Gonzalez v. State, 808 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). · Go Syfert
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Gonzalez v. State, 808 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: GILBERTO ALVAREZ v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA (fladistctapp, 2022-08-10)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) GILBERTO ALVAREZ v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Thus, designation as a sexual predator pursuant to Section 775.21 is “regulatory and procedural in nature,” and “[r]egulatory statutes do not constitute punishment.” Gonzalez v. State, 808 So. 2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (quoting Fletcher v. State, 699 So. 2d 2 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cuevas v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Gonzalez v. State, 808 So.2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).
discussed Cited "see" Boyer v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gonzalez v. State, 808 So.2d 1265 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (quoting Fletcher v. State, 699 So.2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)); Walker v. State, 718 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); see also Freeland v. State, 832 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that the registration and reporting requirements of the Sexual Predator Act are "regulatory and procedural in nature and do not violate the ex post facto clause.").
discussed Cited "see" Therrien v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Gonzalez v. State, 808 So.2d 1265, 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (rejecting appellant's argument that the Florida Sexual Predators Act imposes punishment ex post facto ); Rickman v. State, 714 So.2d 538, 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (same); Collie v. State, 710 So.2d 1000, 1009-11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (same).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Gray v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Walker v. Bentley, 678 *808 So.2d 1265 (Fla.1996) (statute providing that indirect criminal contempt may not be used to enforce compliance with injunctions against domestic violence violates constitutional separation of powers); Page v. State, 677 So.2d 55 (Fla. 1st DCA), approved on other grounds, 684 So.2d 817 (Fla.1996) (statute which requires appellate courts to rule on a question of law raised by the state on cross-appeal regardless of the disposition of the defendant's appeal violates separation of powers doctrine); Ong v. Mike Guido Properties, 668 So.2d 708 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Guillermo GONZALEZ, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
3D98-668.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Mar 6, 2002.
808 So. 2d 1265
Schwartz, C.J., and Jorgenson, J., and Nesbitt, Senior Judge.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Manuel Alvarez, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Erin K. Zack, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and JORGENSON, J., and NESBITT, Senior Judge.

NESBITT, Senior Judge.

Defendant Guillermo Gonzalez appeals the public notification requirement of his classification as a sexual predator. We affirm.

Defendant was charged with one count of kidnaping and six counts of sexual battery with a deadly weapon or force. The information alleged that the foregoing offenses occurred on or between August 3rd and 4th, 1995. On August 28, 1997, defendant was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement, and on February 12, 1998, the trial court declared defendant a sexual predator.[1] The trial court applied the 1997 version of the Sexual Predator Act. Defendant argues that the 1995 version of the Act should have been used. He claims that the application of the notice provisions of the 1997 Act unjustly subjected him to a more wide spread dissemination of his designation as a sexual predator, and as such amounted to an ex post facto violation.[2] We disagree.

[*1266] "In evaluating whether a law violates the ex post facto clause, a two-prong test must be applied: (1) whether the law is retrospective in its effect; and (2) whether the law alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable." Simmons v. State 753 So.2d 762, 763 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), citing Arnold v. State, 755 So.2d 696, 699 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Regulatory statutes do not constitute punishment. See Fletcher v. State, 699 So.2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). The reporting requirements as well as the notification requirements of the Sexual Predator Act are regulatory and procedural in nature and do not violate the ex post facto clause. See Rickman v. State, 714 So.2d 538, 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); see also Oce v. State, 742 So.2d 464, 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Deatley v. State, 722 So.2d 286 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).

Accordingly, the order under review is affirmed.

1 Although the defendant clearly states that he is objecting solely to the public notification portion of his classification as a sexual predator, he argues generally that the trial court was without authority to designate him a sexual predator because the determination was not made contemporaneous to his initial sentencing. We find this claim unmeritorious. As stated in Fletcher v. State, 699 So.2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), the sexual predator designation is not an impermissible modification of an offender's sentence "because the designation `sexual predator' is neither a sentence nor a punishment." See Collie v. State, 710 So.2d 1000, 1006 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
2 The 1995 version of the act required the sheriff or chief of police to notify the public of the sexual predator's presence by publishing a notice in a newspaper for several consecutive weeks. See § 775.225(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). The level of dissemination under the 1997 statute included notification statewide, as well as placement on the Internet. See § 775.21(7), Fla. Stat. (1997).