Morrow v. State, 458 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). · Go Syfert
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Morrow v. State, 458 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
4 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gonzalez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
In Morrow v. State, 458 So.2d 312, 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), the court held that a trial-scheduling conference is not a proceeding at which the defendant’s presence is necessarily required in the absence of an order to that effect.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Clark v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see also · confidence low
P. 3.191(j)(2); see also Morrow v. State, 458 So.2d 312 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (failure of defendant and his counsel to attend trial-scheduling conference did not establish that defendant was unavailable for trial within meaning of the speedy trial rule where trial-scheduling court conference was neither trial date nor proceeding at which presence of defendant was required by rules or any order in present case).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John Leroy MORROW, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
83-1157.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Sep 20, 1984.
458 So. 2d 312
Cowart.
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published

[*313] Leon B. Cheek, III, Casselberry, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and W. Brian Bayly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

COWART, Judge.

The "speedy trial" rule, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191, requires that a person charged with a felony crime offense be brought to trial within 180 days of being taken into custody or, upon motion, that he be discharged. Because the state attorney failed to cause the defendant to be tried within the required period of time and the trial judge failed during that time period to enter an order specifically extending that time period for exceptional circumstances, this court must order that he be discharged. The trial judge's order in another case (erroneously) declaring a statute unconstitutional (see State v. Kaufman, 430 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1983)), did not have the effect of automatically extending the speedy trial time period in this case.

A trial scheduling court conference is neither a trial date nor a proceeding at which the presence of the defendant is required by the rules or any order in this case. Therefore, the failure of the defendant and his counsel to attend a trial scheduling conference does not establish that the defendant was unavailable for trial under Rule 3.191(e). See Fulk v. State, 417 So.2d 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Neither are the operative facts in State v. Kubesh, 378 So.2d 121 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), present here.

The judgment of conviction herein is reversed, the sentence vacated and the defendant discharged.

REVERSED.

COBB, C.J., and DAUKSCH, J., concur.