Glisson v. Morton, 416 S.E.2d 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · Go Syfert
Glisson v. Morton, 416 S.E.2d 134 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
22 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Stephanie Allred v. Progressive County Mutual Insurance Company (gactapp, 2025-03-14)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stephanie Allred v. Progressive County Mutual Insurance Company
Ga. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Your unmarried dependent children temporarily away from home will qualify as a relative if they intend to continue to reside in your household. (emphasis supplied.) 6 (Citation omitted.) Glisson v. Morton, 203 Ga. App. 77, 78 (2) ( 416 SE2d 134 ) (1992). 7 See Johnson v. LT Energy, LLC, 368 Ga. App. 439 , 440 (1) ( 890 SE2d 320 ) (2023). 6 The dispute then is whether Allred qualifies as a “relative” under her parents’ Progressive liability policy.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bregman-Rodoski v. Rozas
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Auth., 233 Ga. App. 706, 707 (1) ( 505 SE2d 232 ) (1998); Goring v. Martinez, 224 Ga. App. 137, 139 (2) (b) (ii) ( 479 SE2d 432 ) (1996). 9 Hailey, supra. 10 In fact, the records were neither attached to Dr. Karol’s affidavit nor tendered during the hearing on Rozas’s motion for summary judgment. 11 See id. at 347-348 ; Herndon, supra. 12 See Hayes v. Murray, 252 Ga. 529, 530 ( 314 SE2d 885 ) (1984). 13 See Crawford v. Phillips, 173 Ga. App. 517, 518 (1) ( 326 SE2d 593 ) (1985). 14 Vick v. Tower Place, L.P., 268 Ga. App. 108, 109 (1) ( 601 SE2d 348 ) (2004). 15 See Berrell v. Hamilton, 260…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mountain Bound, Inc. v. Alliant Foodservice, Inc.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Glisson v. Morton, 203 Ga. App. 77, 78 (2) ( 416 SE2d 134 ) (1992); see Carter v. Myers, 204 Ga. App. 498, 500 (1) ( 419 SE2d 747 ) (1992). 2.
discussed Cited "see" Southern Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Health Care Capital Consolidated, Inc. (2×)
Ga. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Glisson v. Morton, 203 Ga. App. 77 (2) ( 416 SE2d 134 ) (1992). 4.
discussed Cited "see" Everett v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Glisson v. Morton, 203 Ga. App. 77 (2) ( 416 SE2d 134 ) (1992).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." PURCELL ALBRIGHT, SR. v. TERMINAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Guise v. Leoni, 366 Ga. App. 659 , 663 (a) ( 883 SE2d 892 ) (2023) (deeming objection regarding authentication of exhibits waived because party did not object to them or move to strike them from the trial court’s consideration of the summary judgment motion); accord Williams v. Durden, 347 Ga. App. 363, 367, n. 2 ( 819 SE2d 524 ) (2018) (“Because Durden did not object to the aforesaid records submitted by Williams in opposition to summary judgment, Durden waived any objection to the exhibits on hearsay or authentication grounds.”); see also Glisson v. Morton, 203 Ga. App. 77, 78 (2) …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bobbie Ann Hayes v. Sns Partnership, Lp (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Glisson v. Morton, 203 Ga. App. 77, 77-78 (2) ( 416 SE2d 134 ) (1992) (excerpts from plaintiff’s personnel file did not have to be certified or be part of a sworn affidavit to be considered in support of defendant’s motion for summary judgment). 5 Certainly, at trial, the sworn statements could be admissible as prior consistent statements or for impeachment purposes.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hayes v. SNS Partnership, LP (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Glisson v. Morton, 203 Ga. App. 77, 77-78 (2) ( 416 SE2d 134 ) (1992) (excerpts from plaintiff’s personnel file did not have to be certified or be part of a sworn affidavit to be considered in support of defendant’s motion for. summary judgment).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Glisson
v.
Morton
A91A1987.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Feb 25, 1992.
416 S.E.2d 134
Arthur J. Shelfer, Jr., for appellant., Alexander & Vann, William U. Norwood III, for appellee.
Pope, Birdsong, Cooper.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
Pope, Judge.

Plaintiff/appellant Mary Joyce Glisson, a licensed practical nurse, was employed by a nursing home in July of 1988 and terminated in March of 1989. Plaintiff brought suit against defendant/appellee William Morton, M.D., alleging that in retaliation for complaints she made relating to defendant’s lack of competence in his care of certain patients at the nursing home, defendant tortiously interfered with her employment by pressuring the management of the nursing home to fire her. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff appeals.

1. We first reject defendant’s argument that this court should not address plaintiff’s sole enumeration of error because plaintiff violated the rules of this court by: (1) failing to provide references to the record in support of the statement of facts and ¿numeration of error contained in her brief, (2) failing to number each page of her brief, and (3) failing to provide citations of authority and argument in support of her enumeration of error. With respect to the first of these grounds, “we note that in Justice v. Dunbar, 244 Ga. 415 (260 SE2d 327) (1979), the Supreme Court held that an appellant’s failure to make specific references to the record or transcript will not, in and of itself, warrant a summary refusal to consider an enumeration of error.” Gerdes v. Dziewinski, 182 Ga. App. 764, 765 (1) (357 SE2d 110) (1987). With regard to the second of these grounds, we know of no authority which would authorize our refusal to consider an enumeration of error because an appellant failed to number each page in his or her brief. Finally, in regard to the third of these grounds, we conclude that plaintiff’s brief is barely sufficient for us to address the issues raised in this appeal.

2. We next address plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by considering inadmissible excerpts from plaintiff’s personnel file which were attached as exhibits to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. These excerpts were produced by the nursing home in response to plaintiff’s request for production of documents in accordance with OCGA § 9-11-34. Plaintiff argues that these excerpts should not have been considered because they consisted of unsworn documents and hearsay. We disagree.

The excerpts from plaintiff’s personnel file did not have to be certified or be part of a sworn affidavit to be considered in support of defendant’s motion. OCGA § 9-11-29.1 (a) (5); Jacobsen v. Muller, [*78] 181 Ga. App. 382 (3) (352 SE2d 604) (1986). Nor were the excerpts inadmissible as hearsay. OCGA § 24-3-14; Minor v. E. F. Hutton & Co., 200 Ga. App. 645 (2) (409 SE2d 262) (1991). “(T)he court is obliged to take account of the entire setting of the case on a Rule 56 motion. In addition to the pleadings, it will consider all papers of record, as well as any material prepared for the motion that meets the standard prescribed in Rule 56 (e). [Cit.]” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Nelson v. Smothers, 164 Ga. App. 112, 113 (296 SE2d 414) (1982). Because the excerpts from plaintiff’s personnel file met the standards prescribed in OCGA § 9-11-56 (e), the trial court did not err in considering the documents filed in support of defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Decided February 25, 1992. Arthur J. Shelfer, Jr., for appellant. Alexander & Vann, William U. Norwood III, for appellee.

We also note that plaintiff has waived her right to object to these excerpts on appeal not only because she failed to raise this objection in the court below (Southern Intl. Pictures v. Friedman, 201 Ga. App. 87 (2) (410 SE2d 51) (1991)), but because she herself relied on excerpts from her personnel file by attaching certain of the documents to her brief and affidavit filed in opposition to defendant’s motion.

3. Finally, plaintiff argues that the evidence of record, specifically plaintiff’s affidavit filed in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, established a genuine issue of material fact for determination by a jury. We disagree. Our examination of the record indicates that plaintiff was terminated from the nursing home because she repeatedly “failed to follow company policy, [f]ederal and [s]tate regulations regarding drug administering, [documentation, and transcribing doctor’s orders.” The generalized arguments contained in plaintiff’s affidavit attempting to set forth a claim of interference with contract are not sufficient in this instance to avoid summary judgment. Collins v. West Am. Ins. Co., 186 Ga. App. 851 (2) (368 SE2d 772) (1988). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant.

Judgment affirmed.

Birdsong, P. J., and Cooper, J., concur.