Smith v. Florida, 462 U.S. 1145 (1983). · Go Syfert
Smith v. Florida, 462 U.S. 1145 (1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
41 citation events across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Broxson v. State (fladistctapp, 1987-05-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "see" Broxson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Smith v. State, 424 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1145 , 103 S.Ct. 3129 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1983); Palmes v. State, 397 So.2d 648 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882 , 102 S.Ct. 369 , 70 L.Ed.2d 195 (1981).
cited Cited "see" Gonzalez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. State, 424 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1145 , 103 S.Ct. 3129 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1983); Miller v. State, 503 So.2d 929 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
discussed Cited "see" Dasher v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. State, 424 So.2d 726, 731 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1145 , 103 S.Ct. 3129 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1983); Kennedy v. State, 140 Fla. 124, 131 , 191 So. 193, 196 (1939); Jackson v. State, 403 So.2d 1063, 1066 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), pet. for review denied, 412 So.2d 466 (Fla.1982); Horner v. State, 149 So.2d 863, 865 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Francis v. State
Fla. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Smith v. State, 424 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1145 , 103 S.Ct. 3129 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1983).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bundy v. State
Fla. · 1985 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Smith v. State, 424 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1145 , 103 S.Ct. 3129 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1983) (where evidence showed the victim was abducted, confined, and sexually abused by the defendant and then lead into a wooded area and killed execution-style by three shots to the back of her head); Bolender v. State, 422 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 939 , 103 S.Ct. 2111 , 77 L.Ed.2d 315 (1983) (defendant methodically held the victims at gunpoint and ordered them to strip and then beat and tortured them throughout an evening before killing them).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Frank Smith
v.
Florida
82-6474.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jun 20, 1983.
462 U.S. 1145
Brennan, Marshall.
Cited by 39 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida.

The petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice BRENNAN, dissenting.

Adhering to my views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in this case.

Justice MARSHALL, dissenting.

Lead Opinion

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certio-rari denied.

Dissent

Justice Brennan,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence in,,this case.

Dissent

Justice Marshall,

dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, I would grant certio-rari and vacate petitioner’s death sentence on this basis alone. However, even if I accepted the prevailing view that the death penalty can constitutionally be imposed under certain circumstances, I would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentence on the ground that neither the jury that convicted petitioner of murder nor the judge who sentenced him found that he “kill[ed], attempt[ed] to kill, or intended] that a killing take place or that lethal force ... be employed.” Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782, 797 (1982). The jury was instructed that “liability for first degree murder extends to all co-felons who are personally present during the commission of the felony” and that “[ujnder the felony murder rule, [the] state of mind of the defendant is immaterial.” Tr. 2678. In imposing sentence, the trial judge did not find that petitioner himself killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. Although the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that “there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found [petitioner] guilty of premeditated murder,” 424 So. 2d 726, 733 (1982) (emphasis added), neither the jury nor the judge actually made such a finding. Under these circumstances our decision in Enmund v. Florida requires that petitioner’s death sentence be vacated.