Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...Public Defender, Miami, for petitioner. Michael H. Davidson, Gen. Counsel for the Florida Parole and Probation Commission, Tallahassee, for respondent. SUNDBERG, Chief Justice. This suit raises questions concerning a prisoner's eligibility for parole under section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979), when he or she has been incarcerated as a special condition of probation pursuant to sections 948.01(4) and 948.03(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ion Commission informed petitioner that she could not be considered for parole. As a result, petitioner seeks a writ of mandamus from this Court compelling respondent to exercise its statutory duty to determine her eligibility for parole pursuant to section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979). We issued an order to respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Jurisdiction vests in this Court under article V, section 3(b)(5), Florida Constitution (1972). Section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979), states that every person whose sentence or cumulative sentences equal or exceed one year shall be eligible for parole....

...ic or private, by virtue of transfer from the Department of Corrections under any applicable law. Petitioner takes the position that incarceration as a condition of probation is a "sentence" for purposes of eligibility for parole consideration under section 947.16(1)....

...ndition of probation when it was imposed for punitive rather than rehabilitative purposes, and when such a device served to divest the Parole Board of its exclusive authority to parole a prisoner. Petitioner argues that unless the word "sentence" in section 947.16(1) is construed to include incarceration imposed as a condition of probation, it will violate the separation of powers clause of the Florida Constitution [1] by permitting the judiciary rather than the Parole and Probation Commission t...

...mposed before placing the defendant on probation. § 948.06(1), Fla. Stat. (1979). Once a sentence is imposed, a defendant falls within the jurisdiction of the Parole and Probation Commission under the authority granted to the Commission pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ll a sentence of imprisonment where *1111 the express objective is to punish the defendant. Unless otherwise provided by law, a defendant who is sentenced to imprisonment for a term in excess of five years will be eligible for parole after one year. § 947.16(1), Fla....

...State, supra ; Freeman v. State, 329 So.2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). We decline, however, to adopt petitioner's suggestion that we construe a probation condition of incarceration as a sentence for the limited purpose of eligibility for parole under section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...[6] We must determine, then, the point in time at which incarceration ceases to serve a rehabilitative function and is, therefore, invalid as a condition of probation. In Olcott v. State, supra , the district court suggested that a maximum limitation of one year would be appropriate because it would avoid any conflict with section 947.16. We agree. Under section 947.16(1) a prisoner does not become eligible for parole consideration unless he has been sentenced to at least one year in prison....

...is state. Where possible we must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another. State ex rel. School Board v. Department of Education, 317 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1975). Our construction of section 947.16(1) in conjunction with section 948.01(4) achieves these objectives....

...on provided by the particular criminal statute for the offense involved. [4] As to certain serious crimes the trial judge may enter an order at the time of sentencing retaining jurisdiction over the offender for review of a Commission release order. § 947.16(3), Fla....

...Accordingly, this case is AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part and REMANDED. 1 . It is not clear from the record whether appellant has in fact exhausted each of his claims, but it appears that appellee has waived the exhaustion requirement. See Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir.1983). 2 . Section 947.16(3) of the parole statute is an example relied upon by appellant: (3) A person who has become eligible for an initial parole interview and who may, according to the objective parole guidelines of the commission, be granted parole shall...

...Prior to the time the commission adopted AGO 85-11 as its own policy, it had been granting paroles to prisoners who had not begun to serve subsequent consecutive sentences. This practice was specifically authorized by AGO 74-11 which reflected the Attorney General's interpretation of section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1973). Although section 947.16(1) has not changed in any material way since 1974 (though it has been reworded for clarity), other amendments to chapter 947, a shift in the legal definition of parole, the authorization of minimum mandatory sentences, and "the passage of time" were cited as reasons for the shift in interpretation of the law....

...t-degree murder and the jury, if inclined to exercise its "pardon" power, could have returned verdicts of second-degree or third-degree murder. State v. Abreau, 363 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 1978). Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in applying section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1982), by retaining jurisdiction over the first half of the sixty-year sentence on the burglary sentence. Appellant was also sentenced to death for first-degree murder and life imprisonment for robbery with a firearm, all sentences to be concurrent. Section 947.16(3) provides: "When any person is convicted of two or more felonies and concurrent sentences are imposed, then the jurisdiction of the trial court judge as provided herein shall apply to the first half of the maximum sentence imposed fo...

...with a firearm and that the trial judge could not retain jurisdiction over the indeterminant sentences for these convictions. Cordero-Pena v. State, 421 So.2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Thus, appellant argues, the trial court had no jurisdiction under section 947.16(3) to retain jurisdiction for the lowest felony....

...Appellant's argument is ingenuous but circular. We agree that the trial court could not retain jurisdiction of one-half of an indeterminate sentence, but disagree that the trial court erred. The appellant's argument is meritless. The clear intent of section 947.16(3) is to permit the trial court to retain jurisdiction of up to one-half the maximum determinate sentence....

...llegal ex post facto law as applied because the crimes here occurred before the effective date of chapter 82-171. Mills, however, unlike Williams, stood subject to the existing retention of jurisdiction statute at the time the crimes were committed. § 947.16(3), Fla....

...OVERTON, ALDERMAN, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur. NOTES [*] The legislature later reduced the maximum retained jurisdiction period to one-third of the sentence for certain crimes, but provided that ch. 82-171 would still apply to persons convicted during its effective period. § 947.16(3), (5), Fla....

...on the fifth, all to run consecutively, and imposed three year mandatory minimum sentences under section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1983), for those crimes involving a firearm. The trial court additionally retained jurisdiction over parole, under section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), for thirty years of the first sexual battery sentence....

...State, 462 So.2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Finally, Murray contends that the trial court's retention of jurisdiction over parole must be vacated in light of the trial court's failure to "state the justification [therefor] with individual particularity." § 947.16(3)(a), Fla....

...ment whether incarceration is a condition of probation or not. The legislature has repeatedly and consistently distinguished between a sentence of imprisonment and probation. Compare chapter 948, Florida Statutes (1979) (probation) with chapter 947, section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979) (sentence)....

...defendant to fifteen years for escape, five years for rioting, and twenty-five years for each count of kidnapping, with the sentences to run consecutively. The judge retained jurisdiction over the first third of each defendant's sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ngs were incidental to the offense of attempted escape; that the court abused its discretion in limiting cross examination of a state's witness; and that the court erred in retaining jurisdiction over one third of each of their sentences pursuant to section 947.16(3)....

...State, 28 Md. App. 150, 344 A.2d 130 (Ct.Spec.App. 1973). Appellants' fifth point on appeal is that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the first third of each of their sentences. They argue that attempted escape and rioting do not come under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), and that the judge failed to justify his retention of jurisdiction with individual particularity as required by subsection 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). We disagree with the first argument but agree with the second. Section 947.16(3) authorizes a judge to retain jurisdiction over the first third of a defendant's sentence for certain enumerated crimes including "any felony involving ......

...As for the second argument, the trial judge did not make any findings justifying his retention of jurisdiction. Therefore we vacate that portion of the judgment and sentence and remand these cases so that he may make such findings part of the record as required by section 947.16(3)(a)....

...on his two life sentences “within 5 years after the initial date of confinement in execution of the judgment,” and would be eligible for parole on his remaining fifteen-year sentence “within 24 months” of that same date. See Fla. Stat. § 947.16(1)(c)-(d) (1983)....

...Had the resentencing jury fixed Bates’ sentence for first-degree murder at life, it appears that he would have been eligible for parole on all of his convictions within 37 years of his initial 1983 confinement or 25 years after his 1995 resentencing proceeding. See id. § 947.16(2)(g) (“For purposes of determining eligibility for parole interview and release, ....

...Frost, Jr., Public Defender and Charles M. Johnston, Asst. Public Defender, Jacksonville, for petitioner. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Carolyn M. Snurkowski and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Attys. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent. ADKINS, Justice. This case tests the constitutionality of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978). [1] It also asks us to decide whether trial counsel properly raised and preserved his objections for appeal. Williams pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, and the trial judge sentenced him to prison for ninety-nine years. Pursuant to section 947.16(3), the judge retained jurisdiction to review any parole release order issued during the first thirty-three years of petitioner's confinement....

...Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the statute at the sentencing hearing, but the First District Court of Appeal refused to consider the issue, ruling that the absence of a specific objection precluded its review. Williams v. State, 378 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Petitioner first maintains that section 947.16(3) is an ex post facto law as *511 applied to him....

...of the law when the crime was committed prior to the statute's effective date. Under this authority, we agree with petitioner's contention. Petitioner's procedural question focuses on whether his counsel preserved his objections to the invocation of section 947.16(3) by properly presenting them to the trial judge....

...plicability in this instance. I think moreover there is a question as to whether or not that statute was in effect at such time that it can be applied in this case. (T. 33 emphasis supplied). The court, in response, announced its intention to invoke section 947.16(3) while recognizing counsel's objections. The Court will invoke the provisions of Chapter 783.18, Laws of Florida, which has been codified in the Florida Statutes as Section 947.16 as amended, Subsection 2, subject to, of course, or with the understanding that counsel for the defendant has already interposed an objection to such invocation of that provision....

...en. Trial counsel did not specifically cite to the prohibition against ex post facto laws *512 as the basis for his legal argument. But magic words are not needed to make a proper objection. His articulated concern with whether the effective date of section 947.16(3) permitted the statute's application to petitioner's case was sufficiently specific to inform the trial judge of the alleged error....

...Accordingly, we quash the opinion of the district court and remand the cause with instructions to quash the "Order Retaining Jurisdiction Pursuant To Chapter 78-318, Laws of Florida" entered by the trial court. SUNDBERG, C.J., and BOYD, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 947.16(3) reads: "[p]ersons who have become eligible for parole and who may, according to the objective parole guidelines of the commission, be granted parole shall be placed on parole in accordance with the provisions of this law; except tha...

...one who has already decided to commit rape or robbery. NOTES [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. [2] § 787.01(1)(a)2, Fla. Stat. (1979) (kidnapping); § 794.011, Fla. Stat. (1979) (sexual battery); § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979) (burglary). [3] § 947.16, Fla....

...The Parole Act required the Commission to adopt parole “guidelines,” creating presumptive parole release dates based on the “seriousness of the offense” committed and “the likelihood of a favorable parole outcome,” and to consider these guidelines in making release decisions. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 947.165 (1983 Supp.)....

...“objective guidelines” to channel its decision making. These guidelines must be “developed according to an acceptable research method and ... based on the seriousness of offense and the likelihood of favorable parole outcome.” Fla.Stat.Ann. § 947.165(1) (1983 Supp.). They must also be revised yearly to take into account the latest statistical data regarding prior parole decision results. Id. at 947.165(2)....

...They did not substantively alter petitioner’s parole eligibility or confine the Commission’s discretion to release him; they merely clarified the exercise of administrative discretion. Accord, May v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 435 So.2d 834 (Fla.1983). Compare Fla.Stat.Ann. § 947.16 (1973) with Fla.Stat.Ann. 947.16(1) (1983 Supp.); see also id....

...welfare of society.” Fla.Stat.Ann. § 947.18 (1983 Supp.); see also Gobie v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 416 So.2d 838 (Fla.App.1982). *1180 Moreover, the guidelines were based on prisoner and parolee case histories, see Fla. StatAnn. § 947.165(1) & (2) (1983 Supp.), and called for inmates to serve terms equivalent to those served by previous offenders who committed the same crime and constituted a similar parole risk....

...All sentences were consecutive, totaling 260 years. In 1988, the First District remanded the case for resentencing because the trial court erroneously retained jurisdiction for one-half, rather than one-third, of the sentence. Wemett v. State, 529 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). See § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1981). On remand, the circuit court could have merely corrected the illegal portion of its sentence to comply with section 947.16(3)....

...nder the original sentence, whereas he could not under the guidelines life sentences. It is clear that under the original sentence, Wemett was eligible to earn gain-time, sections 944.275, .291, Florida Statutes (1981), and to be released on parole, section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...1st DCA 2000); and Macias v. State, 614 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The Second District in Wright held that the failure of a sentencing court to provide written reasons for retaining jurisdiction, in violation of section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978), [1] does not constitute an "illegal sentence," as contemplated by the provisions of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), [2] thereby permitting a challenge long after the sentence has been imposed....

...The court retained jurisdiction over the first one-third of both sentences. Id. In 2002, twenty-three years after the sentences were imposed, Wright filed a pro se motion in the trial court pursuant to rule 3.800(a), arguing that both his sentences were illegal because, first, under section 947.16(4), a trial court may retain jurisdiction over one-third of only one sentence, not both sentences, and, second, because the trial court did not explain its reasons for retaining jurisdiction over the sentences....

...l nature. We find merit in the Second District's analogy of retaining jurisdiction over a sentence to a trial court's failure to provide departure reasons for a sentence, as was the case in Davis. Wright, 864 So.2d at 1155. Regarding certain crimes, section 947.16(4) provides: [A]t the time of sentencing the judge may enter an order retaining jurisdiction over the offender for review of a commission release order....

...the total consecutive sentences imposed. (a) In retaining jurisdiction for the purposes of this act, the trial court judge shall state the justification with individual particularity, and said justification shall be made a part of the court record. § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1978). The purpose of section 947.16 was to prevent early parole of prisoners convicted of dangerous crimes without the consent of the sentencing judge....

...Wright and disapprove of the other district court decisions conflicting with Wright. It is so ordered. PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Subsection (3) was renumbered (4) with the 1985 amendments to section 947.16....

...Reversed and remanded. NOTES [1] The defendant was sentenced on two counts of armed robbery to consecutive terms of life and 99 years of imprisonment, with the trial court retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the 99-year sentence. The defendant contends that under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), the retention of jurisdiction on one of several consecutive sentences is prohibited, and since jurisdiction over a portion of a life sentence cannot be retained, retention is therefore prohibited when a life sentence is imposed in a multi-count consecutive sentence case....

...e fit to do so in the event an appellate court undertakes to review for substance and reasonableness. Cf. Moore v. State, 392 So.2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (trial judge must state with particularity his reasons for retaining jurisdiction pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes)....

...1st DCA 1984); compare Williams v. State, 414 So.2d 509, 511 (Fla. 1982), and Cofield v. State, 453 So.2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (on motion for rehearing) (contemporaneous objection required as prerequisite to appeal from trial court's retention of jurisdiction under F.S. 947.16)....

...Carithers, Jr., of Sheppard & Carithers, Jacksonville, for respondent. OVERTON, Justice. The First District Court of Appeal has certified for our review the following question as one of great public importance: Does the retention of jurisdiction by a trial judge and denial of release through gain time pursuant to § 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...rder, attempted kidnapping, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The trial court sentenced Williams to a total of 150 consecutive years in state prison and, pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), retained jurisdiction for the first one-third of Williams' sentence. The applicable portion of section 947.16 was enacted after the commission of the offense for which Williams was convicted but before his actual trial, and provides that if a defendant is convicted of certain enumerated, severe crimes, the trial court may retain jurisdiction for the first one-third of the maximum sentence imposed. This in effect imposes an additional requirement before a prisoner can be paroled: he must obtain the approval of both the parole commission and the trial court, as compared to just the commission's approval as it was under the prior law. Section 947.16 also provides that if a trial court retains jurisdiction, the defendant may not be released due to gain time during the first one-third of his sentence, although gain time continues to accrue. On appeal, Williams asserted that the trial court's retention of jurisdiction under section 947.16 constituted an ex post facto application of the statute, because both the trial court's veto power over parole and the denial of release pursuant to gain time in effect enhanced his sentence....

...isadvantageous fashion? If the answer to both questions is yes, then the law constitutes an ex post facto law and is void as applied to those prisoners. Under the facts of the instant case, we find that both prongs of the Weaver test are met. First, section 947.16 attaches the legal consequences of the trial court's parole veto and no gain-time release to those who committed crimes before the provision's effective date. Second, these consequences have a disadvantageous effect in that the prisoners' sentences are enhanced. We note that for many years prior to section 947.16's enactment, the Parole and Probation Commission informally gave notice to the sentencing judge of a prisoner's parole date and sought the judge's comments....

...June 25, 1910, c. 387, § 1, 36 Stat. 819; Jan. 23, 1913, c. 9, 37 Stat. 650; Title 18 U.S.C. § 1940 ed., § 714, Title 18 U.S.C.A., § 4202. See also section 12, Chapter 20519, Laws of Florida, 1941; section 3, Chapter 21775, Laws of Florida, 1943; section 947.16, Florida Statutes 1951, F.S.A....

...this knowledge. The court accepted the plea and ordered a presentence investigation. Later, at the sentencing hearing, the state requested that the court sentence Green to a lengthy term of years and retain jurisdiction over the sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...e eligible for parole in a significantly shorter period than the possible forty-seven years under the retention. While retention of jurisdiction does not guarantee that the defendant will remain imprisoned for that period of time, the purpose behind section 947.16 is to prevent the early parole of dangerous prisoners without the sentencing judge's consent....

...Second, defendant argues that the court improperly retained jurisdiction. The court should have retained jurisdiction over one-third of the total consecutive sentences. See Adams v. State, 435 So.2d 953 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Wicker v. State, 438 So.2d 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1982). Also, jurisdiction should be retained over only one of the concurrent sentences for attempted murder. See § 947.16(3), Fla....

of a convicted person for parole and to read Section 947.16, Florida Statutes 1941, relating to parole

...manently deprive is an essential element of the charge of armed robbery; (3) that the trial court erred in convicting them on the second armed robbery count because that count and the first armed robbery count charged only a single offense; (4) that Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional; (5) that the trial court erred in failing to state with individual particularity why it was retaining jurisdiction over their sentences; and (6) that the trial court erred by imposing sentence...

...from the two tellers during the robbery was money that belonged to a single victim, the bank. We have recently rejected such an argument. See Brown v. State, 413 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Appellants' argument regarding the constitutionality of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, has also been conclusively rejected....

...mission in making parole decisions. This act established a structured parole review process based on objective criteria. This law requires that an inmate be interviewed within a specified time period depending on the length of the inmate's sentence. § 947.16....

...Commission in the sense that, once established, it is not to be changed except for reasons of institutional conduct, acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview, or for good cause in exceptional circumstances. §§ 947.16(4), 947.173(3); Jackson v....

...nes Act has restricted the Commission's previously unbounded discretion in granting parole. The Objective Parole Guidelines Act's ultimate intent is to prevent arbitrary and capricious action by the Commission. § 947.002(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). *820 Section 947.165(1), Fla....

...y time a trial court announces it intends to aggravate a sentence beyond the recommended range. See, Arnett v. State, 397 So.2d 330 (Fla.1st DCA 1981), cert. denied, 408 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 1981). Arnett involved a challenge to the constitutionality of Section 947.16(3), Florida *398 Statutes (1979), which allows the trial court to retain jurisdiction over some offenders for review of a Parole Commission release order....

...775.084, Florida Statutes (1981). In State v. Snow, 462 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1985), the trial court, in retaining jurisdiction over one-third of defendant's sentence, failed to state with individual particularity its reasons for doing so, as required by Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Based on a plea of guilty to a charge of sexual battery in violation of section 794.011(3), Florida Statutes (1979), appellant was adjudged guilty and sentenced to incarceration for seventy-five years. The court retained jurisdiction over the first twenty-five years of the term, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Despite two opportunities given appellant to do so, no good cause was shown the trial court, and we cannot say that he abused his discretion in rejecting the motion. Appellant next contends that the trial court had no authority to retain jurisdiction over the first one-third of his sentence, because section 947.16(3) was first enacted in 1978, and the crime of which he was convicted was committed in 1976. Without question, the application of section 947.16(3) to a crime committed in 1976 is an ex post facto application of the law....

...agreement on a ... date is reached." The only explicitly stated exceptions to the binding effect of the date entered are "for reasons of institutional conduct or the acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview." Section 947.16(4). Additionally, we are of the view that Section 947.16(4) should be considered in pari materia with Section 947.173(3), permitting the Commission to modify a parole release date "for good cause in exceptional circumstances." The record fails to show the applicability of any exceptional circumstance....

...methods. See Section 947.002 and Daniels v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, supra . Under the present act, parole decisions can only be made after the Commission has applied objective parole guidelines to a specific factual situation. See §§ 947.165 and .172....

...d as supported by the record, is simple possession of hard drugs, thereby requiring that the offense characteristic be placed in the category of "low moderate." Finally, in the absence of a showing of either the statutory exceptions delineated under Section 947.16(4), or exceptional circumstances for good cause permitted by Section 947.173(3), the Commission had no discretion to increase the salient factor score or add an aggravating factor after it had previously entered its order fixing a presumptive parole release date....

...lative power in one subsection of that article does not render the delegated power nugatory. The placement is functional, as with executive powers conferred in the judicial article (art. V, § 11) and in the legislative article (art. III, § 8). [5] Section 947.16(1), Fla....

...1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The third point raised by appellant is that the order revoking her probation on attempted arson imposes a five-year prison term with retention of jurisdiction over all five years. This contravenes the applicable statute, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.), in two respects: first, retention can be for only one-third the sentence; [2] second, the applicable statute allows *1061 for retention of jurisdiction by the trial court only for certain enumerated offenses — and attempted arson is not one of them....

...NOTES [1] The state did not seek the death penalty. [2] Neal was arrested on December 26, 1981. She was sentenced on February 16, 1983. Under the law in effect on the date of Neal's arrest, a trial court could retain only up to one-third of a sentence. By a 1982 amendment to section 947.16(3), effective April 20, 1982, a trial court was authorized to retain up to one-half....

...oner for parole — the major concern of the Villery Court in prohibiting incarceration for a period greater than one year as a condition of probation. Any prisoner under sentence for a period greater than one year is unarguably within the purview of section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...An information was filed against appellant, charging him with indecent assault upon a female child. After a jury trial appellant was found guilty and sentenced to nine years in prison, with credit for time already served. The trial court retained jurisdiction over part of appellant's sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979), and ordered him to pay (a) court costs of $12 and (b) the public defender an attorney's fee of $1,000 plus costs pursuant to section 27.56, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...3d DCA 1977); Massey v. State, 348 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 983 (Fla. 1977). Second, the trial court's retention of jurisdiction over one-third of the defendant's sentences is unsupported by the findings justifying retention required by Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...ecessary findings part of the record. See Mobley v. State, 409 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 1982). The trial court is advised that it may not, as it did, retain jurisdiction for the first one-third of each of the consecutive sentences imposed, but, as stated in Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), "......

...By agreement she entered a plea to the lesser offense of second degree murder. At the time of the plea the trial court advised Fairweather that the maximum penalty for second degree murder was life in prison, but failed to warn her that it was considering retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...atory minimum imprisonment provision of section 775.0875(1), Florida Statutes, is hereby imposed for the sentence specified in this count. Other Provisions: Retention of Jurisdiction ____ The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...on of probation. In Villery we stated that incarceration as a condition of probation does not constitute a sentence and declined to construe a probation condition of incarceration as a sentence for the limited purpose of eligibility for parole under section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...nalty prescribed by statute. See cases above cited. The legislature has provided a method for judicial mitigation of sentences. See § 921.13 Fla. Stat., F.S.A. In addition there has been provided a review of sentences by the State Pardon Board. See § 947.16 Fla....

...See also Judge Pearson's dissenting opinion in Whitehead, 450 So.2d at 546. We recognize that our decision places us in conflict with the Third District's opinion in Whitehead. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over his sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3)....

...insure that you serve a substantial period of time without being eligible for parole, the Court is going to retain jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence, ... . *317 (Emphasis added.) Retention of jurisdiction would have been appropriate under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), in view of the nature of the offense and the other factors adverted to by the trial court at the sentencing hearing....

...Insofar as this might apply to the capital offense, it effectively is moot because Hallman will be ineligible for parole for at least twenty-five years. As to the other counts, they are governed by the sentencing guidelines, under which there is no parole. Therefore, section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1985), authorizing retention of jurisdiction in order to limit parole is inapplicable....

...DERED AND ORDERED by the Court that the defendant NEVER be considered for release." Appellant contends that the inclusion of this language was improper because there is no authority for such a provision. We agree. The trial court had authority under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.) to retain jurisdiction over appellant for the first third of the maximum sentence imposed for the highest enumerated felony [2] charged and proven which was committed after its effective date, June 19, 1978, Ch....

...ceeding years of the sentence; and the prisoner shall be entitled to credit for a month as soon as the prisoner has served such time as, when added to the deduction allowable, would equal a month. [4] The statute retrospectively applied to Williams, § 947.16, Fla....

...prevented the release of the defendant due to gain time during the portion of the sentence over which jurisdiction was retained. Thus, the subsequently enacted statute imposed a new obstacle to parole and cut off a statutory right to gain time. [5] § 947.16(1), Fla. Stat. (1979). [6] § 947.165, Fla....

...expanded to include all adults, without regard to race or gender, who possessed a driver's license. [4] Notably, Mr. Williams was sentenced to life for this crime, but at a time when this sentence would have made him eligible for parole. See, e.g., § 947.16, Fla....

...If the State fails to make such discovery before the State can use such rebuttal witness the trial court must comply with the requirements of Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971). In like spirit, if upon retrial the trial court considers retaining jurisdiction over parole as permitted by section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), the majority opinion in Moore v....

...Nor are we convinced that Bellcase is dispositive of this issue. State v. Barber, 301 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1974), remains good law unless the holding in Villery v. The Florida Parole & Probation Board, 396 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 1980), must be read as applying not only to the meaning of "sentence" as used in section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979), governing the right to parole, but also to the term "custody under sentence," as used in rule 3.850....

...should not be so read. The problem with such an expansive reading of Villery is aptly described in the concurring opinion of Justice Overton. The Villery court was called on only to determine the meaning of "sentence" for parole purposes as used in section 947.16(1) in the context of a person on probation after serving time in prison pursuant to a split sentence under sections 948.01-948.03, Florida Statutes (1979), and the actual holding in that case is necessarily limited to the meaning of "sentence" under section 947.16(1)....

...Gen., and Margie Starnes, Legal Intern, Tallahassee, for appellee. PER CURIAM. The sole question presented in this appeal from the sentence imposed following appellant's plea of guilty to the offense of second degree murder is the constitutionality of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). Under the provisions of Section 947.16(3), the trial court judge, at the time of sentencing for certain enumerated crimes, may enter an order retaining jurisdiction over the offender for review of a parole commission release order. The retention of jurisdiction is limited in its duration to the first one-third of the maximum sentence imposed. In retaining jurisdiction, the trial court judge must "state the justification with individual particularity". § 947.16(3)(a), Fla....

...he parole commission's release order was based, may vacate the release order if it is found that "the commission's order is not based on competent substantial evidence or that the parole is not in the best interest of the community or the inmate". §§ 947.16(3)(e), (f), Fla....

...The State contends that appellant lacks standing to raise the constitutional issues and that the constitutional questions have not been adequately preserved for appeal. Initially, we reject the State's argument that appellant lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 947.16(3)....

...s constitutionality. See State v. Benitez, 395 So.2d 514, 1981 FLW 319 (Fla. 1981). Additionally, we reject the State's assertion that appellant has not properly preserved his challenge to the statute. Appellant clearly objected to the invocation of Section 947.16(3) on specific constitutional grounds and the trial court ruled upon appellant's challenges....

...State, 378 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) [review granted Case No. 58,704]: Chatman v. State, 393 So.2d 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Having disposed of these preliminary matters, we now consider the merits of appellant's constitutional challenges. Appellant asserts Section 947.16(3) violates Florida's constitutional separation of governmental powers. Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. Appellant, relying upon Article IV, Section 8(c), Florida Constitution, submits that the parole powers are an executive function vested solely in the parole and probation commission. Appellant reasons, therefore, that Section 947.16(3) violates the constitutional provision regarding separation of governmental powers by usurping the parole function from the executive branch and assigning it to the judicial branch in certain circumstances....

...State, 300 So.2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), appeal dismissed 305 So.2d 203 (Fla. 1974). The rationale of these decisions is that Article IV, Section 8(c) does not restrict the legislature from establishing minimum conditions under which parole may be granted. In effect, Section 947.16(3) merely establishes minimum conditions under which parole may be granted during the first one-third of the maximum sentence imposed. Such conditions are within the legislature's prerogatives and within its constitutional powers to prescribe punishment for crimes. Appellant further asserts that Section 947.16(3) violates the due process provisions of Article I, Section 9, Florida Constitution and Amendments V and XIV, United States Constitution....

...ainst retention of jurisdiction, and because the statute prohibits an appeal from a trial court's decision to vacate a parole commission release order. Appellant's due process arguments are primarily premised upon his assertion that sentencing under Section 947.16(3) is akin to sentencing as an habitual offender pursuant to Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1979). Relying upon Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967); Eutsey v. State, 383 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1980); and Adams v. State, 376 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), appellant asserts Section 947.16(3) does not fulfill the due process requirements which must attend the imposition of an enhanced sentence. We find that retention of jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3) is not analogous to proceedings under the habitual offender statute. See Moore v. State, 392 So.2d 277 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (Cowart, J., concurring specially). Invocation of Section 947.16(3) does not constitute an enhanced sentence nor is it dependent upon a new finding of fact that was not an ingredient of the offense charged. Rather, the invocation of Section 947.16(3) is similar to traditional sentencing procedures where, within limits fixed by the legislature, the trial judge is given broad discretion to determine the type and extent of punishment for convicted defendants....

...rsuant to section 874.04, Florida Statutes, to have been committed for the purpose of benefiting, promoting, or furthering the interests of a criminal gang. Retention of Jurisdiction ____ The court retains jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(34), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...(Emphasis supplied.) Appellant next submits that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction to review — and veto — any parole release order for the first third of his sentence (he received consecutive sentences totaling 150 years). The court retained jurisdiction pursuant to § 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...right and may be withdrawn, modified or denied." Harris v. Wainwright, 376 So.2d 855, 856 (Fla. 1979); see Weaver v. Graham, 376 So.2d 855 (Fla. 1979), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 100 S.Ct. 1311, 63 L.Ed.2d 759 (1980). In the instant case, however, § 947.16, by its retrospective application, appears to reflect the type of circumstances the Supreme Court disapproved in Harris, supra, at 857, "in which a new law has been passed eliminating the allowance of gain time in certain situations." To cl...

...d pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution (1980), we certify the following question as being one of great public importance: Does the retention of jurisdiction by a trial judge and denial of release through gain time pursuant to § 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...lant in the same room where the weapon was located. Based upon the circumstances, the trial judge could extend the time for trial for a reasonable period of time. Appellant's final argument is an attack upon the constitutionality of Florida Statutes section 947.16(3)....

...ircuit Judge Virginia Beverly of Duval County to sentence Williams to 30-year and 50-year terms of imprisonment, to be served consecutively. However, the judge did not reserve jurisdiction to review future parole orders entered by the Commission, as section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ing Judge Beverly to raise objections pursuant to section 947.1745(4), which had the legal effect of deferring his EPRD and preventing his release at PPRD even though she had declined to retain jurisdiction to review a commission release order under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...State, 398 So.2d 976 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 411 So.2d 384 (Fla. 1981); see also Rodriguez v. United States Parole Comm'n, 594 F.2d 170. Retrospective application of the statutory authorization for a judge to retain jurisdiction over an offender under section 947.16(3) was held to violate the ex post facto clause because it imposed an additional requirement on eligibility for parole that was more onerous than the previous law, which did not grant judges such authority....

...In addressing these issues it is necessary to briefly review the statutes and rules governing the Commission's responsibilities when conducting an inmate's EPRD review and determining to defer the EPRD. It likewise is necessary to review the court's role in affording limited judicial review of the Commission's action. Section 947.165(1), Florida Statutes (1989), sets forth the following mandate to the Commission: The commission shall develop and implement objective parole guidelines which shall be the criteria upon which parole decisions are made....

...lable and considered in the last interview that establishes good cause in exceptional circumstances. See Florida Parole and Probation Comm'n v. Paige, 462 So.2d 817; Taylor v. Florida Parole and Probation Comm'n, 543 So.2d 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); §§ 947.16(5), and 947.173(3), Fla....

...idelines Act has restricted the Commission's previously unbounded discretion in granting parole. The Objective Parole Guidelines Act's ultimate intent is to prevent arbitrary and capricious action by the Commission. § 947.002(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). Section 947.165(1), Fla....

...The Commission may supplement its response to the circuit court's order to show cause and, if deemed necessary, the court may hold an evidentiary hearing. Cf. Taylor v. Florida Parole and Probation Comm'n, 543 So.2d 367. REVERSED AND REMANDED. KAHN, J., and SHIVERS, DOUGLASS B., Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [1] In 1978, section 947.16(3) authorized the sentencing judge to retain, for the first third of the sentence, jurisdiction over an offender convicted of sexual battery and kidnapping to review a Commission parole release order....

...The parties agree and we agree that this case must be remanded to the trial court with instructions to either relinquish jurisdiction over the first third of Fagan's sentence or to state with individual particularity the justification for retaining jurisdiction. Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981); Oliver v....

...denied, 229 So.2d 261 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1053, 90 S.Ct. 1393, 25 L.Ed.2d 668 (1970) (only executive, not judiciary, has power to reduce lawful sentence after sixty days from imposition); McRae v. State, 383 So.2d 289 (Fla.2d DCA 1980) (under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), judiciary cannot retain jurisdiction over defendant beyond one-third of maximum sentence of imprisonment imposed)....

...e facts of the case. [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. Respondent was found guilty of armed robbery with a firearm and sentenced to ninety-nine years in prison. The trial court retained jurisdiction for one-third of the sentence in accordance with section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...rida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 alleging, among other things, that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction over the first one-third of the sentence because the crime for which he was convicted was committed before the effective date of section 947.16(3)....

...On review the district court held that failure to object to retention of jurisdiction did not preclude review on a rule 3.850 motion. The court also noted that if it were true, as alleged in the motion for relief, that the crime occurred before the effective date of section 947.16(3), then the sentencing court lacked retention jurisdiction....

...State v. Williams . Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the retention issue. In State v. Williams we responded to a certified question of great public importance, [2] by holding that retroactive application of section 947.16(3) to a crime occurring before its effective date violated the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution and that such retention sentences were void....

...2d DCA 1980), to the same end. Thus, the district court here correctly stated the rule of law from State v. Williams and Rodriguez. However, in remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine if the crime was committed prior to the effective date of section 947.16(3), the court apparently overlooked the finding of the trial court that "[d]efendant is correct that since the crime for which he was convicted occurred several days prior to the effective date of the law authorizing such retention, its application to defendant's sentence is ex post facto." Thus, it is clear that no evidentiary hearing is necessary because the trial court has already determined that the crime occurred before the effective date of section 947.16(3)....

...BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] State v. Williams, 397 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1981). [2] Williams, 397 So. 2 at 664: Does the retention of jurisdiction by a trial judge and denial of release through gain time pursuant to § 947.16, Fla....

...he alias capias which had been issued for his arrest. After hearing, his probation was then revoked because of his failure to appear on June 1, and he was resentenced to 15 years in the state prison; the court also retained jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ranting of his own request for a reciprocal *1348 benefit. [4] See also, Loeb v. State, 387 So.2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); cf., State v. Belien, 379 So.2d 446 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). We will not approve such a result. [5] The trial court's application of Section 947.16(3) was, however, erroneous....

...It is apparent that, since burglary is not one of the specified crimes, the section could not properly be invoked in this case. Robinson v. State, 368 So.2d 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Williams v. State, 374 So.2d 1086 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). [7] The reservation of jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...issue because such failure was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, appellants' reliance on State v. Stacey is misplaced. In that case, the trial court retained jurisdiction for one-third of Stacey's sentence in accordance with Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.)....

...d girl. Snow objected generally to the court's retaining jurisdiction. Snow appealed his sentence on the basis that the trial judge erred in retaining jurisdiction without stating the reasons for doing so with individual particularity as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...cts with Pedroso v. State , wherein the Second District affirmed the trial court's summary denial of a rule 3.850 motion where Pedroso attempted to raise the claim that the trial court had failed to state with individual particularity as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), the reasons for retaining jurisdiction over the first third of his sentence....

...ion over one-third of Snow's sentence provided that "[i]n retaining jurisdiction for purposes of this act, the trial court shall state the justification with individual particularity, and said justification shall be made a part of the court record." § 947.16(3)(a), Fla....

...The district court, therefore, should have considered this issue. Accordingly, the decision of the district court declining to consider the issue raised by Snow is quashed, and this cause is remanded to the district court to determine whether the trial court complied with section 947.16(3)(a) It is so ordered....

...tence without stating with particularity its justification for doing so. On resentencing, if the court wishes to retain jurisdiction over a portion of Roberts's sentence, it must state with particularity its justification for doing so as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and sentence for grand theft, second degree. Finally, appellant points out that the trial court included the fifteen year sentence for dealing in stolen property when it computed the term of his imprisonment over which it could retain jurisdiction pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981). This was error. Section 947.16(3) lists the crimes for which a trial court may retain jurisdiction over the offender for review of a parole commission order....

...t, placed on eight years probation; however, following a hearing at which he was found to have violated the terms of his probation agreement, his probation was revoked, he was adjudicated guilty, and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...agreement. We now consider petitioner's challenge of the trial judge's retention of jurisdiction over him for the first one-third of the sentence imposed. Petitioner contends that such is improper and that the section pursuant to which it was done, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), is unconstitutional. We need not address the constitutional question because petitioner is correct regarding the propriety of the retention. The provisions of section 947.16(3), allowing a trial judge to retain jurisdiction over a convicted offender for up to one-third of the sentence imposed, were enacted in 1978....

...The offense for which petitioner was convicted occurred in 1977, almost eleven months prior to the effective date of chapter 78-318. We held, in State v. Williams, 397 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1981), that retention of jurisdiction by a trial judge pursuant to section 947.16 constitutes an ex post facto application of the law when the crime in question was committed prior to said section's effective date....

...We affirm the appellant's convictions. We vacate that portion of the sentence for first-degree murder wherein the trial court retained jurisdiction for one-third of the life sentence imposed to review any parole commission release order pertaining to the defendant. See § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1981). We conclude that where a court imposes a life sentence, Section 947.16(3) is inoperable, since because a life span is immeasurable, see Alvarez v. State, 358 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1978), no calculation of the length of time jurisdiction is retained can be made. With the exception of the capital felony, all crimes set forth in Section 947.16(3) as to which a trial court may retain jurisdiction over the defendant, including life felonies, are punishable by imprisonment for a term of years, see § 775.082(3), Fla....

...Appellant was charged with first-degree murder. A jury rejected his defense of self-defense and returned a verdict for second-degree murder. The court imposed a sixty-year sentence, then enhanced it by retaining jurisdiction to veto parole during the first one-third of the sentence pursuant to Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981). [1] As justification for the retention of jurisdiction, which justification must be stated "with individual particularity," Section 947.16(3)(a), [2] the court announced: [T]he offense was [a] deliberate act and bolstered by considerable time by consumption of alcohol, apparently enough to carry it out. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981) has generated considerable discussion in recent months....

...ntence is VACATED. NOTES [1] Retention of jurisdiction which empowers a trial court to veto a parole recommendation and deny release pursuant to gain time is, in effect, an enhancement of a sentence. State v. Williams, 397 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1981). [2] Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981) provides: In retaining jurisdiction for the purposes of this act, the trial court judge shall state the justification with individual particularity, and said justification shall be made a part of the court record....

...In this appeal from a sentence in a murder case the appellant assigns as error the method by which the trial judge retained jurisdiction to review any parole release order issued during the first third of appellant's term of confinement. Under the provisions of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Everything a trial judge does should be done in a reasonable manner but that does not mean that everything he does is, or should be, reviewable by appeal. *279 Proceedings under the habitual offender statute, Section 775.084, Florida Statutes, do not resemble, and provide no analogy to, Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, which provides for trial court review of parole releases....

...appeal when its ultimate action, actually vacating parole, is not reviewable creates an amazing legal paradox; yet this is the result here because the final action of the trial court vacating or approving the parole release order is not appealable. Section 947.16(3)(g), Florida Statutes....

...The requirement of a record permits the sentencing judge or his successor, to later have a record of why the initial decision was made in that particular case; it also serves to cause the parole commission to send a notice of the release order to the trial court under Section 947.16(3)(c), Florida Statutes....

...Accordingly, we order that the trial court's marks on these blanks be struck so that Wainwright's sentencing forms for the non-capital offenses reflect the imposition of no mandatory minimum terms under section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes (1993), and no retention of jurisdiction under section *516 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...mistrial, prohibit the party from calling a witness not disclosed or introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. [7] See § 775.082(1), Fla. Stat. (1993). [8] See generally § 947.16(4), Fla....

...tes. Like petitions have been presented to the court with increasing frequency, and counsel for the respondent admits that without direction from this court the commission is unable to chart a course out of what is perceived as an insoluble dilemma. Section 947.16, Florida Statutes, provides that every person who has been convicted of a felony or who has been convicted of one or more misdemeanors and whose sentence or cumulative sentences total 12 months or more, who is confined in execution of...

...incarcerated, and recommendations of the trial judge. While it is true that there is no absolute right to parole, the Florida Legislature has mandated the setting of a presumptive parole release date by the Florida Parole and Probation Commission. §§ 947.16; 947.172, Florida Statutes....

...the Department to acquire the information for the Commission's use. [2] Petitioner Battis, incarcerated prior to the 1978 enactment of the requirement that a presumptive parole release date must be set for all inmates, was interviewed pursuant to §§ 947.16 and 947.12, Fla....

...Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. BROWNING, J. A jury found Timothy Hampton, the appellant, guilty of one count of second-degree murder; he was sentenced in May 1982 to 75 years' imprisonment. The trial court included a special provision, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statute (1981), whereunder it retained jurisdiction over the first third of the appellant's sentence, i.e., 25 years, to monitor any Parole Commission release order....

..."). A December 1999 order of the trial court includes an attachment of a portion of the 1982 sentencing transcript in support of the court's conclusion that the earlier pronouncement provided legally sufficient reasons to satisfy the requirements of section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981) [1] ....

...usness of the offenses," and "the gravity of the offenses," without setting out any specific facts and circumstances of the crimes. See Abbott v. State, 421 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (statement of justification for retention of jurisdiction under § 947.16(3) failed to satisfy statute's "specificity and particularity" requirement); Saname v....

...1st DCA 1983) (trial court adequately justified retention of jurisdiction by including specific observations and enumerating defendant's offenses). Because the challenged findings are no more specific than the findings that we deemed inadequate for purposes of section 947.16(3) in Abbott, 421 So.2d at 24, we VACATE the sentencing order retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the sentence and REMAND, with instructions. ERVIN and LAWRENCE, JJ., CONCUR. NOTES [1] The pertinent provisions of the statute state: 947.16 Eligibility for parole; powers and duties of commission.— (1) Every person who has been, or who may hereafter be, convicted of a felony ......

...The trial court departed from the recommended guidelines range of 22 to 27 years in prison and imposed consecutive sentences of 30 years in prison on each of two counts of armed robbery and 10 years in prison on one count of attempted armed robbery. The trial court also retained jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1983), over 1/3 of each sentence....

...e maximum sentence allowed. " 327 So.2d at 25 (emphasis added). We do not believe, however, that Jones decided the issues presented by this case because it did not consider the impact on the parole process of a jail term as a condition of probation. Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1977), states in pertinent part: Every person who has been, or who may hereafter be, convicted of a felony or who has been convicted of one or more misdemeanors and whose sentence or cumulative sentences total 12 mon...

...s a condition of probation is more onerous than a simple prison sentence of the same length. We affirm the remaining judgments and sentences. BOARDMAN and RYDER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] One solution to the problems posed by this case would be to read Section 947.16 broadly enough to encompass a term of confinement of twelve months or more imposed as a condition of probation....

...Crockett, 377 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1979) (five years of prison on a five year period of probation). [3] The legislature has now provided a method whereby the sentencing court can retain jurisdiction to review orders granting early parole in cases involving serious crimes. Sec. 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1977). [4] There is much to be said for a maximum limitation of one year because it would avoid any conflict with Section 947.16....

...Moreover, in the McKee case the opinion does not disclose the extent of the discussion of the jury instruction. It merely recited in the concluding paragraph of the opinion that there was a contention "that it was error for the trial court to discuss with the jury the eligibility of a convicted person for parole and to read Section 947.16, Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A., relating to parole to the jury during the trial * * *." [9] In the case sub judice the State concedes, so far as the harmful nature of the error is concerned, "that the question asked of the trial court...

...1960), 123 So.2d 703. [3] F.A.R. 1962 Revision 6.16, 31 F.S.A. See 924.32, Florida Statutes 1961, F.S.A. [4] Singer v. State, Fla. 1959, 109 So.2d 7, 28. [5] Pait v. State, Fla. 1959, 112 So.2d 380, 381, 384. [6] The pertinent statutes on this subject are Sections 947.16, 947.17, 947.18, 947.19, Florida Statutes 1961, F.S.A....

...Appellant was sentenced to two thirty-year concurrent sentences of imprisonment for the armed robberies, and a consecutive five-year sentence for the aggravated assault. Jurisdiction was retained for the first one-third of the thirty-year sentence, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), and a written order was entered justifying this action....

...erred from the juvenile to the adult court. See Goodson v. State, 403 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 1981). [2] § 39.111(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979). [3] § 39.111(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1979). [4] See § 958.04, Fla. Stat. (1979). The written order entered pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes also failed to touch on all of the criteria set forth in section 39.111(6)(c), and it was obviously done after and not before any other "determination of disposition."

...[Footnote omitted]. Id. at 12. See also State v. Watson, 453 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1984); Harmon v. State, 438 So.2d 369 (Fla. 1983). Stangherlin next argues that the trial court erred when it retained jurisdiction for one half of the 300 year sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982). She argues that the court could retain jurisdiction for not more than one third of the sentence, and that her objection to such retention should have been sustained. At the time of the commission of the offense on April 1, 1982, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981) permitted retention of jurisdiction for up to one third of the sentence....

...to one half of the sentence. [1] The Florida Supreme Court has recently considered and rejected this argument. Mills v. State, 462 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 1985). As in Mills, Stangherlin stood subject to the existing retention of jurisdiction statute, *336 section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), at the time the crimes were committed....

...The judgments and sentences are affirmed. AFFIRMED. COWART, J., and POWELL, R.W., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] The statute was further amended in 1983 by Chapter 83-131, Laws of Florida, and once again provides for retention of jurisdiction for up to one third of the sentence. See section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983).

...ith a firearm. We affirm the conviction but remand for correction of the sentence. The only point appellant raises which has merit is his contention that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction for the first third of his sentence pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978 Supp.). The date of the offense with which appellant was charged was February 13, 1978. The effective date of the amendment to Section 947.16 allowing the trial court to retain jurisdiction to review a parole release order during the first third of the sentence of a person convicted of any of the enumerated crimes, including robbery, was June 19, 1978. Appellant was convicted and sentenced on September 20, 1978. We agree with appellant that Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978) is an ex post facto law as applied to him....

...es the punishment, or, in short, which in relation to the offense or its consequences alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage. " Higginbotham v. State, 88 Fla. 26, 31, 101 So. 233, 235 (1924) (emphasis added). The challenged amendment to Section 947.16 clearly does alter appellant's situation to his disadvantage....

...1217 his motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendant contends that the reasons given by the trial court in its order retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the defendant's sentence [§ 947.16(3), Fla....

...(1981)] were legally insufficient, and that, accordingly, the subject retention of jurisdiction should be vacated. We agree and reverse. First, we reject the state's sole argument on this appeal that an attack on the legal sufficiency of a trial court order retaining jurisdiction over one-third of the prison sentence [§ 947.16(3), Fla....

...Gaskins raises two points on appeal. First, he argues that the trial judge unlawfully retained jurisdiction over his sentence. Second, he alleges that the trial judge unlawfully habitualized his sentence for grand theft. We deal with each in point of order. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), enumerated certain offenses upon conviction of which a defendant could be subject to retention of jurisdiction. Section 947.16(3) provided, in pertinent part, that: Persons who have become eligible for parole and who may, according to the objective parole guidelines of the commission, be granted parole shall be placed on parole in accordance with the provision...

...s invalid, "the Commission should be given the opportunity to recalculate the Petitioner's presumptive parole release date," and to reinstate the aggravating factors found by the hearing examiners, but not relied upon by the Commission. Relying upon Section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1979), respondent asserted that "[i]f the Commission is unable to utilize the 1951 conviction to extend the Petitioner's presumptive parole release date, it may well decide to follow the recommendation of the hear...

...er and impose as an aggravating factor the concurrent sentences received by the Petitioner." The Commission might well have decided to do what respondent suggests; however, Florida law forbids it. First, the very provision relied upon by respondent, Section 947.16(4), specifically states that the Commission may from time to time review the parole date established for an inmate, but that "the presumptive parole release date shall not be changed except for reasons of institutional conduct or the a...

...ce imposed upon petitioner. This recommendation was specifically rejected by the Commission. It is self-evident that the existence of the concurrent sentence is not new or previously unavailable information upon which the Commission could rely under Section 947.16(4)....

...on when agreement on a ... date is reached.' The only explicitly stated exceptions to the binding effect of the date are `for reasons of institutional conduct or the acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview.' Section 947.16(4). Additionally, we are of the opinion that Section 947.16(4) should be considered in pari materia with Section 947.173(3), permitting the Commission to modify a parole release date `for good cause in exceptional circumstances.' The record fails to show the applicability of any exceptional circumstance....

...e within a certain period of time for each entitled inmate. The chapter contemplates an objective system, Section 947.02, Fla. Stat. (1980); the Commission may exercise its discretion only in limited circumstances with adequate explanation. Sections 947.165, 947.172, Fla....

...Florida Parole and Probation Commission, supra . Similarly, aggravations may not be applied later than 45 days from the date of an inmate's initial interview "except for reasons of institutional conduct or the acquisition of new information not available at the time of the initial interview". Section 947.16(4), Fla....

court partially receded from Jones in light of section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979), which conferred

defendant's sentence, the controlling statute, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), reads: Persons

committed the offenses for which he was convicted, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), provided in part:

ninety-nine and five years, respectively. Relying on section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), the trial judge

judge who retained jurisdiction pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, and imposed extended

third of the maximum sentence imposed" under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), when that sentence

for no more than one-third of his sentence. See § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1983). At the time defendant committed

Appellant challenges the constitutionality of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes. The Supreme Court held

commitment issued by the court pursuant to s. 944.16. § 947.16(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). At least two appellate

to retain jurisdiction over the defendant. See § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1982). Although the trial

reasons for retaining jurisdiction as required by § 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981). We grant the petition

sentences. The court retained jurisdiction under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982) for the first

corrected. According to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, (1979), now section 947.16(4), "When any person

observations and enumeration of offenses accord with Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981). The imposition

lawful remedy is to declare unconstitutional section 947.16(6), Florida Statutes, to the extent that it

jurisdiction over the defendant's sentence for burglary. § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. See Robinson v. State, 368 So.2d

"court maintains jurisdiction over defendant." Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that

the individual particularity requirement of section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981). A court's failure

discretion of the Parole and Probation Commission, § 947.16 Fla. Stat. (1977). Pursuant to § 947.165 Fla.

one third of Watson's sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981) which authorizes

with assault. We agree. The 1982 amendment to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, allows a court to retain

probation. He contends that the amendment to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982), under which

made when the court gratuitously pronounced Section 947.16(3), *410 Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982)[1] to

the first half of four sentences pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982). The crimes

be eligible for parole consideration under section 947.16(1), (2)(g)(3), which provides that: (1) Every

intentional violence within the meaning of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981). This statute authorized

was necessary for the prisoner's release. See § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1978). Judge Morphonios did

reasons fail to comply with the requirements of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The purpose of

elected to retain jurisdiction pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979) (originally enacted

775.082(1), 794.011(2), Fla. Stat.(1989).[2] Section 947.16(2)(g)3, Florida Statutes (1989) provided that

limited purpose of parole eligibility under section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes (1979). Ch. 83-131, §

court's retention of jurisdiction, pursuant to § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat., over the first one-third of his

The trial court has a mandatory duty under section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981), to provide those

of the total consecutive sentences imposed. Section 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1981); Adams v. State, 435

specifying his reason for doing so as required by Section 947.16(3)(a) Florida Statutes (1979). This issue was

with individual particularity as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). The judge summarily

year or more shall be eligible for parole (Section 947.16, Florida Statutes). Persons who are required

parole as to a one year county jail sentence, see § 947.16(1), Fla. Stat. (1979); Villery v. Florida Parole

conduct or the acquisition of new information.” § 947.16(5), Fla. Stat. Because static factors, such as

jurisdiction for only one-third of Barnhill's sentence. § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1983). See Ch. 83-131, § 9, Laws

application of the retention of jurisdiction statute, Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes. The trial court erroneously

(Padovano, J., concurring) (suggesting that section 947.16(6), Florida Statutes, should be deemed unconstitutional

retaining jurisdiction over defendant's sentence. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983) permits the retention

of this offense." Clearly, this reason violates § 947.16(5) because it was previously known and documented

retain jurisdiction over the sentences under section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1985). Senczyszyn v.

precisely what the legislature intended by section 947.16(3) to make possible in these circumstances

stating the reasons on the record pursuant to section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). This point

one-third of the appellant's sentence, pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978). We affirm

retention of jurisdiction in accordance with section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), and Hampton v

one-third of each sentence. This was improper under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), which limits the

Parole and Probation Commission as to parole (see § 947.16(2)(g)) and administrative gain time (see § 944

when the first PPRD was established. We agree. Section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1983), provides, in relevant

jurisdiction over half of each term pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1982). Since that time

jurisdiction over defendant Rosa pursuant to section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). Defendant's

therefor with the particularity required by Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981). The record shows

jurisdiction over his sentences pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). A trial court

June 15, 1983, the legislature had amended section 947.16(3) to permit retention of jurisdiction over

Defendant’s 100-year sentences pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes, to review the Parole Commission’s

justification *178 "with individual particularity." See § 947.16(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1981); Hampton v. State, 764

Retention of [] The Court pursuant to F.S. 947.16(3) retains Jurisdiction jurisdiction

jurisdiction over a portion of his sentence under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978). The portion

over defendant's burglary sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The purpose of

defendant. It does not satisfy the requirement of section 947.16(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), for individual

one-half of his sentence on the grounds that section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981) was amended to provide

three year sentence since August 26, 1981. Section 947.16(1), Fla. Stat. (1981), requires the Commission

within the time limits imposed by the statutes. Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979), does not permit such

during the effective period of Chapter 82-171, section 947.16(3), (5), Florida Statutes (1983). See footnote

of the 99-year sentence imposed. We agree. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), was amended to

jurisdiction over his sentences pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). A trial court

Commission’s authority to grant Appellant parole. See § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1982 Supp.). Under the United

jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). Jail Credit _

committed the offenses, for which he was convicted, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), provided in part:

the period of retention in accordance with section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981). We therefore AFFIRM

this case, i.e., for a period of 127 1/2 years. § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1982). In effect, then, the defendant

the trial court could retain jurisdiction. See § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1983). No purpose would be served

retains jurisdiction on this matter". *521 Section 947.16(3) Florida Statutes (1979) states in pertinent

jurisdiction for one-half of respondent's sentence. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), permits the retention

Appellant's second claim is without merit. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), authorizes the

both sentences contrary to the provisions of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The concurrent

of his 60-year prison sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1985). Specifically, Johnson

the Florida Parole and Probation Commission. See § 947.16, Fla. Stat. 1975. It is that Commission's prerogative

The court also retained jurisdiction under section 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), for the first

open court with particularity as required by section 947.16(3)(a) (1983). The trial judge allowed the prosecutor

jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1983). Jail Credit

on one-third of the sentences, pursuant to section 947.16(3),[2] Florida Statutes (Supp.1978). Hogan

were insufficient to meet the requirement of Section 947.16(3)(a) that justification for retention of jurisdiction

of jurisdiction over one third of his sentence. § 947.16, Fla. Stat. (1987). Because Amazon does not set

of the appellant's life sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981). We hold that the

jurisdiction to review any release order pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, for 66 years. Appellant

appellant's second contention to be meritorious. Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979)[1], allows a

retaining *604 jurisdiction in accordance with section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), and for clarification

first one-third of each sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979). To support the retention

jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1983). Jail Credit

jurisdiction over his case in violation of Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981). We reverse and

jurisdiction over that sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes. The trial court did not

jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). Jail Credit _It

jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). Jail Credit ____

not a defendant was eligible for parole under section 947.16(1) in a situation where the defendant was incarcerated

defendant's sentence. Compare § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1981), with § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1982).

jurisdiction for one third of sentence" pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). However, this

entered subsequent to the effective date of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), which reduced

with individual particularity as required by Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981). Because the

sentences were to run consecutively. Pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), the trial court

retaining jurisdiction, in accordance with section 947.16(3), for the first one-half of Defendant's sentence

*1153Retention of Jurisdiction - The Court pursuant to F.S. 947.16(3) retains jurisdiction over the defendant-for

Parole and Probation Commission as to parole (see § 947.16(2)(g)) and administrative gain time (§ 944.-276(l)(a))

date.” Ch. 96-422, § 19, Laws of Fla., amending § 947.16, Fla. Stat. Control release will be reactivated

factors. Appellant contends also that under section 947.16(5), Florida Statutes, the Commission may not

trial court retained jurisdiction, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), for ten years

without prejudice to appellant to challenge Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979) in any post-conviction

for one-third of the sentences pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). While so doing

applicable to retention of jurisdiction pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). Failure to object

the of-fencse involved in case No. 81-1121, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), provided that

one-third of the defendant’s sentence under section 947.-16(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), which, although

discretion of the Parole and Probation Commission, § 947.-16 Fla.Stat. (1977). Pursuant to § 947.-165 Fla.Stat

over one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981). In his direct ap*29peal

jurisdiction for one-third of the sentence. See § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat. (1983). . The court treated the

of appellant’s 99 year sentence, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). However, the trial

confinement, most would be assigned such a date. § 947.16(1), Fla.Stat. (1981). Once established, the date

portion of the sentence imposed pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979), the court must either

never submitted to the court for signature. Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), clearly requires

24 months” of that same date. See Fla. Stat. § 947.16(1)(c)-(d) (1983). Had the resentencing jury fixed

prior to June 19, 1978, the effective date of section 947.16(3) Florida Statutes (Supp.1978). Rodriguez

retaining such jurisdiction as is required by section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). SCHEB, C.J., and

the first third of his sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp.1978). Appellant was

maximum period of one-third of any sentence. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The State’s contention

available at the time of the initial interview (Section 947.16(4)).2 In defense of its actions, the Commission

jurisdiction to fifteen years in accordance with Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981). AFFIRMED IN PART:

at the time of sentencing. AS TO QUESTION 2: Section 947.16, F.S., as amended by s. 2 of Ch. 74-122, Laws

jurisdiction over defendant’s sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The basis of the

jurisdiction over defendant’s sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The basis of the

retaining such jurisdiction as is required by section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). BOARDMAN, Acting

available at the time of the initial interview, section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes.3 See Moats v. Florida

over one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979). If so, the retention

the defendant’s life sentence pursuant to section 947.-16(4), Florida Statutes (1985). We hold that the

was sentenced prior to the effective date of section 947.16, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), which authorizes

the governing statute section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981). Section 947.16(3), which specifies the

first third of the maximum sentence imposed, Section 947.-16(3), Florida Statutes, yet chose not to do so

first half of both thirty-year sentences.1 Section 947.-16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), provides

Commission release order under the provision of Section 947.16, Florida Statutes. After being fully advised

period of time. This the trial court may not do. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), the statute in

court, in retaining jurisdiction pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979), failed to state

was within the discretion of the Commission. Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1975). Therefore, there

relied in retaining jurisdiction, as required by Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), and Robinson

sentence imposed for the most serious felony. Section 947.16(3). Accordingly, this cause is remanded to

authority of the April 21, 1982, amendment to section 947.16(8), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982). It is irrelevant

of each of the sentences imposed pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981). The trial court

However, it retained jurisdiction pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981), without stating the

parole commission release order, pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1978). For the first

and not long before they are ever begun. See § 947.16(l)(g), Fla.Stat. (1991). For my taste, there is

grant such an interview is discretionary. See § 947.16(2)(f), Fla.Stat. (1985). However, the record*

specify his reasons therefor as mandated by section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). Accordingly, the

retaining such jurisdiction as required by section 947.-16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). SCHEB, C. J.,

for doing so with particularity, according to section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981). The trial court

remand for correction of the sentences imposed. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, provides for the retention

over one-third of his sentence was improper. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), authorizes retention

with individual particularity as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). GRIMES, A.C

with individual particularity as required by section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). GRIMES, A.C

sentence. The sole issue before us is whether section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981) is unconstitutional

not agree. Retention of jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981) has been upheld

State, 400 So.2d 1015, 1016 (Fla.2d DCA 1981); § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat. (1981). SCHEB, C. J., and OTT and

Probation Commission release order pursuant to Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1978). Jacobs then

first one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). The court entered

See Alvarez v. State, 358 So.2d 10 (Fla.1978); § 947.16, Florida Statutes. BOOTH, WENTWORTH and WIGGIN-TON

consideration by the commission for parole. . . . (Section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes, 'F. S.A.; emphasis supplied)

invalidated one of appellant’s convictions. See § 947.16(4), Fla.Stat. (1981). ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C

years. At the time appellant was sentenced, section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), provided

So.2d 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Furthermore, section 947.16(3) of the Florida Statutes (1979), which addresses

The court should address the issue of whether section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1983), was correctly interpreted

judge’s retention of jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 947.16(3) Florida Statutes, for review of any parole

Parole Commission Release Order Pursuant to Florida Statute 947.16.” The trial court lost the chance to properly

Commission. See Crews, 132 So. 3d at 899. Section 947.16(1), Florida Statutes, states that “[e]very

was sentenced prior to the effective date of Section 947.16, Florida Statutes, the court’s retention of

sections 948.01 and 948.03 in pari materia with section 947.16, as they existed in 1979, the supreme court

life imprisonment was eligible for parole. See § 947.16(1), Fla. Stat. (1971). In Atwell, the supreme

jurisdiction over her sentence pursuant to section 947.-16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The purpose of

the first third of that sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes. In this appeal, Shiflet

WHICH HE IS OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE UNDER SECTION 947.16(1), F.S.? Your question involves a determination

over one-third of the defendant’s term under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983). A trial court

objection, “where a court imposes a life sentence, Section 947.16(3) [retention of jurisdiction] is inoperable

since all of the procedural requirements of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), have now

the trial court could retain jurisdiction. See § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat. (1983). Accordingly, the case is

charges of kidnapping and aggravated battery. Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981). Since the record

the total of the consecutive sentences imposed. § 947.16(3), Fla.Stat. (1983); Brown v. State, 458 So.2d

determine whether the trial court complied with Section 947.-16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981). The trial court

first one-third of the sentence, pursuant to Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). From that sentence

serving *1163a criminal sentence pursuant to Section 947.16 Fla.Stat. (Supp.1978). The crimes of which

confined inmates within the prescribed times. Section 947.16(1), F. S., as amended. You did not specify

2d and no retention of jurisdiction under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983).” Wainwright I

jurisdiction over a portion of a sentence pursuant to section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981), he must, in determining

first one-third of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1979). This statute became

first one-third of the sentence pursuant to Section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1981). However, the trial

appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s finding that § 947.16, Florida Statutes, is constitutional and we find

state prison. The trial judge, pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), retained jurisdiction

Department of Corrections on October 11, 1981. Section 947.-16(1), Fla.Stat.(1981), requires the Florida Parole

over one-third of that sentence pursuant to section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1985). If this is true

one-half of the total consecutive sentences imposed. § 947.16(3), Fla. Stat. (1982 Supp.); Goree v. State, 411

retention of jurisdiction as required under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1982).1 The trial court

his plea without any factual basis and that section 947.16, Florida Statutes (1979), by which the court

trial court lacked statutory authority under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), to retain jurisdiction

appellant’s sentence for purposes of parole review. Section 947.16(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1981); Mobley v. State

actual time of incarceration because of parole. See § 947.16, Fla.Stat. (1985).3 We also *21know that even

available at the time of the initial interview. § 947.16(4), Fla.Stat. (1983). GLICKSTEIN and WALDEN, JJ

-087(2), with a retention of jurisdiction under Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes. Assuming we were to construe

relied in retaining jurisdiction, as required by section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983), and Robinson v

jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to section 947.16(4), Florida Statutes (1983). Jail

13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1981). According to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1981), the trial court

Commission for subsequent reviews, pursuant to § 947.16(4), Fla. Stat. (1981),[1] alleging that they had

court’s retention of jurisdiction is unlawful, see § 947.16(3)(a), Fla.Stat. (1981); Rosa v. State, 412 So

one-half of the sentence imposed pursuant to section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), which was