Scheall v. Ingram, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10267 (D. Colo. 1996). · Go Syfert
Scheall v. Ingram, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10267 (D. Colo. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
35 citation events (29 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: American Family Insurance Company, SI v. Orgill Inc. (cod, 2022-08-25)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 18 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) American Family Insurance Company, SI v. Orgill Inc.
D. Colo. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a co-defendant . . . did not join in the petition for removal and the petition was thus procedurally defective.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Tate v. SNH CO Tenant LLC
D. Colo. · 2022 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
it is well established that removal generally requires unanimity among the defendants.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Kavkaz Express, LLC v. Endurance Worldwide Insurance Limited
D. Colo. · 2022 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the party seeking removal has the burden of showing the propriety of removal.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Bellecourt v. Constitution State Service, LLC
D. Colo. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a co-defendant . . . did not join in the petition for removal and the petition was thus procedurally defective.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Lopez v. Lowe's Home Center, LLC
D. Colo. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
a co-defendant . . . did not join in the petition for removal and the petition was thus procedurally defective.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Hood v. Powerpay (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
D. Utah · 2023 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
plaintiff filed proofs of service related to the non-appearing defendants on january 8, 2022, suggesting all three had been served via their putative registered agent.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mulligan v. Alum Rock Riverside
D. Utah · 2025 · confidence medium
“The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based.”1 Defendant bears the burden of showing the propriety of removal,2 and courts exercise a “presumption against removal” and “strictly construe removal statutes and procedural requirements.”3 1 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b)(1). 2 Scheall v. Ingram, 930 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (D.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sherrets v. Buechler
D. Colo. · 2022 · confidence medium
Fla. May 3, 2011) (holding that so long as the defaulted party remains part of the lawsuit, even after final default judgment was entered against it, failure to obtain its 4 Courts understand § 1446 to mean that “a petition filed by less than all the named defendants is considered defective if it fails to contain an explanation for the absence of co-defendants.” Scheall v. Ingram, 930 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (D.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Khan v. United Supermarkets LLC
D.N.M. · 2021 · confidence medium
Brady, 504 F. Supp. 2d at 1173 (citing Scheall v. Ingram, 930 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (D.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Flowers v. Wagoner County Board of County Commissioners
E.D. Okla. · 2020 · confidence medium
Kan. 1997); Scheall v. Ingram, 930 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (D.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) LeBoeuf v. Hatle (2×)
E.D. La. · 2020 · confidence medium
Miss.2007) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp., 313 U.S. 100 , 108–09 (1941)). 10 Tilley, 914 F. Supp. 2d at 849 . 11 Id. at 851. 12 Id. at 849. 13 Scheall v. Ingram, 930 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (D.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sage Telecommunications Corporation of Colorado LLC v. Colony Insurance Company (2×) also: Cited "see"
D. Colo. · 2020 · confidence medium
Citing Scheall v. Ingram, 930 F. Supp. 1448, 1449 (D.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brady v. Lovelace Health Plan
D.N.M. · 2007 · confidence medium
Scheall v. Ingram, 930 F.Supp. 1448, 1449 (D.Colo.1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cellport Systems, Inc. v. Peiker Acustic GMBH & Co. KG
D. Colo. · 2004 · confidence medium
The starting point for analysis is that removal statutes are to be “strictly construed to limit the federal court’s authority to that expressly provided by Congress and to protect the states’ judicial powers.” Scheall, 930 F.Supp. at 1449 (internal quotation omitted); see Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 , 61 S.Ct. 868 , 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941) (removal statutes strictly construed).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McShares, Inc. v. Barry
D. Kan. · 1997 · confidence medium
Where there are multiple defendants the thirty-day period commences when service is obtained on the first-served defendant. 2 Getty Oil Corp., 841 F.2d at 1263 ; Scheall v. Ingram, 930 F.Supp. 1448,1449 (D.Colo.1996).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Glendening ex rel. Carpenter v. Genuine Parts Co. (3×) also: Cited "see"
D. Colo. · 1997 · confidence medium
However, the removal statutes are strictly construed and this court has held that “[a]s judicially interpreted,” the statute requires all served defendants to join or consent to the removal petition within thirty days of service, “commencing when the first defendant is served.” Scheall v. Ingram, 930 F.Supp. 1448, 1449 (D.Colo.1996). 2 The exceptions to section 1446’s requirement that all defendants join in removal do not apply in this case. 3 Here, defendants were served on July 22,1996.
discussed Cited "see" Casey v. WILLIAMS PRODUCTION RMT CO.
D. Colo. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Scheall v. Ingram, 930 F.Supp. 1448, 1449 (D.Colo.1996) (“As judicially interpreted, § 1446(b) requires all served defendants, except nominal defendants, to join or consent to the removal petition within thirty days of service, commencing when the first defendant is served.”).
discussed Cited "see" Riggs v. Plaid Pantries, Inc.
D. Or. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Scheall v. Ingram, 930 F.Supp. 1448, 1449 (D.Colo.1996) (court remanded the case because the removal petition failed to explain the absence of the co-defendants’ consent); Castle v. Laurel Creek Co., 848 F.Supp. 62, 66 (S.D.W.Va.1994) (removing party failed to include the allegation of fraudulent joinder to defeat complete diversity in its notice of removal; case was remanded on grounds that the failure to include this allegation in the notice of removal was a substantial and material defect compelling a remand); Anne Arundel County v. United Pac.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
John J. SCHEALL; Scheall Family Trust; Continental Transportation Network, Inc., a Colorado Corporation; And Contranz, Inc., an Indiana Corporation, Plaintiffs,
v.
Dwight A. INGRAM; Edward I. Cudahy; Frederic W. Eagen; James Faber; Faber & Faber, P.C., a Colorado Professional Corporation; And Company A, an Entity Whose True Name is Unknown, D/B/A “Interstate,” “Interstate Auto Transport, Inc.” and/or “Interstate Transport, Inc.,” Defendants
96-K-1677.
District Court, D. Colorado.
Jul 16, 1996.
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10267
Marc J. Musyl, Gregory J. Kilkenny, Caroline R. Kent, Kilkenny, Donelson & Musyl, Denver, CO, for Plaintiffs., Stanley L. Garnett, Robert C. Troyer, Brownstein Hyatt Farber & Strieklane, P.C., Denver, CO, Carol Mullins, Faber & Faber, Denver, CO, for Defendants.
Kane.
Cited by 19 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 63%
Citer courts: D. Utah (1)

[*1449] ORDER ON REMAND

KANE, Senior District Judge.

On June 13, 1996, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint in District Court, Jefferson County, Colorado. The complaint seeks relief, inter alia, for violations of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., against all Defendants.

On July 12, 1996, Defendants Dwight A. Ingram, Edward I. Cudahy, Frederic W. Eagen and Company A (terming themselves collectively the “Interstate Defendants”) filed a Notice of Removal in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and 1446. The notice makes no mention of the remaining Defendants James Faber and Faber & Faber, P.C.

The notice asserts removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) because this court has original jurisdiction founded on a claim arising under the laws of the United States, i.e. the RICO claim, and that the entire case is removable by virtue of § 1441(c).

Section 1446(a) stipulates “[a] defendant or defendants desiring to remove and civil action ... shall file ... a notice of removal....” “[I]t is well established that removal generally requires unanimity among the defendants.” Balazik v. County of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir.1995). “[I]f a suit arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or if it is a suit between citizens of different states, the defendant, if there be but one, may remove, or the defendants, if there be more than one_” Chicago, R.I. & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 247, 20 S.Ct. 854, 855, 44 L.Ed. 1055 (1900). “Section 1446 has been construed to require that when there is more than one defendant, all must join in the removal petition.” Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir.1985). [1]

As judicially interpreted, § 1446(b) requires all served defendants, except nominal defendants, to join or consent to the removal petition within thirty days of service, commencing when the first defendant is served. Cohen v. Hoard, 696 F.Supp. 564, 566 (D.Kan.1988). Here, it is not clear from the file of this court when defendants were served. An Entry of Special Appearance dated July 8, 1996, indicates that on that date Faber & Faber, P.C. entered a special appearance on behalf of Faber & Faber, P.C. and James W. Faber without conceding jurisdiction for service of process.

“Removal statutes are to be ‘strictly construed to limit the federal court’s authority to that expressly provided by Congress and to protect the states’ judicial powers.’ ” Mathews v. County of Fremont, Wyo., 826 F.Supp. 1315, 1318 (D.Wyo.1993) (quoting First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Nicholas, 768 F.Supp. 788, 790 (D.Kan.1991)). The party seeking removal has the burden of showing the propriety of removal. Id.

Section 1446(c) requires, if it clearly appears on the face of the notice that removal should not be permitted, that I make an order for summary remand. A petition filed by less than all the named defendants is considered defective if it fails to contain an explanation for the absence of co-defendants. Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, a Division of Airco, Inc., 676 F.2d 270, 273 (7th Cir.1982).

The Notice of Removal is defective in that it does not explain the absence of Defendants James Faber and Faber & Faber, P.C. I therefore remand the case to the District Court, Jefferson County, Colorado, Case No. 96CV1140.

IT IS ORDERED THAT this case is remanded to the District Court, Jefferson County, Colorado, Case No. 96CV1140.

1

. The unanimity rule may be disregarded where a non-joining party is an unknown or nominal party; where a defendant has been fraudulently joined; or when a non-resident defendant has not been served at the time the removing defendants filed their petition. Balazik, 44 F.3d at 213 n. 4. Here, the notice of removal does not assert any of these exceptions apply.