Brock v. State, 299 S.E.2d 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). · Go Syfert
Search
Brock v. State, 299 S.E.2d 71 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“probated . . . sentences, upon reasonable conditions, have traditionally been used by trial judges in georgia as effective tools of rehabilita 826 tion and serve a useful purpose in appropriate cases. . . .”
23 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In the Interest of A. H. S. (gactapp, 1996-12-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) In the Interest of A. H. S. (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
probated . . . sentences, upon reasonable conditions, have traditionally been used by trial judges in georgia as effective tools of rehabilita 826 tion and serve a useful purpose in appropriate cases. . . .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nancy Jane Smith v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
And although the DDS has the authority to cancel, suspend, or revoke a driver’s license under the circumstances set out in Article 3 of Chapter 5 of Title 40, those statutory provisions do “not purport to deprive a court of competent jurisdiction of the authority to suspend a driver’s license as a condition of probation,” and “[i]n our view, suspension of a defendant’s driver’s license after his conviction of a traffic-related offense is a reasonable condition of probation.” Brock v. State, 165 Ga. App. 150, 150 ( 299 SE2d 71 ) (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Meyer v. State State v. Rivera
Md. · 2015 · confidence medium
In Brock v. State, the Georgia intermediate appellate court held no separation of powers violation occurred where, as a condition of probation for a traffic-related offense, the court suspended a defendant’s driving privileges for twelve months and required the license to be surrendered to the court clerk. 165 Ga.App. 150 , 299 S.E.2d 71, 72 (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sevostiyanova v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Moreover, “suspension of a defendant’s driver’s license after his conviction of a traffic-related offense is a reasonable condition of probation.” Brock v. State, 165 Ga. App. 150, 151 ( 299 SE2d 71 ) (1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Nelson (2×)
Vt. · 1999 · confidence medium
See City of Detroit v. Del Rio, 157 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (rejecting contention that revocation and suspension statutes impliedly “preempted” court’s power to restrict operation of motor vehicle as condition of probation); People v. Dickens, 373 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (relying on City of Detroit to uphold condition of probation preventing defendant from driving for five years notwithstanding two-year statutory maximum for license revocation or suspension); Brock v. State, 299 S.E.2d 71, 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that Department of Public Safety’s au…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pitts v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Probated and suspended sentences, upon reasonable conditions, have traditionally been used by trial judges in Georgia as effective tools of rehabilitation and serve a useful purpose in appropriate cases as an alternative to confinement.’ [Cit.]” Brock v. State, 165 Ga. App. 150, 151 ( 299 SE2d 71 ) (1983).
discussed Cited "see" Sheppard v. State (2×)
Md. · 1996 · signal: accord · confidence high
Id.; accord Brock v. State, 165 Ga.App. 150 , 299 S.E.2d 71, 72 (1983)(finding that statute giving Department of Public Safety authority to revoke or suspend drivers’ licenses did “not purport to deprive a court ... of the authority to suspend a driver’s license as a condition of probation”); see also Fearn v. Zolin, 9 Cal.App.4th 1756 , 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 314, 316 (1992)(adopting view that administrative suspension of licenses, civil in nature, and licensure restriction pursuant to probation, criminal in nature, operate independently of each other).
discussed Cited "see" Davis v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Brock v. State, 165 Ga. App. 150 ( 299 SE2d 71 ) (1983).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Brock
v.
the State
64889.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Jan 4, 1983.
299 S.E.2d 71
Kennedy R. Packer, for appellant., Ken Stula, Solicitor, for appellee.
Pope, Deen, Sognier.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 86%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Georgia (1)
Pope, Judge.

Jerry Eugene Brock was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants and disregarding a stop sign. He pled guilty to the second offense only and was sentenced to 12 months probation and fined $100.00. One of the conditions of probation was that Brock’s driver’s license be suspended for a period of 12 months “to be surrendered to the court’s clerk ...” The sole enumeration of error on appeal challenges the authority of the trial court to impose such a condition.

Code Ann. § 27-2711 (now OCGA § 42-8-35), which relates to the terms and conditions of probation generally, provides that a trial court shall determine the terms and conditions of probation and may provide that the probationer do or refrain from doing certain enumerated acts. The acts enumerated in this statute are not exclusive, and the trial court has the authority to impose conditions not specifically listed therein. Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225 (1) (113 SE2d 223) (1960). Code Ann. § 27-2506 (now OCGA § 17-10-3 (e)(4)), which relates to punishment in misdemeanor cases, provides: “In addition to or instead of any other penalty for the punishment of a misdemeanor involving a traffic offense,... a judge may impose any one or more of the following sentences: . . . (d) Probation or suspension of all or any part of a penalty upon such terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the judge.” This statute goes on to enumerate several conditions which may be ordered. Because the language of Code Ann. § 27-2506, like that of § 27-2711, is permissive rather than directory, the acts enumerated in the former statute, like those in the latter, are not exclusive.

[*151] Decided January 4, 1983 — Rehearing denied January 18, 1983 — Kennedy R. Packer, for appellant. Ken Stula, Solicitor, for appellee.

“The probation and suspension statutes in Georgia vest broad discretion in trial judges. In the absence of express authority to the contrary, we see no logical reason why any reasonable condition imposed for probation or suspension of a sentence by a trial court should not be approved. Probated and suspended sentences, upon reasonable conditions, have traditionally been used by trial judges in Georgia as effective tools of rehabilitation and serve a useful purpose in appropriate cases as an alternative to confinement.” State v. Collett, 232 Ga. 668, 670 (208 SE2d 472) (1974), and cases cited; West v. State, 160 Ga. App. 855 (4) (287 SE2d 694) (1982). Although the Department of Public Safety has the authority to cancel, suspend or revoke a driver’s license under certain circumstances set forth in Code Ann. Ch. 68B-3 (now OCGA §§ 40-5-50 through 40-5-66), said statute does not purport to deprive a court of competent jurisdiction of the authority to suspend a driver’s license as a condition of probation. In our view, suspension of a defendant’s driver’s license after his conviction of a traffic-related offense is a reasonable condition of probation.

Judgment affirmed.

Deen, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.