State v. Fontes, 986 P.2d 897 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998). · Go Syfert
Search
State v. Fontes, 986 P.2d 897 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
288 citation events (288 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Togaba (arizctapp, 2026-03-31)
Treatment trajectory · 2003 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2003 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Togaba
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). ¶3 In 2012, Togaba met G.C. and began a romantic relationship.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lowe
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). ¶3 While patrolling Whiskey Row in September 2023, Prescott police officers noticed a woman hanging onto a car as it drove away.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Gonzalez
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Gonzalez had the opportunity to file a supplemental brief but did not do so. ¶2 We must review the entire record for reversible error, Clark, 196 Ariz. at 537, ¶ 30 , viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the convictions and resolving all reasonable inferences against Gonzalez, see State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Fullen
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Frasard (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Sierra
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ames v. Tempe, City of
D. Ariz. · 2023 · confidence medium
Ariz. 2007) (describing a conviction for resisting arrest in Arizona but not 28 citing any specific statutory provision); State v. Fontes, 986 P.2d 897, 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (A.R.S. § 13-2508(A) generally). - 53 - Case 2:20-cv-02102-DWL Document 135 Filed 03/29/23 Page 54 of 62 1 officers who continue using force after a suspect has been arrested may be sued for 2 excessive force even if the suspect engaged in unlawful resistance during the arrest 3 sequence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Clark
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). ¶3 In May 2019, a Department of Public Safety Trooper stopped Clark while driving on Highway 95 in Mohave County, Arizona for a turning lane violation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Billingsley
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Arizona Elder Care exercised that POA until November 13, 2017, when the victim revoked that authority and instead granted a POA to Appellant. 1 “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts and resolve all inferences against appellant.” State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. BILLINGSLEY Decision of the Court ¶5 From November 9, 2017, to December 8, 2017, the victim’s checking account balance declined from $19,749.49 to negative $2.01.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Poteet
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Based on that questionnaire, Poteet 1 “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts and resolve all inferences against appellant.” State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. POTEET Decision of the Court was informed he needed to report to the Show Low probation office the following morning and was provided with a written copy of the terms and conditions of his probation. ¶5 Poteet did not report for probation at his assigned time.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Blanco
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
The pair met at a house on Club Avenue (the “Club house”) that Blanco was in the process of remodeling, before getting lunch at In-N-Out Burger and dropping off food to Blanco’s family. 1 “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts and resolve all inferences against appellant.” See State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. BLANCO Decision of the Court ¶5 The two eventually proceeded to the ranch house.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Robertson
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
S.M. tried to restart the 1 “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts and resolve all inferences against appellant.” See State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. ROBERTSON Decision of the Court car but Appellant opened the driver’s door and grabbed her by the hair, forcing her over the middle console of the car and into the passenger’s seat. ¶5 Appellant started driving and the pair continued to argue.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Stables
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Mr. Major indicated he was selling methamphetamine in return for a place to stay and then 1 Absent material changes from the date of the alleged offenses, we cite to the current versions of all statutes and rules. 2 “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts and resolve all inferences against appellant.” See State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. STABLES Decision of the Court provided Deputy Jones the address of the house in which he had been staying. ¶4 Two hours later, Deputy Jones and another officer proceeded to the address …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lynch
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
S.Z. 1 Absent material changes from the date of the alleged offenses, we cite to the current versions of all statutes and rules. 2 “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts and resolve all inferences against appellant.” See State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. LYNCH Decision of the Court reported that the man was kicking and punching the air, yelling, and shooting the gun at random toward a new housing development. ¶4 Two Glendale Police Department patrol units—Sergeant E.H. and Officer J.M.—responded to the 911 call.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jackson
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
After T.H. ran away, she 1 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite a statute’s current version. 2 “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts and resolve all inferences against appellant.” See State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998) (internal citation omitted). 2 STATE v. JACKSON Decision of the Court called the police.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Young
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jacquez
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
He also choked Victim and pointed the gun at her, causing her to fear for 1 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite a statute’s current version. 2 “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts and resolve all inferences against appellant.” See State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998) (internal citation omitted). 2 STATE v. JACQUEZ Decision of the Court her life.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Nelson
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. NELSON Decision of the Court 14.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Madrid
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. MADRID Decision of the Court paraphernalia, each a class six felony.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Castillo
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. CASTILLO Decision of the Court ¶4 A grand jury indicted Castillo and his co-defendant on charges of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, a Class 1 dangerous felony; kidnapping, a Class 2 dangerous felony; two counts of aggravated assault, one a Class 3 dangerous felony and the other a Class 6 felony; and attempted first-degree murder, a Class 2 dangerous felony.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Cryer
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998) (citation and quotation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jorgensen
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998) (citation and quotation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Buzani
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. BUZANI Decision of the Court convictions and, at the time of the current offense, was on probation for one of those prior offenses.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Miles
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. MILES Decision of the Court swabs.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Colorado
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 Colorado waived his right to a trial by jury. 2 STATE v. COLORADO Decision of the Court ¶3 Colorado timely appealed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Peterkin
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. PETERKIN Decision of the Court ¶3 Peterkin was indicted on charges of possession of marijuana for sale (having a weight of four pounds or more/having a weight or value exceeding the statutory threshold amount) and sale or transportation of marijuana (having a weight more than two pounds), each a Class 2 felony.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Zarra
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. ZARRA Decision of the Court The officers continued to struggle with Zarra until one officer deployed a Taser and the other officer was able to handcuff Zarra. ¶3 Zarra was charged with aggravated assault and resisting arrest.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. King
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. KING Decision of the Court ¶3 A jury convicted King of three counts of aggravated assault by domestic violence and one count of disorderly conduct involving a weapon by domestic violence.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Handley
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. HANDLEY Decision of the Court himself . . . from it.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Chesson
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229 , 230 ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 897, 898 (App. 1998). ¶3 On October 30, 2013, Rick1 stepped off a public bus and started walking home.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Kegler
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. KEGLER Decision of the Court ¶3 Following a three-day trial, a jury found Kegler guilty of theft of means of transportation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Kirby
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. KIRBY Decision of the Court evidence of psychosis or mental illness other than Antisocial Personality Disorder." The Commissioner's Court accepted the parties' stipulation to this report, found Kirby competent to stand trial, and transferred the case back to the superior court. ¶4 A jury found Kirby guilty as charged on all three counts.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Philpot
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229 , 230 ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 897, 898 (App. 1998). ¶3 In July 2014, Lake Havasu City Police received a call from an informant who stated that she could purchase methamphetamine from Philpot.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Albano
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229 , 230 ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 897, 898 (App. 1998). ¶3 One evening in October 2012, Phoenix Police went to a home in west Phoenix to conduct a warrant execution on Albano, who had a misdemeanor warrant.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Turner (2×)
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 , 986 P.2d 897, 898 (App. 1998). 2 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Perkins
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229 , 230 ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 897, 898 (App. 1998). ¶3 One summer evening in August 2011, two police officers were seated in their marked patrol car, which was parked on a corner of a street intersection, watching cars drive by.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. McGhee
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. McGHEE Decision of the Court ¶3 McGhee timely appealed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Welch
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite a statute's current version. 2 STATE v. WELCH Decision of the Court DISCUSSION ¶5 Welch argues the superior court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. McGhee
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. McGHEE Decision of the Court ¶3 McGhee timely appealed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Madsen
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. MADSEN Decision of the Court sentences of incarceration, the longest of which is six years, with 99 days of presentence incarceration credit. ¶4 Madsen timely appealed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Tabor
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite a statute's current version. 2 STATE v. TABOR Decision of the Court ¶3 Tabor timely appealed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Marshall
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. MARSHALL Decision of the Court him to concurrent terms of 7.5 years' incarceration for the assault and 2.5 years for the weapons crime. ¶3 Marshall timely appealed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bibbins
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Turvin
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229 , 230 ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 897, 898 (App. 1998). ¶3 Late one evening, two police officers were on patrol when they saw a vehicle make a wide right turn onto a three-lane street, crossing halfway into the center turn lane.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Parsons
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. PARSONS Decision of the Court ¶3 Parsons timely appealed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Miller
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. MILLER Decision of the Court sections 28-1381(A)(1), (A)(2) (2016), -1383(A)(1), (A)(2) (2016).2 The court sentenced Miller to four months' incarceration with 88 days of presentence incarceration credit, to be followed by five years' probation. ¶3 Miller timely appealed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Parsons
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998). 2 STATE v. PARSONS Decision of the Court ¶3 Parsons timely appealed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Petersen
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229, 230, ¶ 2 (App. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Begay
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229 , 230 ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 897, 898 (App. 1998). ¶3 Late one evening in April 2013, a Phoenix police officer on patrol saw the car in front of him stop at a red light then make a right turn, even though two traffic signs prohibited right turns.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Brooks
Ariz. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
State v. Fontes, 195 Ariz. 229 , 230 ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 897, 898 (App. 1998). ¶3 Late one night in 2013, a Mesa police officer noticed a car parked on the side of a road in a residential area known to the officer to have a high vehicle burglary rate.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The STATE of Arizona, Appellee,
v.
Steven Soto FONTES, Appellant
2 CA-CR 98-0101.
Court of Appeals of Arizona.
Nov 26, 1998.
986 P.2d 897
Grant Woods, Arizona Attorney General By Paul J. McMurdie and Galen H. Wilkes, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee., Susan A. Kettlewell, Pima County Public Defender By Kristine Maish, Tucson, Attorneys for Appellant.
Howard, Brammer, Espinosa.
Cited by 216 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

HOWARD, Judge.

¶ 1 Appellant Steven Soto Fontes was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated assault on a peace officer, a class five felony, and resisting arrest, a class six felony. He raises three issues on appeal, none of which merits reversal.

FACTS

¶2 “We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts and resolve all inferences against appellant.” State v. Nihiser, 191 Ariz. 199, 201, 953 P.2d 1252, 1254 (App.1997). An off-duty sheriffs deputy, employed as a plainclothes security officer by a supermarket, saw appellant steal a pack of tobacco rolling papers from the store. The deputy and the store manager approached appellant near the store exit. The deputy had a “flat badge” on a strap around his neck, visible outside his shirt, and a sheriffs badge in his wallet that he showed appellant when he verbally identified himself as a sheriffs deputy and told appellant he was “under arrest” for theft. He informed appellant that, “if he cooperated with me and didn’t fight with me, he’d walk out of [the store] with a ticket ... [or] if he fought with me, he’d be going to jail.” The deputy then told appellant to turn around so he could, pursuant to sheriffs department rules and regulations, place appellant in handcuffs.

¶ 3 At this point, appellant, who had an outstanding arrest warrant and was carrying false identification, dropped his beer in front of the deputy; grabbed the store manager’s tie, forcing him into a pole; and started running out the door. The deputy caught appellant, informed him again that he was a deputy and that appellant was under arrest, and attempted to subdue him by forcing him to the ground. Appellant hit the deputy. The deputy struck appellant in the face several times, but despite the deputy’s requests that he stop resisting, appellant continued to fight, cursed and threatened the deputy, and attempted to kick him in the groin. Appellant was ultimately handcuffed after he was subdued by the deputy, the store manager, and two bystanders. Appellant continued to[*231] curse the deputy, threaten him, and pull away from him, even after he was handcuffed.

DISCUSSION

¶ 4 A required element of aggravated assault on a peace officer is that “the person commits the assault knowing or having reason to know that the victim is a peace officer, or a person summoned and directed by the officer while engaged in the execution of any official duties.” A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(5). A person commits resisting arrest by “intentionally preventing or attempting to prevent a person reasonably known to him to be a peace officer, acting under color of such peace officer’s official authority, from effecting an arrest” by either “[u]sing or threatening to use physical force against the peace officer or another; or ... [u]sing any other means creating a substantial risk of causing physical injury to the peace officer or another.” A.R.S. § 13-2508(A).

¶ 5 Appellant first contends the off-duty deputy was not a “peace officer” “engaged in the execution of any official duties” or “acting under color of ... [the] officer’s official authority.” Therefore, appellant contends, he could not have been convicted of aggravated assault on a peace officer or resisting arrest. See §§ 13-1204(A)(5) and 13-2508(A). Because appellant failed to raise this issue below, it is waived, absent fundamental error. State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 917 P.2d 200 (1996). A conviction not supported by the evidence is fundamental error. State v. Jannamon, 169 Ariz. 435, 819 P.2d 1021 (App.1991).

¶ 6 The deputy, although off-duty, clearly was a peace officer. A.R.S. § 13-105(25) (peace officer is “any person vested by law with a duty to maintain public order and make arrests”).

A police officer on “off-duty” status is nevertheless not relieved of the obligation as an officer to preserve the public peace and protect the lives and property of the citizens of the public in general. Indeed, police officers are considered to be under a duty to respond as police officers 24 hours a day.

16A Timothy P. Bjur et al., Eugene McQuillin The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 45.15 at 123 (3d ed.1992) (footnotes omitted). Because appellant was shown two badges and verbally informed that the deputy was a sheriffs deputy, sufficient evidence was presented to establish that appellant knew or had reason to know that the deputy was a peace officer.

¶ 7 We next consider whether the officer was “engaged in the execution of any official duties” or “acting under color of ... [the] officer’s official authority.” §§ 13-1204(A)(5) and 13-2508(A). Relying on State v. Feld-stein, 134 Ariz. 129, 654 P.2d 63 (App.1982), the state contends that appellant can be guilty of aggravated assault on a peace officer and resisting arrest even without a showing that the deputy was engaged in the execution of his official duties. First, the court in Feldstein construed the specific language of § 13-1204(A)(5). That analysis does not apply to the distinct language of § 13-2508(A). Second, appellant was indicted and convicted under § 13-1204(A)(5) and (C). Subsection (C) provides that aggravated assault on a peace officer is a class five felony when the assault occurs “while the officer is engaged in the execution of any official duties.” Subsection (C) was added after Feldstein, see 1994 Ariz. Sess. Laws, eh. 200, § 12, and therefore, Feldstein is not applicable here. [1]

¶ 8 A sheriffs deputy has a duty to preserve the peace and to arrest “all persons who attempt to commit or [who] have committed a public offense.” A.R.S. § 11-441(A)(1) and (2). This duty applies even when the officer is “off-duty.” Bjur et al., supra. An off-duty officer can be executing official duties or serving a private employer. See State v. Kurtz, 78 Ariz. 215, 278 P.2d 406 (1954). The distinction is based on whether the off-duty officer was “acting in ‘vindication of public right and justice’ or ... merely performing acts of service to [a] private employer.” Id. at 218, 278 P.2d at 408, quoting[*232] Neallus v. Hutchinson Amusement Co., 126 Me. 469, 139 A. 671, 672 (Me.1927). Here, the deputy observed appellant commit theft (A.R.S. § 13-1802), shoplifting (A.R.S. § 13-1805), or possibly burglary (A.R.S. § 13-1506); verbally identified himself as a deputy; showed official identification; followed official sheriff’s department procedures; and attempted to execute his statutory duties by arresting appellant. Under these circumstances, the off-duty, privately employed deputy was acting in vindication of public rights and justice. Therefore, he was a peace officer engaged in the execution of his official duties or acting under color of his official authority for purposes of §§ 13-1204(A)(5) and 13-2508(A). See Kurtz, 78 Ariz. at 219, 278 P.2d at 408 (in arresting defendant who had committed misdemeanor in their presence, off-duty officers employed as private security officers “were not performing mere acts of service for their private employer but were acting in vindication of the public right in apprehending a wrongdoer”). [2] There was no error here, much less fundamental error.

¶ 9 To the extent we understand his next argument, appellant contends, citing § 13-1805(0, that the trial court should have directed a verdict in his favor or sua sponte instructed the jury on the reasonableness of the detention, arguing the deputy’s use of force was not privileged and was “wholly unreasonable.” Section 13-1805(0 states that “[a] merchant, or his agent or employee, with reasonable cause, may detain on the premises in a reasonable manner and for a reasonable time any person suspected of shoplifting ... for questioning or summoning a law enforcement officer.” This subsection does not apply here, because, as previously discussed, the deputy was a peace officer effecting an arrest, not the store’s agent detaining appellant for questioning or summoning an officer.

¶ 10 Appellant next argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal made under Rule 20, Ariz. R.Crim. P., 17 A.R.S., claiming his conduct was justified because the deputy used excessive force during the arrest. A judgment of acquittal is appropriate when no substantial evidence is presented to warrant a conviction. State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 944 P.2d 1204 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1007, 118 S.Ct. 1192, 140 L.Ed.2d 321 (1998). “ ‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence that reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jones, 125 Ariz. 417, 419, 610 P.2d 51, 53 (1980). A trial judge has no discretion to enter a judgment of acquittal if reasonable minds could differ on the inferences to be drawn from the evidence; such a case must be submitted to the jury. State v. Landrigan, 176 Ariz. 1, 859 P.2d 111 (1993).

¶ 11 A defendant is not justified in using force to resist an arrest by a peace officer “unless the physical force used by the peace officer exceeds that allowed by law.” A.R.S. § 13^404(B)(2). An officer can use physical force in arresting a defendant if a “reasonable person would believe that such force is immediately necessary to effect the arrest.” A.R.S. § 13^409. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts, Nihiser, there was substantial evidence that a reasonable person would have believed force was necessary to effect the arrest.

¶ 12 The deputy made no use of physical force until appellant dropped his[*233] beer in front of the deputy, forced the store manager into a pole, and attempted to flee the store. The deputy then pursued appellant and forced him to the ground. Such force was not unreasonable under the circumstances. See State v. Sanders, 118 Ariz. 192, 575 P.2d 822 (App.1978) (force not unreasonable when, among other things, officer wrestled fleeing defendant to the ground). At this point, appellant was not justified in using physical force to resist the arrest. See § 13-404(B)(2). Appellant, however, then struck the deputy, cutting him under the eye and causing redness. This conduct constituted both resisting arrest and aggravated assault on a peace officer. § 13-2508(A)(1) (resisting arrest by using physical force against an officer); § 13-1204(A)(5). Any subsequent force by the deputy, whether reasonable or excessive, did not justify appellant’s initial use of force against the deputy. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying appellant’s motion for acquittal on grounds of excessive force.

¶ 13 Appellant’s convictions and the sentences imposed are affirmed.

CONCURRING: J. WILLIAM BRAMMER, JR., Presiding Judge, and PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Judge, concur.
1

. We express no opinion regarding the continued applicability of Feldstein when a defendant is not indicted and convicted under A.R.S. § 13-1204(C).

2

. See also Hughes v. State, 400 So.2d 533 (Fla. Dist.App.1981); People v. Barrett, 54 Ill.App.3d 994, 12 Ill.Dec. 624, 370 N.E.2d 247 (Ill.App. 1977); Tapp v. State, 406 N.E.2d 296 (Ind.App. 1980); State v. Glover, 52 Ohio App.2d 35, 367 N.E.2d 1202 (Ohio App.1976); Commonwealth v. Gommer, 445 Pa.Super. 571, 665 A.2d 1269 (Pa.Super.Ct.1995); State v. Graham, 130 Wash.2d 711, 927 P.2d 227 (Wash.1996); 6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery § 81 at 465 (1975). Cf. Goodwin v. State, 222 Ga.App. 285, 474 S.E.2d 84 (Ga.App. 1996). Courts have reached a similar conclusion in the civil arena, see, e.g., Dinmark v. Farrier, 510 So.2d 819 (Ala. 1987), and in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Abraham v. Raso, 15 F.Supp.2d 433 (D.N.J. 1998); Alvarado v. City of Dodge City, 238 Kan. 48, 708 P.2d 174 (Kan.1985). See also Alexander C. Black, Annotation, Liability of Municipal Corporation or Other Governmental Entity for Injury or Death Caused by Action or Inaction of Off-Duty Police Officer, 36 A.L.R. 5th 1, § 16 (1996).