Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748 (Del. 2006). · Go Syfert
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Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748 (Del. 2006). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“where the informant is a known, law abiding citizen reporting a crime, the informant is considered presumptively reliable, because the informant has no connection to the criminal world and no reason to fabricate the story.”
85 citation events (85 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
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examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Taylor; State v. Simmons (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Del. Super. Ct. · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
where the informant is a known, law abiding citizen reporting a crime, the informant is considered presumptively reliable, because the informant has no connection to the criminal world and no reason to fabricate the story.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Cosby v. State
Del. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in demonstrating that a forfeited error is prejudicial, the burden of persuasion is on the defendant.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clark v. State
Del. · 2026 · confidence medium
Instead, he argues that no remedy short of a mistrial could “cure[] the egregiously prejudicial impact of the State’s key witness, a minor, contradicting her earlier exculpatory testimony after being improperly influenced at a critical juncture by repeated prosecutorial misconduct and repeated questions about her honesty raised by the trial court.” 41 Our careful examination of the record surrounding S.M.’s testimony leads us to conclude that, because the prosecutor’s interaction with S.M. was outside the jury’s presence, the trial judge’s questions and comments were appropriatel…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Swanson v. State (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Del. · 2025 · confidence medium
“An informant’s tip may provide reasonable suspicion for a stop and seizure where the totality of the circumstances, if corroborated, indicates that the information is 63 Swanson, 2023 WL 11876797 , at *5–7. 64 Answering Br. at 12. 65 Diggs, 257 A.3d at 1005. 66 Swanson, 2023 WL 11876797 , at *5. 67 Id. 20 reliable.”68 “[T]he reasonable suspicion standard ‘requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.’” 69 In determining whether a tip is sufficiently reliable in the totality of the circumstances, “a …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Muniz-Rodriguez v. State
Del. · 2025 · confidence medium
We find no plain error as to these issues. (9) Muniz-Rodriguez asserts that thirteen photographs that he sent to the detective during his interview at the police station—photographs suggesting a positive relationship between the Child and Muniz-Rodriguez, taken before the day 6 See Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006) (finding no plain error as to defendant’s contention that the trial court, sua sponte, should have given a missing-evidence instruction); see also Tisinger v. State, 2025 WL 2047466 , at *2 (Del.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Clifton
Del. Super. Ct. · 2024 · confidence medium
I, § 6; Fink v. State, 817 A.2d 781, 786 (Del. 2003). 34 Sisson v. State, 903 A.2d 288, 296 (Del. 2006). 35 Id. 36 Valentine v. State, 207 A.3d 566, 572 (Del. 2019) (citing Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 715 (Del. 2006); Holden v. State, 60 A.3d 1110, 1114 (Del. 2013); and LeGrande, 947 A.2d at 1108 ). 37 LeGrande, 947 A.2d at 1108 (citing Hubbard v. State, 782 A.2d 264 , 2001 WL 1089664 , at *4 (Del.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Taylor
Del. Super. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
And 12 Revel v. State, 956 A.2d 23, 27 (Del. 2008) (citing Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. 2006)) (citations omitted). 13 Flowers v. State, 858 A.2d 328 , 334–35 (Del. 2004) (citing Ashley v. State, 798 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Del. 2002)). 14 Pena v. State, 856 A.2d 548, 552 (Del. 2004) (citing Davis v. State, 725 A.2d 441 (Del. 1999) (quoting Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998)). 15 Flowers, 858 A.2d at 335 (citations omitted). 16 Revel, 956 A.2d at 27 (quoting Pena, 856 A.2d at 551 ) (citations omitted). 17 856 A.2d 548 (Del. 2004). 18 Pena, 856 A.2d at 550-51 (citations omitted)…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. McGuiness
Del. Super. Ct. · 2022 · confidence medium
If documents from the laptops are used by the Defendant in her case, the Court will 31 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. 2006). 9 consider to what extent the State may use the excluded documents in rebuttal during trial.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) White v. State (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Del. · 2020 · confidence medium
“The trial judge is in the best position to assess the risk of any prejudice resulting from trial events.”126 We have, on at least one other occasion, refused to find plain error from jury confusion due to presence of both accomplice and conspiracy instructions when the instructions were accurate statements of the law, the evidence supports the jury’s 125 Id. at A146. 126 Sykes v. State, 953 A.2d 261, 267 (Del. 2008) (quoting Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. 2006)). 32 findings, and where there was no evidence of jury confusion.127 Because he did not raise it below, we are limited…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Washington
Del. Super. Ct. · 2019 · confidence medium
The parties agreed to arrange a 6 Td. at *2 (quoting Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 751 (Del. 2006). 7 Id transaction for the sale of heroin and meet at a location on Kirkwood Highway.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State
Del. · 2018 · confidence medium
Ct. R. 8 (providing that the Court will only consider on appeal those issues that were fairly presented to the trial court, unless the interests of justice require otherwise). 4 Russell v. State, 5 A.3d 622, 627 (Del. 2010). 5 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 6 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006). 5 significant mental health issues and his history of trauma as mitigating factors at sentencing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pinkston v. State
Del. · 2018 · confidence medium
Ct. R. 8; Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 3 Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100 . 4 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006). 5 Superior Court New Castle County Criminal Case Management Plan at 4-8. 4 additional time to prepare for trial.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State
Del. · 2018 · confidence medium
Ct. R. 8; Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 8 Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100 . 9 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006). 10 Wright v. State, 980 A.2d 1020, 1023 (Del. 2009). 7 (18) “The defense of alibi…is based upon evidence that the defendant ‘was somewhere other than at the place the crime is alleged to have been committed when it is alleged to have been committed.’”11 We have held that “where a defendant offers an alibi defense by introducing substantial evidence showing that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed,” the Superior Court’s failu…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nickerson v. State
Del. · 2018 · confidence medium
State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1099-11 (Del. 1986). 5 Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100 . 6 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. 2006). 7 Miller v. State, 25 A.3d 768, 771 (Del. 2011). 8 Brown, 897 A.2d at 751 . 5 Patrician Terrace Complex on October 27, 2016.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bartell v. State
Del. · 2018 · confidence medium
The principal evidence of Bartell’s guilt was the detailed testimony of his wife, who had promptly reported the assault to the police and then recounted the brutal facts to the nurse who treated her later that same day at the 15 Id. at A118. 16 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 17 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006). 18 Id. 8 hospital.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. State
Del. · 2018 · confidence medium
Ct. R. 8; Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 4 Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100 . 5 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. 2006). 6 Wright v. State, 980 A.2d 1020, 1023 (Del. 2009). 7 room window; and (ii) he was unable to find a projectile because the path of a fired bullet can be unpredictable and he had been to multiple shooting scenes where no projectiles were recovered.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Booker v. State
Del. · 2017 · confidence medium
As important, when read in its full context, the slide presentation was not 25 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 26 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006). 27 Spence v. State, 129 A.3d 212, 223 (Del. 2015). 14 inflammatory but walked the jury through the evidence presented by the State that, in the view of the state, proved that Booker was guilty.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Givens v. State
Del. · 2017 · confidence medium
Ct. R. 8. "' Waimw'ight v. Sta!e, 504 A.?_d 1096, l 100 (Del. 1986). 15 alarm v. Sm:e, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006). 10 (19) We find no plain error in this case. ln its instructions, the Superior Court properly informed the jurors that they were the sole triers of the facts and that the statements made by counsel in their opening and closing arguments were not evidence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wiggins v. State
Del. · 2017 · confidence medium
Ct. R. 8; Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006). 3 face of the record and is so fundamental and serious that it affected the outcome of the proceedings.4 “To be disqualified the alleged bias or prejudice of the judge ‘must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.’”5 (7) At the March 11, 2016 hearing, the Superior Court judge, who accepted Wiggins’ guilty plea and who presided over the cases of Wiggins’ co-defendants, questioned whether Wiggins could satisfy th…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Phillips v. State
Del. · 2017 · confidence medium
Id. at 27 (quoting Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. 2006)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Phillips v. State (2×)
Del. · 2017 · confidence medium
Id. at 27 (quoting Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del 2006)). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Johnson
Del. Super. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
“A tip from a confidential informant can provide probable cause, if the totality of the circumstances demonstrates the tip’s reliability.”16 In evaluating the tip’s reliability, “a court must consider the reliability of the informant, the details contained in the informant's tip, and the degree to which the tip is corroborated by independent police surveillance and information.”17 For instance, 12 Stajj”ord, 59 A.3d at 1229 (citing Tolson, 900 A.2d at 643 ). 13 id. (citing State v. Maxwell, 624 A.2d 926, 928 (Dei. 1993)). 14 See Maxwell, 624 A.2d at 928 (quoting Illinois v. Gates…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clanton v. State
Del. · 2017 · confidence medium
Evid. 103(d). 3 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 4 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006). 5 Tyre v. State, 412 A.2d 326, 330 (Del. 1980). 4 the jury's purview to credit part of her testimony while rejecting other parts.6 Under the circumstances, Clanton has not met his burden of showing any prejudice. (9) Clanton’s second claim is the Superior Court improperly relied upon the victim’s inconsistent statements at sentencing.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Altizer v. State (2×)
Del. Super. Ct. · 2017 · confidence medium
Ct. Apr. 17, 2009). ‘" Bmwn v. Szaze, 897 A.2d 748, 750 (Del. 2006). ll Id 12 S¢are v. Abel, 68 A.3d 1228, 1232 (Dei. 2012); Cooke v. Sm¢e, 977 A.2d 803, 854 (Del. 2009) 13 Abel, 68 A.3d at 1232 (internal quotations and citations omitted); Lopez v. State, 861 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (Del. 2004) (“This deferential standard applies not only to historical facts that are based upon credibility determinations but also to findings of historical fact that are based on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from other facts.”). _4_ cannot be clearly erroneous.”14 Once the facts and reason…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allison v. State
Del. · 2016 · confidence medium
Thus, any objections to the form of the indictment are waived.5 Even if not waived, we would review only for plain error.6 Error is plain when it is “so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”7 Plain errors are “limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.”8 “To be plain, the alleged error must affect substantial rights, gener…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Green v. State
Del. · 2016 · confidence medium
With such overwhelming evidence of guilt, Green has failed to show that the admission of the older sister’s statement would have affected the outcome of the trial. (13) Green argues next that Mother’s statement—that she and her daughters moved from Connecticut to Delaware because Green threatened to kill them—was unfairly prejudicial because the court gave no curative instruction after 6 Id. 7 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006) (citing to United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). 8 Brown, 897 A.2d at 753 . 6 sustaining an objection.9 Green argues that although his c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walsh v. State
Del. · 2016 · confidence medium
Ct. R. 8; Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. 2006). 5 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 4 plain error in the Superior Court’s admission of the evidence seized at Walsh’s apartment. (10) Walsh next argues that he was deprived of his right to a fair and impartial trial because Corporal Popp engaged in conduct designed to intimidate the jurors into returning a favorable verdict for the State.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carter v. State
Del. · 2014 · confidence medium
Evid. 103(d). 10 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 11 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006). 12 See Del.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clark v. State
Del. · 2014 · confidence medium
Evid. 103(d). 4 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 5 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006). 8 basis to conclude that the prosecutor’s error affected Clark’s substantial rights and jeopardized the integrity of the trial. (17) Clark next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this misstatement in the prosecutor’s rebuttal.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. State
Del. · 2014 · confidence medium
The officer testified that he believed Brown was driving with a suspended license at the time of the stop based on a 3 Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1284-85 (Del. 2008). 4 Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 750 (Del. 2006). 5 11 Del.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Oliver v. State
Del. · 2013 · confidence medium
Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del.2006) (quoting Doran, 606 A.2d at 745 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Roy v. State
Del. · 2012 · confidence medium
Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del. 2006). .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Drummond v. State
Del. · 2012 · confidence medium
Jul. 16, 2009); Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del.2006). .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. State
Del. · 2011 · confidence medium
Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 751 (Del.2006) (citing Tatman v. State, 494 A.2d at 1251 ). 11 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stevens v. State
Del. · 2010 · confidence medium
Ct. R. 8; D.R.E. 103(d); Morgan v. State, 962 A.2d 248, 254 (Del.2008); Flamer v. State, 953 A.2d 130, 133 (Del.2008); Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del.2006); Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 960 (Del.2006). 24 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Woodlin v. State
Del. · 2010 · confidence medium
See Wright v. State, 980 A.2d at 1023 ; Flamer v. State, 953 A.2d 130, 133 (Del.2008); Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del.2006). 6 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bohan v. State
Del. · 2010 · confidence medium
Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del.2006). 2 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) McNally v. State (3×)
Del. · 2009 · confidence medium
R. 8; Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del.2006) (internal citation omitted). 4 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Brower
Del. · 2009 · confidence medium
Burrell v. Slate, 953 A.2d 957, 960 (Del.2008) (citing Brown v. Stale, 897 A.2d 748, 750 (Del.2006); Downs v. State, 570 A.2d 1142, 1144 (Del.1990)). 12 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Greene v. State
Del. · 2009 · confidence medium
Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 753 (Del.2006) (citing Del.Supr.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Brodie v. State (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Del. · 2009 · confidence medium
I, § 7 (same). [2] Culver v. State, 956 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 2008); Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. 2006); McAllister v. State, 807 A.2d 1119, 1122-23 (Del. 2002). [3] Dabney v. State, 952 A.2d 159, 163 (Del. 2008); Culver, 956 A.2d at 10 ; Keyser v. State, 893 A.2d 956, 961 (Del. 2006); McAllister, 807 A.2d at 1122-23 . [4] SUPER.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State
Del. · 2008 · confidence medium
See Revel v. State, 956 A.2d 23, 27 (Del.2008); Chambers v. State, 930 A.2d 904, 909 (Del.2007); Guy v. State, 913 A.2d 558, 565 (Del.2006); Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del.2006); Flowers v. State, 858 A.2d 328, 332-33 (Del.2004); Pena v. State, 856 A.2d 548, 550 (Del.2004). 6 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Morgan v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Del. · 2008 · confidence medium
Id. at 1108 (citing Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 751 (Del.2006)). 8 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Revel v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Del. · 2008 · confidence medium
See Chambers v. State, 930 A.2d 904, 909 (Del.2007); Guy v. State, 913 A.2d 558, 565 (Del.2006); Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del.2006); Flowers v. State, 858 A.2d 328, 332-33 (Del.2004); Taylor v. State, 827 A.2d 24, 27 (Del.2003). 3 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Burrell v. State
Del. · 2008 · confidence medium
Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 750 (Del.2006); Downs v. State, 570 A.2d 1142, 1144 (Del.1990). 12 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) LeGrande v. State
Del. · 2008 · confidence medium
Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 751 (Del.2006); accord Tolson v. State, 900 A.2d 639, 643 (Del.2006); Hubbard, 2001 WL 1089664 , at *4. 9 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sykes v. State
Del. · 2008 · confidence medium
Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. 2006); Smith v. State, 913 A.2d 1197, 1223 (Del.2006).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Fullman
Del. Super. Ct. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 751 (Del. 2006) (determining probable cause for a warrantless arrest based on informant’s tip, the Supreme Court looked to (1) the reliability of the informant, (2) the details contained in the tip; and (3) the degree of independent police corroboration); Holden, 60 A.3d at 1115–16 (same).
discussed Cited "see" McKinney v. State
Del. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 751 (Del.2006) (“The information provided in the tip was corroborated by independent police observations of Brown approaching the Closet at the time reported in the tip.”); Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d 997, 1000 (Del. 1982) (finding that a tip from citizen informant was corroborated when police found the victim’s body at the identified location).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Green v. State
Del. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
But during the CAC interview that occurred on May 29th, Sarah told the interviewer that Green only performed an act of cunnilingus after which he ejaculated on her buttocks and 66 Revel v. State, 956 A.2d 23, 27 (Del. 2008) (quoting Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57, 62 (Del. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Phillips v. State, 154 A.3d 1130, 1144 (Del. 2017). 67 Pena v. State, 856 A.2d 548, 550 (Del. 2004). 68 Revel, 956 A.2d at 27 (quoting Brown v. State, 897 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. 2006)). 31 then left the room.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jeron BROWN, Defendant Below, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee
274,2005.
Supreme Court of Delaware.
Apr 6, 2006.
897 A.2d 748
Thomas D. Donovan, Esquire, Schwartz & Schwartz, Dover, Delaware, for appellant., John Williams, Esquire, Department of Justice, Dover, Delaware, for appellee.
Steele, Holland, Jacobs.
Cited by 54 opinions  |  Published
HOLLAND, Justice.

The defendant-appellant, Jeron Brown, appeals from his convictions of Burglary in the Second Degree, Theft, two counts of Receiving Stolen Property, and Criminal Mischief. In this appeal, Brown alleges that the Superior Court erred by: first, denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search incident to his arrest because the police did not have probable cause to arrest him; second, denying his request for a mistrial after the State disclosed potentially exculpatory evidence during the trial; and third, failing to[*750] provide, sua sponte, a missing evidence jury instruction because a witness was unavailable to testify at trial. We conclude that there was no reversible error. Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court must be affirmed.

Facts

On January 20, 2004, the Del-Mar Appliance store and two private residences in Dover, Delaware, were burglarized. After the third burglary, the police reviewed a video surveillance tape from a local 7-11 store that showed an African American male and female attempting to sell items to the store clerk. Anwar Al-Rasul, the third burglary victim, had earlier identified the items on the tape as items that were stolen from his home. Later that day, the police received a tip from Mr. Al-Rasul’s wife that an African American man would soon attempt to sell items similar to those stolen from her home at a nearby store, named the Closet.

The police set up surveillance outside the Closet. Jeron Brown approached the store carrying a duffel bag and wearing a jacket similar to the jacket worn by the man whose image was captured in the 7-11 video surveillance tape. Brown was also the same race, height, and build of the man shown in the tape. Brown entered the Closet and left shortly thereafter.

As he exited the store, the police approached Brown and immediately handcuffed him. The officers asked Brown if they could pat him down. They also asked Brown if they could search his jacket and duffel bag. Brown consented to both requests. Mr. Al-Rasul identified the items found by the police in Brown’s jacket and duffel bag as his stolen property. The police then obtained a search warrant for Brown’s residence, where they searched and seized more stolen property.

Probable Cause Established

Before trial, Brown moved to suppress the evidence seized from his person and his home. The Superior Court denied Brown’s motion and held that the police had probable cause to arrest Brown when they approached him and handcuffed him. In this appeal, Brown argues that the police had no reasonable and articulable suspicion to arrest him at the time he exited the Closet because the tip to the police was anonymous and uncorroborated and Brown did not attempt to sell anything inside the Closet. The State argues that the arrest was proper.

The police handcuffed Brown immediately after approaching him. That action placed Brown in police custody. [1] Consequently, the appropriate inquiry, as correctly determined by the Superior Court, is whether the police had probable cause to arrest Brown at that point in time. [2]

Whether probable cause exists in a given case is a mixed question of fact and law. [3] The trial court’s basic factual findings will be upheld on appeal if they are supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process. [4] The trial court’s ultimate findings, however, implicate questions of law and, therefore, the standard of appellate review is de novo. 5

[*751] The police may, by statute, make a war-rantless arrest where “[t]he officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony...” [6] This Court has interpreted “reasonable ground to believe” as the legal equivalent of “probable cause.” [7] That standard is measured by the totality of the circumstances. [8]

An informant’s tip may provide probable cause for a warrantless arrest where the totality of the circumstances, if corroborated, indicates that the information is reliable. [9] In making that determination, a court must consider the reliability of the informant, the details contained in the informant’s tip, and the degree to which the tip is corroborated by independent police surveillance and information. [10] Where the informant is a known, law-abiding citizen reporting a crime, the informant is considered presumptively reliable, because the informant has no connection to the criminal world and no reason to fabricate the story. [11]

The evidence of record supports the Superior Court’s determination that the police had probable cause to arrest Brown. The police knew the informant’s identity. The information provided in the tip was corroborated by independent police observations of Brown approaching the Closet at the time reported in the tip. One of the burglary victims, Mr. Al-Rasul, had identified the items from the 7-11 surveillance tape as those stolen from his home. Brown was wearing a jacket similar to the jacket worn by the man in the 7-11 tape. Brown also was carrying a duffel bag and was of similar build, race and height as the man shown in the tape. These circumstances, when viewed in their totality, establish that probable cause existed to arrest Brown. The Superior Court properly denied Brown’s motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the police search incident to Brown’s arrest.

Mistrial Properly Denied

On the morning of the third day of Brown’s trial, his defense counsel moved for a mistrial because alleged Brady material was not disclosed by the prosecution until the preceding Friday, following two days of Brown’s trial. The alleged Brady material at issue was a laptop computer stolen during the January 20, 2004 burglary of the Del-Mar Appliance store in Dover. The stolen laptop computer was recovered by the Delaware Probation Department from an individual named Moustapha Bobbo. After a probation officer took the laptop from Bobbo, it was turned over to Detective Virdin of the Dover Police Department. Detective Virdin then returned the computer to its rightful owner, Bruce Nygard.

Brown contends that, because the State did not inform him of information regarding Nygard’s recovered laptop computer and because the computer was found in the possession of Bobbo, not Brown, this prevented Brown from introducing witnesses at trial to trace the whereabouts of the computer after it was stolen from the Del-Mar Appliance store. In denying the mistrial motion, the trial judge noted that Brown’s contention concerning the laptop[*752] computer related to only one of his three pending burglary charges.

The State tried to mitigate any potential prejudice to Brown by the late disclosure of the information regarding the laptop computer. The State was able to locate both Moustapha Bobbo and Antonio Medina, another witness who had some information as to how the laptop computer came to be in the possession of Bobbo. Both Bobbo and Medina appeared at Brown’s trial and testified as defense witnesses.

The Superior Court has a variety of remedies available for a discovery violation under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16(d)(2). As this Court has noted, “[I]n determining the question of whether sanctions should be imposed, the trial court should weigh all relevant factors, such as the reason for the State’s delay and the extent of prejudice to the defendant.” [12] As we pointed out in Doran, 13 “Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 sets forth four alternative sanctions: 1) order prompt compliance with the discovery rule; 2) ‘grant a continuance;’ 3) ‘prohibit the party from introducing in evidence material not disclosed;’ or 4) such other order the Court ‘deems just under the circumstances.’ ” [14] At trial, the only remedy requested for the prosecution’s late discovery disclosure was the ultimate sanction of a mistrial on the third day of trial.

Whether a mistrial should be declared is a matter entrusted to the trial judge’s discretion. [15] The trial judge is in the best position to assess the risk of any prejudice resulting from trial events. [16] “A trial judge should grant a mistrial only where there is ‘manifest necessity’ or the ‘ends of public justice would be otherwise defeated.’ ” [17] The remedy of a mistrial is “mandated only when there are ‘no meaningful and practical alternatives’ to that remedy.” [18]

In this case, the practical alternative to granting a mistrial was to permit Brown to present the testimony of both Moustapha Bobbo and Antonio Medina regarding the stolen laptop computer. Both could testify that Jeron Brown had no ostensible connection with that particular item of stolen property before its seizure by a probation officer and ultimate return to the true owner. In fact, Brown presented testimony to that effect by both of those witnesses.

Brown argues on appeal that, had he known about this information at an earlier date, his trial examinations of Medina and Bobbo would have been different. He fails to explain, however, how their examinations would have been different and how the difference(s), if any, would have mattered. The record reflects that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial judge’s refusal to grant Brown’s motion for a mistrial.

[*753] No Plain Error

Finally, Brown contends that the trial judge, sua sponte, should have given a missing evidence instruction pursuant to Deberry v. State. 19 Brown’s request for the Deberry missing evidence jury instruction did not involve the physical evidence at issue (the laptop computer), but, rather, related to a missing witness, Laura Johansen, who was not available to testify at Brown’s trial. Johansen was the person who gave the stolen laptop computer to Bobbo and presumably could have testified that she purchased the laptop computer from someone other than Brown.

Brown made no request at trial for a Deberry missing evidence jury instruction. Therefore, that claim has been waived by Brown and may now be reviewed on appeal only for plain error. [20] To be plain, the alleged error must affect substantial rights, generally meaning that it must have affected the outcome of Brown’s trial. [21] In demonstrating that a forfeited error is prejudicial, the burden of persuasion is on Brown. [22]

Brown was found in possession of a digital camera and camera printer taken from the Del-Mar Appliance store when he was arrested by the police. The digital camera and printer that the police discovered in Brown’s possession linked him to the stolen property from the Del-Mar appliance burglary. Accordingly, there was an independent evidentiary basis for the jury to conclude that Brown was guilty of receiving that other stolen property.

Brown was not convicted of the Del-Mar Appliance store burglary. He was convicted only of receiving stolen property resulting from that burglary, property that included the digital camera and the printer. [23] Consequently, Brown cannot demonstrate plain error, because even if Johansen had appeared at trial and testified that she purchased the stolen laptop computer from someone other than Brown, the ultimate result at trial would have been the same.

Conclusion

The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed.

1

. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Quarles v. State, 696 A.2d 1334, 1337 (Del.1997).

3

. Downs v. State, 570 A.2d 1142, 1144 (Del.1990).

4

.Lopez v. State, 861 A.2d 1245, 1248-49 (Del.2004).

5

.Id.

7

. Thompson v. State, 539 A.2d 1052, 1055 (Del.1988).

8

.Id.

9

. Tatman v. State, 494 A.2d 1249, 1251 (Del.1985) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)).

11

. Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d 997, 999 (Del.1982).

12

. Snowden v. State, 677 A.2d 33, 39 (Del.1996). See also Doran v. State, 606 A.2d 743, 745 n. 3 (Del.1992).

13

. Doran v. State, 606 A.2d at 745.

14

. See also Ray v. State, 587 A.2d 439, 441 (Del.1991).

15

. See Flowers v. State, 858 A.2d 328, 332-33 (Del.2004); Taylor v. State, 827 A.2d 24, 27 (Del.2003); Ashley v. State, 798 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Del.2002); Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d 5, 11 (Del.1998).

16

. See Ashley v. State, 798 A.2d at 1022; Hope v. State, 570 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Del.1990); Bowe v. State, 514 A.2d 408, 410 (Del.1986).

17

. Steckel v. State, 711 A.2d at 11 (quoting Fanning v. Superior Court, 320 A.2d 343, 345 (Del.1974)). Accord Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1075-78 (Del.1987).

18

. Dawson v. State, 637 A.2d 57, 62 (Del.1994) (quoting Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d at 1077).

19

. Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744, 750-53 (Del.1983).

20

. Supr. Ct. R. 8; Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 652-53 (Del.2001).

21

. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869, 107 S.Ct. 236, 93 L.Ed.2d 161 (1986) ("Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”); Floray v. State, 720 A.2d 1132, 1137 (Del.1998).

22

. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (federal plain error rule). See also Brown v. State, 729 A.2d 259, 265 (Del.1999); Stevenson v. State, 709 A.2d 619, 633 (Del.1998).