green
Positive treatment
31.6 score
Treatment trajectory · 2009 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 29 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
DePhillips v. Tishman Constr. Corp.
(3×)
The Court of Appeals observed in Scaparo v Village of Ilion that "the term 'owner' is not limited to the titleholder of the property where the accident occurred and encompasses a person 'who has an interest in the property and who fulfilled the role of owner by contracting to have work performed for his [or her] benefit'" (13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009]; see also Smith v McClier Corp. , 22 AD3d 369, 371 [1st Dept 2005] [the key to imposing Labor Law liability is that the party to be charged have authority to supervise and control the work and safety]; Sweeting v Board of Coop.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Emery v. Village of Clinton
Other factors, however, support a conclusion that the Village was not an "owner"; these include the unanimous testimony that Spinella, Sr. was the one responsible for on-site safety, the testimony that Spinella, Sr. had "the right to control the work" ( Thompson , 174 AD3d at 1444, quoting Ryba , 27 AD3d at 719 ), and the possibility that the Village seems to have contracted to have this work done for the benefit of the abutting landowner (i.e., Clinton Pottery), not for the Village's own benefit ( see Scaparo , 13 NY3d at 866).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Emery v. Village of Clinton
Other factors, however, support a conclusion that the Village was not an "owner"; these include the unanimous testimony that Spinella, Sr. was the one responsible for on-site safety, the testimony that Spinella, Sr. had "the right to control the work" ( Thompson , 174 AD3d at 1444, quoting Ryba , 27 AD3d at 719 ), and the possibility that the Village seems to have contracted to have this work done for the benefit of the abutting landowner (i.e., Clinton Pottery), not for the Village's own benefit ( see Scaparo , 13 NY3d at 866).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Geloso v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.
As a preliminary matter, the court notes that there is no dispute that ESD was the owner of the Moynihan Train Hall Project.3 It is also undisputed that MSDC, an ESD subsidiary that was the “eyes 3 “Courts have held that the term ‘owner’ is not limited to the titleholder of the property where the accident occurred and encompasses a person ‘who has an interest in the property and who fulfilled the role of owner by contracting to have work performed for his [or her] benefit’” (Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Coon v. WFP Tower B Co. L.P.
Scaparo v Village of Ilion , 13 NY3d 864, 867 [2009]).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Coon v. WFP Tower B Co. L.P.
Scaparo v Village of Ilion , 13 NY3d 864, 867 [2009]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Winkler v. Halmar Intl., LLC
Although the City defendants were not title owners of the property, they had an interest in the Maybrook site and "fulfilled the role of owner by contracting to have work performed for [their] benefit" ( Scaparo v Village of Ilion , 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009] [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted]) by approving the contractually required construction of a mockup.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Winkler v. Halmar Intl., LLC
Although the City defendants were not title owners of the property, they had an interest in the Maybrook site and "fulfilled the role of owner by contracting to have work performed for [their] benefit" ( Scaparo v Village of Ilion , 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009] [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted]) by approving the contractually required construction of a mockup.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Paul v. Village of Quogue
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Co. , 81 NY2d at 501-502 ). "[T]he term owner is not limited to the titleholder of the property where the accident occurred and encompasses a person who has an interest in the property and who fulfilled the role of owner by contracting to have work performed for his [or her] benefit" ( Scaparo v Village of Ilion , 13 NY3d 864, 866 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Copertino v Ward , 100 AD2d 565, 566 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Guminiak v. VGFC Realty II, LLC
Moreover, the appellant failed to establish, prima facie, that it was not an owner or agent within the meaning of the Labor Law (see Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009]; Alfonso v Pacific Classon Realty, LLC, 101 AD3d 768, 770 [2012]; Copertino v Ward, 100 AD2d 565, 566 [1984]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Custer v. Jordan
Rather, a prerequisite to the imposition of liability upon such an owner is “some nexus between the owner and the worker, whether by a lease agreement or grant of an easement, or other property interest” (Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio Assoc., 3 NY3d 46, 51 [2004]; see Morton v State of New York, 15 NY3d 50, 56 [2010]; Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Custer v. Jordan
Rather, a prerequisite to the imposition of liability upon such an owner is “some nexus between the owner and the worker, whether by a lease agreement or grant of an easement, or other property interest” (Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio Assoc., 3 NY3d 46, 51 [2004]; see Morton v State of New York, 15 NY3d 50, 56 [2010]; Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wicks v. Leemilt's Petroleum, Inc.
However, the evidence they submitted in support of that contention failed to es tablish that they did not either “fulfill[ ] the role of owner by contracting to have [the] work performed” (Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009]), have the right to control the work being done (see Ferluckaj v Goldman Sachs & Co., 12 NY3d 316, 320 [2009]), or have a sufficient “nexus” to the work performed, “whether by a lease agreement or grant of an easement, or other property interest,” to support the imposition of Labor Law § 240 (1) liability on them (Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wicks v. Leemilt's Petroleum, Inc.
However, the evidence they submitted in support of that contention failed to es tablish that they did not either “fulfill[ ] the role of owner by contracting to have [the] work performed” (Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009]), have the right to control the work being done (see Ferluckaj v Goldman Sachs & Co., 12 NY3d 316, 320 [2009]), or have a sufficient “nexus” to the work performed, “whether by a lease agreement or grant of an easement, or other property interest,” to support the imposition of Labor Law § 240 (1) liability on them (Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio …
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Miller v. Savarino Construction Corp.
Here, through the submission of the abstract and the contract, defendants established that 26 Mississippi is not an “owner” within the meaning of Labor Law § 241 (6) (see generally Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009]), and plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact in opposition (see generally Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Miller v. Savarino Construction Corp.
Here, through the submission of the abstract and the contract, defendants established that 26 Mississippi is not an “owner” within the meaning of Labor Law § 241 (6) (see generally Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009]), and plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact in opposition (see generally Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Guryev v. Tomchinsky
But, as the statute itself makes clear and we have accordingly recognized (see Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009]), the absence of title does not necessarily dictate a contrary conclusion.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Dahar v. Holland Ladder & Manufacturing Co.
The Bechtel defendants also submitted evidence in support of their motion establishing that they are not subject to liability under section 240 (1) either as “owners” (see generally Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866-867 [2009]), or as “contractors” (see generally Rauls v DirecTV, Inc., 60 AD3d 1337 [2009]), and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect thereto (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cortez v. Northeast Realty Holdings, LLC
National also demonstrated, prima facie, that it was not an “owner” for purposes of the Labor Law because it did not have an interest in the property (see Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009]; Kwang Ho Kim v D & W Shin Realty Corp., 47 AD3d 616, 618 [2008]; Ryba v Almeida, 27 AD3d 718, 719 [2006]; Billman v CLF Mgt., 19 AD3d 346, 347 [2005]; Copertino v Ward, 100 AD2d 565, 566 [1984]; Ogden v City of Hudson Indus.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Larosae v. American Pumping, Inc.
In Scaparo, the Court of Appeals determined that a church was not liable as an owner within the meaning of the Labor Law because the church had no ownership interest in adjoining land where a sewer lateral line was being built and where a worker was injured, although the line was being installed to benefit the church (Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d at 866-867; compare Copertino v Ward, 100 AD2d at 566-567 ).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Fallon v. Flach Development & Realty, Inc.
However, “[i]n cases imposing liability on a property owner who did not contract for the work performed on the property . . . ‘some nexus between the owner and the worker, whether by lease agreement or grant of an easement, or other property interest’ [is required]” (Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009], quoting Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio Assoc., 3 NY3d at 51 ).
examined
Cited "see"
Lincho v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
(3×)
See Scaparo v. Vill. of Ilion , 13 N.Y.3d 864 , 866, 893 N.Y.S.2d 823 , 921 N.E.2d 590 (2009) (landowner where sewer lateral installation accident occurred not an "owner" under § 241(6) where landowner did not contract for the installation, had no choice but to allow Village workers to enter its property pursuant to a right-of-way, and did not grant the Village an easement or other property interest creating the right-of-way); Abbatiello v. Lancaster Studio Assocs., 3 N.Y.3d 46 , 51-52, 781 N.Y.S.2d 477 , 814 N.E.2d 784 (2004) (building owner was not liable as an "owner" under § 240(1) where…
discussed
Cited "see"
Powell v. Norfolk Hudson, LLC
Under the circumstances of this case, triable issues of fact exist as to whether the defendant 101 Norfolk contracted to have the injury-causing work performed, or had a sufficient nexus to that work, so as to support liability under Labor Law §§ 240 and 241 ( see Wicks v Leemilt's Petroleum, Inc., 103 AD3d 793 , 795-796; Ferreira v Village. of Kings Point, 68 AD3d 1048, 1050 ; see generally Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864 ; Sanatass v Consolidated Inv.
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Macropoulos v. City of New York
Therefore, it cannot be held liable under Labor Law §§ 240 or 241 (6) ( Addonisio v City of New York , 112 AD3d 554, 555 [1st Dept 2013]["Con Ed and Verizon both established that they cannot be held liable under Labor Law § 241(6), since neither one was an owner, contractor, or statutory agent"]; see also Scaparo v. Village of Ilion , 13 NY3d 864 [2009]; Grilikhes v International Tile & Stone Show Expos , 90 AD3d 480, 483 [1st Dept. 2011]). [FN2] Mere ownership of the energized conduit does not establish Con Edison as an "owner" under the statute, as Plaintiff asserts ( Addonisio , 112 AD3d…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Macropoulos v. City of New York
Therefore, it cannot be held liable under Labor Law §§ 240 or 241 (6) ( Addonisio v City of New York , 112 AD3d 554, 555 [1st Dept 2013]["Con Ed and Verizon both established that they cannot be held liable under Labor Law § 241(6), since neither one was an owner, contractor, or statutory agent"]; see also Scaparo v. Village of Ilion , 13 NY3d 864 [2009]; Grilikhes v International Tile & Stone Show Expos , 90 AD3d 480, 483 [1st Dept. 2011]). [FN2] Mere ownership of the energized conduit does not establish Con Edison as an "owner" under the statute, as Plaintiff asserts ( Addonisio , 112 AD3d…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Salter
Defendant matched the description of the suspect in the 911 calls and the police radio dispatch, and the officer observed defendant acting in a suspicious manner (see Moore, 6 NY3d at 500-501 ; see also People v Zeigler, 61 AD3d 1398, 1399 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 864 [2009]).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
SALTER, STYLES C., PEOPLE v
Defendant matched the description of the suspect in the 911 calls and the police radio dispatch, and the officer observed defendant acting in a suspicious manner (see Moore, 6 NY3d at 500-501 ; see also People v Zeigler, 61 AD3d 1398, 1399 , lv denied 13 NY3d 864 ).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Salter
Defendant matched the description of the suspect in the 911 calls and the police radio dispatch, and the officer observed defendant acting in a suspicious manner (see Moore, 6 NY3d at 500-501 ; see also People v Zeigler, 61 AD3d 1398, 1399 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 864 [2009]).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
Morton v. State
(2×)
Rather, we have insisted on "some nexus between the owner and the worker, whether by a lease agreement or grant of an easement, or other property interest" ( Abbatiello, 3 NY3d at 51 ; see also Scaparo v Village of Ilion, 13 NY3d 864, 866 [2009] ["In cases imposing liability on a property owner who did not contract for the work performed on the property, this Court has required `some nexus between the owner and the worker, whether by a lease agreement or grant of an easement, or other property interest'" (quoting Abbatiello, 3 NY3d at 51 )]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Charles Scaparo Et Al., Appellants,
v.
Village of Ilion Et Al., Defendants, and Herkimer County Industrial Development Agency Et Al., Respondents. (Action No. 1.) Anthony Yero Et Al., Appellants, v. Village of Ilion Et Al., Defendants, and Herkimer County Industrial Development Agency Et Al., Respondents. (Action No. 2.)
v.
Village of Ilion Et Al., Defendants, and Herkimer County Industrial Development Agency Et Al., Respondents. (Action No. 1.) Anthony Yero Et Al., Appellants, v. Village of Ilion Et Al., Defendants, and Herkimer County Industrial Development Agency Et Al., Respondents. (Action No. 2.)
212 SSM 42.
New York Court of Appeals.
Dec 1, 2009.
921 N.E.2d 590
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Brindisi, Murad, Brindisi, Pearlman, Julian & Perz, LLP, Utica (Anthony J. Brindisi of counsel), for appellants., Roche, Corrigan, McCoy & Bush, PLLC, Albany (Robert P. Roche of counsel), for Herkimer County Industrial Development Agency, respondent., Law Office of John A. Panzone, PC., Barneveld {John A. Pan-zone of counsel), for Our Lady Queen of Apostles Church of St. Mary of Mount Carmel/S.S. Peter and Paul, respondent.
Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones Concur in Memorandum.
Cited by 32 opinions | Published
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs, and the certified question answered in the affirmative.
The Appellate Division majority properly concluded that no triable issue of fact exists whether defendant Herkimer County Industrial Development Agency (HCIDA) was an owner within the contemplation of Labor Law § 241 (6). In cases imposing liability on a property owner who did not contract for the work performed on the property, this Court has required “some nexus between the owner and the worker, whether by a lease agreement or grant of an easement, or other property interest” (Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio Assoc., 3 NY3d 46, 51 [2004]). Here, although the accident occurred on HCIDA’s property, HCIDA did not contract with the Village of Frankfort to have the sewer lateral installed, it had no choice but to allow the Village to enter its property pursuant to a right-of-way, and it did not grant the Village an easement or other property interest creating the right-of-way.
Likewise, the Appellate Division correctly concluded that no triable issue of fact exists whether defendant Our Lady Queen of Apostles Church of St. Mary of Mount Carmel/S.S. Peter and Paul (the Church) was an owner under Labor Law § 241 (6). Courts have held that the term “owner” is not limited to the titleholder of the property where the accident occurred and encompasses a person “who has an interest in the property and who fulfilled the role of owner by contracting to have work performed for his [or her] benefit” (Copertino v Ward, 100 AD2d 565, 566 [2d Dept 1984]; see also Reisch v Amadori Constr. Co., 273 AD2d 855, 856 [4th Dept 2000]). Here, although the Church agreed to pay for the cost of materials, the Church had no interest in the property over which the sewer lateral was placed. Notably, municipal employees working at the site testified that no representative from the Church was present at, or gave directions during, the excavation work. Moreover, the testimony adduced indicated that the Village assumed full responsibility for[*867] installing the lateral sewer line and acknowledged that the lateral would be available for use by future property owners in the area who wished to connect to the village sewer system.
Finally, the Appellate Division majority properly concluded that no triable issue of fact exists whether the Church was in a position to control the sewer lateral installation process or to insist that proper safety practices were followed under Labor Law § 200 (see generally Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877-878 [1993]).
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur in memorandum.
On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order affirmed, etc.