Moore v. Florida Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 289 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1974). · Go Syfert
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Moore v. Florida Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 289 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1974). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
87 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Progressive Select Insurance Company v. Leslie Bunsee (fladistctapp, 2024-03-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 28 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Progressive Select Insurance Company v. Leslie Bunsee
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 289 So. 2d 719, 720 (Fla. 1974) (noting that an allowable mandamus writ “would not command the respondent’s discretion, but rather would compel the respondent to exercise its discretion”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert E. Banks v. Julie L. Jones, Secretary, etc. (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 289 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla.1974) (holding mandamus ..will not lie to compel grant of parole, which is solely within the discretion of the Parole and Probation Commission, but “[t]he Parole Commission is required, as any other body, to comply with constitutional requirements; it cannot deny parole upon illegal grounds or upon improper considerations.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Spradley v. Parole Commission
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
However, “there is a right to a proper consideration for parole.” Moore v. Fla. Parole & Probation Comm’n, 289 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla.1974), superseded by section 120.52(10), Fla. Stat. (1983), on other grounds as stated in Johnson v. Fla. Parole & Prob.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Comm’n, 289 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla. 1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Florida Parole Com'n
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
The writ itself, if it be granted after respondent has responded to the alternative writ, would not command the respondent's discretion, but rather would compel the respondent to exercise [sic] its discretion as to the granting or denial of parole without consideration of the aforementioned convictions. 289 So.2d at 720 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adams v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
In the parole review context, it is well settled that an inmate incarcerated for a parole eligible offense, has a clear legal right to proper consideration for parole, Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 , 94 S.Ct. 2649 , 41 L.Ed.2d 239 (1974), and that the Commission has a concomitant legal duty to establish an inmate's presumptive parole release date in accordance with objective parole guidelines. § 947.165, Fla. Stat. (1979); Florida Parole and Probation Commission v. Paige, 462 So.2d 817, 819-820 (Fla. 1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Farber v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
It is well settled that “there is no absolute right to parole,” Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla.1974), nor “[is] [t]here ... [any] constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7 , 99 S.Ct. at 2103 , 60 L.Ed.2d at 675 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kirsch v. Greadington (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla. 1974).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
See Ivory v. Wainwright, 393 So.2d 542, 544 (Fla. 1981); Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla. 1974); Gobie v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 416 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Arnett v. State, 397 So.2d 330, 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); and Staton v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir.1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. Wainwright
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
Hardy also observed that, whereas the granting or withholding of parole is discretionary, the Parole Commission cannot deny parole upon illegal grounds or improper consideration, else it is answerable in mandamus, citing the Florida Supreme Court case of Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla. *1098 1974) for this proposition.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gobie v. FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COM'N
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
Ivory v. Wainwright, 393 So.2d 542, 544 (Fla. 1980); Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719, 721 (Fla. 1974); Arnett v. State, 397 So.2d 330, 332 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); and Staton v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir.1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hardy v. Greadington
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla. 1974).
discussed Cited "see" Boykin v. Garrison
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: accord · confidence high
Glosson v. Solomon, 490 So.2d 94 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); accord Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719 (Fla.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 , 94 S.Ct. 2649 , 41 L.Ed.2d 239 (1974); Fazio v. Russell Building Movers, Inc., 469 So.2d 844 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
cited Cited "see" Charles A. Damiano A/K/A Charles A. Damyn v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission and Jim Smith, the Attorney General of the State of Florida
11th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moore, supra. Therefore, we vacate denial of the writ on this ground and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
discussed Cited "see" Jones v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1974). [2] The offense with which appellant was charged occurred on September 3, 1983, whereas guideline sentencing became effective on October 1, 1983.
discussed Cited "see" Zatler v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Chapter 83-78, § 1, Laws of Florida. 1 As to the propriety of mandamus in such cases, in Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719 (Fla.), cert. denied 417 U.S. 935 , 94 S.Ct. 2649 , 41 L.Ed.2d 239 (1974)(which was decided prior to adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes) the supreme court stated that while mandamus does not lie to compel the granting of parole, it does lie to compel the Commission to exercise its discretion without consideration of illegal grounds or other improper bases.
cited Cited "see" Albert E. Paschal v. Louie L. Wainwright, Etc.
11th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moore, 289 So.2d at 720 .
discussed Cited "see" Daizi v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719 (Fla.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 , 94 S.Ct. 2649 , 41 L.Ed.2d 239 (1974); Harrisson v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 428 So.2d 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Pannier v. Wainwright, 423 So.2d 533 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) and Hardy v. Greadington, 405 So.2d 768 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
cited Cited "see" Zygadlo v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719 (Fla.1974).
cited Cited "see" McKahn v. FLORIDA PAROLE & PROBATION
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moore v. Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1974).
cited Cited "see" Berry v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719 (Fla.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 , 94 S.Ct. 2649 , 41 L.Ed.2d 239 (1974); Wright v. State, 342 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
cited Cited "see" Baker v. FLORIDA PAROLE & PROBATION COM'N
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1974).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Angel Barreiro v. Florida Commission on Offender Review
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Sheley v. Fla. Parole & Probation Comm’n, 496 So.2d 854, 855 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (affirming denial of mandamus petition challenging decision not to change PPRD after biennial interview); see also Moore v. Fla. Parole & Probation Comm’n, 289 So.2d 719, 720 (Fla.1974) (“While there is no absolute right to parole, there is a right to a proper consideration for parol[e]....
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Rigabar v. Broome
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 935 , 94 S.Ct. 2649 , 41 L.Ed.2d 239 (1974); Yepes v. Tobin, 531 So.2d 1067 (Fla.3d DCA 1988); Glosson v. Solomon, 490 So.2d 94 (Fla.3d DCA 1986); and Hamilton v. Davis, 427 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), approved, 448 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 1984).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Ruzicka v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Moore v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719 (Fla.1974) and Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 , 88 S.Ct. 258 , 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Wainwright v. Taylor
Fla. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Moore v. Fla. Parole & Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1974).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Pannier v. Wainwright
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Moore v. Fla. Parole & Probation Commission, 289 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1974).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Wallace v. Turner
S.D. Fla. · 1981 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Moore, supra. Inasmuch as the Court has determined that Petitioner has shown resulting prejudice to him, the Court thereupon concludes and determines that Petitioner is entitled to relief upon his claim of due process violation.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Rayfield MOORE, Petitioner,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, Respondent.
44248.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Feb 6, 1974.
289 So. 2d 719
Dekle.
Cited by 67 opinions  |  Published

Rayfield Moore, in pro. per.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Enoch J. Whitney, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

DEKLE, Justice.

By petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner Moore seeks review in this Court of respondent's denial of parole to him alleging that Respondent Commission improperly considered petitioner's prior convictions in determining not to grant him parole, and that such prior convictions are invalid in that they were rendered while petitioner was without assistance of counsel. Treating the petition as one for mandamus, pursuant to Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const., F.S.A., we issued our alternative writ. Respondent has now filed a motion to quash and to deny the petition, asserting that the remedy sought is improper in that the granting or denial of parole is a discretionary matter, hence not within the bounds of application of a writ of mandamus. We deny the motion.

Respondent is correct in its contention that a writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the granting of parole, such being a matter within respondent's discretionary powers under F.S. §§ 947.13 and 947.16(2), F.S.A. Marsh v. Garwood, 65 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1953). This Court cannot command that an officer perform an act unless it is his duty to perform it. State v. Chancey, 129 Fla. 194, 176 So. 78 (1937).

[*720] However, this contention misses the mark. Although perhaps inartfully worded, the intent of our alternative writ was to require respondent to show cause why it should not be compelled to reconsider the eligibility of petitioner for parole without consideration of the aforementioned prior convictions, not to compel the granting of parole. While there is no absolute right to parole, there is a right to a proper consideration for parole. And this should be free from the consequences of a conviction not meeting the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733 (1963); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967). The Parole Commission is required, as any other body, to comply with constitutional requirements; it cannot deny parole upon illegal grounds or upon improper considerations. It is answerable in mandamus if it does.

Petitioner contends that a denial of parole based on his "invalid" convictions in fact causes him to suffer anew from the prior violations of his Sixth Amendment rights, citing the somewhat analogous cases of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), and Mitchell v. Wainwright, 308 F. Supp. 436 (D.C.Fla. 1969). Petitioner is entitled to have the question of his eligibility for parole determined upon evidence which passes constitutional muster.

In short, the alternative writ does not direct itself toward the issue of whether parole should be granted to the petitioner, but to the issue of whether certain matters were and should have been considered by respondent in its denial of parole to the petitioner. The writ itself, if it be granted after respondent has responded to the alternative writ, would not command the respondent's discretion, but rather would compel the respondent to exercise its discretion as to the granting or denial of parole without consideration of the aforementioned convictions.

Accordingly, the motion is denied and respondent is directed to file its response to the alternative writ within 20 days of the filing of this opinion.

It is so ordered.

CARLTON, C.J., and ERVIN, BOYD and McCAIN, JJ., concur.

ROBERTS and ADKINS, JJ., dissent.

Supplemental Opinion

Response to our alternative writ of mandamus has now been filed; it appears therefrom that in determining whether or not to grant parole to petitioner, the respondent did not in fact consider petitioner's prior convictions not meeting the standards set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), as petitioner contended that respondent had done. Rather, in evaluating petitioner for parole, the respondent considered certain independent admissions of petitioner to representatives of respondent and of the Florida Division of Corrections as to prior criminal conduct. Petitioner's conviction for which he is serving his present sentence was considered but there he was represented by counsel and plead guilty.

The writ is accordingly

Discharged.

ADKINS, C.J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN, BOYD, McCAIN and DEKLE, JJ., concur.