A. If a prisoner is certified as eligible for parole pursuant to section 41-1604.09 the board of executive clemency shall authorize the release of the applicant on parole if the applicant has reached the applicant's earliest parole eligibility date pursuant to section 41-1604.09, subsection D and it appears to the board, in its sole discretion, that there is a substantial probability that the applicant will remain at liberty without violating the law and that the release is in the best interests of the state. The applicant shall thereupon be allowed to go on parole in the legal custody and under the control of the state department of corrections, until the board revokes the parole or grants an absolute discharge from parole or until the prisoner reaches the prisoner's individual earned release credit date pursuant to section 41-1604.10. When the prisoner reaches the prisoner's individual earned release credit date the prisoner's parole shall be terminated and the prisoner shall no longer be under the authority of the board but shall be subject to revocation under section 41-1604.10.
B. Notwithstanding subsection A of this section, the director of the state department of corrections may certify as eligible for parole any prisoner, regardless of the classification of the prisoner, who has reached the prisoner's parole eligibility date pursuant to section 41-1604.09, subsection D, unless an increased term has been imposed pursuant to section 41-1604.09, subsection F, for the sole purpose of parole to the custody of any other jurisdiction to serve a term of imprisonment imposed by the other jurisdiction or to stand trial on criminal charges in the other jurisdiction or for the sole purpose of parole to the custody of the state department of corrections to serve any consecutive term imposed on the prisoner. On review of an application for parole pursuant to this subsection the board may authorize parole if, in its discretion, parole appears to be in the best interests of the state.
C. A prisoner who is otherwise eligible for parole, who is not on home arrest or work furlough and who is currently serving a sentence for a conviction of a serious offense or conspiracy to commit or attempt to commit a serious offense shall not be granted parole or absolute discharge from imprisonment except by one of the following votes:
1. A majority affirmative vote if four or more members consider the action.
2. A unanimous affirmative vote if three members consider the action.
3. A unanimous affirmative vote if two members consider the action pursuant to section 31-401, subsection I and the chairman concurs after reviewing the information considered by the two members.
D. The board, as a condition of parole, shall order a prisoner to make any court-ordered restitution.
E. Payment of restitution by the prisoner in accordance with subsection D of this section shall be made through the clerk of the superior court in the county in which the prisoner was sentenced for the offense for which the prisoner has been imprisoned in the same manner as restitution is paid as a condition of probation. The clerk of the superior court, on request, shall make the prisoner's restitution payment history available to the board, victim, victim's attorney and department without cost.
F. The board shall not disclose the address of the victim or the victim's immediate family to any party without the written consent of the victim or the victim's family.
G. For the purposes of this section, "serious offense" includes any of the following:
1. A serious offense as defined in section 13-706, subsection F, paragraph 1, subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g), (h), (i), (j) or (k).
2. A dangerous crime against children as defined in section 13-705. The citation of section 13-705 is not a necessary element for a serious offense designation.
3. A conviction under a prior criminal code for any offense that possesses reasonably equivalent offense elements as the offense elements that are listed under section 13-705, subsection T, paragraph 1 or section 13-706, subsection F, paragraph 1.
Notes of Decisions
Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227 (Ariz. 1977).
· cites it 16× “A.R.S. § 31-412 sets forth the criterion for release on parole: "If it appears to the board of pardons and paroles, from a report by the department of corrections, or upon the application by the prisoner for a release on parole, that there is reasonable probability that the…”
State v. Wagstaff, 794 P.2d 118 (Ariz. 1990).
· cites it 8× “The court of appeals found the statute "invalid" because: (1) it gives the judicial branch power to grant parole and that power rests exclusively with the Board of Pardons and Paroles; (2) it is inconsistent with other sections of the criminal code, specifically, A.R.S. §§…”
Borchers v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 851 P.2d 88 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 18× “Sufficiency of Reasons Given for Parole Denial Appellant argues that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for parole denial in violation of A.R.S. § 31-412. The State responds that the reasons given were sufficiently specific and individualized, that the Board has sole…”
State ex rel. Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 907 P.2d 72 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 14× “A.R.S. § 31-412(0(2) (Supp.1994). 1 On September 27, 1994, a three-person panel designated by the Board conducted Richard’s parole hearing.”
State v. Wagstaff, 775 P.2d 1130 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 4× “See A.R.S. § 31-412(A), 31-414 (a defendant can be on parole only before the expiration of the term specified in his sentence, or before absolute discharge).”
State v. Johnson, 827 P.2d 1134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 6× “” A.R.S. § 31-412(A). However, the state does not suggest how we should construe “in any correctional or detention facility.”
Stinson v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 725 P.2d 1094 (Ariz. 1986).
· cites it 11× “Therefore, Stinson claims, the Board failed to comply with the criteria for determining parole eligibility as set forth in A.R.S. § 31-412(A). The superior court subsequently dismissed Stinson’s complaint.”
State v. Tarango, 914 P.2d 1300 (Ariz. 1996).
· cites it 4× “A.R.S. § 31-412(A) provides the criterion for release on parole, "if the applicant has reached his earliest parole eligibility date pursuant to § 41-1604.”
Taggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243 (Wash. 1992).
· cites it 2× “'" Grimm , at 265 (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-412 ). The court held that this statute implies "that parole may not be authorized if there is no such reasonable probability, and therefore immunity should adhere only for acts within the guidelines.”
State v. Oehlerking, 709 P.2d 900 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 6× “” Presumably, the trial court ordered the board to determine the amount and time of the payments in reliance upon A.R.S. § 31-412, which provides, in part: C.”
Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010).
“" Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 31-412(A); see also Cooper v.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-412(A) — 23 cases
State v. Wagstaff, 794 P.2d 118 (Ariz. 1990).
“The court of appeals found the statute "invalid" because: (1) it gives the judicial branch power to grant parole and that power rests exclusively with the Board of Pardons and Paroles; (2) it is inconsistent with other sections of the criminal code, specifically, A.R.S. §§…”
Borchers v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 851 P.2d 88 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
“Sufficiency of Reasons Given for Parole Denial Appellant argues that the Board failed to provide adequate reasons for parole denial in violation of A.R.S. § 31-412. The State responds that the reasons given were sufficiently specific and individualized, that the Board has sole…”
State v. Wagstaff, 775 P.2d 1130 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).
“See A.R.S. § 31-412(A), 31-414 (a defendant can be on parole only before the expiration of the term specified in his sentence, or before absolute discharge).”
Stinson v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 725 P.2d 1094 (Ariz. 1986).
“Therefore, Stinson claims, the Board failed to comply with the criteria for determining parole eligibility as set forth in A.R.S. § 31-412(A). The superior court subsequently dismissed Stinson’s complaint.”
State v. Tarango, 914 P.2d 1300 (Ariz. 1996).
“A.R.S. § 31-412(A) provides the criterion for release on parole, "if the applicant has reached his earliest parole eligibility date pursuant to § 41-1604.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-412(B) — 8 cases
State v. Johnson, 827 P.2d 1134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
“” A.R.S. § 31-412(A). However, the state does not suggest how we should construe “in any correctional or detention facility.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-412(C) — 4 cases
State ex rel. Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 907 P.2d 72 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
“A.R.S. § 31-412(0(2) (Supp.1994). 1 On September 27, 1994, a three-person panel designated by the Board conducted Richard’s parole hearing.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-412(C)(2) — 1 case
State ex rel. Gonzalez v. Superior Court, 907 P.2d 72 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
“A.R.S. § 31-412(0(2) (Supp.1994). 1 On September 27, 1994, a three-person panel designated by the Board conducted Richard’s parole hearing.”
— Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-412(D) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.