440.19
Time bars to filing petitions for benefits.
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440.19 Time bars to filing petitions for benefits.—
(1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee’s estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death pursuant to s. 440.185(1) and the petition is filed within 2 years after the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and scope of employment.
(2) Payment of any indemnity benefit or the furnishing of remedial treatment, care, or attendance pursuant to either a notice of injury or a petition for benefits shall toll the limitations period set forth above for 1 year from the date of such payment. This tolling period does not apply to the issues of compensability, date of maximum medical improvement, or permanent impairment.
(3) The filing of a petition for benefits does not toll the limitations period set forth in this section unless the petition meets the specificity requirements set forth in s. 440.192.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the failure to file a petition for benefits within the periods prescribed is not a bar to the employee’s claim unless the carrier advances the defense of a statute of limitations in its initial response to the petition for benefits. If a claimant contends that an employer or its carrier is estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense and the carrier demonstrates that it has provided notice to the employee in accordance with s. 440.185 and that the employer has posted notice in accordance with s. 440.055, the employee must demonstrate estoppel by clear and convincing evidence.
(5) If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the limitations period is tolled while that person has no guardian or other authorized representative, but the period shall begin to run from the date of appointment of such guardian or other representative, or in the case of a minor, if no guardian is appointed before the minor becomes of age, from the date the minor becomes of age.
(6) When recovery is denied to any person in a suit brought at law or in admiralty to recover damages for injury or death on the ground that such person was an employee, that the defendant was an employer within the meaning of this chapter, and that such employer had secured compensation of such employee under this chapter, the limitations period set forth in this section shall begin to run from the date of termination of such suit; however, in such an event, the employer is allowed a credit of his or her actual cost of defending such suit in an amount not to exceed $250, which amount must be deducted from any compensation allowed or awarded to the employee under this chapter.
History.—s. 19, ch. 17481, 1935; CGL 1936 Supp. 5966(19); s. 1, ch. 23908, 1947; s. 10, ch. 26484, 1951; s. 4, ch. 29778, 1955; s. 1, ch. 57-192; s. 1, ch. 65-120; s. 2, ch. 67-554; ss. 17, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 23, ch. 78-300; ss. 15, 124, ch. 79-40; ss. 11, 21, ch. 79-312; s. 7, ch. 80-236; s. 7, ch. 83-305; ss. 15, 43, ch. 89-289; ss. 23, 56, ch. 90-201; ss. 21, 52, ch. 91-1; s. 23, ch. 93-415; s. 113, ch. 97-103.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 270
cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1944–2026 · leading case: Crutcher v. School Bd. of Broward County
Crutcher v. School Bd. of Broward County (2002)
“1st DCA 1998), as that case addressed a previous version of section 440.19, Florida Statutes. I, therefore, join the majority in reversing the JCC's order.”
McBride v. Pratt & Whitney (2005)
“The outcome of this appeal turns on our interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations, found in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994).”
Holder v. Keller Kitchen Cabinets (1992)
“See § 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). This amendment removed the limitation restricting the exception to the two-year limitation period for filing a claim for compensation to situations where payment of compensation or remedial treatment was voluntarily provided.”
ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL BD. v. Best (1999)
“§ 440.19, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] Subsections (5) and (6) provide: (5) If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the limitations period is tolled while that person has no guardian or other authorized representative, but the…”
Keller Kitchen Cabinets v. Holder (1991)
“The current order before us resolves the claim on the ground that only the limitations period in Section 440.19 need be applied, which conclusion we now reverse.”
Roe v. CITY INVESTING/GENERAL DEV. CORP. (1991)
“When the legislature amended section 440.19 to eliminate the statute of limitations for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device, I doubt if it intended that the providing of such remedial attention would reopen the claim period for the…”
Gaines v. Orange County Public Utilities (1998)
“1994), provides: (1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee's estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death…”
Punsky v. Clay County Board of County Commissioners (2011)
“In his first point on appeal, claimant contends that section 440.19(6) permits an award of either zero costs or, at most, 0 in costs against a claimant in a case where compensability is denied because there is no fund of money from which to deduct the 0.”
Palmer v. McKesson Corp. (2009)
“Although it can be inferred from our prior decisions that we have concluded (without expressly saying so) that a workers’ compensation claimant carries the burden of proving the applicability of the tolling exception contained in section 440.”
City of Orlando v. Blackburn (1987)
“We decline to interpret the word "remedial" as used in section 440.19 in such a narrow manner to mean strictly curative care to the exclusion of treatment which is not curative but which nevertheless mitigates the conditions or effects of the injury.”
Gore v. Lee County School Board (2010)
“The JCC reasoned that the Legislature made a substantive change to the law when it amended section 440.19, Florida Statutes, regarding the application of the statute of limitations to prosthetic devices, and therefore intended a specific alteration of the law.”
Airey v. WAL-MART/SEDGWICK (2009)
“In this workers’ compensation case, claimant seeks review of a final order dismissing his petition for benefits filed on February 15, 2007, as time-barred pursuant to section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2003). Because we conclude that the judge of compensation claims erred as a…”
— 440.19(1) — 74 cases
Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel (1952)
AB Taff & Sons v. Clark (1959)
Palmer v. McKesson Corp. (2009)
“Although it can be inferred from our prior decisions that we have concluded (without expressly saying so) that a workers’ compensation claimant carries the burden of proving the applicability of the tolling exception contained in section 440.”
ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL BD. v. Best (1999)
“§ 440.19, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] Subsections (5) and (6) provide: (5) If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the limitations period is tolled while that person has no guardian or other authorized representative, but the…”
— 440.19(1)(a) — 34 cases
Holder v. Keller Kitchen Cabinets (1992)
“See § 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). This amendment removed the limitation restricting the exception to the two-year limitation period for filing a claim for compensation to situations where payment of compensation or remedial treatment was voluntarily provided.”
Roe v. CITY INVESTING/GENERAL DEV. CORP. (1991)
“When the legislature amended section 440.19 to eliminate the statute of limitations for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device, I doubt if it intended that the providing of such remedial attention would reopen the claim period for the…”
Bassett's Dairy v. Thomas (1983)
— 440.19(1)(b) — 12 cases
Gaines v. Orange County Public Utilities (1998)
“1994), provides: (1) Except to the extent provided elsewhere in this section, all employee petitions for benefits under this chapter shall be barred unless the employee, or the employee's estate if the employee is deceased, has advised the employer of the injury or death…”
Roe v. CITY INVESTING/GENERAL DEV. CORP. (1991)
“When the legislature amended section 440.19 to eliminate the statute of limitations for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device, I doubt if it intended that the providing of such remedial attention would reopen the claim period for the…”
— 440.19(1)(c) — 2 cases
— 440.19(1)(d) — 5 cases
Gulledge v. Dion Oil Co. (1992)
City of Hollywood v. Pisseri (1986)
Gunter v. Sauer, Inc. (1994)
— 440.19(1)(e) — 6 cases
McBride v. Pratt & Whitney (2005)
“The outcome of this appeal turns on our interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations, found in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994).”
Gunter v. Sauer, Inc. (1994)
— 440.19(1)(f) — 1 case
Borges v. Osceola Farms Co. (1995)
— 440.19(2) — 37 cases
ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL BD. v. Best (1999)
“§ 440.19, Fla. Stat. (1995). [2] Subsections (5) and (6) provide: (5) If a person who is entitled to compensation under this chapter is mentally incompetent or a minor, the limitations period is tolled while that person has no guardian or other authorized representative, but the…”
City of Orlando v. Blackburn (1987)
“We decline to interpret the word "remedial" as used in section 440.19 in such a narrow manner to mean strictly curative care to the exclusion of treatment which is not curative but which nevertheless mitigates the conditions or effects of the injury.”
Palmer v. McKesson Corp. (2009)
“Although it can be inferred from our prior decisions that we have concluded (without expressly saying so) that a workers’ compensation claimant carries the burden of proving the applicability of the tolling exception contained in section 440.”
Gore v. Lee County School Board (2010)
“The JCC reasoned that the Legislature made a substantive change to the law when it amended section 440.19, Florida Statutes, regarding the application of the statute of limitations to prosthetic devices, and therefore intended a specific alteration of the law.”
— 440.19(2)(a) — 17 cases
Holder v. Keller Kitchen Cabinets (1992)
“See § 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). This amendment removed the limitation restricting the exception to the two-year limitation period for filing a claim for compensation to situations where payment of compensation or remedial treatment was voluntarily provided.”
Keller Kitchen Cabinets v. Holder (1991)
“The current order before us resolves the claim on the ground that only the limitations period in Section 440.19 need be applied, which conclusion we now reverse.”
Roe v. CITY INVESTING/GENERAL DEV. CORP. (1991)
“When the legislature amended section 440.19 to eliminate the statute of limitations for remedial attention relating to the insertion or attachment of a prosthetic device, I doubt if it intended that the providing of such remedial attention would reopen the claim period for the…”
Garza v. Jordan Farms (1988)
— 440.19(2)(b) — 19 cases
Herb's Exxon v. Whatmough (1986)
— 440.19(2)(d) — 14 cases
Ardmore Farms v. Smith (1982)
Jones v. K & L Contractors (1981)
Austin Co. v. Lindenberger (1982)
— 440.19(3) — 13 cases
McBride v. Pratt & Whitney (2005)
“The outcome of this appeal turns on our interpretation of the applicable statute of limitations, found in section 440.19, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994).”
Airey v. WAL-MART/SEDGWICK (2009)
“In this workers’ compensation case, claimant seeks review of a final order dismissing his petition for benefits filed on February 15, 2007, as time-barred pursuant to section 440.19, Florida Statutes (2003). Because we conclude that the judge of compensation claims erred as a…”
— 440.19(4) — 28 cases
Crutcher v. School Bd. of Broward County (2002)
“1st DCA 1998), as that case addressed a previous version of section 440.19, Florida Statutes. I, therefore, join the majority in reversing the JCC's order.”
— 440.19(5) — 2 cases
Benton v. ICR Electric (2003)
— 440.19(6) — 1 case
Punsky v. Clay County Board of County Commissioners (2011)
“In his first point on appeal, claimant contends that section 440.19(6) permits an award of either zero costs or, at most, 0 in costs against a claimant in a case where compensability is denied because there is no fund of money from which to deduct the 0.”
— 440.19(8) — 1 case
— 440.19(I) — 1 case
— 440.19(b) — 2 cases
— 440.19(d) — 1 case
Keller Kitchen Cabinets v. Holder (1991)
“The current order before us resolves the claim on the ground that only the limitations period in Section 440.19 need be applied, which conclusion we now reverse.”
— 440.19(l) — 2 cases
Shannon v. Cheney Bros. Inc. (2012)
— 440.19(l)(a) — 19 cases
Bell v. Commercial Carriers (1992)
Daniel v. Holmes Lumber Co. (1985)
Brunswick Corp. v. Cummings (1994)
— 440.19(l)(b) — 12 cases
Garza v. Jordan Farms (1988)
— 440.19(l)(c) — 5 cases
Bay Plumbing Co. v. Harbin (1976)
Hartzog v. New York Yankees (2003)
— 440.19(l)(d) — 5 cases
Garza v. Jordan Farms (1988)
Grieco v. Lehigh Corp. (1989)
Mays v. Packers (1996)
Stallings v. F.M.C. Corp. (1995)
— 440.19(l)(e) — 5 cases
Holder v. Waldrop (1995)
— 440.19(l)(e)(7) — 1 case
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