green
Positive treatment
Quoted verbatim 2×
21.3 score
“we find that, despite the practice of appointing dual attorneys, the decision of whether to appoint co-counsel is not a right but is a privilege that is subject to the trial court's discretion.”
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994
2010
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 33 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Comer v. State
as a practical matter, a trial judge's inquiry into a defendant's complaints of incompetence of counsel can be only as specific and meaningful as the defendant's complaint.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Jimenez v. State
we find that, despite the practice of appointing dual attorneys, the decision of whether to appoint co-counsel is not a right but is a privilege that is subject to the trial court's discretion.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Jason Dowdell v. State of Florida
Lowe v. State, 650 So. 2d 969, 975 (Fla. 1994) (citing Wilder v. State, 587 So. 2d 543 , 544–45 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)); see also Logan v. State, 846 So. 2d 472, 477 (Fla. 2003); Wilson v. State, 889 So. 2d 114, 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
ELLIOT SHAWN BUTLER v. STATE OF FLORIDA
"A trial judge's inquiry into a defendant's complaints of incompetence of counsel can be only as specific and meaningful as the defendant's complaint." Davila v. State, 829 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (citing Lowe v. State, 650 So. 2d 969, 975 (Fla. 1994)). 6 Here, Mr. Butler generally complained that there was "something" mentally wrong with counsel, that counsel was "lazy," and that he felt prejudiced.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Rodney Tyrone Lowe v. State of Florida
Lowe v. State, 650 So. 2d 969, 971 (Fla. 1994).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
& SC16-341 Renaldo Devon McGirth v. State of Florida & Renaldo & Devon McGirth v. Julie L. Jones, etc.
(2×)
However, the postconviction court cannot be faulted for failing to inquire deeper into this claim where nothing discussed during the hearing indicated its existence. “[A] trial judge’s inquiry into a defendant’s complaints of incompetence of counsel can be only as specific and meaningful as the defendant’s complaint.” Lowe v. State, 650 So. 2d 969, 975 (Fla. 1994).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Braddy v. State
In fact, in Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969, 973 (Fla.1994), this Court highlighted the comments of the United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529-30 , 107 S.Ct. 1931 , 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (1987), that “[i]n deciding whether particular police conduct is interrogation [under Innis 21 ], we must remember the purpose behind our decisions in Miranda and Edwards: preventing government officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained environment.” What could violate this principle more than an officer using …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Herron v. State
“This is not a case where the defendant ceased complaining about his counsel and proceeded to trial after having an opportunity to express to the court the reasons for his dissatisfaction with counsel.” Milkey, 16 So.3d at 178 ; see also State v. Kelly, 999 So.2d 1029, 1036 (Fla.2008) (reiterating the well-established principle that courts may not presume waiver of constitutional rights from a silent record); Lindsey, 69 So.3d at 366 (concluding that “the passage of a few months and a subsequent trial do not amount to a waiver” of a request to discharge counsel); Cf. Morrison v. State,…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Milkey v. State
See, e.g., Morrison, 818 So.2d at 441 ; Lowe, 650 So.2d at 975; Wilson, 889 So.2d at 116-17 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Maine v. Violette
Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 , (1931) (no interrogation under Miranda when suspect's wife spoke with suspect about murder with a police officer present and recording the conversation, after the suspect had invoked his right to counsel); Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969, 972-74 (Fla. 1994) (suspect not interrogated under Miranda when suspect's girlfriend sought and was granted access to suspect after he had invoked his right to counsel, and she persuaded him to confess); United States v. Gaddy, 894 F.2d 1307, 1309-11 (11th Cir. 1990) (no Miranda violation when suspect’s aunt, who was a police officer, cal…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Smithers v. State
Lowe then gave the investigators a statement in which he confessed that he was the driver of the getaway car involved in the crime but denied any complicity in the murder, which he blamed on one of two alleged accomplices. 650 So.2d at 972 (footnote omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Morrison v. State
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Moreover, as stated in Lowe, a trial judge's inquiry into a defendant's complaints about his or her attorneys "can only be as specific and meaningful as the defendant's complaint." 650 So.2d at 975.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Tucker v. State
Furthermore, "[a]s a practical matter, a trial judge's inquiry into a defendant's complaint of incompetence of counsel can be only as specific and meaningful as the defendant's complaint." Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969, 975 (Fla.1994).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cook v. State
See, e.g., Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 , 107 S.Ct. 1931 , 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (no interrogation under Miranda when suspect's wife spoke with suspect about murder with a police officer present and recording the conversation, after the suspect had invoked his right to counsel); United States v. Gaddy, 894 F.2d 1307, 1309-1311 (11th Cir.1990) (no Miranda violation when suspect's aunt, who was a police officer, called suspect in jail after he invoked his right to counsel and persuaded him to confess); Snethen v. Nix, 885 F.2d 456, 457-460 (8th Cir.1989) (accused not interrogated under Miranda when h…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dunn v. State
The court noted, "Davis never made any unequivocal request to discharge his court-appointed counsel; he subsequently allowed his attorney to represent him throughout the trial. `As a practical matter, a trial judge's inquiry into a defendant's complaints of incompetence of counsel can be only as specific and meaningful as the defendant's complaint.'" Davis, 703 So.2d at 1058 -59 (quoting Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969, 975 (Fla. 1994)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Norton v. State
Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969, 974 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 887 , 116 S.Ct. 230 , 133 L.Ed.2d 159 (1995); Jackson v. State, 451 So.2d 458, 461 (Fla.1984); Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla.1978).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Davis v. State
Davis never made an unequivocal request to discharge his court-appointed counsel; he subsequently allowed his attorney to represent him throughout the trial. [3] *1059 "As a practical matter, a trial judge's inquiry into a defendant's complaints of incompetence of counsel can be only as specific and meaningful as the defendant's complaint." Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969, 975 (Fla.1994).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Gainer v. State
Mindful that a " Nelson inquiry" can only be "as specific and meaningful as the defendant's complaint" of ineffective assistance, Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969, 975 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 230 , 133 L.Ed.2d 159 , we find no error.
discussed
Cited "see"
Ryan Erick Cheney v. State of Florida
See Lowe v. State, 650 So. 2d 969, 975 (Fla. 1994) (rejecting defendant’s claim that trial court erred in failing to conduct a Nelson 4 inquiry when the defendant told the trial court “[n]ever mind . . . [j]ust forget it” while the court was questioning the defendant about his concerns with his counsel).
discussed
Cited "see"
Knight v. State
(2×)
See Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969 (Fla.1994) (holding a defendant's general grievances did not warrant additional inquiry where the defendant could point to no specific acts of counsel's alleged incompetence); Smith v. State, 641 So.2d 1319 (Fla.1994); Augsberger v. State, 655 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (finding appellant's stated basis for dissatisfaction was obviously founded on what he perceived to be inadequate conferences with his attorney which, without a more specific claim of incompetence, does not require a full Nelson inquiry).
discussed
Cited "see"
Soto v. State
See Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969, 975 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 887 , 116 S.Ct. 230 , 133 L.Ed.2d 159 (1995) ("[A]s a practical matter, a trial judge's inquiry into a defendant's complaints of incompetence of counsel can be only as specific and meaningful as the defendant's complaint.").
cited
Cited "see"
Moultrie v. State
See Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 230 , 133 L.Ed.2d 159 (1995).
cited
Cited "see"
McPhee v. State
See Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969 (Fla.1994); State v. Law, 559 So.2d 187 (Fla.1989); Augsberger v. State, 655 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
cited
Cited "see"
Jones v. State
See Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969 (Fla. 1994); Augsberger v. State, 655 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Matthews v. State, 584 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Jackson v. State
See, e.g., Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969, 975 (Fla.1994) (making no mention of request to discharge attorney during defendant’s expressions of dissatisfaction with appointed counsel); cf. Davis v. State, 70S So.2d 1055, 1058-59 (Fla.1997) (concluding Nelson was inapplicable because defendant never made unequivocal request to discharge appointed counsel).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Franqui v. State
See, e.g., Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969 (Fla.1994), ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 230 , 133 L.Ed.2d 159 (1995); Smith v. State, 641 So.2d 1319 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1163 , 115 S.Ct. 1129 , 130 L.Ed.2d 1091 (1995); Mordenti v. State, 630 So.2d 1080 (Fla.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1227 , 114 S.Ct. 2726 , 129 L.Ed.2d 849 (1994).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Mayfield
We reject this argument “because it is clear that defendant’s conversations with his own visitors are not the constitutional equivalent of police interrogation.” (People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 170 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 679 , 802 P.2d 169 ]; see Arizona v. Mauro (1987) 481 U.S. 520, 530 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 458, 468-469 , 107 S.Ct. 1931 ]; see also Lowe v. State (Fla. 1994) 650 So.2d 969, 972-974 .) This is particularly true here because defendant had specifically and repeatedly asked to be allowed to speak with his father.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Mesa v. State
Mauro, 481 U.S. at 528 , 107 S.Ct. at 1936 ; see also, Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 230 , 133 L.Ed.2d 159 (1995) (Police did not interrogate defendant, who had asserted his right to counsel, by allowing his girlfriend to speak with him at her request, even though the police knew that there was a good possibility that she was going to try to get him to admit his involvement in a murder.) In Mauro , the Court concluded that although there was a possibility that the defendant would incriminate himself while talking to his wife, the police actions …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Joseph THOMPSON, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
83064.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct 27, 1994.
Per Curiam.
Cited by 7 opinions | Published
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and James W. Rogers, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Thompson v. State, 627 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), which expressly and directly conflicts with the opinions in Sirmons v. State, 634 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1994), and Goodwin v. State, 634 So.2d 157 (Fla. 1994). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
Based on a single sexual act, Thompson was convicted of sexual battery on a physically incapacitated victim in violation of section 794.011(4)(f), Florida Statutes (1991), and sexual activity while in custodial authority of a child, in violation of section 794.041(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991). He was sentenced to two concurrent nine-year terms. The district court found no multiple-punishments problem in this sentencing scheme, but noted possible conflict with George v. State, 488 So.2d 589 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). However, the district court proceeded to distinguish George from the instant case.
We do not address whether conflict with George exists, because we find independent conflict with Sirmons and Goodwin. In those two cases we held multiple punishments impermissible based on a single act if the various offenses are distinguished only by degree elements, which clearly is the case here. Accordingly, we find that the prohibition against multiple punishments has been violated. Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. The decision below is quashed, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with our views here and in Sirmons and Goodwin. Dual convictions and sentences are not permissible here.
It is so ordered.
GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur.