Jarvious Cotton v. Kirk Fordice, Et Al, 157 F.3d 388. · Go Syfert
Search
Jarvious Cotton v. Kirk Fordice, Et Al, 157 F.3d 388. Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“241 was enacted in an era when southern states discriminated against lack by disenfranchising convicts for crimes that, it was thought, were committed primarily by lack .”
79 citation events (78 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hopkins v. Watson (ca5, 2024-07-18)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Hopkins v. Watson
5th Cir. · 2024 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
241 was enacted in an era when southern states discriminated against lack by disenfranchising convicts for crimes that, it was thought, were committed primarily by lack .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Treva Thompson v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama
11th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that “because Mississippi’s proce- dure resulted both in 1950 and in 1968 in a reenact- ment of the provision, each amendment superseded the previous provision and removed the discrimina- tory taint associated with the original version.” Id. (citing Cotton, 157 F.3d at 191) (internal citations and alterations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Barcenas-Rumualdo
5th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
President Truman’s opinion on the INA is not probative of what Congress believed. 27 And as other circuits have recognized, “opponents of a bill are to be accorded little weight because ‘[i]n their zeal to defeat a bill, [opponents] understandably 23 See Harness, 47 F.4th at 306. 24 See also Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018) (“The allocation of the burden of proof and the presumption of legislative good faith are not changed by a finding of past discrimination.”). 25 Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998). 26 As other courts have noted, President Truman’s …
examined Cited as authority (rule) Thompson v. Allen (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
M.D. Ala. · 2020 · confidence medium
The Eleventh Circuit noted that in Cotton, a disenfranchisement provision was challenged which had been adopted with discriminatory intent in 1890, but was amended by the legislature in 1950 to remove burglary as a disenfranchising crime, and was amended in 1968 to add murder and rape as disenfranchising crimes, “two crimes which were historically excluded because they were not considered ‘black’ crimes.” Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1224 (citing Cotton, 157 F.3d at 391).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McLemore v. Hosemann
S.D. Miss. · 2019 · confidence medium
Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Veasey v. Abbott
S.D. Tex. · 2017 · confidence medium
Defendants argue that' the discriminatory taint of SB 14 can no longer control the remedy because SB 5 stripped SB 14 of its discriminatory purpose, citing Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Perez v. Abbott (2×)
W.D. Tex. · 2017 · confidence medium
Id. at 521 (citing Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998)). 36 It continued, “We do not suggest that the changes implemented in 1993, 1995, and 1997 to the original framework were as 'dramatic as those in Cotton .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas Johnson v. Governor of the State of FL (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
In Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir.1998), the Fifth Circuit relied upon this statement to conclude that Hunter "left open the possibility that by amendment, a facially neutral provision... might overcome its odious origin." 15 On that basis, the Fifth Circuit upheld, despite its discriminatory origin, a criminal disenfranchisement provision subsequently reenacted with modifications by the State of Mississippi.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Governor of Florida (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
11th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
In Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir.1998), the Fifth Circuit relied upon this statement to conclude that Hunter “left open the possibility that by amendment, a facially neutral provision ... might overcome its odious origin.” 15 On that basis, the Fifth Circuit upheld, despite its discriminatory origin, a criminal disenfranchisement provision subsequently reenacted with modifications by the State of Mississippi.
cited Cited "see" NORTH CAROLINA A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE v. THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS
M.D.N.C. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See 157 F.3d 388 , 391 (5th Cir. 1998).
examined Cited "see" Harness v. Watson (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
5th Cir. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cotton, 157 F.3d at 391 ; ante, at 11, 17.
cited Cited "see" Johnson v. Bush
S.D. Fla. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See id.
discussed Cited "see" Chen v. City of Houston
5th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir.1998) (while disenfranchisement constitutional provision originated in attempt to discriminate, subsequent reenactment with alterations approved by voters added categories of crimes originally excluded because they were not considered “Black” crimes and subtracted a less serious offense that had been considered a “Black” crime).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hayden v. Paterson
2d Cir. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence medium
After assuming, without deciding, that racial animus motivated the 1868 law, id. at 1223, the court held that “Florida’s felon disenfranchisement provision is constitutional because it was substantively altered and reenacted in 1968 in the absence of any evidence of racial bias,” id. at 1225; see also Cotton, 157 F.3d at 391 (“Because Mississippi’s [deliberative] procedure resulted both in 1950 and in 1968 in a reenactment of [the state’s felon disenfranchisement constitutional provision originally enacted in 1890], each amendment superseded the previous provision and removed the d…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hayden v. Paterson
2d Cir. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence medium
After assuming, without deciding, that racial animus 16 motivated the 1868 law, id. at 1223, the court held that “Florida’s felon disenfranchisement 17 provision is constitutional because it was substantively altered and reenacted in 1968 in the 18 absence of any evidence of racial bias,” id. at 1225; see also Cotton, 157 F.3d at 391 (“Because 19 Mississippi’s [deliberative] procedure resulted both in 1950 and in 1968 in a re-enactment of [the 20 state’s felon disenfranchisement constitutional provision originally enacted in 1890], each 21 amendment superseded the previous provisio…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hayden v. Pataki
2d Cir. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Similarly, the portion of the Mississippi Constitution at issue in Williams v. Mississippi disenfranchised citizens who had committed specific felonies thought to be committed disproportionately by African Americans. 170 U.S. 213, 222 , 225 n. 1, 18 S.Ct. 583 , 42 L.Ed. 1012 (1898); see also Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir.1998) (stating that Section 241 of the Mississippi Constitution was unconstitutionally discriminatory when first adopted but subsequent amendments and reenactments for nondiscriminatory purposes cured it of its "odious origin").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hayden v. Pataki
2d Cir. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Similarly, the portion of the Mississippi Constitution at issue in Williams v. Mississippi disenfranchised citizens who had committed specific felonies thought to be committed disproportionately by African Americans. 170 U.S. 213, 222 , 225 n. 1, 18 S.Ct. 583 , 42 L.Ed. 1012 (1898); see also Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir.1998) (stating that Section 241 of the Mississippi Constitution was unconstitutionally discriminatory when first adopted but subsequent amendments and reenactments for nondiscriminatory purposes cured it of its “odious origin”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jarvious Cotton
v.
Kirk Fordice, Et Al
157 F.3d 388
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 88%
Citer courts: Fifth Circuit (1)
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 97-60275
Summary Calendar
_____________________

JARVIOUS COTTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KIRK FORDICE, ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:96-CV-141BN
_________________________________________________________________ January 26, 1998 Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jarvious Cotton, # 34463, appeals the district court’s summary judgment for the defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights actions. Cotton’s appeal is hereby SEVERED from that of his co-appellant Keith Brown, # 45542, for separate disposition. Cotton argues that the defendants denied him his right to vote.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, or 3 or more prior

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

occasions, while incarcerated on detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be grated, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “[D]ismissals as frivolous in the district courts or the court of appeals count [as strikes] for the purposes of [§ 1915(g)].” Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996). A dismissal as frivolous by a district court does not count as a strike until the prisoner has exhausted or waived his appeals. Adepegba, 103 F.3d at 387. An affirmance by this court of a dismissal as frivolous by the district court does not count as a separate strike. Id. at 387. However, the dismissal of an appeal as frivolous counts as a separate strike for purposes of § 1915(g). Id. at 388.

Cotton has had three dismissals as frivolous by the district court and/or this court. See Cotton v. Hargett, No. 95-60284 (5th Cir. Aug. 22, 1995)(unpublished)(district court and court of appeals dismissed frivolous counts as two separate strikes); Cotton v. Fordice, No. 4:94CV202-S-D (N.D. Miss. Sept. 19, 1996) (district court dismissed case as frivolous). This appeal does not involve claims of imminent danger of serious physical injury. Cotton’s appeal is DISMISSED pursuant to § 1915(g). Cotton is hereby put on notice that he cannot file further appeals unless he meets the exception of § 1915(g).

-2-

APPEAL SEVERED and DISMISSED.

-3-