Vines v. State, 499 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. 1998). · Go Syfert
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Vines v. State, 499 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 2 distinct cases · …for purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent. ✓
150 citation events (136 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: The State v. Rich. (gactapp, 2019-01-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 45 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) The State v. Rich.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
o the extent any uncertainty or ambiguity exists in the meaning of , the rule of strict construction would require us to construe that ambiguity in favor.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) WENDY JORDAN v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC A/K/A J.W. MARRIOTT ATLANTA BUCKHEAD (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
for purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) JORDAN v. MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC. Marriott International, Inc. v. Jordan. (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
for purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nissan North America, Inc. v. Walker-Jones Nissan, LLC
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Third, “[f]or purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Prophitt v. the State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
D. *269 Our conclusion in this regard is reinforced by the fact that “[a]s a criminal statute, OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) must be construed strictly against criminal liability and, if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the interpretation most favorable to the party facing criminal liability must be adopted.” Vines, 269 Ga. at 438-439 (citation and punctuation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Evans v. the State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Thus, while OCGA § 24-4-404 governs the general admissibility of evidence of extrinsic acts, OCGA § 17-10-6.2 specifically governs the sentencing of sexual offenses, and “[f]or purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.” (Citation omitted.) Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas J. McFarland v. A. Stephenson Wallace (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Even assuming McFarland is correct on these two points, it is well-settled that “[f]or purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438 , 499 S.E.2d 630, 632 (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The State v. Randle (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
The trial court granted Randle’s petition and the State appealed, arguing that Randle, who touched the genitals of a ten-year-old boy, cannot show that his victim did not suffer “intentional physical harm.” The majority would affirm, holding that “evidence of offensive and unwanted touching, without more, does not show ‘intentional physical harm.’ ” I respectfully dissent because Randle’s touching of the genitals of his child victim amounted to “intentional physical harm” such that he is not eligible to be released from sex offender registry requirements. 3 “For purposes …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest Of: R. M., a Child
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
“For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of R. M.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
“For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McFarland v. Wallace
S.D. Ga. · 2014 · confidence medium
Ga. 2012); In re Allen, 2010 WL 3958171 , at *3 (quoting Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438 , 499 S.E.2d 630, 632 (1998)); see also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 385 , 112 S.Ct. 2031 , 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Taylor (2×)
7th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
So, Cochran is of no precedential or persuasive value. [2] Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438 , 499 S.E.2d 630, 632 (1998) (telephone); Selfe v. State, 290 Ga.App. 857 , 660 S.E.2d 727 (2008) (webcam). [3] United States v. Knowles, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 404, 405 , 35 C.M.R. 376 (C.M.A.1965) (telephone); United States v. Miller, 67 M.J. 87, 89 (Army Ct.Crim.App.2008) (webcam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
J., concurring specially). 16 Supra. 17 Id. at 423. 18 Id. at 427 (2). 19 Heard v. State, 287 Ga. 554, 555 (1) ( 697 SE2d 811 ) (2010), quoting Haugland, supra; see OCGA § 16-8-41 (a) (defining armed robbery as occurring “when, with intent to commit theft, [a person] takes property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by use of an offensive weapon, or any replica, article, or device having the appearance of such weapon”). 20 In Miles v. State, 261 Ga. 232, 235 (1) (b), n. 2 ( 403 SE2d 794 ) (1991), the Court noted *28 that, under the Model Penal Code, as well as…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frix v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
“When a criminal statute fairly and reasonably is subject to two constructions, one which would render an act criminal, the other which would not, the statute must be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 439 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Long v. Greenwood Homes, Inc.
Ga. · 2009 · confidence medium
“For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent. [Cit.]” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gavin v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
J., and Johnson, P. J., concur. 1 Dennard v. State, 243 Ga. App. 868, 869 ( 534 SE2d 182 ) (2000). 2 Id. at 869-870 (citation omitted). 3 Subsection (1) states that it is unlawful for “[a]ny person in a clandestine manner intentionally to overhear, transmit, or record or attempt to overhear, transmit, or record the private conversation of another which shall originate in any private place.” 4 Goldberg v. State, 282 Ga. 542, 546 ( 651 SE2d 667 ) (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted). 5 Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681 ( 279 SE2d 430 ) (1981). 6 Abdulkadir v. State, 279 Ga. 122, 123 (…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Goldberg v. State
Ga. · 2007 · confidence medium
“For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent. [Cit.]” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gillen v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Additionally, even though the principle is often stated that a specific statute controls a general statute, the complete statement of the rule is that “a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.” (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maxwell v. State
Ga. · 2007 · confidence medium
However, because this challenge was not raised during trial, Maxwell is procedurally barred from raising it on appeal. 4 Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438,438-439 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998), quoting Fleet Finance v. Jones, 263 Ga. 228, 231 (3) ( 430 SE2d 352 ) (1993). 5 Sikes v. State, 268 Ga. 19, 21 ( 485 SE2d 206 ) (1997). 7 270 Ga. 540 ( 512 SE2d 275 ) (1999). 8 Id. at 542 . 9 Id. 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Id.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Farmer v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
It is well established in this state that “[f]or purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dixon v. State
Ga. · 2004 · confidence medium
State v. English, 276 Ga. 343, 348 ( 578 SE2d 413 ) (2003) (courts must “construe the statute to give sensible and intelligent effect to all of its provisions and to refrain from any interpretation which renders any part of the statute meaningless.”). 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Marlowe
Ga. · 2003 · confidence medium
Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Perkins v. State
Ga. · 2003 · confidence medium
By its terms, the only proscribed conduct is the failure to register with the local sheriff. “ ‘ “The unambiguous words of a criminal statute are not to be altered by judicial construction so as to punish one not otherwise within its reach. . . .” ’ [Cit.]” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. · 2002 · confidence medium
It is well settled that “a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent. [Cit.]” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Damare v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Arnold v. State, 249 Ga. App. 156, 158-159 (1) (a) ( 545 SE2d 312 ) (2001) (exposing penis to child in lewd manner was child molestation, even though the child turned her head and did not actually see the penis); Worley v. State, 193 Ga. App. 58, 60 (3) ( 386 SE2d 879 ) (1989) (exposing penis); Bentley v. State, 179 Ga. App. 287 (1) ( 346 SE2d 98 ) (1986) (same); see also Chapman v. State, 170 Ga. App. 779 -780 (1) ( 318 SE2d 213 ) (1984) (defining “immoral” and “indecent” under the child molestation statute); cf. Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998) (defendant’s …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arnold v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Norman, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. 1 See Russell v. State, 230 Ga. App. 546, 549 (4) ( 497 SE2d 36 ) (1998). 2 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 3 OCGA § 16-6-4 (a). 4 See Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 439-440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998). 5 See Grimsley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 781, 784 (1) ( 505 SE2d 522 ) (1998) (court found evidence sufficient even though children left room when parents began having sexual intercourse in their presence). 6 (Punctuation omitted.) Id.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mann v. State
Ga. · 2001 · confidence medium
There is no dispute that Mann was not eligible for parole, whatever the length of the sentence imposed, as subsection (c) of § 17-10-7 provides that after a fourth felony conviction, a defendant is not eligible for parole. 3 See Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998). 4 See Mikell v. State, 270 Ga. 467 ( 510 SE2d 523 ) (1999). 5 Vines, 269 Ga. at 438-439 ; State v. Mills, 268 Ga. 873, 875 ( 495 SE2d 1 ) (1998); Paras v. State, 247 Ga. 75, 76 ( 274 SE2d 451 ) (1981). 6 Vines, 269 Ga. at 438-439 ; Mills, 268 Ga. at 875 ; Paras, 247 Ga. at 76 . 7 Mann, 240 Ga. App. at 811 . 8 2…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Garden Hills Civic Ass'n v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
Ga. · 2000 · confidence medium
“For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent. [Cit.]” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Corinna Carmen Crumpton (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See, e. g., Ga. L. 1983, p. 721, § 1; see also Ga. L. 2019, p. 912, § 1 (removing the term “sexual assault” from the text of the statute, changing the 12 legislature intended.7 Even if it is accomplished via images sent electronically, however, the first-degree crimes comprising “sexually explicit conduct” under OCGA § 16-6-5.1 (b) (1), as defined by OCGA § 16-12-100 (a) (4), could be significantly more severe and potentially damaging to a minor, see, e. g., OCGA § 16-12-100 (a) (4) (B) (bestiality), (E) (flagellation or torture of someone who is nude), (H) (defecation or urinatio…
cited Cited "see" Justin Daniel Rice v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vines, 269 Ga. at 440 ; Prophitt v. State, 336 Ga. App. 262, 270-271 ( 784 SE2d 103 ) (2016) (physical precedent only).
discussed Cited "see" Dority v. the State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998) (“For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.”) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Brimm, 608 Fed.
discussed Cited "see" Demarkius Dority v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998) (“For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.”) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Brimm, 608 F. Appx. 795, 798 (I) (B) (11th Cir. 2015) (“[FRCP] Rules 413 and 414 permit the introduction of propensity evidence and thus contain exceptions to Rule 404 (b)’s general ban on propensity evidence in “sexual assault” and “child molestation” cases.”) (citations omitted). 4.
discussed Cited "see" Maynard v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438,440 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998) (sexually explicit telephone call to minor is insufficient “contact” to constitute child molestation).
discussed Cited "see" Ewell v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Jones v. Cooke, 169 Ga. App. 516 (1) ( 313 SE2d 773 ) (1984). 6 (Punctuation omitted.) Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438 -439 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." MAHONE v. the STATE. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Vines , 269 Ga. at 439 -440 , 499 S.E.2d 630 (declining to extend the child molestation statute to encompass conduct that was not expressly mentioned therein and noting that two other statutes criminalized the conduct in question).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Mathis v. the State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 438-439 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998) (where a criminal statute “is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the interpretation most favorable to the party facing criminal liability must be adopted”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Olalde-Hernandez (2×)
5th Cir. · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence low
In addition, as in IzaguirreFlores , the proscribed conduct is also “abusive” because the prohibited act “involves taking undue or unfair advantage of the minor and causing such minor psychological — if not physical — harm.” 405 F.3d at 275-76 ; see also United States v. DiazIbarra, 522 F.3d 343, 352 (4th Cir.2008) (“Georgia courts have ‘strictly construed’ § 16-6-4 to require that the molestative act occur in the presence of the child and, it appears, that the child be aware of the perpetrator’s presence.”) (citing Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438 , 499 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1998…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Marshall (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Vines, 226 Ga. App. 779, 780 ( 487 SE2d 521 ) (1997) (noting that OCGA § 16-6-5, among other statutes located in Chapter 6, “were enacted as part of a general legislative scheme to protect children under the age of 16 from physical and psychological damage resulting from sexual exploitation”), rev’d on other grounds, Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Goody's Family Clothing, Inc. v. Mountaineer Property Co. II, LLC (In Re Goody's Family Clothing, Inc.) (2×)
D. Del. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence low
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 , 122 S.Ct. 528 , 151 L.Ed.2d 474 (2001); see also Vines v. Georgia, 269 Ga. 438 , 499 S.E.2d 630, 632 (1998) (“For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent.” (emphasis added)).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Klausen v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998) (no child molestation where only contact between defendant and child victim was by telephone). 2.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Diaz-Ibarra (2×)
4th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438 , 499 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1998) (holding that “the victim and the accused must be together in order for the crime of ‘child molestation’ to be committed”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Pruitt v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Dennis v. State, 263 Ga. 257, 259 (4) ( 430 SE2d 742 ) (1993). 4 Id. 5 OCGA § 16-4-8. 6 OCGA § 16-13-31 (e). 7 An ounce of methamphetamine equals 28 grams. 8 OCGA § 16-13-31 (e). 9 OCGA § 16-4-8. 10 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hernandez v. State, 182 Ga. App. 797, 800 (1) ( 357 SE2d 131 ) (1987). 11 United States v. Ford, 324 F2d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 1963). 12 (Punctuation omitted.) Hernandez, supra, 182 Ga. App. at 800 . 13 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. 14 See, e.g., Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 439 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998). 15 (Citation and punctuation omitted.)…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Rainey v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 439 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998) (one is not in the presence of the victim for the purposes of child molestation when the only contact is over the telephone).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Lyons (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Wright, for appellees. 1 (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Busch v. State, 271 Ga. 591, 592 ( 523 SE2d 21 ) (1999). 2 Dudley v. State, 273 Ga. 466, 468 ( 542 SE2d 99 ) (2001). 3 See Drake v. State, 239 Ga. 232 -233 (1) ( 236 SE2d 748 ) (1977). 4 OCGA § 16-6-3 (a); Drake, supra. 5 Supra. 6 Drake, supra at 233 . 7 Id. at 234 . 8 Id. 9 270 Ga. 42, 43 ( 508 SE2d 390 ) (1998) (the State must prove the element of force as a factual matter in forcible rape cases rather than presuming force as a matter of law based on the victim’s age). 10 Collins, supra at 44 ; see also Drake, supra at 234 . 11…
examined Cited "see, e.g." Dennard v. State (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Wilcox v. State, 229 Ga. App. 227, 231 (2) ( 493 SE2d 724 ) (1997). 7 269 Ga. 438 ( 499 SE2d 630 ) (1998). 8 Id. 9 Id. at 439 . 10 OCGA § 16-4-1. 11 (Punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 189 Ga. App. 27, 30 (1) ( 375 SE2d 69 ) (1988). 12 (Punctuation omitted.) Groves v. State, 116 Ga. 516, 517-518 ( 42 SE 755 ) (1902).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Vines
v.
the State
S97G1569.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
May 18, 1998.
499 S.E.2d 630
Brenda J. Bernstein, William C. Drosky, Davis, Zipperman, Kirschenbaum & Lotito, Nicholas A. Lotito, for appellant., Tommy K. Floyd, District Attorney, Thomas R. McBerry, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Carley, Hunstein, Hines.
Cited by 63 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 92%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Georgia (5)

Lead Opinion

Carley, Justice.

The grand jury indicted Donnie E. Vines for the crime of child molestation. The indictment alleged as the immoral and indecent act Vines’ sexually explicit telephone conversation with the 14-year-old victim. Vines filed a general demurrer, contending that the allegations of indictment were insufficient to charge him with an act of child molestation as defined in OCGA § 16-6-4. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the indictment. However, the State appealed and, in a whole-court decision, the Court of Appeals reversed. State v. Vines, 226 Ga. App. 779 (487 SE2d 521) (1997). We granted certiorari to determine whether the crime of child molestation can be committed when the only contact between the accused and the alleged victim was by telephone. Because, under the applicable rules of statutory construction, such contact is insufficient to constitute the crime of child molestation as currently defined in OCGA § 16-6-4, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) provides that the crime of “child molestation” is committed when a person “does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person.” (Emphasis supplied.) As a criminal statute, OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) “must be construed strictly against criminal liability and, if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the interpretation most favorable to the party facing criminal liability must be[*439] adopted. [Cits.]” Fleet Finance v. Jones, 263 Ga. 228, 231 (3) (430 SE2d 352) (1993). “ ‘(W)hen a criminal statute fairly and reasonably is subject to two constructions, one which would render an act criminal, the other which would not, the statute must be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.’ [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Crane, 247 Ga. 779, 780 (279 SE2d 695) (1981). According to the State, the plain language of the statute renders it unnecessary that the child be in the perpetrator’s presence in order for the molestation to occur. However, the existing Georgia authority is consistent only with a contrary construction of the statute requiring that the victim and accused must be together in order for the crime of “child molestation” to be committed. The accused and the victim certainly are together when the accused commits an immoral or indecent act “to” the child, such as by forcing her to dance naked in the accused’s presence. See Thompson v. State, 187 Ga. App. 563 (370 SE2d 819) (1988). Likewise, they necessarily are together in order for an immoral or indecent act, such as exposure by the accused, to be committed “in the presence” of the child. See Gunter v. State, 215 Ga. App. 517, 519 (3) (451 SE2d 108) (1994); Blanton v. State, 191 Ga. App. 454 (382 SE2d 133) (1989); Smith v. State, 178 Ga. App. 300, 301 (1) (342 SE2d 769) (1986). Obviously, the accused and the victim were together when the immoral or indecent act of sexual intercourse was committed “with” the child. See Barnes v. State, 244 Ga. 302, 304-305 (1) (260 SE2d 40) (1979). If the plain language of the statute defined “child molestation” as broadly as the State contends, then the existing Georgia authority would not be entirely consistent with the contrary interpretation.

In any event, the determinative factor is whether, when OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) is given the requisite strict construction, it is unreasonable to interpret its provisions as requiring that the State prove that the victim and accused were together in order for the crime of “child molestation” to be committed. Construing the statute most strictly against criminal liability, that interpretation is not unreasonable. Thus, even if the State’s broad construction were reasonable despite the lack of any supporting authority, the contrary strict construction of OCGA § 16-6-4 nevertheless must be accepted because it is at least equally reasonable. Fleet Finance v. Jones, supra; State v. Crane, supra.

Furthermore, OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) must be construed in connec-' tion with all of the other provisions of the criminal code. Huntsinger v. State, 200 Ga. 127, 130 (1) (36 SE2d 92) (1945). There are at least two statutory provisions which define as criminal the specific act attributed to Vines. Under OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (4), Vines’ alleged act constitutes the misdemeanor of “disorderly conduct” and, under OCGA § 46-5-21 (a), he could be found guilty of the misdemeanor of[*440] using the telephone to make a “comment, request, suggestion, or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent. . . .” The State urges that the existence of these specific criminal statutes is irrelevant because, unlike OCGA § 16-6-4 (a), neither contemplates protection of the child against psychological injury resulting from hearing sexually explicit language over the telephone. However, in making this assertion, the State fails to acknowledge that the General Assembly could have made a policy determination that, because there is not a significant risk of psychological injury to the child when the language is employed over the telephone, that act should be punishable as a misdemeanor and not as the felony of “child molestation.” For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent. First Nat. Bank v. Sinkler, 170 Ga. App. 668, 670 (1) (317 SE2d 897) (1984).

“‘The unambiguous words of a criminal statute are not to be altered by judicial construction so as to punish one not otherwise within its reach, however deserving of punishment his conduct may seem.’ ” Waldroup v. State, 198 Ga. 144, 145 (30 SE2d 896) (1944). In accordance with the applicable rules of statutory construction, the act attributed to Vines is not within the ambit of OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) and, unless and until the General Assembly amends the statute to provide that “child molestation” can be committed over the telephone, such conduct is subject to prosecution as a misdemeanor only. Accordingly, the trial court correctly sustained Vines’ demurrer and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing that ruling.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Hunstein and Hines, JJ, who dissent.

Dissent

Hines, Justice,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion is contrary to OCGA § 16-6-4’s plain language and its intent. “A person commits the offense of child molestation when he or she does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person.” OCGA § 16-6-4 (a). Speech is an “act” contemplated by the statute. A child’s mind as well as a child’s body may be victimized by molestation. Smith v. State, 178 Ga. App. 300, 301 (1) (342 SE2d 769) (1986). Psychological damage to children is one of the evils OCGA § 16-6-4 is to guard against. Barnes v. State, 244 Ga. 302, 304-305 (1) (260 SE2d 40) (1979); Roe v. State Farm Fire &c. Co., 188 Ga. App. 368, 369 (373 SE2d 23) (1988) (aff’d, 259 Ga. 42 (376 SE2d 876) (1989)). Acts which impact the child psychologically, even if they do not involve a physical touching of the child, have been repeatedly recognized as molestation. See Gunter v. State, 215 Ga.[*441] App. 517, 519 (3) (451 SE2d 108) (1994) (lewdly exposing genitalia to a child); Blanton v. State, 191 Ga. App. 454 (382 SE2d 133) (1989) (exposure with invitation for child to join defendant in vehicle); Thompson v. State, 187 Ga. App. 563 (370 SE2d 819) (1988) (forcing child to dance naked in front of defendant); Smith, supra (showing and describing the use of a condom to a child while displaying an erection). Just as these are “acts” of molestation, speech over the telephone is an “act” within the meaning of OCGA § 16-6-4; speech can be used to “arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person” and thus can victimize a child in the manner the statute seeks to prevent. The injury involved here is not simply that a child hears explicit language, as the majority suggests; it is the use of a child victim for a sexual purpose while employing that language that OCGA § 16-6-4 protects against, and it is that conduct that is prohibited.

Because the prohibited conduct is accomplished over the telephone does not change the fact that it is in violation of OCGA § 16-6-4. The plain language of the statute renders it unnecessary that the child victim be in the perpetrator’s presence in order for molestation to occur. The crime is committed when the perpetrator, with the intent to arouse or satisfy either his or her own sexual desires or those of the child, does an immoral or indecent act in one of three ways; 1) to a child, 2) in the presence of a child, or 3) with a child. To declare that the statute does not criminalize the conduct unless the perpetrator is in the child’s presence would be to ignore two of the ways in which the legislature has declared the crime can be committed. When the legislature uses the disjunctive “or,” it must be so construed unless there is a clear indication otherwise. Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167, 169 (2) (465 SE2d 440) (1996). By the specific terms of OCGA § 16-6-4, if the perpetrator performs an immoral or indecent act “to” or “with” a child, having the required intent, the crime is committed, regardless of presence. That is the only reasonable reading of the statute.

The majority concludes that the fact that prior reported cases addressing OCGA § 16-6-4 have not involved molestation by use of the telephone shows that the defendant must be physically present with the victim because that circumstance has consistently appeared in those reported cases. However, the question before this Court is not what acts have occurred before, how they may have been prosecuted, or whether any reported case has the same facts as appear in this case. The question is whether the act alleged in this indictment falls within the ambit of the statute. That there is no precedent saying it does begs the question; there is also no case law establishing that the act is outside OCGA § 16-6-4’s coverage. The plain language of OCGA § 16-6-4, and its clear purpose, demonstrate that Vines’[*442] alleged act may be prosecuted under the statute.

The majority also relies on the existence of two other Code sections, OCGA §§ 16-11-39 (a) (4) and 46-5-21 (a), to conclude that Vines’ alleged act cannot constitute child molestation. However, these Code sections do not preclude prosecution under OCGA § 16-6-4 and do not show any legislative intent that Vines’ alleged conduct is to be considered something other than child molestation. OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (4) is violated when a person “[w]ithout provocation, uses obscene and vulgar or profane language in the presence of or by telephone to a person under the age of 14 years which threatens an immediate breach of the peace.” First, it is undisputed that the victim was fourteen years old at the time of the crime and therefore, by its specific terms, OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (4) cannot apply to Vines’ alleged acts. Second, OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (4) contains an element not necessary for a conviction under OCGA § 16-6-4, and not alleged in Vines’ case; there must be the threat of an immediate breach of the peace. But more fundamentally in this context, OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (4) does not contemplate the psychological injury done when a child is used for the purpose of sexual gratification. It is that injury specifically targeted by OCGA § 16-6-4 (a), and that injury which makes Vines’ alleged conduct of a different degree and character than misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The two crimes are distinct and each focuses on preventing different conduct; OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) on preventing the use of children for sexual gratification, and OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (4) on preventing speech that endangers the peace.

Similarly, the existence of OCGA § 46-5-21 (a) (1) neither shows a legislative intent that acts such as are at issue should fall outside the ambit of OCGA § 16-6-4, nor bars Vines’ prosecution under the indictment. OCGA § 46-5-21 (a) (1) provides: “[i]t shall be a misdemeanor for any person, by means of telephone communication in this state, to . . . make any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent.” This Code section applies to any telephone speech that could be so described, regardless of the age of the recipient. It also applies regardless of whether the call was made for purposes of arousing or satisfying sexual desire. Thus, OCGA § 46-5-21 (a) (1) does not focus on the evil that OCGA § 16-6-4 is intended to guard against. The calls alleged in the indictment were more than simply “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent”; they were made to arouse and satisfy sexual desires, using the child to that end. Only OCGA § 16-6-4 specifically targets such behavior. Neither OCGA § 16-11-39 (a) (4) nor OCGA § 46-5-21 (a) (1) bars the prosecution here, and neither demonstrates a legislative intent that acts of molestation committed over the telephone should not be prosecuted as a felony under OCGA § 16-6-4. The State is not required to prosecute only the lesser offense commit[*443] ted, even if one statute is deemed more “specific”; when the elements of the crime appear, the State may properly prosecute the defendant under any Code section that fits the defendant’s conduct. Here, Vines’ alleged act fits the statutory definition of child molestation and he may be prosecuted under OCGA § 16-6-4.

Decided May 18, 1998. Brenda J. Bernstein, William C. Drosky, Davis, Zipperman, Kirschenbaum & Lotito, Nicholas A. Lotito, for appellant. Tommy K. Floyd, District Attorney, Thomas R. McBerry, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

The Court of Appeals correctly held that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the indictment, and this Court should affirm. I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.