Cmty. Nat'l v. Kelleher, 19 F.3d 1427 (1st Cir. 1994). · Go Syfert
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Cmty. Nat'l v. Kelleher, 19 F.3d 1427 (1st Cir. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“a gap in the medical evidence may itself be evidence that the claimant's condition was not as dire as alleged.”
47 citation events (27 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: DANIELLO v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMISSIONER (med, 2020-04-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1994 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1994 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) DANIELLO v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION COMMISSIONER
D. Me. · 2020 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
a gap in the medical evidence may itself be evidence that the claimant's condition was not as dire as alleged.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Patoski v. Berryhill
D. Mass. · 2018 · confidence medium
The ALJ may assess medical evidence after the DLI to determine if the claimant was disabled prior to the DLI, Rivera 19 F.3d at 1427, but it is also her responsibility to draw inferences from the record, Ortiz 955 F.2d at 769 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nancy Keith McFall v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner, U.S. Social Security Administration (2×)
D.N.H. · 2016 · confidence medium
It is not enough “for a claimant to establish that her impairment had its roots before the date that her insured status expired.” Moret Rivera v. Sec’y Health & Human Servs., 19 F.3d 1427, at *5 (1st Cir. 1994) (Table).
cited Cited "see" Sibley v. SSA
D.N.H. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moret Rivera v. Sec'y of Health & Human Services, 19 F.3d 1427, *6 (1st Cir. 1994) [No.93-1700, slip op. at 6].
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Hunnewell (2×)
1st Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Labonte, 19 F.3d 1427 , 1994 WL 107868 (1st Cir.1994) (table).
cited Cited "see" United States v. George Labonte, United States of America v. David E. Piper, United States of America v. Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell, Stephen Dyer v. United States
1st Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Labonte, 19 F.3d 1427 , 1994 WL 107868 (1st Cir.1994) (table). 13 Subsequent to the promulgation of Amendment 506, LaBonte moved for resentencing.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Piper
1st Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. LaBonte, 19 F.3d 1427 (1st Cir. ___ _____________ _______ 1994) (table).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Community National
v.
Kelleher
93-2181.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Mar 16, 1994.
19 F.3d 1427
Unpublished
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 79%
Citer courts: D. Maine (1)

19 F.3d 1427

NOTICE: First Circuit Local Rule 36.2(b)6 states unpublished opinions may be cited only in related cases.
COMMUNITY NATIONAL BANK, ET AL., Plaintiff, Appellees,
v.
CENTERPOINT BANK, ET AL., Defendants, Appellees,
Regina M. KELLEHER, Intervenor Plaintiff-Appellant.

No. 93-2181.

United States Court of Appeals,
First Circuit.

March 16, 1994

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire

Regina M. Kelleher on brief pro se.

Martha V. Gordon, Nelson, Kinder, Mosseau & Gordon on brief for appellee.

D.N.H.

AFFIRMED.

Before Breyer, Chief Judge, Torruella and Boudin, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam.

1

Plaintiff/appellant Regina M. Kelleher, appeals, pro se, the dismissal of her second amended civil complaint by the district court. The complaint alleges a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961-1968, and a pendent state law claim for tortious interference with business relations. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff lacks standing to assert a RICO claim.

2

We have reviewed the parties' briefs and the record below and affirm for essentially the reasons stated in the district court's order. We add that although the district court did not specifically address the pendent state claim in its order, the court's blanket dismissal seemingly encompasses all claims in the second amended complaint. The district court appropriately dismissed the pendent claim without reaching the merits. As the Supreme Court has held, "when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages, and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988); see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

3

Affirmed.