Morris v. Pavarini Constr., 874 N.E.2d 723 (NY 2007). · Go Syfert
Morris v. Pavarini Constr., 874 N.E.2d 723 (NY 2007). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
69 citation events (69 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 2007 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2007 2016 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 26 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) In re World Trade Center Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litigation (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 2014 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
the meaning of specialized terms in such a regulation is' a question on which a court must sometimes hear evidence before making its determination.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Mann v. Mezuyon, LLC (7×)
NY · 2026 · confidence medium
Consequently, Mezuyon "can be liable to [plaintiff] only if Labor Law § 241 (6) imposes on [Mezuyon] a nondelegable duty, making [it] liable for the conduct of others" ( Morris v Pavarini Const. , 9 NY3d 47, 50 [2007]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Andres-Valdez v. 1818 Nadlan LLC
N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. · 2024 · confidence medium
NO. 57 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 09/27/2024 so as to maintain position and shape." The Court of Appeals has defined a 'form' as "a kind of mold used in the fabrication of concrete walls" (Morris v Pavarini Const., 9 NY3d 47, 49 [2007]; see also Mueller v PSEG Power New York, Inc., 83 AD3d 1274, 1275-76 [3d Dept 2011] ["[r]ead as a whole, 12 NYCRR 23-2.2 does not require tying together of forms except at times when they are being used as a mold for pouring and curing concrete]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harvey v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sierra Leone
2d Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
Under New York law, “a regulation will generally create a nondelegable duty where it contains a ‘specific positive command,’ but not where it merely incorporates ‘the ordinary tort duty of care,’ using terms like ‘adequate,’ ‘effective,’ or ‘suitable.’” Id. at 110–11 (quoting Morris v. Pavarini Constr., 9 N.Y.3d 47, 50 (2007)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Reinhardt v. The City of Buffalo
W.D.N.Y. · 2022 · confidence medium
Morris v. Pavarini Constr., 9 N.Y.3d 47, 50 (N.Y. 2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Curby Toussaint v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
NY · 2022 · confidence medium
The statute is a “hybrid,” with the first sentence “merely reiterat[ing] the common law- standards of care” and accordingly providing no independent source for an owner’s or general contractor’s non-delegable duty (Morris v Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 50 [2007]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Buono v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 2021 · confidence medium
“The interpretation of [an Industrial Code] regulation presents a question of law.” See Morris v. Pavarini Const., 874 N.E.2d 723, 726 (N.Y. 2007); accord Pruszko v. Pine Hollow Country Club, Inc., 52 N.Y.S.3d 442, 444 (2d Dep’t 2017).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kuligowski v. One Niagara, LLC
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
Finally, defendants failed to show that 12 NYCRR 23-9.8 (j) was not violated given evidence that the forklift's forks were raised two to three feet and given the dearth of evidence justifying that positioning ( see generally Morris v Parvarini Constr. , 9 NY3d 47, 51 [2007]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Winters v. Uniland Dev. Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · confidence medium
We conclude that there are issues of fact whether, inter alia, defendants' failure in their nondelegable duty to shut off the electricity was a proximate cause of the accident ( see generally Morris v Pavarini Constr. , 9 NY3d 47, 50 [2007]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marcello v. State
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Thus, section 241 (6) imposes a nondelegable duty on a defendant “only where the regulation in question contains a ‘specific, positive command! ]’ ” (Morris v Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 50 [2007], quoting Allen v Cloutier Constr.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marcello v. State
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Thus, section 241 (6) imposes a nondelegable duty on a defendant “only where the regulation in question contains a ‘specific, positive command! ]’ ” (Morris v Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 50 [2007], quoting Allen v Cloutier Constr.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Flores v. Infrastructure Repair Service, LLC
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2015 · confidence medium
(Morris v Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 51 [2007]; Buchholz v Trump 767 Fifth Ave., LLC, 5 NY3d 1, 7 [2005]; Lopez v Chan, 102 AD3d 625, 626 [1st Dept 2013]; McCoy v Metropolitan Transp.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) VANDERWALL, SHANE v. 1255 PORTLAND AVENUE LLC
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · confidence medium
Nevertheless, we further conclude that, although plaintiff and his supervisor were performing excavation work at the time of the incident, plaintiff was not part of any “excavation crew.” In support of that conclusion, we note that the interpretation of a regulation presents a question of law for a court to resolve (see Morris v Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 51 [2007]) and, in our view, the word “crew” necessarily denotes more than one worker.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Morris v. Pavarini Construction (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
In an order entered July 2, 2007, the Court of Appeals directed the motion court to hold a hearing to determine if the words of the regulation at issue here, Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-2.2 (a), “can sensibly be applied to anything but completed forms” ( 9 NY3d 47, 51 [2007]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Morris v. Pavarini Construction (2×)
N.Y. App. Div. · 2012 · confidence medium
In an order entered July 2, 2007, the Court of Appeals directed the motion court to hold a hearing to determine if the words of the regulation at issue here, Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-2.2 (a), “can sensibly be applied to anything but completed forms” ( 9 NY3d 47, 51 [2007]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Mueller v. PSEG Power New York, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
Although sufficiently specific to form a basis for liability under the statute (see Morris v Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 50 [2007]), that regulation is not applicable here.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nostrom v. A.W Chesterton Co.
NY · 2010 · confidence medium
The commissioner may make rules to carry into effect the provisions of this subdivision, and the owners and contractors and their agents for such work, except owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work, shall comply therewith.” The second sentence of this provision, requiring owners and contractors to comply with the Commissioner of Labor’s rules, creates a nondelegable duty “where the regulation in question contains a specific, positive command” (Morris v Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 50 [2007] [internal quotation marks and citation om…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rought v. Price Chopper Operating Co. (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
An allegation of a violation of a specific safety regulation can give rise to a viable cause of action under Labor Law § 241 (6) (see Misicki v Caradonna, 12 NY3d 511, 515 [2009]; Morris v Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 51 [2007]; Hotaling v Corning Inc., 12 AD3d 1064, 1065 [2004]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Verdugo v. Seven Thirty One Ltd. Partnership
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
Assoc., LLC, 61 AD3d 596 [2009]), 731 was entitled to its affirmative defense of “acts of another or independent contractor” (see Morris v Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 50 [2007]; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Reinauer Transportation Companies, LLC
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · confidence medium
In the absence of any further evidence to support defendants’ interpretation of 46 CFR 42.15-75 (d) as inapplicable to permissively manned barges and given the evidence presented by plaintiffs that the Coast Guard deems barges to be “manned” whenever manning is either required or permitted, we cannot say that Supreme Court erred in declining to rule that permissively manned barges are exempt from 46 CFR 42.15-75 (d) as a matter of law (see generally Morris v Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 51 [2007]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Misicki v. Caradonna
NY · 2009 · confidence medium
When analyzing section 23-9.2 (a)’s specificity, the parties focused on the regulation’s first three sentences, which are, in order, as follows: (1) “All power-operated equipment shall be maintained in good repair and in proper operating condition at all times.” (2) “Sufficient inspections of adequate frequency shall be made of such equipment to insure such maintenance.” (3) “Upon discovery, any structural defect or unsafe condition in such equipment shall be corrected by necessary repairs or replacement.” Plaintiff concedes that the first sentence is “undoubtedly general and…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCoy v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority
N.Y. App. Div. · 2008 · confidence medium
The dissent cites no authority from any source—statute, procedural rule, or case law—that would warrant denying defendants, under these circumstances, the opportunity to obtain a pretrial judicial determination of the legal question of whether the Gradall constitutes a “mobile crane” under the relevant regulations (see Morris v Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 51 [2007] [“The interpretation of the (Industrial Code) regulation presents a question of law, but the meaning of specialized terms in such a regulation is a question on which a court must sometimes hear evidence before making its …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Markey v. C.F.M.M. Owners Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2008 · confidence medium
Labor Law § 241 (6) applies to “[a]ll contractors and owners and their agents.” That provision imposes a nondelegable duty on the owner and general contractor to conform to its requirements (see Morris v Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 50 [2007]; Coleman v City of New York, 91 NY2d 821 [1997]; Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d at 318 ; see also, Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio Assoc., 3 NY3d 46, 51 [2004]).
cited Cited "see" Yaucan v. Hawthorne Village, LLC
N.Y. App. Div. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
Realty, LLC, 96 AD3d 727 , 727-728 [2012]; see Morris v Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 50 [2007]).
examined Cited "see" USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. PERMANENT MISSION OF NAMIBIA (3×)
2d Cir. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fagan v. Pathe Indus., Inc., 274 A.D. 703, 706 , 86 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1st Dep’t 1949). 41 . 9 N.Y.3d at 50 , 842 N.Y.S.2d 759 , 874 N.E.2d 723 ; see supra note 36. 42 .The Mission argues that it is absolved of liability by our holding in Roditis v. United States, 122 F.3d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir.1997).
cited Cited "see" Picchione v. Sweet Construction Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
Auth., 249 AD2d 184, 185 [1998]; see generally Morris v Pavarini Constr., 9 NY3d 47, 50 [2007]).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Glenford Morris, Appellant,
v.
Pavarini Construction Et Al., Respondents. (And a Third-Party Action.)
New York Court of Appeals.
Jul 2, 2007.
874 N.E.2d 723
POINTS OF COUNSEL, Sacks and Sacks, LLP, New York City (Scott N. Singer of counsel), for appellant., London Fischer LLP, New York City (Daniel Zemann, Jr., Anthony D. Capasso and Daniel P. Mevorach of counsel), for respondents.
Smith.
Cited by 32 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 57%
Citer courts: S.D. New York (3)

OPINION OF THE COURT

Smith, J.

The issue is whether a Labor Department regulation requiring “forms” to be “braced or tied together so as to maintain position and shape” (12 NYCRR 23-2.2 [a]) has been violated. We hold that the question cannot be answered on this record.

Facts and Procedural History

Plaintiff, a carpenter, was working on the construction of a new building in Manhattan when a large object, which he says was a “form,” fell on and injured his hand. The record shows that the word “form” can refer to several different things, but for present purposes it is a kind of mold used in the fabrication of concrete walls. Such a form is made of two metal sides with a space between them, into which liquid concrete is poured; the form is removed after the concrete has hardened.

The only description in the record of the object that fell on plaintiff is from his deposition; the description is neither clear nor complete. The object was not a completed form, but was part or all of one of a form’s sides. The side was constructed of metal plates, estimated by plaintiff to be two feet wide and four feet long, joined together in a way plaintiffs testimony does not explain. Plaintiff testified that the wall that was to be shaped using the form would be very large—“like 30 feet high and maybe the same amount in length”—and so presumably the side of the form was, or was to be, of at least that size.

Plaintiff sued the construction manager and the owner of the premises, claiming among other things that the object that fell on him was rendered unsafe by the violation of a Labor Department regulation governing concrete work and that defendants were therefore liable for his injuries under Labor Law § 241 (6). Supreme Court dismissed his other claims, but denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim. On defendants’ appeal, the Appellate Division reversed and ordered the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim dismissed. We granted leave to appeal, and now reverse the Appellate Division’s order and remit the case to Supreme Court for further proceedings.

[*50] Discussion

Defendants did not direct or control the work that plaintiff was doing when he was injured. Thus, they can be liable to him only if Labor Law § 241 (6) imposes on them a nondelegable duty, making them liable for the conduct of others. Labor Law § 241 (6) says:

“All areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being performed shall be so constructed, shored, equipped, guarded, arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to the persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places. The commissioner may make rules to carry into effect the provisions of this subdivision, and the owners and contractors and their agents for such work, except owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work, shall comply therewith.”

This statute, we have explained, is, “in a sense, a hybrid” (Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 503 [1993]). Its first sentence merely reiterates common-law standards of care, and thus cannot be a basis for civil liability by persons who are not themselves negligent; the first sentence “cannot by itself be relied upon as the source of an owner’s or general contractor’s nondelegable duty” (id. at 504). The second sentence, however, requiring owners and contractors to comply with rules of the Commissioner of Labor, does create a nondelegable duty—but only where the regulation in question contains a “specific, positive command[ ]” (Allen v Cloutier Constr. Corp., 44 NY2d 290, 297 [1978]), not where the regulation itself, using terms like “adequate,” “effective,” “proper,” “safe,” or “suitable,” merely incorporates “the ordinary tort duty of care” (Ross, 81 NY2d at 504).

Thus, plaintiff here can recover only if he shows a violation of a specific regulatory requirement. The regulation he relies on is 12 NYCRR 23-2.2 (a), which says in relevant part: “Forms . . . shall be structurally safe and shall be properly braced or tied together so as to maintain position and shape.”

The words “structurally safe” and the adverb “properly” are not specific enough to be a basis for Labor Law § 241 (6) liability, but the words “braced or tied together so as to maintain position and shape” impose more specific requirements. Plaintiff[*51] has alleged that those requirements were violated. Defendants assert, and the Appellate Division held, that there was no violation.

The gist of defendants’ argument is that the regulation is inapplicable here because it cannot apply to anything but a completed form. It does not make sense, defendants say, to require one side of a form to be “braced or tied together so as to maintain position and shape.” Plaintiff disagrees, relying on the affidavit of an engineer; the affidavit uses the words “metal concrete forms” to refer to objects of the kind that injured plaintiff, and says “[t]he metal concrete forms could have been tied together via wood or straps or both to secure the metal forms to each other and provide stability.” Plaintiffs engineer offers no further explanation of what he says should have been done; defendants submitted no expert testimony.

It was premature for the Appellate Division to grant summary judgment on this record. The interpretation of the regulation presents a question of law, but the meaning of specialized terms in such a regulation is a question on which a court must sometimes hear evidence before making its determination (see Millard v City of Ogdensburg, 274 AD2d 953, 954 [4th Dept 2000]). Here, a more complete record is necessary, both as to the nature of the object that caused the injury and the opinions of those expert in the construction of concrete walls as to whether the words of the regulation can sensibly be applied to anything but completed forms.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted to Supreme Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Pigott and Jones concur.

Order reversed, etc.