Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, annotations decided under former Code 1933, §§ 27-2702 and 27-2705 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Warrantless searches vs. warrantless arrests.

- Trial court erred in denying a probationer's motion to suppress the evidence seized from the probationer's apartment as, even though the entry into the apartment for the purpose of effecting an arrest of the probationer was permissible, most of the evidence was seized without a warrant after the probationer was not found in the apartment and had to be excluded under the Fourth Amendment as the search conducted was only permissible insofar as the search involved the observation of items of obvious evidentiary value in plain view during the time and activities required to attempt the probationer's arrest. The probationer was never placed on notice that the probationer was going to be subjected to warrantless searches, and the state failed to demonstrate any exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search. Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 784, 653 S.E.2d 456 (2007).

Privatization of probation services.

- Trial court erred in holding that the imposition of electronic monitoring on misdemeanor defendants supervised by private probation servicing companies was prohibited. Sentinel Offender Svcs., LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (2014).

Cited in Reynolds v. State, 101 Ga. App. 715, 115 S.E.2d 214 (1960); O'Quinn v. State, 121 Ga. App. 231, 173 S.E.2d 409 (1970); Raines v. State, 130 Ga. App. 1, 202 S.E.2d 253 (1973); State v. Collett, 232 Ga. 668, 208 S.E.2d 472 (1974); P.R. v. State, 133 Ga. App. 346, 210 S.E.2d 839 (1974); Gilbert v. State, 137 Ga. App. 754, 225 S.E.2d 86 (1976); Bennett v. State, 141 Ga. App. 795, 234 S.E.2d 327 (1977); Eubanks v. State, 144 Ga. App. 152, 241 S.E.2d 6 (1977); Smith v. State, 148 Ga. App. 634, 252 S.E.2d 62 (1979); Allen v. State, 150 Ga. App. 109, 257 S.E.2d 5 (1979); Stephens v. State, 245 Ga. 835, 268 S.E.2d 330 (1980); Cannon v. State, 246 Ga. 754, 272 S.E.2d 709 (1980); Johnson v. State, 162 Ga. App. 226, 291 S.E.2d 94 (1982); Malcom v. State, 162 Ga. App. 587, 291 S.E.2d 756 (1982); In re J.C., 163 Ga. App. 822, 296 S.E.2d 117 (1982); Shaw v. State, 164 Ga. App. 208, 296 S.E.2d 765 (1982); Smith v. State, 164 Ga. App. 384, 297 S.E.2d 738 (1982); Davis v. State, 172 Ga. App. 787, 324 S.E.2d 767 (1984); Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702 (11th Cir. 1987); Wilson v. State, 188 Ga. App. 731, 374 S.E.2d 345 (1988); Burke v. State, 201 Ga. App. 50, 410 S.E.2d 164 (1991); Anderson v. State, 226 Ga. App. 286, 486 S.E.2d 410 (1997); Staley v. State, 233 Ga. App. 597, 505 S.E.2d 491 (1998); Sanchez v. State, 234 Ga. App. 809, 508 S.E.2d 185 (1998).

Authority of court to set terms and conditions.

- This section is not exclusive in its provisions, but places upon the court authority to set terms of probation and thereafter lists certain conditions which the court may impose if the court sees fit. George v. State, 99 Ga. App. 892, 109 S.E.2d 883 (1959); Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225, 113 S.E.2d 223 (1960); Falkenhainer v. State, 122 Ga. App. 478, 177 S.E.2d 380 (1970); Marshall v. State, 127 Ga. App. 805, 195 S.E.2d 469 (1972); Geiger v. State, 140 Ga. App. 800, 232 S.E.2d 109 (1976).

Trial judge is not limited to imposition of only those restrictions enumerated in this section. Clackler v. State, 130 Ga. App. 738, 204 S.E.2d 472 (1974); Giddens v. State, 156 Ga. App. 258, 274 S.E.2d 595 (1980); Parkerson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 440, 274 S.E.2d 799 (1980).

This section permits the court to determine the terms and conditions of probation, and lists ten conditions of probation. Parkerson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 440, 274 S.E.2d 799 (1980).

Absent inclusion of a record and an express authority to the contrary, the trial judge was authorized to impose attendance at the Chatham County DUI court treatment program as a condition of the defendant's probation; further, imposition was not a denial of the defendant's equal protection rights in that nonresidents were not required to attend, especially and in light of the fact that the defendant failed to show any evidence to show the genesis, nature, or content of the program of which the defendant complained. Kellam v. State, 271 Ga. App. 125, 608 S.E.2d 729 (2004).

While the Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant that the cited probation conditions were peculiar to a DUI conviction, because the defendant failed to cite any authority showing that a court abused the court's discretion in imposing the condition's upon a probated sentence for serious injury by vehicle, when DUI was the predicate offense, and the defendant failed to show that any such condition was unreasonable or failed to serve the main goals of probation, the appeals court saw no reason why the cited conditions could not be imposed upon a probated sentence for serious injury by vehicle. Hannah v. State, 280 Ga. App. 230, 633 S.E.2d 800 (2006).

In overruling the defendant's objection to the probation imposed, the trial court erroneously deferred to the probation department in stating that any invalid conditions could be removed by the probation department; the appeals court disapproved of such a practice as O.C.G.A. § 42-8-35(a) provided that only the court was to determine the terms and conditions of probation. Grovenstein v. State, 282 Ga. App. 109, 637 S.E.2d 821 (2006).

Special probation conditions, requiring that the defendant complete a driving under the influence risk reduction course under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(c), perform 40 hours of community service under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(c), and pay a $25 photograph fee under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(j)(1), (2), were not an abuse of discretion despite the fact that the conditions of probation were not imposed upon the defendant's driving under the influence conviction, for which probation was not imposed, but were instead imposed on the defendant's sentence of probation on the related convictions; while the defendant claimed that the conditions were peculiar to a driving under the influence conviction, the conditions were reasonably related to the nature of the offenses and the rehabilitative goals of probation pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-8-35. Johnson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 258, 638 S.E.2d 406 (2006).

Constitutionality of polygraph test requirement.

- Condition requiring probationer to submit to polygraph tests does not violate the defendants' Fifth Amendment rights, and the condition may be imposed, in the discretion of the trial judge, with no more than a general finding of the court that it is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of probation. Mann v. State, 154 Ga. App. 677, 269 S.E.2d 863 (1980).

Confinement not "incarceration."

- Sentence of defendant based on first offender treatment, to five years' probation, conditioned upon successive periods of confinement in a detention center, a diversion center, and in defendant's house under intensive supervision, was authorized and did not constitute "incarceration," which refers to continuous and uninterrupted custody in a jail or penitentiary. Penaherrera v. State, 211 Ga. App. 162, 438 S.E.2d 661 (1993).

Condition precluding contact between perpetrator of sexual crime and victim.

- Imposition as a condition of probation that the defendant who was convicted of aggravated child molestation have no direct or indirect contact with the defendant's seven-year-old daughter until she reached the age of majority was within the discretion of the court, and was not a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights. Tuttle v. State, 215 Ga. App. 396, 450 S.E.2d 863 (1994).

Condition of probation that defendant live with parents during course of probated sentences implicitly imposes restriction on defendant's parents, i.e., that the parents maintain a domicile for the defendant, and is unenforceable. Ward v. State, 248 Ga. 60, 281 S.E.2d 503 (1981).

Suspension of defendant's hunting and fishing privileges during the probation period imposed upon conviction of a violation of O.C.G.A. § 27-3-9, unlawful enticement of game, was not an abuse of discretion. Quintrell v. State, 231 Ga. App. 268, 499 S.E.2d 117 (1998).

Condition that defendant wear special bracelet.

- List in O.C.G.A. § 42-8-35 of conditions which may be imposed is not exclusive and the court had authority to impose the requirement that the defendant wear a fluorescent pink plastic bracelet imprinted with the words "D.U.I. CONVICT." Ballenger v. State, 210 Ga. App. 627, 436 S.E.2d 793 (1993).

Condition requiring child support payments.

- Condition requiring that the probationer make child support payments directly to his ex-wife was not unreasonable and served a legitimate purpose. Darby v. State, 230 Ga. App. 32, 495 S.E.2d 146 (1998).

Condition requiring curfew.

- Probation condition stating that "Defendant will submit a schedule of weekly activities to the probation officer and will be subject to curfews at the officer's discretion" was not improper. Tyler v. State, 279 Ga. App. 809, 632 S.E.2d 716 (2006), cert. denied, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 810 (Ga. 2006); overruled on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 642 S.E.2d 56 (2007).

Danger to probationer.

- Court would reverse a sentence which required the defendant, as a condition of probation, to wear a placard stating "BEWARE HIGH CRIME AREA" for a certain number of hours while walking through the area where the defendant committed the defendant's offense since the sign itself indicated that the defendant would be patrolling in a high crime area and, therefore, this would result in the defendant being placed in danger. Williams v. State, 234 Ga. App. 37, 505 S.E.2d 816 (1998).

Incarceration not imposable as condition for probation.

- In the absence of express statutory authority recognizing continuous and uninterrupted incarceration in a jail or penitentiary as a viable condition of probation, the imposition of any term of continuous and uninterrupted incarceration in a jail or penitentiary as a special condition of probation is unauthorized by law. Pitts v. State, 206 Ga. App. 635, 426 S.E.2d 257 (1992).

Condition for sex offenders imposed.

- Trial court was authorized to conclude that the defendant's conduct of secretly videotaping the defendant's stepdaughter while she was in the nude was by its nature a sexual offense against a minor or criminal sexual conduct toward a minor. The court, therefore, did not err in exercising the court's broad discretion to impose upon the defendant special conditions of probation for sex offenders. Price v. State, 320 Ga. App. 85, 738 S.E.2d 289 (2013).

Collection of electronic monitoring fees by private probation service.

- Trial court erred by finding that electronic monitoring fees imposed by the sentencing court and collected by a private probation service for monitoring services rendered during a probationer's original term of sentence were prohibited because only when electronic monitoring was unlawfully imposed by the court on a misdemeanor probationer after the expiration of the probationer's original sentence would such fees potentially be recoverable. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (2014).

Prohibition against alcohol consumption.

- Prohibition against consumption of alcohol as condition of probation is authorized by paragraph (1) of this section. An alcoholic is not exempt from such a condition. Mock v. State, 156 Ga. App. 763, 275 S.E.2d 393 (1980).

Condition against engaging in profession for certain period.

- Condition that defendant not engage in practice of law for a period of one year was within the sound discretion of the court in probating the sentence, and was authorized under former Code 1933, § 27-2702 and Ga. L. 1965, p. 413, § 3 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 42-8-34 and42-8-35). Yarbrough v. State, 119 Ga. App. 46, 166 S.E.2d 35 (1969).

Diversion center.

- Probationer is not subject to prosecution for the felony offense of escape, after the probationer fails to return to a diversion center from which the probationer is given permission to leave. Chandler v. State, 257 Ga. 775, 364 S.E.2d 273 (1988).

Banishment.

- Banishment of one convicted of crime from county or counties may be a reasonable condition of probation. Parkerson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 440, 274 S.E.2d 799 (1980).

No section or other authority grants jurisdiction to trial court to banish a person other than the convicted criminal as a condition of the criminal's probation. Parkerson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 440, 274 S.E.2d 799 (1980).

Habeas court properly denied the defendant's petition for habeas relief based on the contention that a condition of probation banishing the defendant from every county in the State of Georgia but one was unconstitutional as the defendant failed to show that the probation condition to remain in Toombs County only was unreasonable or otherwise failed to bear a logical relationship to the rehabilitative scheme of the sentence pronounced. The Supreme Court of Georgia noted that the banishment was justified to protect the victim, the defendant's ex-spouse, from the defendant's propensity for violence toward the victim. Terry v. Hamrick, 284 Ga. 24, 663 S.E.2d 256 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 510, 172 L. Ed. 2d 375 (2008).

Trial court did not err in modifying the probationary portion of the defendant's sentence by imposing a condition banishing the defendant from the subdivision in which the defendant committed burglaries because the trial court's original sentencing order included as a special condition of probation that the defendant was to avoid all contact with the burglary victims, each of whom lived in the subdivision at issue, and to the extent that the modified sentence simply clarified the scope of that special condition, it was contemplated within the terms of the original sentence pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-8-34(g); the banishment provision was reasonable, narrow in scope, and included only the subdivision in which the victims resided, and in the absence of a hearing transcript or any record evidence to the contrary, the court of appeals had to presume that the trial court properly considered the evidence before the court. Tyson v. State, 301 Ga. App. 295, 687 S.E.2d 284 (2009).

Although the legislature has expressly provided that banishment is a valid term and condition of probation, the trial court cannot banish a probationer to any area within the state that does not consist of at least one entire judicial circuit. Because Toombs County was part of the five-county Middle Judicial Circuit, which also included Emanuel, Jefferson, Washington, and Candler Counties, the trial court was not statutorily authorized to banish the defendant from the entire state, except for Toombs County. Regent v. State, 333 Ga. App. 350, 774 S.E.2d 213 (2015), vacated on other grounds, 339 Ga. App. 885, 795 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016).

Threat of refusal to abide by banishment.

- When the trial court imposes 20 year sentence with ten years thereof to be probated, conditional upon banishment of the defendant from the judicial circuit, threats by the defendant not to abide by probational banishment authorize the judge to impose a sentence of 20 years. Garland v. State, 160 Ga. App. 97, 286 S.E.2d 330 (1981).

Constitutionality of restitution condition.

- Sentence on a conviction for a fraudulent disposition of crops subject to a landlord's lien under former Code 1933, § 61-9903 (see now O.C.G.A. § 44-14-348), which provided for probation in lieu of a prison sentence on the condition that the landlord was repaid, was a valid and legal sentence and was not violative of Ga. Const. 1945, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXI (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXIII). Davis v. State, 53 Ga. App. 325, 185 S.E. 400 (1936) (decided under former law).

Probation may be conditioned upon payment of expenses in accordance with the conditions of probation. Giddens v. State, 156 Ga. App. 258, 274 S.E.2d 595 (1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1026, 101 S. Ct. 1733, 68 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1981).

Serving sentence outside detention center.

- Court may probate sentence to permit convicted person to serve sentence outside confines of place of detention "on such conditions as it may see fit," and this vests a broad power in the trial court, and restitution to an injured person or the person's property cannot be said to be a condition in violation of that power. Henry v. State, 77 Ga. App. 735, 49 S.E.2d 681 (1948).

Notice and hearing requirements.

- Prior notice and an opportunity to be heard are prerequisite where restitution is ordered by court to be paid out of a probationer's weekly salary and the penalty for failure to pay is imprisonment. Morgan v. Wofford, 472 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1973).

Effect of fixing amount of restitution required to be paid under paragraph (a)(7) of this section, without notice to the probationer and without any opportunity for probationer to question or appeal amount, especially when criminal sanctions may be involved, violates the Fourteenth Amendment, since due process requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case when the state seeks to deprive a person of property or liberty. Morgan v. Wofford, 472 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1973).

Contesting restitution condition.

- Recourse for defendant who does not agree to amount of restitution ordered by trial court is to contest the issue at the time the condition is imposed. Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 511, 274 S.E.2d 669 (1980); Johnson v. State, 157 Ga. App. 155, 276 S.E.2d 667 (1981).

Appellant's plea of guilty to accusation and execution of written acknowledgment of conditions of probation did not constitute an agreement to the value of stolen property for purposes of restitution. Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 511, 274 S.E.2d 669 (1980).

When the appellant failed to dispute or contest amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, restitution was properly imposed without an adjudication. Cobb v. State, 162 Ga. App. 314, 291 S.E.2d 390 (1982); Patrick v. State, 184 Ga. App. 260, 361 S.E.2d 251 (1987).

Defendant is only entitled to adjudication of the restitutionary amount when that amount is in dispute. Johnston v. State, 165 Ga. App. 792, 302 S.E.2d 708 (1983); Williams v. State, 180 Ga. App. 854, 350 S.E.2d 837 (1986).

Since the defendant failed to dispute the amount of restitution ordered as a condition of probation for theft by taking, and the state failed to prove the amount at trial is of no consequence, because the state was only required to prove that the defendant stole in excess of $200.00 (now $500.00) under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-12(a)(1). Johnston v. State, 165 Ga. App. 792, 302 S.E.2d 708 (1983).

When the amount of medical expenses of a juvenile assault victim is undisputed based on the uncontradicted testimony of the victim in the disposition hearing, there is no error in ordering restitution. C.P. v. State, 167 Ga. App. 374, 306 S.E.2d 688 (1983).

When the defendant voiced no objection in the trial court to the interest charged as part of the amount of restitution, the defendant may not complain of it on appeal. Corbin v. State, 202 Ga. App. 464, 415 S.E.2d 14 (1992).

Restitution as condition.

- While the defendant may not be sentenced to make restitution, the court may make restitution a condition of probation. Biddy v. State, 138 Ga. App. 4, 225 S.E.2d 448 (1976).

Determining nature of restitution order.

- Elements of O.C.G.A. T. 17, Ch. 14 may be used to discern nature of order of restitution made under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-35. This can be done since under § 42-8-35 "restitution" was an authorized condition of probation and the enactment of T. 17, Ch. 14 "is merely a more detailed enactment regarding restitution." Newton v. Fred Haley Poultry Farm, 15 Bankr. 708 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).

Condition for restoration of driver's license.

- Restitution of damages to other persons involved in an automobile accident may not be imposed as a condition for restoration of a driver's license in such cases when the amount is in dispute, unless the issue has been adjudicated because a party may be guilty of violating the traffic laws and be found not liable in a civil suit for damages. Payne v. State, 138 Ga. App. 358, 226 S.E.2d 152 (1976).

Restitution permissible despite scheduling obligation owed creditor.

- Trial court is empowered to stipulate as a condition of probation that restitution shall be made to the aggrieved party despite the defendant having scheduled the obligation owing the creditor in bankruptcy proceedings. Marshall v. State, 127 Ga. App. 805, 195 S.E.2d 469 (1972).

Restitution based on untried charge improper.

- When there was no accusation or evidence relating to a particular theft, the trial court cannot order restitution for that theft as a condition of probation even if the court was aware of an untried charge relating to that theft. Robinson v. State, 169 Ga. App. 763, 315 S.E.2d 277 (1984).

Repayment of salary.

- Trial court may, as a condition of probation, require repayment of the salary received by a county officer while the officer was suspended. LaPann v. State, 167 Ga. App. 288, 306 S.E.2d 373 (1983).

Reimbursement of costs of representation.

- Georgia Indigent Defense Act, in replacing former O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10(c), did not preclude a trial court from ordering restitution of attorney fees as part of the court's general power to impose reasonable conditions of probation under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-35; thus, a defendant was properly ordered to reimburse the costs of the defendant's legal representation, and that aspect of the defendant's sentence was not a nullity. State v. Pless, 282 Ga. 58, 646 S.E.2d 202 (2007).

Restitution properly adjudicated.

- See Lee v. State, 166 Ga. App. 485, 304 S.E.2d 446 (1983).

Revocation of purported probation sentence.

- Sentences for criminal offenses should be certain, definite, and free from ambiguity, and, when the contrary is the case, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the accused. Hence, the trial court erred in revoking a purported probation sentence since construed as a whole, the sentence was an alternative one and the defendant was to be discharged upon payment of fines and costs. Favors v. State, 95 Ga. App. 318, 97 S.E.2d 613 (1957).

Service of sentence on probation as privilege.

- Service of sentence on probation is conferred as privilege and cannot be demanded as a matter of right, but this does not mean that a defendant's liberty is something that can be the subject matter of whim or fancy of the trial judge. Cross v. Huff, 208 Ga. 392, 67 S.E.2d 124 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 27-2702 and 27-2705 prior to revision by Ga. L. 1956, p. 27, §§ 1, 21).

Authority of judge to suspend or probate sentence.

- Judge imposing a sentence is granted power to suspend or probate the sentence under such rules and regulations as the judge thinks proper. Cross v. Huff, 208 Ga. 392, 67 S.E.2d 124 (1951).

Judge has the right and authority to revoke the suspension or probation, after notice and a hearing, when the defendant violates any of the rules and regulations prescribed by the court. Simmons v. State, 96 Ga. App. 718, 101 S.E.2d 111 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 27-2702 and 27-2705, prior to revision by Ga. L. 1956, p. 27, §§ 1, 21).

Notice or hearing required for sentence revocation. Balkcom v. Gunn, 206 Ga. 167, 56 S.E.2d 482 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, T. 27, including §§ 27-2702 and 27-2705, prior to revision by Ga. L. 1956, p. 27, §§ 1, 21).

Sufficiency of notice.

- Notice must be sufficient to inform the defendant of the manner in which the defendant has violated the defendant's parole and give the defendant an opportunity to defend. George v. State, 99 Ga. App. 892, 109 S.E.2d 883 (1959).

Some evidence required for revocation of probation.

- While the trial court has a wide discretion in revoking a probated sentence, and while only slight evidence will support a judgment of revocation, some evidence that the defendant violated the terms of the defendant's probated sentence as charged in the notice given the defendant of the revocation hearing is required. George v. State, 99 Ga. App. 892, 109 S.E.2d 883 (1959); Gay v. State, 101 Ga. App. 225, 113 S.E.2d 223 (1960).

Evidence held insufficient.

- Evidence was insufficient when notice contained in special order of arrest charged the defendant with manufacturing illicit whiskey, but no evidence was introduced; mere fact that the defendant was operating a truck loaded with sugar, and the defendant refused to give the name of the purchaser or seller of the sugar and had no bill of lading or bill of sale for the sugar, which facts were perfectly consistent with the defendant's contention that the defendant was doing some hauling, was of itself not sufficient to authorize revocation of the probation order. George v. State, 99 Ga. App. 892, 109 S.E.2d 883 (1959).

When notice contained in order of arrest failed to charge the defendant with violation of the provision of the probation order prohibiting the defendant from leaving the state without permission, mere fact that the defendant was stopped in Alabama was not sufficient ground for revocation thereof. George v. State, 99 Ga. App. 892, 109 S.E.2d 883 (1959).

Matters to be considered in revoking probation.

- Since the court cannot revoke a probated sentence unless the sentence has conditions sufficiently definite to be enforceable, and unless the conditions have not been complied with, and since the defendant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard on the charge which is brought against the defendant, only those alleged violations which are terms of the original sentence, and notice of the violation of which has been given the probationer, may be considered by the court on the hearing to revoke the probated sentence. George v. State, 99 Ga. App. 892, 109 S.E.2d 883 (1959).

Need for prescribed rules and regulations.

- When no rules or regulations are prescribed in the alleged suspended or probated sentence, and no violation of a prescribed rule or regulation is alleged, the court is without authority to order the defendant incarcerated upon the theory that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of a probation sentence. Morgan v. Foster, 208 Ga. 630, 68 S.E.2d 583 (1952); Simmons v. State, 96 Ga. App. 718, 101 S.E.2d 111 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 27-2702, 27-2705, and 27-2706, prior to revision by Ga. L. 1956, p. 27, §§ 1, 21).

Probated sentences must show rules and regulations prescribed so that a violation of such rules and regulations will revoke probation. Simmons v. State, 96 Ga. App. 718, 101 S.E.2d 111 (1957) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 27-2702 and 27-2705, prior to revision by Ga. L. 1956, p. 27, §§ 1, 21); George v. State, 99 Ga. App. 892, 109 S.E.2d 883 (1959).

Discretion to impose non-specified restrictions.

- Court has authority to impose restrictions not specifically listed in this section, and among them the restriction that the defendant shall not violate the penal laws of the state. George v. State, 99 Ga. App. 892, 109 S.E.2d 883 (1959).

Strict construction.

- Statutes providing for suspension of a sentence or probation of defendant must be strictly followed. Cross v. Huff, 208 Ga. 392, 67 S.E.2d 124 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 27-2702 and 27-2705, prior to revision by Ga. L. 1956, p. 27, §§ 1, 21).

Language held not so vague as to be unenforceable.

- Provision in a probation sentence that the "sentence is suspended on payment of fine and on the further condition that defendant not violate laws of this state, and until further order of this court," is not so vague, indefinite, ambiguous, and uncertain as to be unenforceable; the laws of this state being fixed by statute and presumed to be within the knowledge of every competent person. Bryant v. State, 89 Ga. App. 891, 81 S.E.2d 556 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 27-2705).

Probation sentence held unenforceable.

- If the words, "maintain a correct life" are intended to impose any condition upon the defendant over and beyond compliance with the rules prescribed for the defendant's conduct by the court, the words are too vague, indefinite, and uncertain to be given any construction or application. Morgan v. Foster, 208 Ga. 630, 68 S.E.2d 583 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 27-2705 and 27-2706, prior to revision by Ga. L. 1956, p. 27, § 21).

Condition applicable for probated sentence applies to suspended sentence.

- Condition which would be authorized in the case of a probated sentence would be authorized in the case of a suspended sentence. Falkenhainer v. State, 122 Ga. App. 478, 177 S.E.2d 380 (1970).

Releasing defendant without prescribing conditions or rules.

- When no conditions or rules are prescribed by the court for the conduct of the defendant, the defendant's release at the direction of the court upon payment of a fine is not a suspended or probated sentence, but an unconditional discharge. The words, "until further order of the court," appearing in the sentence, are insufficient to constitute a suspended sentence or probation. Morgan v. Foster, 208 Ga. 630, 68 S.E.2d 583 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, §§ 27-2705 and 27-2706 prior to revision by Ga. L. 1956, p. 27, § 21).

Imposition of terms by board.

- Board or the board's agents may not place on a prisoner in connection with the prisoner's probation any terms or conditions not required of the prisoner by court order passed by the trial judge at the conclusion of the hearing held for the purpose of considering the prisoner's probation. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 223.

Board, acting through the director of probation (now commissioner of corrections) and probation officers, is without authority to require of probationers under the board's supervision the execution of any waiver of any right of extradition or otherwise, or to impose upon the probationers any condition not placed upon the probationers by the trial judge in the judge's probation order. 1958-59 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 223.

Screening for virus as probation condition.

- Confidential screening for the HTLV-III/LAV virus in convicted prostitutes may be required: (1) as a health measure by the Department of Human Resources; or (2) as a condition of probation by the sentencing court. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 86-19.

Imposition of fine payment.

- Superior court judge may impose payment of a fine as a term and condition of probation for a defendant being treated under Ga. L. 1968, p. 324, § 1 (see now O.C.G.A. § 42-8-60 et seq.). 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U75-42.

Banishment as condition.

- Supreme Court of this state has upheld a trial court's authority to impose banishment as a condition of probation. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U79-8.

List not exclusive.

- List of conditions of probation in this section is not exclusive. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U79-8.

Community service as condition.

- Probated sentence providing for specified community service as a condition of probation is permissible. 1979 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U79-8.

Probationer contributing for probation supervisors' insurance.

- Probationer can be required to pay by court order, as a condition of his/her probation, a reasonable amount toward the cost of maintaining insurance to protect probation supervisors from personal liability should probationers be injured while performing court-ordered community service. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-18.

Covenant not to sue probation supervisors.

- Probationer may be required to enter into covenant not to sue probation supervisors personally. A sentencing court may, in the court's discretion, require a probationer to enter into, as a condition of probation, a covenant not to sue probation supervisors in their personal capacity if the probationer is injured while performing court-ordered community service work. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-18.

Reasonable supervision fee as condition.

- Probationer's agreement to pay supervision fee should be obtained at time of sentencing and should be recorded. But, regardless of whether the probationer agrees, the probationer can be required to pay the reasonable supervision fee as a condition of probation. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-100.

Statutory conditions in O.C.G.A. § 42-8-35 are not exclusive, and trial courts may, as a condition of probation, impose a probation supervision fee. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-4.

Collection of supervision fees by Department.

- Department of Offender Rehabilitation (Corrections) may not on its own initiative collect a supervision fee from probationers. 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-100.

Withholding "collection fee" from fines to offset costs.

- Probation supervision fee collected pursuant to probation order of sentencing court does not have a statutory premise. Therefore, such a fee does not have to be paid into state treasury but, if permitted by probation order, could be retained by the Department of Offender Rehabilitation (Corrections). 1981 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 81-100.

Use of restitution funds.

- Pursuant to this section, funds collected for the purpose of restitution may be used only for that purpose. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-182.

Returning funds to probationer.

- When a trust of funds collected pursuant to this section fails of accomplishment, the funds should be returned to the probationer who is similar to the grantor of an implied or resulting trust. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-182.

Return of small fund amount when probationer not found.

- When neither the intended recipient nor the probationer can be found, and the sum collected pursuant to this section is quite small, the money should continue to be held since the escheat procedure would consume the fund. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-182.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, §§ 526-536.

C.J.S.

- 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 2144-2161.

ALR.

- Power to impose sentence with direction that after defendant shall have served part of time he be placed on probation for the remainder of term, 147 A.L.R. 656.

Propriety of conditioning probation or suspended sentence on defendant's refraining from political activity, protest, or the like, 45 A.L.R.3d 1022.

What constitutes "good behavior" within statute or judicial order expressly conditioning suspension or sentence thereon, 58 A.L.R.3d 1156.

Propriety, in imposing sentence for original offense after revocation of probation, of considering acts because of which probation was revoked, 65 A.L.R.3d 1100.

Propriety of condition of probation which requires defendant convicted of crime of violence to make reparation to injured victim, 79 A.L.R.3d 976.

Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, indigent defendant reimburse defense costs, 79 A.L.R.3d 1025.

Propriety of conditioning probation upon defendant's posting of bond guaranteeing compliance with terms of probation, 79 A.L.R.3d 1068.

Validity of requirement that, as condition of probation, defendant submit to warrantless searches, 79 A.L.R.3d 1083.

Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant's not associating with particular person, 99 A.L.R.3d 967.

Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant's serving part of probationary period in jail or prison, 6 A.L.R.4th 446.

Propriety of requirement, as condition of probation, that defendant refrain from use of intoxicants, 19 A.L.R.4th 1251.

Power of court to revoke probation for acts committed after imposition of sentence but prior to commencement of probation term, 22 A.L.R.4th 755.

Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant's not entering specified geographical area, 28 A.L.R.4th 725.

Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant's submission to polygraph or other lie detector testing, 86 A.L.R.4th 709.

Propriety of conditioning probation on defendant's submission to drug testing, 87 A.L.R.4th 929.

Propriety of conditioning parole on defendant's not entering specified geographical area, 54 A.L.R.5th 743.

Propriety of probation condition exposing defendant to public shame or ridicule, 65 A.L.R.5th 187.

Propriety of requirement, as condition of probation, that defendant refrain from use of intoxicants, 46 A.L.R.6th 241.

Propriety, in criminal case, of Federal District Court order restricting defendant's right to re-enter or stay in United States, 94 A.L.R. Fed. 619.

Admissibility, in state probation revocation proceedings, of evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure, 92 A.L.R.6th 1.