Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1977). · Go Syfert
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Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
28 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ashley Knapp v. Brian Knapp (fladistctapp, 2019-02-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ashley Knapp v. Brian Knapp
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
The wife’s pro se plea, that the case be lodged in the county where she and the children 4 reside (and where a local court can oversee a parenting plan and settlement agreement), versus in a county a four-hour drive away, where the former husband doesn’t live and only occasionally visits his mother (and where, according to the former wife’s legal papers, the former wife and former husband “never lived as a married couple” thereby precluding venue in the first instance; that they were married there doesn’t support a finding that they lived there), see Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So. 2d …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McGee v. McGee
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
“In a dissolution of marriage action, the trial court is to look to the single county where ‘the intact marriage was last evidenced by a continuing union of partners who intended to remain and to remain married, indefinitely if not permanently.’” Crawford v. Crawford, 415 So.2d 870, 870 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (citing Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So.2d 771, 772 (Fla.1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kopecky v. Kopecka
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
“It is well-established that venue [for the purposes of applying the venue statute, section 47.011, Florida Statutes], in an action for dissolution of marriage, lies in the county where the parties last lived with a common intent to remain married.” Butler v. Butler, 866 So.2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (citing Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So.2d 771, 772 (Fla.1977)); see also Bowman v. Bowman, 597 So.2d 399, 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (citing Carroll).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Butler v. Butler
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So.2d 771, 772 (Fla.1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Brown
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
However, the correct construction and application of this section in a dissolution proceeding is set forth in Carroll v. Carroll, 341 So.2d 771, 772 (Fla.1977), where the court said: To protect the beneficial purposes of both the marriage dissolution legislation and the venue statute, we are required to look, not for the county or the scattered counties where the breach may be said to have occurred, but to the single county where the marriage last existed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Goedmakers v. Goedmakers
Fla. · 1988 · confidence medium
Ordinarily the court will recognize that county naturally, as do the parties themselves, and the venue problem will be no more difficult than finding where the marriage partners called home." 341 So.2d at 772 (emphasis added).
cited Cited "see" Beggs v. Beggs
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Carroll v. Carroll, 322 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), affirmed, 341 So.2d 771 (Fla.1977).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Vernell CARROLL, Petitioner,
v.
Glen A. CARROLL, Respondent.
48495.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan 13, 1977.
341 So. 2d 771
Overton.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published

Wm. Howard LaPorte, Crestview, for petitioner.

W. Paul Thompson of Thompson & Adkinson, Defuniak Springs, for respondent.

[*772] OVERTON, Chief Justice.

This is a petition for writ of certiorari seeking reversal of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal reported at 322 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). As acknowledged by the First District, that decision conflicts with Arnold v. Arnold, 273 So.2d 405 (Fla.2d DCA 1973). We have jurisdiction.[1]

This case involves a dispute over venue in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. On April 8, 1972, respondent and petitioner travelled to Alabama to be united in marriage as husband and wife. They returned to Florida and lived in Holmes County for about eight months when petitioner left her husband and moved to Okaloosa County. She remained there for about a year but then rejoined her husband in Holmes County. This second and last attempt to cohabit as husband and wife endured no longer than the first, and petitioner returned to Okaloosa County in July of 1974.

According to petitioner, four days after she resumed residence in Okaloosa County she was visited by her husband who angrily demanded the keys to their automobile. Petitioner yielded, giving the keys to respondent. It was at this point, petitioner contends, that she realized their marriage was irretrievably broken and that she decided to seek its dissolution.

Three months later petitioner filed in Okaloosa County a petition for dissolution of their marriage. Respondent objected to petitioner's choice of forum and filed a "plea of privilege," which, as noted by the First District,

"... was properly treated as a motion to dismiss for improper venue or to transfer. Rule 1.140 R.C.P.; Inverness Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. McDaniel, 78 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1955)." 322 So.2d at 54.

The trial judge denied respondent's motion.

Respondent took an interlocutory appeal to the First District Court of Appeal, contending that venue was improper under Section 47.011, Florida Statutes.[2] The issue before the First District was whether the cause of action in this dissolution proceeding arose in Okaloosa County because petitioner alleges that it was in that county their marriage became irretrievably broken. The First District answered in the negative, ruling as follows:

"To protect the beneficial purposes of both the marriage dissolution legislation and the venue statute, we are required to look, not for the county or the scattered counties where the breach may be said to have occurred, but to the single county where the marriage last existed. In that county the intact marriage was last evidenced by a continuing union of partners who intended ... to remain married, indefinitely if not permanently. Ordinarily the court will recognize that county naturally, as do the parties themselves, and the venue problem will be no more difficult than finding where the marriage partners called home. Courts have long asked that simple question when determining the domicile of succession. Smith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 81, 97-101, 154-59 (1857), reh. den. 7 Fla. 180. The harder cases inevitably arising in this day of atomic families and separate residence [Judd v. Schooley, 158 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1963)] will respond to a test like that employed to resolve domiciliary controversies in other contexts. See Wade v. Wade, 93 Fla. 1004, 113 So. 374 (1927), invoking the Roman doctrine, and Perez v. Perez, 164 So.2d 561 (Fla.App.3rd, 1964). In what county were both partners last present with a common intention to remain married and in that place? There the marriage was broken, although recognition of the breach was postponed; there the cause of action for dissolution arose, within the meaning and application of § 47.011... ." 322 So.2d at 57.

We agree with the reasoning of the First District Court of Appeal and adopt it as our[*773] own. The decision of the First District is approved and the petition for writ of certiorari is denied.

It is so ordered.

BOYD, ENGLAND, SUNDBERG and ROBERTS (Retired), JJ., concur.

1 Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
2 "Where actions may be begun. — Actions shall be brought only in the county where the defendant resides, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located. This section shall not apply to actions against nonresidents." [Emphasis supplied.]