Supreme Court of Texas ══════════ No. 25-0161 ══════════

Prabhakar Gopalan, Petitioner, v. Andrea Marsh, Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════ On Petition for Review from the Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas ═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued March 4, 2026

JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this divorce proceeding, the jury found that the father should have the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence. But the trial court awarded the mother more time with the children under the divorce decree’s possession order. The central issue is whether the court’s possession order contravened the jury verdict. We hold that it did. The ordinary meaning of “primary residence” does not encompass a home where the child lives less time than elsewhere, and the statutory context supports that understanding. We therefore

reverse and remand the possession order for the trial court’s redetermination. Because that issue may inform the best-interest analysis in assigning parental rights and duties, we likewise reverse and remand those determinations, along with the appellate attorney’s fee award. We otherwise affirm. I. Background Andrea Marsh and Prabhakar Gopalan filed for divorce after nine years of marriage. They agreed to joint managing conservatorship of their two children but disputed the allocation of parental rights and division of the marital estate. Following a five-day trial, the jury found that Gopalan should have the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence within Travis County. The trial court then determined the specific possession terms, child support, and distribution of the remaining parental rights—matters assigned to the court under the Family Code.^[1] In the final decree, the court divided the estate, adopted the jury’s finding on primary residence, and awarded Marsh greater possession (approximately 57% of the time), monthly child support, the majority of exclusive parental rights, and conditional appellate attorney’s fees. After the court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, Gopalan appealed. Among other issues, he challenges the possession order as contravening the verdict and seeks a remand of possession and related issues.

A divided court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the “decree in this case implements the letter of the jury’s verdict.”2 Acknowledging a split among the courts of appeals,3 the court agreed with the Dallas Court of Appeals that “[t]here is simply no requirement in the Family Code that one joint managing conservator be given more time of possession of a child because of any particular jury finding.”4 In so holding, the court adopted the view that the primary-residence right is necessary “for purposes of public school enrollment and as a significant factor in the power of relocation” but awarding “more days” of possession to the other parent does not undermine that right.^[5] The dissent would have held that the decree impermissibly conflicts with the verdict because the ordinary meaning of “primary residence” requires that “the children should live there at least half, if not slightly more than half, of the time.”6 We granted review to resolve the split of authority.

2 706 S.W.3d 650, 659, 667 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025).

II. Discussion A. By way of context, we begin with a brief overview of the pertinent statutory history.^[7] Before the Family Code’s codification, divorce courts were empowered to award child custody8—a term that “connotes the right to establish the child’s domicile”9—and since 1961 have been bound by the jury’s custody determinations.^[10] At that time, courts disfavored “split custody” and ordinarily granted custody to a single parent.^[11] In 1973, the Legislature enacted Title II of the Family Code, which replaced “custodian” terminology with “conservator” and enumerated parental rights and duties.^[12] The statute placed first in that list “the right to have physical possession of the child and to establish its [sic] legal domicile,” thereby linking possession with the authority to determine domicile (now “residence”) in a single right.^[13] Under this scheme, divorce courts typically appointed a “managing” conservator with that right and a “possessory” conservator with limited possession rights.^[14] Then, as now, the child’s best interest remained the “primary consideration” for those decisions.^[15] Fourteen years later, the Legislature articulated the state’s policy to ensure a child’s “frequent and continuing contact” with fit parents and to encourage divorced parents “to share in the rights and responsibilities of raising their children.”16 To further that policy, it authorized courts to appoint “joint managing conservators,”17 defined as “the sharing of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of a parent by two parties, ordinarily the parents, even if the exclusive power to make certain decisions may be awarded to one party,” and with no requirement of equal or nearly equal possession periods.^[18] In doing so, courts would specify which rights were to be exercised “jointly” or “exclusively” and would “ordinarily” designate “a primary physical residence.”19 The Legislature subsequently adopted possession guidelines that established a presumptive minimum possession period for “a parent named as a joint managing conservator who is not awarded the primary physical residence of the child.”20 Over time, “[c]onfusion arose . . . over the relationship between binding jury verdicts on custody and court-determined conservatorship terms.”21 As initially enacted, Title II barred courts from issuing decrees that contravened a jury verdict on managing conservatorship, possession, or access.^[22] Shortly thereafter, the Legislature altered

and exclusively), .134(b) (authorizing courts to allocate rights “between the parents, independently, jointly, or exclusively,” and to establish “a geographic area within which the conservator shall maintain the child’s primary residence”). Alternatively, the parents could agree on “the county of residence of the child” or “designate[] the conservator who has the sole legal right to determine the residence of the child” and allocate all the remaining rights, privileges, and duties “between the parents, solely, concurrently, or jointly.” Act of May 26, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 744, § 6, sec. ^[14].021(c)(1), (4), 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2666, 2668 (repealed and recodified 1995) (current version, as amended, at TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.133(a)(1), (4)).

course, empowering courts to set “the specific terms and conditions of access to the child, support of the child, and the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of conservators, on which issues the [jury] verdict, if any, is advisory only.”23 But this shift prompted concern “that such authority would ultimately thwart the jury’s will in determining custody.”24 In 1997, the Legislature again clarified the statute, specifying the jury issues that a court “may not contravene,” including “the determination of the primary residence of the child.”25 B. With this historical context in mind, we turn to the statute’s operative language. Section 105.002(c) of the Family Code provides that “[i]n a jury trial”: (1) a party is entitled to a verdict by the jury and the court may not contravene a jury verdict on the issues of: ... (D) the determination of which joint managing conservator has the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child; . . . [but] (2) the court may not submit to the jury questions on the issues of: ... (B) a specific term or condition of possession of or access to the child; or (C) any right or duty of a conservator, other than a determination under Subdivision (1)(D), (E), or (F).26 The issue here is whether a jury finding on the primary-residence right restricts the court’s possession allocation without also improperly determining a specific term or condition of possession. We conclude that it does. At its core, this question comes down to what “primary residence” means within the statutory context. A statute’s meaning presents a question of law that we review de novo, applying well-established principles and rules to guide our analysis.^[27] When a statutory term is undefined, as here, we apply its common, ordinary meaning unless this yields an absurd result or a different meaning is apparent from the statutory context.^[28] To ascertain a term’s ordinary meaning, we often start by consulting dictionaries.^[29] Dictionaries define (1) “residence” as “the place where one actually lives or has his home as distinguished from his technical domicile,”30 (2) “primary” as “first in rank or importance,”31 and (3) “primary residence” as “[t]he place where a person lives most of the time.”32 Simply put, a home where the child actually lives less time than elsewhere is not the child’s “primary residence” as that phrase is ordinarily understood. Courts of appeals that have reached a contrary conclusion failed to properly engage with the statute’s plain meaning.^[33] Instead, they construed “primary residence” as a legal label designed “to achieve stability” “for purposes of public school enrollment and as a significant factor in the power of relocation.”34 Neither the plain language nor the statutory context—including “the larger historical sweep” described above or “the surrounding provisions”35—supports such a technical and narrow meaning. Moreover, regardless of their “primary residence,” children may generally attend a public school where either parent resides.^[36] The rigorous statutory hurdle for modifying the primary-residence right is also at odds with an interpretation that would confine “primary residence” to a mere legal label for relocation purposes.^[37] To the extent these courts have imposed a different construction on “primary residence” than its ordinary meaning, we disapprove of those opinions. When a term’s ordinary meaning and statutory context both point in the same direction, our fidelity to enacted text compels an end to our interpretative inquiry. We therefore hold that the trial court contravened the jury verdict by awarding greater possession time to Marsh. The verdict on the primary-residence right does not dictate a “specific term or condition” of possession; it imposes a general constraint. Thus, remand is necessary for the trial court to redetermine the decree’s possession order. Because the possession schedule informs the best-interest analysis for allocating parental rights and duties, including child support,38 we lack confidence that the court’s initial determinations were not significantly affected by its erroneous possession order. Under these circumstances, the trial court should have an opportunity to reconsider those issues as well. Two additional observations deserve mention. First, the plain meaning of “primary residence” in its statutory context does not preclude a possession arrangement of equal periods. The Family Code provides that “[j]oint managing conservatorship does not require the award of equal or nearly equal periods of physical possession of and access to each of the joint conservators.”39 This provision implies that equal time is permissible; otherwise, the statement that it is not required would be surplusage.^[40] And in such an arrangement, the children would not be spending more time living elsewhere. That said, there can be only one “primary residence.” Accordingly, even when the parent with the primary-residence right has been awarded equal or greater possession time, the order would still contravene the jury verdict if the possession periods are structured such that the designated residence would not be “primary” in the sense of “first in rank or importance.” Second, Gopalan repeatedly refers to the joint managing conservator with the exclusive right to designate the primary residence as the “primary parent.”41 We emphatically reject this conflation, which has no textual basis. The significance of the primary-residence right, with its concomitant responsibilities, cannot be doubted. But its assignment reflects a best-interest consideration, not a hierarchical ordering of the parents in rank or importance. Both parents are encouraged to “share in the rights and duties of raising their child,”42 and our legal language should reflect this noteworthy public policy. Courts and litigants should avoid injecting into highly charged divorce proceedings shorthand references like “primary parent” that carry contentious value judgments untethered from any legal grounding. C. Gopalan challenges other unrelated portions of the divorce decree involving a bond requirement for international travel with the children, the characterization of Gopalan’s interest in the marital residence, and certain findings of facts and conclusions of law. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment on these issues.^[43] Our independent review reveals no error requiring reversal, and further discussion would not aid the development of the state’s jurisprudence.^[44] Without expressing an opinion on the appellate court’s reasoning, we conclude its judgment on those portions of the decree is correct.^[45] D. Gopalan’s final issue concerns attorney’s fees. Because the court of appeals affirmed, it did not reach this issue.46 In the interest of judicial economy, we address it here.^[47] In the divorce decree, the trial court (1) required the parties to bear their own trial-attorney fees, (2) awarded Marsh $80,000 in contingent appellate fees,48 and (3) accounted for $117,411.02 of Marsh’s trial fees as part of the just-and-right division of the marital estate, citing Gopalan’s “unnecessary escalation of litigation.” Gopalan does not challenge the court’s discretion to allocate those fees,49 but he seeks a remand for redetermination of Marsh’s fee award if he succeeds on appeal. We agree remand is warranted as to the appellate fees but not to revisit the property division’s treatment of the trial-attorney fees. The trial court’s equitable consideration of excessive fees in dividing the community estate was based on Gopalan’s pretrial conduct, not on any legal conclusion now found erroneous on appeal.^[50] The court’s fact findings explain that Gopalan’s escalation of pretrial litigation unnecessarily caused both parties to incur substantial fees paid from the community estate.^[51] In other words, those fees bore no relation to Gopalan’s successful appellate issue regarding the jury verdict. On this record, reversal of the possession order affords no basis to disturb the property division. The appellate-fee award requires a different analysis. Because Gopalan has prevailed in part on appeal, Marsh may not be entitled to the full award.^[52] But she may recover fees incurred in addressing his unmeritorious issues.^[53] Marsh’s evidence does not identify the appellate fees that would be incurred on those issues, so remand is necessary to determine that amount.^[54]

III. Conclusion For these reasons, we reverse the divorce decree’s allocation of possession, child support, and parental rights and duties between Marsh and Gopalan. We remand those issues along with the award of appellate attorney’s fees for redetermination consistent with our opinion. We otherwise affirm the court of appeals’ judgment. Our judgment is without prejudice to either party seeking modification of the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of a child under any relevant authority.

John P. Devine Justice OPINION DELIVERED: May 22, 2026