People v. Antonio R., 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1631 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). · Go Syfert
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People v. Antonio R., 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1631 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 8× by 8 distinct cases, 2013–2026 · 2 courts · …direct the upbringing and education of children. at p. 941 ✓ Topic ↗
137 citation events (134 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
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2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 33 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" People v. Victor L. (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: but see · confidence high
(E.g., In re White, supra, 97 Cal.App.3d at pp. 147-152 [remanding for modification of condition of probation that prohibited prostitute from going into certain, high-prostitution areas of Fresno, in part because it interfered with her right to intrastate travel]; People v. Beach (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 612, 619-623 [ 195 Cal.Rptr. 381 ] [condition of probation requiring elderly widow convicted of involuntary manslaughter to relocate from home community was overbroad and violated her constitutional rights]; but see U.S. v. Watson *917 (9th Cir. 2009) 582 F.3d 974, 977, 983-985 [upholding conditi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Jones CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(See People v. Relkin (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1188, 1195 [“the condition’s limitation on interstate travel is closely tailored to the purpose of monitoring defendant’s travel to and from California not by barring his ability to travel altogether but by requiring that he first obtain written permission before doing so”]; In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 942 (Antonio R.) [a minor’s constitutional rights were not “impermissibly burdened” by a probation condition restricting travel to Los Angeles County from Orange County in light of the “safety valve” that allowed such t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Macovichuk CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
(Relkin, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 1195 [“the condition’s limitation on interstate travel is closely tailored to the purpose of monitoring defendant’s travel to and from California not by barring his ability to travel altogether but by requiring that he first obtain written permission before doing so”]; In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 942 (Antonio R.) [a minor’s constitutional rights were not “impermissibly burdened” by a probation condition restricting travel to Los Angeles County from Orange County in light of the “safety valve” that allowed such travel with th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re A.C. CA2/6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
(In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 (Antonio R.).) While a juvenile court has broader discretion in formulating probation conditions than adult criminal courts, that discretion “is not boundless.” (In re Luis F. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 176, 189 (Luis F.).) Juvenile probation conditions must meet the three-part Lent test of reasonableness applied to adult probationers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Juan R.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
(In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 134 [privacy rights of a probationer are “diminished”]; In re Antonio R., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 941 [juvenile’s constitutional rights more circumscribed than adult’s].) The People appear to concede Juan has a privacy interest, even if it is limited, in the information stored on his cell phone or other electronic devices.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. R.S.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
(Sheena K., supra, at pp. 887-889.) ‘“The state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents” (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 212 ]), thereby occupying a ‘“unique role ... in caring for the minor’s well-being” (In re Laylah K. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1500 [ 281 Cal.Rptr. 6 ]). “ ‘[A] condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court.’ ” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889 .…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Q.R.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
DISCUSSION Minor argues that the electronic search condition is unconstitutionally overbroad because it fails to adequately define “electronic devices”; implicates the privacy rights of third parties; allows searches of remotely stored *1235 information; and unnecessarily infringes upon his expectation of privacy in the contents of electronic devices. 1 A. Standard of Review Juvenile courts have broad discretion to fashion probation conditions, and “may impose ‘ “any reasonable condition that is ‘fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabil…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. J.E.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
The state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents . . . [and] may ‘curtail a child’s exercise of . . . constitutional rights.’ ” (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 212 ].) Accordingly, although we agree with Minor that his right to privacy is implicated by the electronic search condition (People v. Appleton, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 724 [“individuals retain a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in the contents of their own [electronics]”]), we nevertheless disagree with his contention that the c…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. George F.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
(In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 212 ].) Our Supreme Court has said, “ ‘ “[because] juvenile probation is not . . . an act of leniency in lieu of statutory punishment . ...” [¶] ... a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court.’ ” (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889 .) In other words, the court may impose broader probation conditions on juveniles than it may adults, because for juveniles, probation is not an…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Elijah H. CA1/5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
(In re Antonio R., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 941 [juvenile’s constitutional rights more circumscribed than adult’s]; In re Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 134 [privacy rights of a probationer are “diminished”].) However, contrary to the People’s argument,12 the electronics search condition implicates Elijah’s constitutional privacy rights.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. P.O.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
And a parent may ‘curtail a child’s exercise of . . . constitutional rights . . . [because a] parent’s own constitutionally protected “liberty” includes the right to “bring up children” [citation] and to “direct the upbringing and education of children.” [Citation.]’ ” (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 212 ].) Whether a probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad presents a question of law reviewed de novo.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Patrick F.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 (Antonio R.) [juvenile’s constitutional rights more circumscribed than adult’s]; In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 136 [noting privacy rights of a probationer are “diminished”].) In fashioning probation conditions for a juvenile who has been adjudicated a ward, the court has broader powers than when imposing such conditions on an adult, and we look to whether a condition “is consistent with the rehabilitative purpose of probation and constitutional parental authority.” (In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232 , 1243 (Frank V.).…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Malik J.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
And a parent may ‘curtail a child’s exercise of the constitutional rights . . . [because a] parent’s own constitutionally protected “liberty” includes the right to “bring up children” [citation] and to “direct the upbringing and education of children.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 212 ].) But the juvenile court’s discretion is not unlimited.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re C.P. CA1/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
(Cf. In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 887-889; see, e.g., In re Pedro Q. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1373 [restriction on minor’s travel to gang territory might be proper for a minor living outside the gang’s territory but overbroad for a minor who lives, works, or attends school within that same area]; In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941-942 [upholding probation condition requiring minor who lived in one county not to travel to another county, where criminal conduct at issue occurred and his gang was located].) The record reveals ample and legitimate reasons for C.P.�…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Kenneth T. CA4/1
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
General Legal Principles "The state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents." (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 (Antonio R.).) When a 16 juvenile court adjudges a minor a ward of the court under section 602 and places the ward under the supervision of a probation officer, "[t]he court may impose and require any and all reasonable [probation] conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." (§ 730, subd. (b).) "The juvenile court has wide di…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Makayla B. CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
(In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 (Antonio R.).) “This is because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor’s constitutional rights are more circumscribed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Shaun R. (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
The court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced." "Section 730 grants courts broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases. [Citation.] `[T]he power of the juvenile court is even broader than that of a criminal court.'" ( In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684, 692 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 ].) As the court explained in In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 212 ], "juvenile [probati…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re DG
Cal. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Because wards are thought to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults and have more circumscribed constitutional rights, and because the juvenile court stands in the shoes of a parent when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, juvenile conditions "may be broader than those pertaining to adult offenders." ( In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 212 ].) In Tyrell J., the Supreme Court explained another aspect of the difference: "Although the goal of both types of probation is the rehabilitation of the offender, `[j]uvenile probation is not, as with an ad…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. D.G.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Because wards are thought to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults and have more circumscribed constitutional rights, and because the juvenile court stands in the shoes of a parent when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, juvenile conditions “may be broader than those pertaining to adult offenders.” (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 212 ].) In Tyrell /., the Supreme Court explained another aspect of the difference: “Although the goal of both types of probation is the rehabilitation of the offender, ‘[j]uvenile probation is not, as wit…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Spencer S.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
This is because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor’s constitutional rights are more circumscribed.” (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 212 ].) Under section 730, subdivision (b), when the juvenile court places a section 602 ward under a probation officer’s supervision or commits the ward to a probation officer’s care, custody, and control, the “court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and th…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alex O. v. Superior Court of San Diego Cty.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
(People v. Carabajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681 , 899 P.2d 67 ].) As we noted in In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684, 692-693 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 ]: “The juvenile court is statutorily authorized to place a ward on probation and ‘impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’ [Citation.] [Welfare and Institutions Code] [s]ection 730 grants courts broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juveni…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. R.V.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
This is because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor’s constitutional rights are more circumscribed.” (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 212 ].) GPS monitoring is expressly authorized by statute for adult probationers (Pen.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re RV
Cal. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
This is because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor's constitutional rights are more circumscribed." ( In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 212 ].) (3) GPS monitoring is expressly authorized by statute for adult probationers (Pen.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Sheena K.
Cal. · 2007 · confidence medium
The Attorney General also asserts that a challenge to a probation condition based upon a constitutional defect such as vagueness or overbreadth usually is not a “pure question of law” similar to that presented by an “unauthorized sentence” or a “sentence in excess of jurisdiction,” which “can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court.” (Welch, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 235.) He urges that a claim of vagueness or overbreadth generally must be considered in light of the facts of a particular case because, for example, conditions t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Daniel R.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
(People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681 , 899 P.2d 67 ].) As we noted in In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 ]: “The juvenile court is statutorily authorized to place a ward on probation and ‘impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’ [Citation.] Section 730 grants courts broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases. [Citation.] ‘[T]he power of the …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Christopher M.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
(In re Ronny P. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1207 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 675 ].) “[T]he power of the juvenile court is even broader than that of a criminal court.” (In re Binh L. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194, 203 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 678 ].) The juvenile court’s exercise of discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases “will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse.” (In re Josh W. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 701 ].) A juvenile probation condition is generally valid unless it “ ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convic…
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Antonio C.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
(In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 212 ].) Further, when the state asserts jurisdiction over a minor, it stands in the shoes of the parents.
discussed Cited "see" In re M.S. CA5
Cal. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see · confidence high
“Imposing a limitation on probationers’ movements as a condition of probation is common.” (People v. Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 406 ; see In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937 , 941–942.) A probation officer’s knowledge of probationer’s whereabouts “facilitates supervision and rehabilitation and helps ensure probationers are complying with the terms of their conditional release.” (Moran, at p. 406; see People v. Thrash (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 898, 902 [travel-restriction conditions “validly appl[y] to everyone because of the continuing supervision by the probation depart…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Bryant
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence low
Although these cases are instructive, consideration of them must take into account the fact that “ ‘ “the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.” ’ [Citation.] 5 Our Supreme Court has granted review in In re Ricardo P. (2016) 241 Cal.App.4th 676 , review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S230923, to consider the following issue: “Did the trial court err by imposing an ‘electronics search condition’ on the juvenile as a condition of his probation when that condition had no relationship to the crimes he committed but was …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Bryant
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence low
Although these cases are instructive, consideration of them must take into account the fact that “ „ “the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.” ‟ [Citation.] 5 Our Supreme Court has granted review in In re Ricardo P. (2016) 241 Cal.App.4th 676 , review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S230923, to consider the following issue: “Did the trial court err by imposing an „electronics search condition‟ on the juvenile as a condition of his probation when that condition had no relationship to the crimes he committed but was …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." People v. Bryant (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence medium
(See, e.g., J.E., supra, 1 Cal.App.5th 795 , review granted; In re P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 288 .) Although these cases are instructive, consideration of them must take into account the fact that “ ‘ “the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults ....”’ [Citation.] This is because juveniles are deemed to be ‘more in *403 need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor’s constitutional rights are more circumscribed.’ [Citation.]” (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910 [ 106 Cal.Rp…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re B.M. CA4/2
Cal. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see also · confidence medium
While this condition may indeed “restrict[] his ability to go to parks, movie theater[s] or any other recreational facility, or even restaurants, unless accompanied by a responsible adult,” it is reasonable, given the “circumstances and the minor.” (In re Binh L. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194, 203 ; see also In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 [“The state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re O.C. CA6
Cal. Ct. App. · 2014 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Code, § 730, subd. (b).) In fashioning conditions of probation, the juvenile court considers “ ‘not only the circumstances of the crime but also the minor’s entire social history.’ ” (In re Laylah K. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1500 , disapproved on other grounds in In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 962, fn. 2, 983-984, fn. 13 .) “[Welfare and Institutions Code s]ection 730 grants courts broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases. [Citation.] ‘[T]he power of the juvenile court is even broader than that of a criminal court.’ ” (In re Christo…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re ANTONIO R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ANTONIO R., Defendant and Appellant
G025423.
California Court of Appeal.
Feb 29, 2000.
2000 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1631
Counsel, Susan K. Keiser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant., Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Carl H. Horst and Larissa Karpovics Hendren, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Crosby.
Cited by 72 opinions  |  Published

[*939] Opinion

CROSBY, Acting P. J .

Antonio R. appeals from a juvenile court probation order that requires him to stay out of Los Angeles County unless accompanied by a parent or with prior permission from the probation officer. We affirm.

I

Antonio absconded from Orange County juvenile probation supervision on his 17th birthday, January 18, 1999, four days after his release from a county program. [1] In Los Angeles in early March, he burgled a car. He claimed to be living with a pregnant girlfriend in Lennox or Inglewood and working as a gardener. The minor admitted membership in the Lennox 13 gang for many years with the name “Lil Boy,” and conceded he had been “kicking back” with gang members while AWOL. [2] He regularly drank and smoked marijuana.

A juvenile court report from Los Angeles detailed Antonio’s lengthy arrest history. It described his “overall conduct under supervision” as poor: “Minor has changed his place of residence without informing the probation department. Minor has stopped going to school without informing the probation officer. [He] has been involved in criminal behavior in both Los Angeles and Orange County. . . . [ft] . . . [He] has an extensive criminal history .... [T]he current plan involving minor being home after camp graduation is not working.”

Addressing the condition that Antonio not be allowed to travel to Los Angeles County without a parent or the permission of the probation officer, defense counsel questioned whether the proviso was overbroad. The court said this: “Gee I don’t know. ... I would really hope that since the last time he went to L.A. County he committed a felony, that you would be really happy that he didn’t go . . . where the gang is, that he stay here where his mother wants him to be; but obviously that’s hoping against hope. So if it is overbroad you know what to do. And that’s certainly something that . . . [the Court of Appeal] can deal with, [ft] See, just to add one part of that, I think that at his age—this is just my thinking, you know—and I would think[*940] that if you were a mother and this were your child and the mother didn’t want him to go to L.A.. County, right, that that ought to be what’s going to control; and so I’m backing her up.” Antonio’s mom, who was in court, agreed: “I don’t let him go over there. I keep telling him.” [3]

II

The minor argues the condition was impermissibly overbroad. [4] He claims the condition did not directly relate to past or future criminal conduct. He also asserts the condition impinges on his constitutional rights to travel and freely associate, and was not narrowly tailored to address the state’s compelling interest in his reformation.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 730 grants courts broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases. The court may impose “any . . . reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” (Id., subd. (b).)

In an adult probation setting, “[a] condition of probation which (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality does not serve the statutory ends of probation and is invalid.” (People v. Dominguez (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 623, 627 [64 Cal.Rptr. 290]; accord, People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 [124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545].)

The minor relies on several cases where an adult probation condition was considered overbroad, unreasonable, or unconstitutional. (In re White (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 141 [158 Cal.Rptr. 562] [defendant found guilty of soliciting an act of prostitution was granted probation on condition she not go into certain high-prostitution areas of the City of Fresno; court held factual nexus between the proscribed activity and future criminality was tenuous and the condition interfered with her right to intrastate travel]; [5] People v. Beach (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 612 [195 Cal.Rptr. 381] [an elderly[*941] widow convicted of involuntary manslaughter was placed on probation on condition that she relocate from the community where she had resided in her own home for 24 years; appellate court struck the condition as unreasonably broad, not sufficiently related to future criminality, and violative of constitutional rights]; People v. Bauer (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 937 [260 Cal.Rptr. 62] [26-year-old defendant convicted of false imprisonment and assault granted probation on condition his residence be approved by the probation officer, effectively banishing him from living with or near his parents; condition invalid because nothing in the record suggested his home life contributed to the crime of which he was convicted or was reasonably related to future criminality].)

However, as explained in In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232 [285 Cal.Rptr. 16], juvenile conditions may be broader than those pertaining to adult offenders. This is because juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor’s constitutional rights are more circumscribed. The state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents. And a parent may “curtail a child’s exercise of the constitutional rights . . . [because a] parent’s own constitutionally protected ‘liberty’ includes the right to ‘bring up children’ [citation,] and to ‘direct the upbringing and education of children.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1243; In re Roger S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 921, 928 [141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 569 P.2d 1286].)

In In re Pedro Q. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368 [257 Cal.Rptr. 821], although the issue addressed was whether a probation officer may unilaterally impose a new condition restricting travel to a particular locale (he or she may not), a panel of this division noted: “[Conditions infringing on constitutional rights are not automatically invalid [citation]; indeed, they will pass muster if tailored to fit the individual probationer. [Citation.] For example, while a travel restriction may be proper for a minor who lives outside the gang’s territory, it may be overbroad for one who lives, works or goes to school within the area. But the court alone is empowered to determine the propriety of the proposed conditions and their applicability to the individual offender.” (Id. at p. 1373, italics added; cf. In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 893] [no reasonable basis for sustaining a condition requiring a minor to absent himself from the country of his residence].)

Antonio has been involved in extensive and recent criminal conduct in Los Angeles County. (See fn. 1, ante.) His gang holds court in at least a[*942] portion of that county, and it is readily inferable that his criminal behavior is related to his associations. His parents and residence are in Orange County, which distinguishes this case from those cited above where the probationers were effectively banished from their homes. Also, from an administrative standpoint, the condition effectively permits the minor to associate with his girlfriend (assuming she is not a gang member), if she wishes to come to Orange County, without embroiling the court in disputes about whether the minor violated probation by visiting her in the gang’s neighborhood.

We acknowledge that Los Angeles County is a large place. There is much that Antonio may be prevented from doing that does not relate to potential criminality. For example, the minor may not, without prior permission or with his parents, visit the Getty Museum. Flexing or gawking at Muscle Beach is prohibited. He may not take in a basketball game at Pauley Pavilion, nor a college football game at the Coliseum.

But we have confidence that any reasonable request to travel within Los Angeles County will be honored by his parents or the probation officer, and this safety valve saves the condition. In essence, the minor may not travel “extra-locally” without his parents’ cooperation or his probation officer’s assent. This does no more than reaffirm the traditional parental prerogative. The condition is thus consistent with the rehabilitative purpose of probation and constitutional parental authority. Antonio’s constitutional rights have not been impermissibly burdened.

The judgment is affirmed.

Rylaarsdam, J., and Bedsworth, J., concurred.

1

Los Angeles County authorities had filed six juvenile court petitions involving the minor since 1997. Sustained allegations included drug possession and vandalism. The minor’s case was transferred to Orange County, his legal residence, in August 1997. On January 11, 1999, the court sustained a petition alleging auto taking (Veh. Code, § 10851) and Antonio was released three days later having served 17 days of a 90-day commitment.

2

We realize Antonio is now 18 years old, but use the word “minor” here in an historical context.

3

The court imposed many other conditions (including standard gang terms) that prevented Antonio from associating with known gang members or being in any known gang gathering area.

4

Because the Attorney General does not argue the point, we will assume defense counsel’s query “I was just asking ... if the order was not overbroad in barring him,” and her statement that she “just wanted to get clarification,” preserved the issue for appeal. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 520, 851 P.2d 802].)

5

In re White, supra, noted, “No case has been called to our attention upholding such a broad condition which completely prohibits mere presence in a geographical area at all times as[*941] contrasted with the prohibition of entry into selected and particularized places (such as bars, pool rooms and the like) with reasonable restrictions as to time.” (97 Cal.App.3d at p. 150.)