Cases from cite.case.law:

O. MOISE, v. DISNEY POP CENTURY RESORT, Co., 244 So. 3d 403 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . (4)(i), Florida Statutes (2011), permitting motions to dismiss for lack of prosecution, and section 440.19 . . . In response, Disney filed notices of denial raising SOL defenses pursuant to section 440.19 as to both . . . The motivating factor(s) to file a PFB is not pertinent to the analysis of timeliness under section 440.19 . . . merits of the claims raised in the PFB are relevant to whether its filing was timely pursuant to section 440.19 . . . As illustrated by the facts of this case, the interaction of sections 440.19 and 440.25(4)(i) can prompt . . .

RING POWER CORPORATION v. MURPHY,, 238 So. 3d 906 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 440.19, Fla. Stat. (2006) (establishing general two-year limitations period). . . . Murphy responded by asserting that section 440.19(2) applied, making his petition timely. . . . City of Jacksonville , 616 So.2d 37, 39 (Fla. 1993) (noting that based on § 440.19(2), claimant must . . . See § 440.19(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). We hold it does not. . . .

CITY OF DANIA BEACH PGCS, v. ZIPOLI,, 204 So.3d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . asserting, among other defenses, that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations found in section 440.19 . . .

DAVIS, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY SHERIFF S OFFICE USIS,, 196 So. 3d 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Because subsection 440.092(5) is silent on any reporting requirement, we must look to section 440.19, . . .

SANCHEZ, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES CMS,, 169 So. 3d 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . that his April 2014 petition for' benefits (PFB) was barred by the statute of limitations in section 440.19 . . . medical treatment — the only two events that will extend the statute of limitations under subsection 440.19 . . . s fee to the claimant’s attorney is not the ‘payment of compensation’ within the meaning of section 440.19 . . .

LIMITH, v. LENOX ON LAKE FTMI LLC Co. d b a U. S., 163 So. 3d 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . visit, but also rejecting the E/C’s affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations, section 440.19 . . .

PANZER LAW, P. A. v. PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT A, 150 So. 3d 823 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Straw was the 1991 version of the Workers’ Compensation Law and the statutory citations were to section 440.19 . . . 1993, moving the provisions relating to the “Procedure for Resolving Benefit Disputes” from section 440.19 . . .

POMERANTZ, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY SHERIFF S OFFICE USIS,, 131 So. 3d 823 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . finding his petition for benefits barred by the running of the statutory limitations period under section 440.19 . . . We also affirm the JCC’s finding that the statute of limitations was tolled under section 440.19(1) for . . .

CHILDERS, v. CLAY COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS SCIBAL ASSOCIATES,, 128 So. 3d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . The majority properly resolves this case by applying the plain language of section 440.19(4), Florida . . . Consequently, under the authority of section 440.19(4), the second PFB is not time-barred. . . . Previously, this Court has held that the limitations period under section 440.19, once expired, cannot . . . The pleading requirement of section 440.19(4) is petition-specific. . . . The risk, of course, is that section 440.19 will cease to function as a true limitations period. . . . See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2007); § 440.19(2), Fla. . . . Section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that, “the failure to file a petition for benefits . . . Nothing we said in Palmer affects the operation of section 440.19(4) or has any bearing on the outcome . . .

CITY OF NORTH BAY VILLAGE v. GUEVARA,, 129 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . March 15, 2007, date of accident, which is beyond the two-year limitations period set forth in section 440.19 . . . concluded that the E/C was es-topped from raising the statute of limitations defense provided in section 440.19 . . . Claimant’s right to file a petition was barred by the statute of limitations as set forth in section 440.19 . . .

WESTPHAL, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG RISK MANAGEMENT,, 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . . known that the injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment.” § 440.19 . . .

MIRANDA, v. BRIDGE,, 112 So. 3d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . permanent total disability benefits based on the expiration of the statute of limitations found in sections 440.19 . . . conclusion that the petition for permanent total disability benefits was untimely filed under sections 440.19 . . .

SHANNON, v. CHENEY BROTHERS INC., 98 So. 3d 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See § 440.19(l)-(6), Fla. . . . Compare § 440.19(l)(a), Fla. . . . Stat. (1993) (providing compensation is barred unless timely “claim” is filed), with § 440.19(1), Fla . . . period regarding Shannon’s entitlement to benefits under the applicable statute of limitations, section 440.19 . . .

MIAMI- DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD v. RUSS,, 88 So. 3d 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (2006), provides: Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, . . . We disagree because section 440.19(4) places the (potentially) heightened burden on Claimant to prove . . .

OCEAN REEF CLUB, INC. a v. WILCZEWSKI, 99 So. 3d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . limitations for employee/attorney to raise petition for benefits expired pursuant to Florida Statute 440.19 . . . See § 440.19(1), Fla. . . . after the date of the last remedial treatment or rehabilitative services furnished by the employer. § 440.19 . . . The year after Timmeny issued, the Florida legislature amended section 440.19(l)(a) to add the Timmeny . . .

MIRANDA, v. AZUL PLASTERING CORP., 74 So. 3d 1123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . benefits on July 2, 2010, and the E/C defended by alleging the limitations period set forth in section 440.19 . . . Section 440.19(4) outlines the standards of proof and burdens of proof applicable in such a situation . . .

VARITIMIDIS, v. WALGREEN COMPANY SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC., 58 So. 3d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2007), provides in pertinent part: (1) Except to the extent provided . . . Section 440.19(1) thus provides that a petition for benefits is timely if filed within two years after . . . Best, 728 So.2d 1186, 1188 (Fla, 1st DCA 1999) (explaining section 440.19(2) extends rather than shortens . . . limitation period described in section 440.19(1), and if petition for benefits is timely under section . . . 440.19(1) or section 440.19(2) there is no bar to compensation). . . .

PUNSKY, v. CLAY COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 60 So. 3d 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . In his first point on appeal, claimant contends that section 440.19(6) permits an award of either zero . . . Section 440.19(6) reads: When recovery .is denied to any person in a suit brought at-law or in admiralty . . . Contrary to claimant’s contention, section 440.19(6) applies only when a claimant first proceeds against . . . Accordingly, section 440.19(6) does not apply- B. . . . Based on the foregoing, we reject claimant’s first point on appeal, that sections 440.19(6) and 440.24 . . .

COBURN, v. POLK COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 51 So. 3d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . which determined that Co-burn’s claim was barred by the one-year statute of limitations in section 440.19 . . .

GORE, v. LEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD Co., 43 So. 3d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . continuous provision of remedial treatment that tolled the statute of limitations pursuant to section 440.19 . . . The JCC reasoned that the Legislature made a substantive change to the law when it amended section 440.19 . . . Analysis Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that a petition for benefits is barred . . . Section 440.19(2) acts to toll this statute of limitations for a period of one year from the payment . . . Our analysis does not overlook the legislative amendments to section 440.19(1)(b). . . .

GAUTHIER, v. FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, 38 So. 3d 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . ANALYSIS Claimant’s petition was untimely under section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2005), because her . . . Section 440.19(4), however, provides than an E/C may be estopped from raising a statute of limitations . . . See § 440.19(4), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .

CERTAIN, Jr. v. BIG JOHNSON CONCRETE PUMPING, INC., 34 So. 3d 149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (2005), provides that a petition for benefits is barred unless filed . . . But section 440.19 states elsewhere that: Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the failure . . . advances the defense of a statute of limitations in its initial response to the petition for benefits. § 440.19 . . . raise the statute of limitations as grounds for denying the claim, the petition is not time barred. § 440.19 . . .

L. JACKSON, v. COMPUTER SCIENCE RAYTHEON CNA, 36 So. 3d 754 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . . § 440.19(4), Fla. . . .

AIREY, v. WAL- MART SEDGWICK,, 24 So. 3d 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . dismissing his petition for benefits filed on February 15, 2007, as time-barred pursuant to section 440.19 . . . See § 440.19(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). Accord Rice v. . . . benefits was timely filed and remained pending, it was error to conclude that it was barred by section 440.19 . . .

MEDPARTNERS DIAGNOSTIC CLINIC MEDICAL GROUP, P. A. v. ZENITH INSURANCE COMPANY,, 23 So. 3d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 440.19(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . limitation period described in section 440.19(1), and if PFB is timely under section 440.19(1) or section . . . See § 440.19(l)(a)-(b) Fla. . . . See § 440.19(l)-(2), Fla. Stat. (1994). . . . See § 440.19(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (1994). . . .

PADILLA, v. COLLINS CONTRACTING,, 22 So. 3d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). REVERSED and REMANDED. . . .

PALMER, v. CORPORATION,, 7 So. 3d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . fails to appreciate the distinction between the general statute of limitations contained in section 440.19 . . . two years of the date of injury), and the express tolling exception to that statute found in section 440.19 . . . raising that defense and proving that the petitions for benefits were untimely pursuant to section 440.19 . . . See § 440.19(4), Fla. Stat. (2001); see also Denestan v. . . . then becomes whether the general statute was tolled or extended pursuant to the exception in section 440.19 . . .

R. IVESTER, Jr. C. v. P. MILLER,, 398 B.R. 408 (M.D.N.C. 2008)

. . . . § l-440.19(a) to allow the attachment of a stock certificate but not an intangible ownership interest . . .

BATISTA, v. PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS, INC., 993 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . . § 440.19(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1986). . . .

BRANHAM, v. TMG STAFFING SERVICES,, 994 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Because the majority fails to apply sections 440.185(4) and 440.19, Florida Statutes, as construed by . . . An E/C is required by sections 440.185 and 440.19 to mail the required informational brochure to a claimant . . . competent, substantial evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence; as stated, sections 440.185 and 440.19 . . .

In YATKO A. v., 416 B.R. 193 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2008)

. . . Gen.Stat. 1-440.19. . . . case, Yatko’s prospective Deerfield distribution could either be considered a stock interest under 1-440.19 . . . Gen.Stat. 1-440.19. .The attachments to the bankruptcy adversary Complaint and the Summary Judgment motion . . .

ROBERSON, v. ST. JOHNS COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 973 So. 2d 598 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 440.19, Fla. Stat. (2001). . . .

TROCHE, v. GEICO LLC,, 966 So. 2d 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . benefits regarding his condition in both wrists due to the statute of limitations set forth in section 440.19 . . .

HANSON, v. FLORIDA HOSPITAL,, 946 So. 2d 601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . it was determined that his petition for benefits is barred by the statute of limitations in section 440.19 . . . despite the employer having provided him with an approved informational brochure in accordance with § 440.19 . . . apparently received an informational brochure he was not made aware of the limitations period under section 440.19 . . .

KIMMINS CORPORATION v. TRUC,, 941 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . for attorney’s fees and costs, which was filed within the two-year period in accordance with section 440.19 . . .

L. GINSBERG, v. CORP. d b a, 929 So. 2d 633 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . I concur because prior decisions constrain me from properly interpreting section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes . . . The operative language in section 440.19(2) initiates the statute of limitations with E/C’s “furnishing . . . I believe that the correct interpretation of section 440.19(2) here would result in affirming the JCC . . . To interpret section 440.19(2), as this court did in Fuster, requires extensive factual determinations . . . denying and dismissing all pending claims based on the running of the statute of limitations, section 440.19 . . . ANALYSIS Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (1998), provides a two-year statute of limitations for workers . . . limitations would bar the claims in the present case unless the statute was tolled pursuant to section 440.19 . . . apply to the issues of compensability, date of maximum medical improvement, or permanent impairment. § 440.19 . . . Blackburn, 519 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (holding that “remedial” as used in section 440.19 includes . . .

CAMUS, v. MANATEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 923 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . his evaluation of claimant on September 21, 2004 was within the limitations period imposed by section 440.19 . . . benefits shall toll the limitations period set forth above for 1 year from the date of such payment.” § 440.19 . . .

RICE, v. REEDY CREEK IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT, 924 So. 2d 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . 2000 Accident Claimant argues that because his first petition for benefits was timely under section 440.19 . . . statement from the legislature to the contrary, the one-year statute of limitations specified in section 440.19 . . . Section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (2000), provides: "Payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing . . .

BORNEISEN, v. HOME DEPOT, 917 So. 2d 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . The JCC recognized that section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes, provides, as an exception to the two-year . . . remedial” and not “palliative” treatment is capable of reviving the limitations period under section 440.19 . . . “Remedial,” as it is used in section 440.19, Florida Statutes, has been defined to include “palliative . . . Blackburn, 519 So.2d 1017, 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (holding that “remedial,” as it is used in Section 440.19 . . .

PATCO TRANSPORT, INC. v. ESTUPINAN,, 917 So. 2d 922 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . The petition for benefits was filed outside the statutory limitations period, see § 440.19(1), Florida . . . See § 440.19(4), Fla. . . .

CITY OF FORT LAUDERDALE v. ST. LOUIS,, 917 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . See § 440.19, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994). . . . See § 440.19(4), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994); Fontanills v. . . .

A. RIVERA, v. MIAMI- DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 916 So. 2d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . carrier fails or refuses to pay a claim filed with the division which meets the require-merits of s. 440.19 . . .

FONTANILLS, v. HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,, 913 So. 2d 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . determining that his petition for continuing medical benefits was barred by the limitation period in section 440.19 . . . informational brochure of the one-year limitation period, which, he argues, is required by sections 440.19 . . . court’s opinion in Hanssen was incorrect because Hans-sen had dealt with a prior version of section 440.19 . . . Section 440.19(4), as construed by this court in Crutcher and Coleman, places the burden on the claimant . . . Subsection (4) amended section 440.19 by adding the language estopping an E/C from raising the statute . . .

McBRIDE, v. PRATT WHITNEY USA,, 909 So. 2d 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . this appeal turns on our interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations, found in section 440.19 . . . To the extent pertinent, section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), reads: (1)Except to the extent . . . Similarly, section 440.19(3) merely states that a petition must be filed in compliance with the specificity . . . dismissal in which to file an amended claim regardless of any other limitation in this chapter.” § 440.19 . . . In short, there is nothing to suggest that section 440.19(3) was intended to alter the well-established . . .

CITY OF PEMBROKE PINES, v. VILLASENOR, 894 So. 2d 991 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . This, rather than the two years mentioned in section 440.19, Florida Statutes, is the correct limitations . . . period because the wording of section 440.19(1) indicates that 'it applies to “employee petitions for . . . Accordingly, the Skip’s Shoes opinion discusses in detail the statute of limitations in section 440.19 . . .

DEERE, v. SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, 880 So. 2d 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Appellant’s petition was untimely under ' section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2002), because her claim . . . However, section 440.19(4) provides that an E/C may be estopped from raising a statute of limitations . . . See § 440.19(4); Crutcher v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, 834 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). . . .

JEFFREY S STEEL AIG v. CONIBEAR EQUIPMENT, INC., 854 So. 2d 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . See § 440.19(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). . . . See § 440.19(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). . . . However, “Notwithstanding the provisions of section [440.19], the failure to file a[PFB] within the periods . . . carrier advances the defense of a statute of limitations in its initial response to the [PFB]....” § 440.19 . . .

BENTON, v. ICR ELECTRIC ITT, 852 So. 2d 295 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Pursuant to section 440.19(5), Florida Statutes (1997), the two-year limitations period is tolled while . . .

C. HARTZOG, Jr. v. NEW YORK YANKEES TIG, 847 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . defined by the relevant workers’ compensation statute in effect at the time he was injured, section 440.19 . . . Compensation Claims erred in denying appellant’s claim based on the statute of limitations, section 440.19 . . . See § 440.19(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). . . .

CRUTCHER, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, 834 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Hanssen, 727 So.2d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), as that case addressed a previous version of section 440.19 . . . However, I do not agree that section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (1995), requires that the claimant must . . . This case revolves around the statutory construction of section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1995). . . . Section 440.19, prior to 1989, contained no express provision regarding the tolling of the statute of . . . Section 440.19(4) is not a codification of the pre-1989 judicial estoppel/tolling principle. . . . Section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), states: Notwithstanding the provisions of this section . . . evidence, sole reliance on Hanssen was incorrect because that case dealt with a prior'version of section 440.19 . . . Coleman, 743 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), this court addressed the post-1994 version of section 440.19 . . . However, because of the 1994 amendment to section 440.19, this court remanded in Coleman for the JCC . . .

SODPOLIS, INC. v. BANEGAS,, 799 So. 2d 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . treatment sought on the basis that the two-year statute of limitations had run pursuant to section 440.19 . . .

ELLIS, v. GALLOWAY S INC. n k a FCCI, 794 So. 2d 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 440.19(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994) (stating the one-year SOL); § 440.19(l)(a), Fla. . . . See § 440.19(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

TAMPA BAY PERFORMING ARTS CENTER CNA v. L. CAMPBELL,, 789 So. 2d 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . remanded for a new hearing to determine the application of the statute of limitations pursuant to section 440.19 . . .

DENESTAN, v. MIAMI- DADE COUNTY,, 789 So. 2d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 440.19(4), Fla. . . .

LARRY K. MEYER, P. A. v. M. KIMBERLY,, 765 So. 2d 951 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . And finally, the references to 440.055 in sections 440.185 and 440.19 strongly suggest that the notice . . . Although it is possible that the 440.185 and 440.19 references to 440.055 reflect a legislative error . . . , this seems unlikely in light of the fact that the relevant 440.185 and 440.19 language was inserted . . .

PARRY, v. SOUTH MIAMI HOSPITAL, 778 So. 2d 997 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . As a result, the claim was not barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in section 440.19 . . .

CLAIMS MANAGEMENT, INC. v. PHILIP,, 746 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . claim of appellee George Philip (claimant) was not barred by the statute of limitations under section 440.19 . . . This decision construed section 440.19, but the E/C in Best was urging the court to shorten the basic . . . (2) has no practical effect until after the two-year period provided for in section 440.19(1) expires . . . As long as the petition is timely under either section 440.19(1) or section 440.19(2), the statute of . . . While the Best decision is not dispositive of the instant case, our construction of section 440.19(2) . . .

TALLAHASSEE MEMORIAL HEALTHCARE, INC. f k a v. COLEMAN,, 743 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . .” § 440.19(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). After the hearing, however, the decision in Gaines v. . . . his compensation order, the judge of compensation claims noted: “In Gaines, the Court found that § 440.19 . . .

ARBOLEDA, v. PREMIER BEVERAGE CO., 739 So. 2d 655 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . claimant appeals a workers’ compensation order by which his claim was denied as untimely under section 440.19 . . . by a petition filed within two years of payment for the unauthorized care, was timely under section 440.19 . . .

CITY OF HOLLYWOOD v. LOMBARDI,, 738 So. 2d 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . payment of compensation benefits diminish the period for filing a claim for benefits as provided in s. 440.19 . . .

ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD v. BEST,, 728 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . .” § 440.19(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). . . . Complying with section 440.19(4), Florida Statutes (1995), the Board and United raised the statute in . . . They contend that section 440.19(2), Florida Statutes (1995), limited the period in which Ms. . . . Section 440.19(2) has no practical effect until after the two-year period provided for in section 440.19 . . . As long as the petition is timely under either section 440.19(1) or section 440.19(2), the statute of . . .

SOLAR PANE INSULATING GLASS, INC. v. J. HANSSEN,, 727 So. 2d 961 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (1985), the statute of limitations in effect at the time of the injury . . . Subsection 440.19(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1971) requires a worker’s compensation claim to be filed within . . . this case would in no way further the legislative objective behind the statute,” id., here section 440.19 . . .

KENNEDY, v. ORLANDO SHADER REALTY, 711 So. 2d 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . employer/earrier argued that the claim failed to comply with the specificity requirements of section 440.19 . . .

GAINES, v. ORANGE COUNTY PUBLIC UTILITIES, 710 So. 2d 139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . denied and dismissed his petition for benefits on the grounds that his claim was barred by section 440.19 . . . Section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), provides that all rights for remedial attention shall . . . Although, prior to this 1989 amendment, section 440.19(l)(b) contained no express provision tolling the . . . Effective January 1, 1994, section 440.19(l)(b) was further amended to remove the preclusion on tolling . . . The court rejected the employer’s assertion that the 1989 amendment to section 440.19 should be applied . . . for benefits is barred by the statute of limitations in effect at the time of Claimant’s accident, § 440.19 . . . The amended statute, Section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), provides: (1) Except to the extent . . . after the date of the last remedial treatment or rehabilitative services furnished by the employer. § 440.19 . . .

WEAVER, v. SOUTHERN BELL, 703 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . found that this workers’ compensation claim was barred by the statute of limitations found at sections 440.19 . . .

GULFSTREAM PRESS, INC. v. ACLE,, 697 So. 2d 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . We find the claim barred by section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1987), and reverse. . . . Judge of Compensation Claims found “fully credible,” testified that he was never informed of section 440.19 . . .

HOPPE, v. CITY OF LAKELAND, 691 So. 2d 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . to asbestos, and possible injury therefrom, in 1989, well over the two year limit imposed by Section 440.19 . . . Section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes (1995), bars all petitions not “filed within 2 years after the date . . .

FLORIDA HOSPITAL v. P. WILLIAMS,, 689 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . based on the “reasonable person” exception to the two-year statute of limitations found in section 440.19 . . . care furnished by the employer, the right to further compensation is barred by the terms of section 440.19 . . . Berkeley Florist Supply, 574 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), which state that the section 440.19 limitations . . . We first note that the statute of limitations contained in section 440.19 contains no reasonableness . . .

NORTH RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY, c o M. F. v. WUELLING,, 683 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . section 440.192(8) “act to revive a claim previously barred by the statute of limitations under F.S. 440.19 . . .

MAYS, v. PACKERS, 677 So. 2d 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . medical benefits claim contained an incorrect date of injury, contrary to the provisions of section 440.19 . . . In creating the “equivalent information” language in section 440.19, we consider that the legislature . . . In its interpretation of section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1957), which contained a provision similar . . . If we were to accept the JCC’s rigid interpretation of section 440.19(l)(d) as requiring the explicit . . . Although we have referred in this opinion to the 1989 version of section 440.19, which was in effect . . .

DAYTONA BEACH GERIATRIC CENTER v. R. LINEHAN,, 673 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . carrier fails or refuses to pay a claim filed with the division which meets the requirements of s. 440.19 . . . Section 440.19(l)(e), Florida Statutes (1991), provides, in part, that a “claim may contain a claim for . . . Section 440.19(l)(e) also provides that “[notwithstanding the provisions of s. 440.34, a judge of compensation . . . We conclude that an award of attorney’s fees in this situation does not comply with sections 440.19(l . . .

REGENCY KAWASAKI SEA DOO, INC. FESA, v. H. SHEPPARD,, 674 So. 2d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . . § 440.19(l)(e)(7), Fla.Stat. (1993). In reaching his decision, the JCC relied on Litvin v. St. . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF WORKERS COMPENSATION PROCEDURE, 674 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1996)

. . . Workers’ Compensation — Rules-of-Procedure, or any other-rules-except those of the division-,- — Section 440.19 . . .

GILBERT, A. v. PINELLAS SUNCOAST TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 674 So. 2d 818 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . benefits on the basis that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in section 440.19 . . . Section 440.19(8), Florida Statutes (1985), provides in part: If a person who is entitled to compensation . . .

SOUTHERN BELL v., 671 So. 2d 207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . physician for an undisputed compensable condition, the medical services are “furnished” under section 440.19 . . .

FLORIDA BIRTH- RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, v. McKAUGHAN a HUMANA OF FLORIDA, INC. d b a s L. M. D. v. McKAUGHAN a SOLOMON, M. D. v. McKAUGHAN a, 668 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1996)

. . . . § 440.19(4), Fla.Stat. (1993). . . .

CONTINENTAL CAN COMPANY v. BAILEY,, 668 So. 2d 695 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . We conclude that the claim should have been denied because it was untimely under section 440.19(l)(b) . . . The employer/carrier interposed a statute of limitations defense under section 440.19(l)(b), asserting . . . As it pertains in the circumstances of this case, section 440.19(l)(b) bars medical claims unless filed . . . thus not furnished by the employer, and the claim should have been denied as untimely under section 440.19 . . .

R. SANCHEZ, v. ACAPULCO PLASTERS STUCCO, 668 So. 2d 298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . The statute of limitations in effect on the date of the accident, section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1991 . . . The judge of compensation claims (JCC) observed that the legislature changed section 440.19 effective . . . However, the JCC determined that since the legislature removed the word “claim” from section 440.19 and . . . The statute governing this workers’ compensation case is section 440.19, Florida Statutes (1991), which . . . Madison, 658 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), that the claim for benefits required under section 440.19 . . .

HOUSTON- MILLER, v. U. S. FIRE INSURANCE, 668 So. 2d 653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . that her petition for benefits was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 440.19 . . . that the payment of an attorney’s fee to her attorney within the two-year period set forth in section 440.19 . . . s fee to the claimant’s attorney is not the “payment of compensation” within the meaning of section 440.19 . . . Section 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), provides in part: All rights for remedial attention under . . . of an attorney s fee to the claimant’s attorney is not the “payment of compensation” under section 440.19 . . .

ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL v. H. CAUSEY,, 667 So. 2d 464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . Employer and Carrier defended on a number of grounds urging that the statute of limitations under section 440.19 . . . Causey was not required to proceed by way of modification, and the limitations provision of section 440.19 . . .

COLONIAL OAKS APARTMENT v. M. HOOD,, 680 So. 2d 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . penetrating keratoplasty or corneal graft constituted a “prosthetic device” for the purposes of section 440.19 . . . rejecting the statute of limitations defense on the basis of the prosthetic device exception in section 440.19 . . . appeal is whether a corneal transplant or graft is a “prosthetic device” for the purposes of section 440.19 . . . The supreme court subsequently adopted that definition and added that, for purposes of section 440.19 . . .

WRIGHT, v. INDUSTRIAL AUTOMOTIVE F. A. W. A., 662 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . The pre-1994 amendment “Claim for Benefits” under section 440.19, Florida Statutes and the post-1994 . . .

RALSTON, v. CIRCLE K, 659 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . carrier fails or refuses to pay a claim filed with the division which meets the requirements of s. 440.19 . . .

UNITED WAY OF AMERICA St. v. MERLO,, 659 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . compensation claims (JCC) that appellee’s claim was not barred by the two-year statute of limitations, section 440.19 . . .

BAPTIST MANOR NURSING HOME v. MADISON,, 658 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . claimant as PTD within 21 days of service of a claim which met the specificity requirements of section 440.19 . . . 21 days of service of a claim, which claim the JCC held met the specificity requirements of section 440.19 . . . the docketing judge treated as a petition which, in fact, met the specificity requirements of section 440.19 . . . carrier fails or refuses to pay a claim filed with the division which meets the requirements of s. 440.19 . . . same time, the claimant filed a claim for benefits which met the specificity requirements of section 440.19 . . .

HOLDER, v. WALDROP, a a a a Co. a, 654 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . section 440.02, the Definitions section of the statute, that term is adequately defined in section 440.19 . . . It is undisputed that Holder never filed a § 440.19(1) claim invoking jurisdiction of the Division of . . .

ESCAMBIA COUNTY TRANSIT v. STALLWORTH,, 652 So. 2d 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . In finding that claimant’s claim was not time-barred, the JCC noted that, under section 440.19(3), Florida . . . Unlike the limitations period for filing a claim provided in section 440.19, Florida Statutes, the limitations . . .

STALLINGS, v. F. M. C. CORPORATION, 651 So. 2d 724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . Section 440.19(l)(d) bars the right to compensation for death benefits “unless a claim therefor ... is . . .

BORGES, v. OSCEOLA FARMS COMPANY, 651 So. 2d 173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . Moreover, we note the E/C fulfilled its duty under section 440.19(l)(f)7, Florida Statutes (Supp.1990 . . .

A. RABON, v. HARDAWAY CONSTRUCTION, 651 So. 2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . statute of limitations in effect in 1974 applied to bar the claim, because the 1979 amendment to section 440.19 . . .

D. STRAW, v. STEVE MOORE CHEVROLET, 651 So. 2d 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . that, since his claim for wage loss benefits failed to meet the specificity requirements of section 440.19 . . . Statutes (1991), the mandatory bar on the award of attorney’s fees for non-specific claims under section 440.19 . . . In her order, the JCC has misconstrued and misapplied the statutory provisions of section 440.19(l)(e . . . (l)(e)2 or the requirement of section 440.19(l)(e)l.h that the claim explain the basis for the request . . . This case involves the construction of section 440.19, as it existed at the time of the December 1991 . . .

BRUNSWICK CORPORATION GAB v. CUMMINGS,, 648 So. 2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . Section 440.19(l)(a) & (b) bar disability compensation and remedial attention claims filed more than . . .

NELSON, v. HENKELS McCOY, INC. Co., 641 So. 2d 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . compensation claims finding that his claim for medical care and treatment was time barred by section 440.19 . . .

JUAREZ, v. BURGER KING, 638 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . See § 440.19(l)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985). . . . We formerly noted that section 440.19’s two-year limitations period “does not commence until a reasonable . . .

BRAVO, v. GULF WESTERN FOOD PRODUCTS, n k a, 637 So. 2d 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . , answering a question certified by this court, held that under the unique facts presented, section 440.19 . . . Nevertheless, the JCC concluded, the claim was governed by section 440.19(l)(a), and was thus timely . . . Holder, we conclude that claimant is entitled to maintain his claim filed August 15, 1989, under section 440.19 . . .

GOLD COAST MEDICAL GROUP v. J. FASANO,, 634 So. 2d 325 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . The JCC awarded penalties on grounds that appellant’s notice to controvert was untimely under section 440.19 . . .

PEO, v. MAAS BROTHERS, 634 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device” as con- ■ templated in section 440.19 . . . The following statutory exception is included in section' 440.19(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1983): However . . .

E. SMITH, v. DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATION, 634 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . claims (JCC) denying her claim for benefits as time-barred under the statute of limitations, section 440.19 . . . Accordingly, the order denying benefits pursuant to section 440.19(1), Florida Statutes, is AFFIRMED. . . .

KRAFT DAIRY GROUP v. R. SORGE,, 634 So. 2d 720 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . . § 440.19(l)(e)l.i., Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH v. BURBAUM,, 632 So. 2d 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . However, since no compensation benefits were awarded, it appears tó be pursuant to section 440.19(l)( . . . Technically, the E/SA failed to comply with section 440.19 because the notice to controvert was not filed . . .