State of California v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). · Go Syfert
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State of California v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
16 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Paulek v. Department of Water Resources
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
(Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 117 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 326 ].) “[A]n EIR is presumed adequate [citation], and the [petitioner] in a CEQA action has the burden of proving otherwise.” (State of California v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1419 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 472 ].) 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Maywood v. Los Angeles Unified School District
Cal. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
(State of California v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1420 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 472 ] [“Under CEQA, an EER is presumed adequate [citation], and the plaintiff in a CEQA action has the burden of proving otherwise.”].) Maywood contends that any future project that is undergoing “environmental review” qualifies as a “probable future project.” The case law makes clear, however, that this is true only to the extent that the particular “environmental review” at issue provides evidence that the proposed project is both probable and sufficiently certain to allow for meaningful c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City & County of San Francisco
Cal. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Resources Code, § 21167.3; Laurel Heights I, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 393 ; Save Our Peninsula Committee v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 99, 116-117 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 326 ] (Save Our Peninsula); Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agency (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 511, 523 [ 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 334 ] (Friends of Mammoth); Davidon Homes v. City of San Jose (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 106, 113-114 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 612 ]; Sequoyah Hills, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 712, 717; State of California v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1419 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 47…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agency
Cal. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Resources Code, § 21167.3; State of California v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1419 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 472 ].) II Adequacy of EIR’s Analysis of Proposed Redevelopment Projects Plaintiffs claim the EIR violated CEQA, and particularly Public Resources Code section 21090, by failing to analyze the indirect or secondary environmental impacts likely to be caused by each of the proposed redevelopment projects included in the redevelopment plan.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barthelemy v. Chino Basin Municipal Water District
Cal. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Citizens of South Central L.A. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 826, 836 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 ], quoting Al Larson Boat Shop, Inc. v. Board of Harbor Commissioners (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 729, 740 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 618 ], quoting State of California v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1419 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 472 ].) “In reviewing the sufficiency of an EIR, the rule of reason applies.” (A Local & Regional Monitor v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1773, 1793 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 358 ].) “ ‘The court does not pass upon the correctness of the EIR’s env…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Al Larson Boat Shop, Inc. v. Board of Harbor Commissioners
Cal. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Resources Code, § 21167.3), and the plaintiff in a CEQA action has the burden of proving otherwise.” (State of California v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1419 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 472 ].) 3.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) A Local & Regional Monitor v. City of Los Angeles
Cal. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
The court decides only whether the administrative record as a whole demonstrates substantial evidence to support the determination that the changes in the project or its circumstances were not so substantial as to require major modifications to the EIR.” (Italics added.) (Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318.) Moreover, “[ujnder CEQA, an EIR is presumed adequate.” (State of California v. Superior Court (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1419 [ 272 Cal.Rptr. 472 ].) In reviewing the sufficiency of an EIR, the rule of reason applies.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
The STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Real Party in Interest
B051842.
California Court of Appeal.
Aug 20, 1990.
222 Cal. App. 3d 1416
Counsel, John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General, Marvin Goldsmith, Assistant Attorney General, Robert H. Francis and Marsha S. Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Petitioner., No appearance for Respondent., De Witt W. Clinton, County Counsel, Jonathan B. Crane and Helen S. Parker, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
Boren.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published

Opinion

BOREN, J.

This proceeding concerns a dispute between the State of California (the State) and the County of Los Angeles (the County) over the State’s plans to construct the Mira Loma State Prison near Lancaster. The State filed a petition for writ of mandate after the respondent court sustained the County’s demurrer (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (c)) to the State’s complaint in eminent domain. [1] The effect of the order was to abate the eminent domain proceeding pending resolution of the County’s pending action under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.), in which it challenged the validity of the environmental impact report (EIR) filed by the State in connection with the project. The petition is granted. [2]

In its demurrer, the County cited authority to the effect that a County victory in the CEQA action would bar the State’s eminent domain proceeding until such time as the State filed an EIR which complied with CEQA. (City of San Jose v. Great Oaks Water Co. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1005 [237 Cal.Rptr. 845].)

The case of City of San Jose, supra, might have been dispositive here were it not for the specific pronouncement of the Legislature as to the limited circumstances under which the planning and construction of the prison could be abated. In 1987, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 18 (Stats. 1987, ch. 165) as an urgency measure, for the express purpose of expediting new prison construction. (Sen. Bill No. 18, § 2, subd. (1).) In so doing, the Legislature declared: “Presently, the state prisons are operating[*1419] at over 175 percent of capacity and the prison population is still increasing. It is essential to the public safety that construction of new prisons proceeds as expeditiously as possible to relieve prison overcrowding and to maintain public safety and security.” (Sen. Bill No. 18, § 9.)

So great was the Legislature’s concern that the prison construction might be halted by the filing of a CEQA action that it provided: “The filing of an action pursuant to Division 13 (commencing with Section 21000) of the Public Resources Code involving the project shall not stop the planning and construction of the facility, provided that no temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, permanent injunction, or any other court order mandating cessation of the activity exists.” (Sen. Bill No. 18, § 2, subd. (k).)

A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain and implement the intent of the Legislature, so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 121 [253 Cal.Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852].) Given the Legislature’s emphatic pronouncement that the planning and construction of the prison proceed “as expeditiously as possible,” we believe it is safe to assume that Legislature included section 2, subdivision (k) in Senate Bill No. 18 to insure that the project could not be halted without some judicial evaluation of the merits of the CEQA action challenging the EIR. Under CEQA, an EIR is presumed adequate (Pub. Resources Code, § 21167.3), and the plaintiff in a CEQA action has the burden of proving otherwise. Senate Bill No. 18 imposes upon the plaintiff the obligation to make a preliminary showing, as it must to obtain a temporary restraining order or an injunction, that the EIR is defective, and that the CEQA action has merit. [3]

In the present case, the County did not avail itself of the only means provided by the Legislature for abating the project. By sustaining the County’s demurrer abating the State’s eminent domain action on solely procedural grounds, without requiring the County to make the preliminary showing compelled by Senate Bill No. 18, the respondent court violated the spirit, if not the letter, of that statute.

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the respondent court to vacate its order of July 6, 1990, which sustained the demurrer of defendant[*1420] County of Los Angeles, and to enter a new and different order overruling the demurrer, in that matter entitled State of California v. County of Los Angeles et al., Los Angeles Superior Court, No. BC000884.

Lucas, P. L, and Turner, J., concurred.

The petition of real party in interest for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 20, 1990.

1

Section 430.10, subdivision (c), permits a party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed to object to the pleading, by demurrer or answer, on the ground that “There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.”

2

The County received due notice from petitioners that the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance was being sought, and it filed opposition to the petition on July 31, 1990. Accordingly, the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180-181 [203 Cal.Rptr. 626, 681 P.2d 893].)

3

We therefore conclude that the language “any other court order mandating cessation of the activity” does not encompass the respondent court’s order here. The County’s demurrer merely raised the existence of the CEQA action as a bar to the eminent domain proceeding, and did not address the merits of the CEQA action.