discussed Cited "see" United States v. Kellogg See United States v. Cooney, 26 Fed.Appx. 513, 523 (6th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1118 , 122 S.Ct. 2342 , 153 L.Ed.2d 170 ; see also United States v. McCurdy, 40 F.3d 1111, 1118 (10th Cir.1994) (“An officer’s request to search a defendant’s automobile does not constitute interrogation invoking a defendant’s Miranda rights.”); United States v. Glenna, 878 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir.1989) (same).

discussed Cited "see" United States v. Jameel Asmar Fareed, United States of America v. Albert Monte Reid Accordingly, when the district court imposed Appellants’ post-revocation prison terms, it “impos[ed] a sentence to a term of imprisonment for a felony,” and therefore was authorized under § 3583(a) to “include as a part of thp sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (a); see United States v. Marlow, 278 F.3d 581, 586-88 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that imposing post-revocation prison term is “imposing a sentence” within the meaning of § 3583(a) and therefore that § 3583(a) authorizes post-revocation…