintiffs demonstrate entitlement to relief against Patriot Front under Virginia Code § 8.01-42.1 based on the well-pleaded facts in the Amended Complaint. To state a Virginia Code § 8.01-42.1 claim, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege the following elements: (1) the defendant subjected Plaintiffs to either “(i) intimidation or harassment, (ii) violence directed against [their] person{s], or (iii) vandalism against [their] real or personal property”, and (2) such acts were “motivated by racial, religious, gender, disability, gender identity, sexual orientation, or ethnic animosity.” Va. Code § 8.01-42.1(A) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Patriot Front, through its members’ defacement of the Arthur Ashe mural, subjected them to intimidation and harassment and that these acts were motivated by racial animosity. Plaintiffs have established the elements necessary to state a claim under Count Three.

C. Plaintiffs are Entitled to Damages and Attorney’s Fees Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 expressly authorize damages awards. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 expressly authorizes the Court to grant attorney’s fees in actions under §§ 1985(3) and 1986. Virginia Code § 8.01-42.1 likewise expressly permits damages awards. The Court will order Plaintiffs to file supplemental briefing concerning the damages and attorney’s fees to which they are entitled and will reserve ruling on each. In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs also seek a declaratory judgment that the Defaulting Defendants’ actions deprived Plaintiffs of their rights under state and federal law and injunctive relief enjoining the Defaulting Defendants from future violations of rights guaranteed by state and federal law. (ECF No. 31, at 35.) Plaintiffs’ memoranda discuss only their entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees. As a result, the Court will order Plaintiffs to include in their supplemental briefing argument concerning their entitlement to declaratory and injunctive relief. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Motions. (ECF Nos. 190, 191, 192.) The Court will order that default judgment be entered against the Defaulting Defendants. The Court will further order Plaintiffs to file a motion outlining the damages they believe appropriate and the fees to which they believe they are entitled. An appropriate Order shall issue.

Date: af? 7/2 6 M. Hannalf H b Richmond, Virginia Chief United States District Judge

4]