green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 1×
7.7 score
G Cite
cited 3× by 1 distinct case ·
“by its own terms, Article III only applies during the period when a prisoner continues to serve a term of imprisonment”
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "but see"
United States v. Desmond Rouse
But see Rincon v. United States, 510 U.S. 801 , 114 S.Ct. 41 , 126 L.Ed.2d 12 (1993) (summarily remanding case for reconsideration in light of Daubert where expert testimony about reliability of eye witness testimony at issue).
discussed
Cited as authority (quoted)
Dunaway v. Commonwealth
by its own terms, article iii only applies during the period when a prisoner continues to serve a term of imprisonment
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Daniel Tejeda
See United States v. Saffeels, 982 F.2d 1199, 1204 (8th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 510 U.S. 801 , 114 S.Ct. 41 , 126 L.Ed.2d 12 (1993) (commenting that the expiration of a defendant’s sentence before the 180 days meant that the IAD no longer applied to him and resulted in his reversion to the status of being simply a “pretrial detainee”); see also United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 633 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that, once a defendant’s state sentence expired, the IAD no longer applied with respect to the trial deadline for his federal charges).
discussed
Cited "see"
Saldano v. State
(2×)
See Texas v. Parrish, 510 U.S. 801 , 114 S.Ct. 41 , 126 L.Ed.2d 11 (1993) (District Attorney of Harris County); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 , 109 S.Ct. 2533 , 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (Criminal District Attorney of Dallas County); Texas v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 1114 , 106 S.Ct. 1627 , 90 L.Ed.2d 175 (1986) (Criminal District Attorney of Bexar County); Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 , 106 S.Ct. 976 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986) (Criminal District Attorney of Randall County); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (Criminal District Attorney of Tarrant County). .
discussed
Cited "see"
People v. Evans
See United States v. Saffeels, 982 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir.1992), vacated on other grounds, 510 U.S. 801 , 114 S.Ct. 41 , 126 L.Ed.2d 12 (1993); United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628 (7th Cir.1987); Commonwealth v. Koutras, No. 9773CR0073A-C (Mass.Super.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Anderson, Nicholas T. v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
If the legislative intent were to include both local and state facilities, the statute would have so read.”); see also United States v. Paige, 332 F. Supp. 2d 467, 473 (D.R.I. 2004) (“It is well established that a defendant who is detained pending parole revocation is not a prisoner serving a ‘sentence of imprisonment’ within the meaning of the [IADA].” (first citing United States v. Saffeels, 982 F.2d 1199, 1204 (8th Cir. 1992), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 801 (1993); and then citing United States v. Reed, 620 F.2d 709, 712 (9th Cir. 1980))).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Pierre-Louis v. State
See also U.S. v. Saffeels, 982 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir.1992), vacated on other grounds by 510 U.S. 801 , 114 S.Ct. 41 , 126 L.Ed.2d 12 (1993); U.S. v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 , 108 S.Ct. 456 , 98 L.Ed.2d 396 (1987); U.S. v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211 , 103 S.Ct. 1206 , 75 L.Ed.2d 446 (1983), and cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211 , 103 S.Ct. 1206 , 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983); § 901.151(2), Fla.Stat. (1993).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Texas
v.
Parrish
v.
Parrish
92-1826.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 4, 1993.
Cited by 3 opinions | Published
Citer courts: Kentucky Supreme Court (1)
Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688 (1993).