Ripple v. Packard, 471 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). · Go Syfert
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Ripple v. Packard, 471 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
4 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Ruffin v. KINGSWOOD E. CONDOMINIUM ASS'N (fladistctapp, 1998-10-07)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ruffin v. KINGSWOOD E. CONDOMINIUM ASS'N
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Nevertheless, that finding did not give the arbitrator jurisdiction where the arbitrator also determined that appellant had vacated the apartment. [2] In Ripple v. Packard, 471 So.2d 1293, 1294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), the third district held that it was error for a circuit court to vacate an arbitration award without directing a rehearing where the parties had agreed to submit all disputes to arbitration in their contract.
discussed Cited "see" Loewenstein, Inc. v. Draheim
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Ripple v. Packard, 471 So.2d 1293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Fridman v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc., 596 So.2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), overruled on other grounds by Tumberry Assocs. v. Service Station Aid, Inc., 651 So.2d 1173 (Fla.1995); see also § 682.13(3), 682.20(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2005).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
David W. RIPPLE and Kenneth M. Williams, Petitioners,
v.
Thomas R. PACKARD, Respondent.
84-1900.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
May 28, 1985.
471 So. 2d 1293
Nesbitt, Baskin and Jorgenson.
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published

Kanner, Brown & Lambert, Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson and William E. Sadowski and Nina Kole Brown, Miami, for petitioners.

Ezell, Menendez & Patterson and William D. Matthewman and Boyce F. Ezell, III, Miami, for respondent.

Before NESBITT, BASKIN and JORGENSON, JJ.

JORGENSON, Judge.

David W. Ripple and Thomas R. Packard entered into a written joint venture agreement[*1294] involving three parcels of real estate located in Dade County, Florida. Their joint venture agreement included an arbitration clause. The predictable falling-out occurred, and Packard brought an action in the circuit court seeking enforcement of the terms of the agreement and invoking the arbitration clause. The trial court entered an order compelling arbitration. Subsequently, the parties agreed to the conditions of an arbitration award which provided for the sale of all joint venture assets, the method and manner by which the real property would be sold, and the division of the proceeds. The agreed award also contained a provision conferring upon Ripple a right of first refusal for ten days on any bona fide written offer for each of the parcels involved. Two of the parcels have been sold to Ripple pursuant to those provisions; only lot 7 remains and is at issue.

Ripple sought to close on lot 7 and, finding Packard reluctant, moved to compel compliance with the award. Packard countered with a motion to vacate the award, alleging in substance that the award had been procured by fraud. Following a hearing on the issues raised, the trial court granted Packard's motion to set aside the agreed arbitration award.

As a threshold issue, Packard argues that this court is without jurisdiction to review the trial court's order. We disagree. See Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Bloom, 386 So.2d 286, 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). An order vacating an arbitration award without directing a rehearing is a departure from the essential requirements of law. See § 682.20(e), Fla. Stat. (1983); see also Carner v. Freedman, 175 So.2d 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) (trial court order vacating arbitration award and directing rehearing by arbitration panel not appealable). The rehearing contemplated by the statute is before the arbitration panel and not, as Packard suggests, further proceedings by the trial court. See Carner.

We, accordingly, grant certiorari, quash the order under review, and remand to the trial court with directions either to enforce the remaining one-third of the agreed arbitration award or, in the alternative, to remand to the arbiter for further proceedings.

Certiorari granted; order quashed; cause remanded with directions.