Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 440.19 (2025)

Time bars to filing petitions for benefits.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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440.19 Time bars to filing petitions for benefits.—

(1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee’s estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death pursuant to s. 440.185(1) and the petition is filed within 2 years after the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment.

(2) Payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of remedial treatment, care, or attendance pursuant to either a notice of injury or a petition for benefits shall toll the limitations period set forth above for 1 year from the date of such payment. This tolling period does not apply to the issues of compensability, date of maximum medical improvement, or permanent impairment.

(3) The filing of a petition for benefits does not toll the limitations period set forth in this section unless the petition meets the specificity requirements set forth in s. 440.192.

(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the failure to file a petition for benefits within the periods prescribed is not a bar to the employee’s claim unless the carrier advances the defense of a statute of limitations in its initial response to the petition for benefits. If a claimant contends that an employer or its carrier is estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense and the carrier demonstrates that it has provided notice to the employee in accordance with s. 440.185 and that the employer has posted notice in accordance with s. 440.055, the employee must demonstrate estoppel by clear and convincing evidence.

(5) If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the limitations period is tolled while that person has no guardian or other authorized representative, but the period shall begin to run from the date of appointment of such guardian or other representative, or in the case of a minor, if no guardian is appointed before the minor becomes of age, from the date the minor becomes of age.

(6) When recovery is denied to any person in a suit brought at law or in admiralty to recover damages for injury or death on the ground that such person was an employee, that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of this chapter, and that such employer had secured compensation of such employee under this chapter, the limitations period set forth in this section shall begin to run from the date of termination of such suit; however, in such an event, the employer is allowed a credit of his or her actual cost of defending such suit in an amount not to exceed $250, which amount must be deducted from any compensation allowed or awarded to the employee under this chapter.

History.—s. 19, ch. 17481, 1935; CGL 1936 Supp. 5966(19); s. 1, ch. 23908, 1947; s. 10, ch. 26484, 1951; s. 4, ch. 29778, 1955; s. 1, ch. 57-192; s. 1, ch. 65-120; s. 2, ch. 67-554; ss. 17, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 23, ch. 78-300; ss. 15, 124, ch. 79-40; ss. 11, 21, ch. 79-312; s. 7, ch. 80-236; s. 7, ch. 83-305; ss. 15, 43, ch. 89-289; ss. 23, 56, ch. 90-201; ss. 21, 52, ch. 91-1; s. 23, ch. 93-415; s. 113, ch. 97-103.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 270 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1944–2026 · leading case: Crutcher v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 834 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

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Crutcher v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 834 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). · cites it 31× “1st DCA 1998), as that case addressed a previous version of section 440.19, Florida Statutes. I, therefore, join the majority in reversing the JCC's order.”

McBride v. Pratt & Whitney, 909 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). · cites it 10× “The outcome of this appeal turns on our interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations, found in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994).”

Holder v. Keller Kitchen Cabinets, 610 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1992). · cites it 13× “See § 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). This amendment removed the limitation restricting the exception to the two-year limitation period for filing a claim for compensation to situations where payment of compensation or remedial treatment was voluntarily provided.”

Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Best, 728 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). · cites it 22× “§ 440.19, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] Subsections (5) and (6) provide: (5) If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the limitations period is tolled while that person has no guardian or other authorized representative, but the…”

Keller Kitchen Cabinets v. Holder, 586 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). · cites it 22× “The current order before us resolves the claim on the ground that only the limitations period in Section 440.19 need be applied, which conclusion we now reverse.”

Roe v. City investing/Gen. Dev. Corp., 587 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1991). · cites it 17× “When the legislature amended section 440.19 to eliminate the statute of limitations for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device, I doubt if it intended that the providing of such remedial attention would reopen the claim period for the…”

Gaines v. Orange Cnty. Pub. Utils., 710 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). · cites it 17× “1994), provides: (1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee's estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death…”

Punsky v. Clay Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 60 So. 3d 1088 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). · cites it 5× “In his first point on appeal, claimant contends that section 440.19(6) permits an award of either zero costs or, at most, 0 in costs against a claimant in a case where compensability is denied because there is no fund of money from which to deduct the 0.”

Palmer v. McKesson Corp., 7 So. 3d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). · cites it 12× “Although it can be inferred from our prior decisions that we have concluded (without expressly saying so) that a workers’ compensation claimant carries the burden of proving the applicability of the tolling exception contained in section 440.”

City of Orlando v. Blackburn, 519 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). · cites it 8× “We decline to interpret the word "remedial" as used in section 440.19 in such a narrow manner to mean strictly curative care to the exclusion of treatment which is not curative but which nevertheless mitigates the conditions or effects of the injury.”

Gore v. Lee Cnty. Sch. Bd., 43 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). · cites it 14× “The JCC reasoned that the Legislature made a substantive change to the law when it amended section 440.19, Florida Statutes, regarding the application of the statute of limitations to prosthetic devices, and therefore intended a specific alteration of the law.”

Airey v. Wal-mart/sedgwick, 24 So. 3d 1264 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). · cites it 5× “In this workers’ compensation case, claimant seeks review of a final order dismissing his petition for benefits filed on February 15, 2007, as time-barred pursuant to section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2003). Because we conclude that the judge of compensation claims erred as a…”

Show all 270 citing cases →

— 440.19(1) — 74 cases

Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1952).

AB Taff & Sons v. Clark, 110 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959).

Palmer v. McKesson Corp., 7 So. 3d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “Although it can be inferred from our prior decisions that we have concluded (without expressly saying so) that a workers’ compensation claimant carries the burden of proving the applicability of the tolling exception contained in section 440.”

Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. Best, 728 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). “§ 440.19, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] Subsections (5) and (6) provide: (5) If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the limitations period is tolled while that person has no guardian or other authorized representative, but the…”

— 440.19(1)(a) — 34 cases

Holder v. Keller Kitchen Cabinets, 610 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 1992). “See § 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). This amendment removed the limitation restricting the exception to the two-year limitation period for filing a claim for compensation to situations where payment of compensation or remedial treatment was voluntarily provided.”

Roe v. City investing/Gen. Dev. Corp., 587 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 1991). “When the legislature amended section 440.19 to eliminate the statute of limitations for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device, I doubt if it intended that the providing of such remedial attention would reopen the claim period for the…”

Timmeny v. Tropical Botanicals Corp., 615 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

Univ. of Florida v. McLarthy, 483 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Bassett's Dairy v. Thomas, 429 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

— 440.19(1)(b) — 12 cases

Gaines v. Orange Cnty. Pub. Utils., 710 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). “1994), provides: (1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee's estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death…”

Universal Rivet, Inc. v. Cash, 598 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

McNeilly v. Farm Stores, Inc., 553 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

Cash v. Universal Rivet, Inc., 616 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1993).

— 440.19(1)(c) — 2 cases

United States Steel Corp. v. Green, 353 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1977).

Krajenta v. Div., Wkrs'Comp., 376 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

— 440.19(1)(d) — 5 cases

Nieves v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 583 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

Gulledge v. Dion Oil Co., 605 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

City of Hollywood v. Pisseri, 504 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).

Gunter v. Sauer, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

Iafornaro v. Charter Builders, 557 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

— 440.19(1)(e) — 6 cases

Baptist Manor Nursing Home v. Madison, 658 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

McBride v. Pratt & Whitney, 909 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “The outcome of this appeal turns on our interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations, found in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994).”

Daytona Beach Geriatric Ctr. v. Linehan, 673 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Gunter v. Sauer, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

City of West Palm Beach v. Burbaum, 632 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

— 440.19(1)(f) — 1 case

Borges v. Osceola Farms Co., 651 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

— 440.19(2) — 37 cases

City of Orlando v. Blackburn, 519 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). “We decline to interpret the word "remedial" as used in section 440.19 in such a narrow manner to mean strictly curative care to the exclusion of treatment which is not curative but which nevertheless mitigates the conditions or effects of the injury.”

Wood v. McTyre Trucking Co., Inc., 526 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Gore v. Lee Cnty. Sch. Bd., 43 So. 3d 846 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “The JCC reasoned that the Legislature made a substantive change to the law when it amended section 440.19, Florida Statutes, regarding the application of the statute of limitations to prosthetic devices, and therefore intended a specific alteration of the law.”

— 440.19(2)(a) — 17 cases

Keller Kitchen Cabinets v. Holder, 586 So. 2d 1132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). “The current order before us resolves the claim on the ground that only the limitations period in Section 440.19 need be applied, which conclusion we now reverse.”

North River Ins. Co. v. Wuelling, 683 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Garza v. Jordan Farms, 532 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

— 440.19(2)(b) — 19 cases

Tower Chem. Co. v. Hubbard, 527 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Foster Wheeler Energy Grp. v. Fairhurst, 405 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

Herb's Exxon v. Whatmough, 487 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 438 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

Wood v. McTyre Trucking Co., Inc., 526 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

— 440.19(2)(d) — 14 cases

Ardmore Farms v. Smith, 423 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

Jones v. K & L Contractors, 392 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

Albertson's Southco v. Williams, 402 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

Gunn's Quality Glass & Mirrors, Inc. v. Strode, 425 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

Austin Co. v. Lindenberger, 410 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

— 440.19(3) — 13 cases

Airey v. Wal-mart/sedgwick, 24 So. 3d 1264 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “In this workers’ compensation case, claimant seeks review of a final order dismissing his petition for benefits filed on February 15, 2007, as time-barred pursuant to section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2003). Because we conclude that the judge of compensation claims erred as a…”

Allen v. City of St. Augustine, 500 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

Diamond R. Fertilizer v. Davis, 567 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

Aris v. Big Ten Taxi Corp., 330 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1976).

— 440.19(4) — 28 cases

Crutcher v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 834 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). “1st DCA 1998), as that case addressed a previous version of section 440.19, Florida Statutes. I, therefore, join the majority in reversing the JCC's order.”

Gauthier v. Florida Int'l Univ., 38 So. 3d 221 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Jackson v. Comput. Sci. Raytheon, 36 So. 3d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Patco Transp., Inc. v. Estupinan, 917 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

Certain v. Big Johnson Concrete Pumping, Inc., 34 So. 3d 149 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

— 440.19(5) — 2 cases

Benton v. ICR Elec., 852 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

Estes v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist., Davies Claims North Am., Inc. (Fla. 1st DCA 2026).

— 440.19(6) — 1 case

Punsky v. Clay Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 60 So. 3d 1088 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “In his first point on appeal, claimant contends that section 440.19(6) permits an award of either zero costs or, at most, 0 in costs against a claimant in a case where compensability is denied because there is no fund of money from which to deduct the 0.”

— 440.19(8) — 1 case

Gilbert v. Pinellas Suncoast Transit Auth., 674 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

— 440.19(I) — 1 case

Aris v. Big Ten Taxi Corp., 330 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1976).

— 440.19(b) — 2 cases

Morris Canning Corp. v. Blanchard, 528 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Collins v. Town of Palm Beach, 272 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1973).

— 440.19(d) — 1 case

— 440.19(l) — 2 cases

Medpartners/Diagnostic Clinic Med. Grp., P.A. v. Zenith Ins. Co., 23 So. 3d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

Shannon v. Cheney Bros. Inc., 98 So. 3d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

— 440.19(l)(a) — 19 cases

Ocean Reef Club, Inc. v. Wilczewski, 99 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).

Bell v. Com. Carriers, 603 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

Medpartners/Diagnostic Clinic Med. Grp., P.A. v. Zenith Ins. Co., 23 So. 3d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

Daniel v. Holmes Lumber Co., 471 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

Brunswick Corp. v. Cummings, 648 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

— 440.19(l)(b) — 12 cases

Houston-Miller v. U.S. Fire Ins., 668 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Ricardo Sanchez v. Am. Airlines & Sedgwick CMS, 169 So. 3d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).

Iuen v. Live Wire Elec. Co., 538 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

Colonial Oaks Apt. v. Hood, 680 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Garza v. Jordan Farms, 532 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

— 440.19(l)(c) — 5 cases

Krajenta v. Div. of Workers' Comp., Dep't of Labor & Emp. Sec., 376 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).

Bay Plumbing Co. v. Harbin, 337 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 1976).

Hartzog v. New York Yankees, 847 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

Cecil W. Perry, Inc. v. Lopez, 425 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

Canestrelli v. Torneos Medievales, 579 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

— 440.19(l)(d) — 5 cases

Gilman v. South Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 584 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

Garza v. Jordan Farms, 532 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

Grieco v. Lehigh Corp., 549 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).

Mays v. Packers, 677 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Stallings v. F.M.C. Corp., 651 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

— 440.19(l)(e) — 5 cases

Straw v. Steve Moore Chevrolet, 651 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

Parkway Gen. Hosp. v. Ogletree, 629 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

Kennedy v. Orlando Shader Realty, 711 So. 2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

Gold Coast Med. Grp. v. Fasano, 634 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

Holder v. Waldrop, 654 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

— 440.19(l)(e)(7) — 1 case

Regency Kawasaki & Sea Doo, Inc. v. Sheppard, 674 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

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