Patrick v. Field Rsch. Corp. Et Al., 414 U.S. 922 (1973). · Go Syfert
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Patrick v. Field Rsch. Corp. Et Al., 414 U.S. 922 (1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
5 citation events across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co. (wyo, 1980-05-14)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see, e.g." MacGuire v. Harriscope Broadcasting Co. (2×)
Wyo. · 1980 · signal: see also · confidence low
In New York Times, the United States Supreme *842 Court held that, in order for a public official to be able to recover for defamation, the First Amendment required the public official to prove, with convincing clarity, the defendant's `actual malice,' at the time of the publication. `Actual malice' can be shown by proving either that the defendant knew of the falsity of the statement or that the defendant uttered the statement in reckless disregard for the truth. * * * * * * * * * "Actual malice must be proved with convincing clarity. ( New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, 285…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Widener v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1977 · signal: see also · confidence low
(New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, 285-286 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 709-710 ]; Goldwater v. Ginzburg (2d Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 324, 341 , cert. den., 396 U.S. 1049 [ 24 L.Ed.2d 695 , 90 S.Ct. 701 ]; see also Field Research Corp. v. Patrick (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 603, 608 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 473 ], cert. den., 414 U.S. 922 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 157 , 94 S.Ct. 218 ].) Whether there was “actual malice,” as required by the New York Times standard, is, of course, a question of fact for the jury.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
William P. Patrick
v.
Field Research Corporation
72-1659.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 15, 1973.
414 U.S. 922
Douglas.
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Ct. App. Cal., 1st App. Dist. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Douglas,

dissenting.

This case involves a libel suit based on statements made in the heat of the vigorous 1966 campaign for the office of Governor of California. Respondents published a poll indicating that, of the candidates in the Republican primary, petitioner was favored by only 1% of the voters. Petitioner responded by saying that he believed, based on reports from a reliable source, that the poll was corrupt, dishonest, and rigged as a result of a bribe paid by one of the other candidates. Respondents instituted a libel action and recovered $300,000 in damages.

Respondents concede public figure status and the libel award is thus based on the “malice” with which petitioner made the statements. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U. S. 29; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 130; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254. But “[t]he requirement that malice be proved provides[*923] at best an evanescent protection for the right critically to discuss public affairs and certainly does not measure up to the sturdy safeguard embodied in the First Amendment.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, at 293 (Black, J., concurring). In my opinion the First Amendment prohibits the use' of civil libel laws to impose damages for the discussion of public affairs or criticism of public figures, and this prohibition is in no way dependent upon the results of uncertain speculation as to the “malicious” mental state of the speaker. Freedom of speech does not admit of differentiation limiting its applicability to those possessed of judicially approved states of mind.

I would grant this petition and reverse the judgment below.