Tallahassee Mem'l Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 743 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). · Go Syfert
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Tallahassee Mem'l Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 743 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · …we dismiss the petition for writ of certiorari because no order was rendered from which certiorari can be taken and vest jurisdiction in this court. the circuit court only pronounced an oral ruling. at p. 1200 ⚠ not in text
13 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: JULIANNE M. HOLT, P.D. v. MICHAEL EDWARD KEETLEY & STATE OF FLORIDA (fladistctapp, 2018-06-20)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) JULIANNE M. HOLT, P.D. v. MICHAEL EDWARD KEETLEY & STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
we dismiss the petition for writ of certiorari because no order was rendered from which certiorari can be taken and vest jurisdiction in this court. the circuit court only pronounced an oral ruling.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Holt v. Keetley
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
we dismiss the petition for writ of certiorari because no order was rendered from which certiorari can be taken and vest jurisdiction in this court. the circuit court only pronounced an oral ruling.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Fort Lauderdale v. St. Louis
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
See § 440.19(4), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994); Fontanills v. Hillsborough County School Bd., 913 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1st DCA, 2005); Crutcher v. School Bd. of Broward County, 834 So.2d 228, 229 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); Tallahassee Mem'l Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 743 So.2d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." BANK OF AMERICA, N.A. v. LISA S. DULBERG DE MORALES
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Contrary to the bank’s suggestion, we cannot quash the trial court’s oral ruling deferring to rule on its motion to dismiss. “[T]his court lacks jurisdiction to review orders which have not been reduced to writing.” Rivera v. Dade County, 485 So. 2d 17, 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); see also Davis v. Heye, 743 So. 2d 1200, 1200 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (dismissing petition for certiorari involving only oral ruling, not written order).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
TALLAHASSEE MEMORIAL HEALTHCARE, INC., f/k/a Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Center, Inc., and Palmer & Cay, Inc., Appellants,
v.
Susie COLEMAN, Appellee.
98-3721.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Nov 8, 1999.
743 So. 2d 1200
Benton.
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 2 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 75%
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (2)

[*1201] William E. Whitney, Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellants.

Maureen Proctor Kole, Solomon & Proctor, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.

BENTON, J.

Tallahassee Memorial Healthcare, Inc. (the hospital) provided Susie Coleman medical benefits on account of an industrial accident she sustained on October 21, 1992. In June of 1993, she declined rotator cuff surgery that Dr. Peter Loeb recommended. Although Dr. Loeb never released her from his care, she did not seek further evaluation or care until she did so through counsel by a letter addressed to the hospital's servicing agent dated March 26, 1997. The letter does not seek alternative medical care.

The servicing agent's adjustor denied the claim for additional medical benefits on statute of limitations grounds. Compensation benefits had never been provided— Ms. Coleman never missed work—and more than two years had elapsed since medical benefits had been provided. At the hearing on the ensuing petition for benefits, the judge of compensation claims concluded that she had not been apprised of all of her rights under the workers' compensation law but that the omission was not "intentional and done to deprive the employee of benefits." § 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991).

After the hearing, however, the decision in Gaines v. Orange County Public Utilities, 710 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), came down. In his compensation order, the judge of compensation claims noted: "In Gaines, the Court found that § 440.19(4), Florida Statute[s] (Supp.1994)... applies to pre-1994 dates of accident." On this basis, the compensation order rejected the statute of limitations defense. We decline the hospital's invitation to revisit the decision in Gaines.

In Solar Pane Insulating Glass, Inc. v. Hanssen, 727 So.2d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), which was decided after the compensation order had been entered, we made clear that the "two-year statutory limitations period is not tolled by failure to advise an injured worker that a statute of limitations exists." 727 So.2d at 964. It is also clear here as it was in Hanssen that the claimant knew of her entitlement to medical benefits. We therefore remand for the judge of compensation claims to determine whether she lacked actual knowledge of any other pertinent right under the workers' compensation law and, if so, whether such ignorance accounted for her failure to obtain care during the two years following her last visit to Dr. Loeb.

Reversed and remanded.

BARFIELD, C.J., and WEBSTER, J., CONCUR.