Quarterman v. State, 401 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). · Go Syfert
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Quarterman v. State, 401 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
7 citation events across 3 distinct courts.
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited "see, e.g." Jones v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
State v. Wynn, 433 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); see also Quarterman v. State, 401 So.2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Ontiveros
N.M. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Odom v. Sheriff, 88 Nev. 315 , 497 P.2d 906 (1972) (actions of police officer who while lying in front seat of car feigning drunkenness as part of setup changed his position so as to expose pocket containing money did not amount to consent to taking) with Quarterman v. State, 401 So.2d 1159 (Fla.App.1981) (reporter did not consent to taking when he parked old car on highway in order to film car during anticipated theft); see generally 50 Am.Jur.2d Larceny § 139 (1970); 52A C.J.S.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Lawrence Edris QUARTERMAN, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
78-1888.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Aug 4, 1981.
401 So. 2d 1159
Barkdull, Schwartz and Baskin.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Gerald D. Hubbart, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Anthony C. Musto, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, SCHWARTZ and BASKIN, JJ.

BASKIN, Judge.

We reject the argument presented by defendant Quarterman in which he asks us to hold that when reporter Clarence Jones parked an old car on Interstate-95 in order to film the car during its anticipated theft he consented to the taking. In Lowe v. State, 44 Fla. 449, 32 So. 956, 957 (1902), the court disposed of a similar contention by stating:

[A] taking by the voluntary consent of the owner, or his authorized servant or agent, even though with a felonious intent, does not constitute larceny. But where the criminal design originates with the accused, and the owner does not, in person or by an agent or servant, suggest the design, nor actively urge the accused on to the commission of the crime, the mere fact that such owner, suspecting that the accused intends to steal his property, in person or through a servant or agent, exposes the property, or neglects to protect it, or furnishes facilities for the execution of the criminal design, under the expectation that the accused will take the property or avail himself of the facilities furnished, will not amount to a consent in[*1160] law, even though the agent or servant of such owner by his instructions appears to cooperate in the execution of the crime. 1 Bish. New Cr. Law, § 262; Alexander v. State, 12 Tex. 540; Dodge v. Brittain, [19 Tenn.] Meigs, 84. See, also, note to Connor v. People (Colo.Sup.) [18 Colo. 373] 33 P. 159, 25 L.R.A. 341, 36 Am.St.Rep. 295.

We agree.

Affirmed.