Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). · Go Syfert
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Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases · …is a procedural device aimed at promoting accurate fact finding and ensuring the accurate review of revocation decisions. at p. 620 ✓
cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, 2012–2018 · …proof of a single violation of the conditions of a defendant's probation is sufficient to support a trial court's decision to revoke probation. at p. 622 ✓
83 citation events (75 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Derrick L. Myers v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
proof of a single violation of the conditions of a defendant's probation is sufficient to support a trial court's decision to revoke probation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lamenski Ewing v. State of Indiana
Ind. · 2026 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Long v. State, 717 N.E.2d 1238, 1240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that “probation may not be revoked based upon proof of an act that is merely similar in nature to the violation charged in the written notice”); Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that the court could not base its revocation of probation on the probationer’s failure to take a test because that was not a basis “set out in the State’s petition for revocation”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Curtis Lowder v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). [9] The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a claim of self- defense claim is the same standard used for any claim of insufficient evidence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paul J. Coy v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ind. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). [14] Here, the trial court determined that Coy had violated the terms of his community corrections placement as alleged in the petition to revoke, which included allegations that Coy had: (1) committed new criminal offenses, including burglary, battery, residential entry, and invasion of privacy; and (2) failed to report to the Community Justice Center to serve his sentence from this underlying cause in the COS program. [15] Coy, however, challenges the trial court’s determination on only two of the violations.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Rashad Lamar Thompson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (3×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
“Those rights include written notice to the probationer of the claimed violations.” Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); see also Washington v. State, 758 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (due process requires that the petition for revocation disclose the grounds upon which revocation is being sought). [16] This court has repeatedly held that it is error to base revocation upon a violation for which the probationer did not receive notice in the petition for revocation.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Ralph J. Johnson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ind. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
The requirement for a written statement “is a procedural device aimed at promoting accurate fact finding and ensuring the accurate review of revocation decisions.” Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (footnote omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Charles Johnson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Samuel Lawrence Morgan v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ashlee K. Pierce v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ind. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
The requirement for a written statement “is a procedural device aimed at promoting accurate fact finding and ensuring the accurate review of revocation decisions.” Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (footnote omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Derek Carter v. Keith Butts, Warden of the New Castle Correctional Facility (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brandon McCall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Phillip D. Martin v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
See Wilson v. State, 708 N.E.2d 32, 33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that a trial court’s “oral statement, if it contains the facts relied upon and reasons for revocation, and is reduced to writing in the transcript of the hearing, is sufficient to satisfy” the due process requirement that a trial court “set forth in writing the evidence relied upon and the reasons for his probation revocation”); Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that, taken together, the trial court’s written order of revocation and the hearing transcript provided an adequate basis…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Micah Ormsby v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chester Irons v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Terry Wilson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Reginald D. Ivy, Jr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Bovie v. State, 760 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Shaun Pierce v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind.Ct.App.1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jimmy Scott Huntington v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
“Revocation of an individual’s probation deprives the individual ‘not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.’” Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Joseph D. Reed v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Wilson v. State, 708 N.E.2d 32, 33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rebecca Roberts v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bruce L. Truett v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) John Joseph Ramsey II v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
This court has held that “placing the transcript of the evidentiary hearing in the record, although not the preferred way of fulfilling the writing requirement, is sufficient if it contains a clear statement of the trial court’s reasons for revoking probation.” Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kenneth Galvin v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
See Beeler v. State, 959 N.E.2d 828, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied; Bussberg v. State, 827 N.E.2d 37, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied; Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lawrence Harris v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thomas Rayford, Jr. v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Bovie v. State, 760 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Tharl Pinkston v. State of Indiana (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ind. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E. 2d 618, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Amanda Spicer v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jesse R. Luckey v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Andrew J.P. Cox v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Justin A. Staton v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
“It is well settled that although a probationer is not entitled to the full array of rights afforded at trial, certain due process rights inure to a probationer at a revocation hearing.” Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ramon Crawford v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Plue v. State, 721 N.E.2d 308, 310 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Austin Harmon v. State of Indiana (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
“Due process requires a written statement by the fact finder regarding the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking probation.” Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).3 This written statement requirement is a “procedural device aimed at promoting accurate fact finding and ensuring the accurate review of revocation decisions.” Id. at 620-21 (footnote omitted); see also Medicus, 664 N.E.2d at 1164 (explaining that “[d]ue process requires that the reasons for revoking probation be clearly and plainly stated by the sentencing judge not merely to give appellan…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Heaton v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
While we have consistently held that one probation violation is sufficient to revoke an individual’s probation, Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), we also must review the sentence imposed, as the trial court has various options for sentencing a probation violator.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Puckett v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620-21 (Ind.Ct.App.1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bussberg v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ind. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind.Ct.App.1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bovie v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind.Ct.App.1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kincaid v. State (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind.1999); Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620 (Ind.Ct.App.1997).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Crump v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
In Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620-621 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), this court held the following: Due process requires a written statement by the fact finder regarding the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking probation.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Plue v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620 (Ind.Ct.App.1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pavey v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620 (Ind.Ct.App.1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wilson v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 620 (Ind.Ct.App.1997).
discussed Cited "see" Arthur Delaney Scott v. State of Indiana (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ind. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). [18] During Scott’s revocation hearing, the trial court stated that it made its findings “based on the evidence presented to the court.” Tr. p. 28.
discussed Cited "see" Armando Nicasio v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hubbard v State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (affirming probation revocation even though one of the trial court’s grounds for revocation was erroneous; other grounds supported revocation). [10] Next, Nicasio did not raise any objections during Officer Pettit’s testimony.
discussed Cited "see" Cynthia S. Gordon v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (probationer not harmed by trial court’s error in light of evidence of multiple probation violations).
discussed Cited "see" Marven Lemock v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (2×)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that where the trial court found defendant had violated several conditions of probation of which he received notice, it was harmless error to find defendant in violation of a condition of which he did not receive notice). [15] Lemock next asserts that he was denied due process because the trial court failed to provide him with a written statement as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons probation revocation was appropriate.
cited Cited "see" Ronald Buttermore v. State of Indiana
Ind. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that a single violation is sufficient to warrant revocation of probation).
cited Cited "see" Morgan v. State
Ind. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind.Ct.App.1997).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Orlando D.D. Mitchell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence medium
But the written requirement “may be satisfied by placement of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing in the record if the transcript contains a clear statement of the trial court’s reasons for revoking probation.” Washington v. State, 758 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Crump v. State, 740 N.E.2d 564, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied); see also Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that our court has “held that placing the transcript of the evidentiary hearing in the record, although not the preferred way of fulfilling the writing …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Catina M. Caudill v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (the trial court’s order of probation revocation and the hearing transcript were adequate for appellate review and, when examined together, satisfied the writing requirement). [15] Accordingly, applying our standard of review, because probation is a matter of grace and because Caudill violated her probation twice, we hold that the trial court’s decision to revoke her previously suspended sentence in light of her behavior was well within the trial court’s sound discretion.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Benjamin T. Haines v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Ind. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Hubbard v. State, 683 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that “[p]roof of a single violation of the conditions of a defendant’s probation is sufficient to support a trial court’s decision to revoke probation”).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Leroy HUBBARD, Appellant-Defendant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
85A02-9601-CR-33.
Indiana Court of Appeals.
Jul 16, 1997.
683 N.E.2d 618
Kristina L. Lynn, Tiede Metz & Downs, P.C., Wabash, for Appellant-Defendant., Jeffrey Modisett, Attorney General, Randi F. Elfenbaum, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee-Plaintiff.
Kirsch, Friedlander, Baker.
Cited by 52 opinions  |  Published

OPINION

KIRSCH, Judge.

Leroy Hubbard appeals from the revocation of his probation [1] and raises the following issues:

I. Whether the trial court violated due process requirements in failing to set forth in writing the facts and reasons for revoking probation;
II. Whether the trial court violated due process requirements in basing the probation revocation on an alleged violation of which Hubbard received no. notice; and
III. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s revocation of Hubbard’s probation.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1980, Hubbard was convicted by a jury of battery, as a Class C felony, and of being a habitual offender. He was sentenced to eight years on the battery conviction, enhanced by an additional thirty years for habitual offender status. In June, 1994, Hubbard’s Motion for Modification of Sentence was granted, and the trial court suspended the remaining ten years of the habitual offender sentence and placed Hubbard on probation for five years.

On September 7, 1995 Wabash City police officers George Ryan Short and David Owen were called to investigate a report that Hubbard was involved in a fight and in violation of a protective order. When the officers approached him, they found that Hubbard’s face was swollen and bruised, that his eyes were bloodshot, and that he smelled strongly of alcoholic beverages. Officer Short asked him if he had been drinking. Hubbard did not respond. When the officers attempted to test Hubbard with an Alco-Sensor, Hubbard became argumentative and refused twice, saying that he was not “taking the f-test.” Record at 53. Hubbard pushed Officer Owen and, in a loud voice, threatened that he “could take him out.” Record at 53. Feeling that the situation was getting out of control, Officer Short arrested Hubbard for[*620] operating a vehicle while intoxicated, public intoxication, and intimidation of a law enforcement officer.

The State filed a petition to revoke Hubbard’s probation. In its Petition, the State alleged that Hubbard had violated “term 6, 8 and 13 of his terms of probation.” Record at 14. Number 6 of these terms provided:

“You shall work faithfully at a suitable employment, notifying your Probation Officer of the place of your employment, and not causing your employment to be terminated by your own actions. If your employment is terminated, you shall notify your Probation Officer within 24 hours.”

Record at 9-10. Number 8 provided:

“You shall not violate any law of the State of Indiana or any other jurisdiction during the term of your probation.”

Record at 10. Number 13 provided:

‘You shall not use alcoholic beverages of any kind, and you shall not use drugs (controlled substances) unless prescribed by a physician. Further, you shall not associate with anyone who is using marijuana, and any testing procedure which shows your exposure to marijuana shall be deemed a violation of your probation.”

Record at 10. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ordered revocation of Hubbard’s probation, and Hubbard now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Probation is a conditional liberty that is a privilege, not a right. Perry v. State, 642 N.E.2d 536, 538 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). Revocation of an individual’s probation deprives the individual “not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.” Dulin v. State, 169 Ind.App. 211, 215, 346 N.E.2d 746, 749 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). The decision on whether to revoke probation is a matter addressed to the sole discretion of the trial judge. Johnson v. State, 606 N.E.2d 881, 882 (Ind.Ct.App.1993).

We will affirm revocation if, considering only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, there is sufficient evidence supporting the conclusion that the probationer is guflty of violating any condition of his probation. IC 35-38-2-3; Menifee v. State, 600 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). We will neither weigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Writing Requirement

Hubbard first contends that the trial court violated due process requirements by failing to set forth in writing the facts and reasons for revoking his probation. Pursuant to IC 35-38-2-3(a), “[t]he court may revoke an individual’s probation if: (1) The person has violated a condition of probation during the probationary period....” The State must prove the violation of a probation condition by a preponderance of the evidence. IC 35-38-2-3; Menifee, 600 N.E.2d at 970. Due process requires a written statement by the fact finder regarding the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking probation. Offringa v. State, 637 N.E.2d 190, 190-91 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). This requirement is a procedural device [2] aimed at[*621] promoting accurate fact finding and ensuring the accurate review of revocation decisions. Clark v. State, 580 N.E.2d 708, 710-11 (Ind. Ct.App.1991). We have held that placing the transcript of the evidentiary hearing in the record, although not the preferred way of fulfilling the writing requirement, is sufficient if it contains a clear statement of the trial court’s reasons for revoking probation. Id. at 711-12 n. 3.

Here, the reasons for revoking probation were properly set out in the trial court’s Order of Revocation of Probation, which stated:

“3. The Defendant has violated the terms of probation by failing to maintain employment and report loss of employment to the probation office, for using an alcoholic beverage and for failing to take test [sic] for use of alcoholic beverage.”

Record at 18. Although the trial court did not issue a separate writing, the evidence it relied upon in revoking Hubbard’s probation is contained in the transcript of the trial court’s evidentiary hearing. The evidence therein shows that Hubbard was fired for failing to appear at his job for two days without notifying his employer of the reason and that Hubbard did not notify his probation officer within twenty-four hours of his termination. This evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Hubbard “[failed] to maintain employment and report loss of employment to the probation office” in violation of condition No. 6 which states:

“6. You shall work faithfully at a suitable employment, notifying your Probation Officer of the place of your employment and not causing your employment to be terminated by your own actions. If your employment is terminated, you shall notify your Probation Officer within 24 hours.”

Record at 41.

The transcript also contains evidence that the officers found Hubbard with bloodshot eyes and smelling strongly of alcoholic beverages, that Hubbard refused to answer Officer Short’s question as to whether he had been drinking, that he refused to take an alcohol test, and that he became agitated, belligerent, and aggressive when requested to do so. This evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Hubbard “[used] an alcoholic beverage” in violation of condition No. 13 which states:

“13. You shall not use alcoholic beverages of any kind, and you shall not use drugs (controlled substances) unless prescribed by a physician. Further, you shall not associate with anyone who is using marijuana, and any testing procedure which shows your exposure to marijuana shall be deemed a violation of your probation.”

Record at 41.

The trial court’s Order of Revocation provides the reasons for, and the hearing transcript provides the evidence underlying, the trial court’s revocation of Hubbard’s probation. Both documents provide an adequate basis for appellate review and, thus, are adequate to satisfy the separate writing requirement.

II. Notice

Hubbard next contends that his probation may not be revoked for his refusal to take an alcohol test because he received no notice that this act was a violation of his probation. We agree.

[*622] It is well settled that although a probationer is not entitled to the full array of rights afforded at trial, certain due process rights inure to a probationer at a revocation hearing. State v. Cass, 635 N.E.2d 225, 226 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied. Those rights include written notice to the probationer of the claimed violations. Isaac v. State, 605 N.E.2d 144, 147-48 (Ind.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 922, 113 S.Ct. 2373, 124 L.Ed.2d 278 (1993); Gleason v. State, 634 N.E.2d 67, 68 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). The State’s failure to give written notice of a claimed probation violation deprives the defendant of adequate due process. Gleason, 634 N.E.2d at 69. Basing a probation revocation on a claimed violation for which the defendant received no notice is error. Id.

In its Order of Revocation of Probation, the trial court listed as one of four reasons for revoking Hubbard’s probation his failure to take the test for use of alcoholic beverages. Although such a requirement is contained in the terms of Hubbard’s probation, it was not set out in the State’s petition for revocation. Thus, Hubbard received no notice of this claimed violation, and the trial court may not base revocation on it.

Hubbard was not harmed by this error, however, because the trial court found that he had violated several conditions of his probation of which he did receive notice. Proof of a single violation of the conditions of a defendant’s probation is sufficient to support a trial court’s decision to revoke probation. Menifee, 600 N.E.2d at 970.

III. Sufficiency of Evidence

Hubbard next contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s revocation of his probation. The record does not support this contention. As stated above, a violation of a single condition of probation is sufficient to revoke probation. Menifee, 600 N.E.2d at 970. Here, we have more than one violation.

Hubbard was fired for not appearing at his job for two days without notifying his employer of the reason, and Hubbard did not notify his probation officer within twenty-four hours of his termination. This evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Hubbard violated condition No. 6. Hubbard had bloodshot eyes, smelled strongly of alcoholic beverages, refused to answer the officers’ question as to whether he had been drinking, refused to take an alcohol test, and became agitated, belligerent, and aggressive when requested to do so. This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that Hubbard violated condition No. 13.

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER and BAKER, JJ., concur.
2

. The rationale underlying the writing requirement in probation revocation proceedings is not entirely clear. The rule has its genesis in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), where the Supreme Court recognized that because a parolee has a conditional liberty interest at stake, some procedural due process rights apply to parole revocation proceedings. The Court observed that the State has an interest in being able to return the parolee to imprisonment without the burden of a formal adversary criminal trial. After balancing the competing interests, the Court concluded that while an informal hearing structure is permissible, it still must comport with basic notions of due process, including (1) written notice of the claimed parole violations; (2) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (3) an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentaiy evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses; and (5) a written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole. Id., at 488-89, 92 S.Ct. at 2604 (emphasis added).

In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Court applied the Morrissey holding to probation revocation proceedings, holding that for purposes of due pro[*621] cess analysis, the two proceedings are the same. 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759-1760, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). However, parole revocation and probation revocation are not the same: a parole revocation hearing is an administrative proceeding; a probation revocation hearing is a judicial proceeding. Congress has mandated that written findings of fact are required for administrative proceedings. There is no such requirement for judicial proceedings.

An agency’s duty of explanation reflects the fact that the agency is exercising delegated adjudicative powers in a quasi-judicial capacity. Written findings are not required in judicial proceedings, except where required by statute or trial rules. See Ind.Trial Rule 52. Thus, requiring written findings in probation revocation proceedings gives more due process to an offender on probation, who has only a conditional liberty interest at stake, than that person was accorded at the initial trial, when the person’s full liberty interest was at stake, even though both proceedings are before the same body. Nevertheless, our supreme court in Medicus v. State, 664 N.E.2d 1163 (Ind. 1996), applied the Gagnon rule to probation revocation proceedings, and we accordingly must apply it here.