green
Positive treatment
Issue: Fourth Amendment violationFL ↗
Issue: Katz testFL ↗
Quoted verbatim 1×
22.0 score
G Cite
cited 2× by 1 distinct case ·
…a purely consensual encounter, which officers may initiate without any objective level of suspicion.
⚠ not in text
cited 2× by 1 distinct case ·
…for all of the many reasons that people knock on front doors.
at p. 528
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 2011 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2011
2018
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
STATE OF FLORIDA v. GREGORY EDWARD GUANSO MILLER
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
before the trial court considers the merits of a fourth amendment motion to suppress, the defendant must first establish a factual basis justifying his or her claim to have possessed a fourth amendment right at the time of the alleged invasion.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Tennessee v. James Robert Christensen, Jr.
(4×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
In short, the Defendant has failed to demonstrate that he had a reasonable expectation that ordinary citizens would not occasionally enter his property by walking or driving up his driveway and approaching his front door to talk with him “for all of the many reasons that people knock on front doors.” Nieminski v. State, 60 So.3d 521, 528 (Fla. Dist.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Holmes
(2×)
May 20, 2011) (same); Nieminski v. State, 60 So.3d 521, 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (same).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Thomas v. State
This was no mere “knock and talk.” A “knock and talk” is only justified as a consensual encounter during which officers are authorized to “approach a dwelling on a defined path, knock on the front door, briefly await an answer, and either engage in a consensual encounter with the resident or immediately depart.” Powell v. State, 120 So.3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (citing Nieminski v. State, 60 So.3d 521, 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Waldo v. State, 975 So.2d 542, 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Calloway v. State
Second, a “knock and talk” is only justified as a consensual encounter during which officers are authorized to “approach a dwelling on a defined path, knock on the front door, briefly await an answer, and either engage in a consensual encounter with the resident or immediately depart.” Powell v. State, 2013 WL 2232319 , 120 So.3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA May 22, 2013) (citing Nieminski v. State, 60 So.3d 521, 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Waldo v. State, 975 So.2d 542, 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Arias v. State
Therefore, the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case when it found that, absent the dog sniff, Detective Don-nelly had sufficient probable cause to procure a warrant. 3 See State v. Roman, 103 So.3d 922, 925-26 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (finding that the smell of marijuana through an open door was sufficient probable cause for a warrant); Nieminski v. State, 60 So.3d 521, 523 (Fla. 2d DGA 2011) (finding that the smell of marijuana through a partially opened window coupled with an anonymous tip provided sufficient probable cause for a search warrant); State v. Pereira, 967 So.…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Ferrer v. State
Cf. Nieminski v. State, 60 So.3d 521, 525-27 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (finding no violation of privacy where officers entered fenced property through a closed, but unlocked, gate).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bishram v. State
See State v. Morsman, 394 So.2d 408, 409 (Fla.1981) (“Under Florida law it is clear that one does not harbor an expectation of privacy on a front porch where salesmen or visitors may appear at any time.”); Nieminski v. State, 60 So.3d 521, 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (“[I]f the address ... had been a more traditional lot in a residential neighborhood surrounded by a white picket fence and a gate that closed but did not lock, no one would reasonably suggest that the knock and talk was improper or that officers were required to describe the picket fence in the affidavit used to obtain the warra…
cited
Cited "see"
SCOTT RUDOLPH v. STATE OF FLORIDA
See Nieminski v. State, 60 So. 3d 521, 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
discussed
Cited "see"
JONATHAN OSORIO v. STATE OF FLORIDA
See Nieminski v. State, 60 So. 3d 521, 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); see also State v. Morsman, 394 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1981) (“[O]ne does not harbor an expectation of privacy on a front porch where salesmen or visitors may appear at any time.”).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
STATE OF FLORIDA v. DERRICK JAMMELL PETTIS
"A search violates a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights only if (1) a defendant demonstrates that he or she had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the property searched and (2) a defendant establishes that society would recognize that subjective expectation as objectively reasonable." Hicks v. State, 929 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); see also Nieminski v. State, 60 So. 3d 521, 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) ("[B]efore the trial court considers the merits of a Fourth Amendment motion to suppress, the defendant must first establish a factual basis justifying his or her claim to have po…
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Jacot
See also Nieminski v. State, 60 So.3d 521, 526 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2011) (law enforcement officer may open a closed, but unlocked driveway gate on rural acreage completely surrounded by a chain link fence to walk to the front door of house, in the absence of no-trespassing sign or similar warning for persons to stay out).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Powell v. State
See, e.g., Nieminski v. State, 60 So.3d 521, 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); Waldo v. State, 975 So.2d 542, 543 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
J.W. v. State
See e.g., Nieminski v. State, 60 So.3d 521, 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (citing Hicks v. State, 929 So.2d 13 , 16 n. 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). .
cited
Cited "see, e.g."
Mesa v. State
See, e.g., Nieminski v. State, 60 So.3d 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); State v. Arango, 9 So.3d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Rodriguez v. State, 958 So.2d 469 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Ludolfo MEDINA, Petitioner,
v.
FONTAINEBLEAU HILTON and FHM Ins. Co./United Self Insured, Respondents
v.
FONTAINEBLEAU HILTON and FHM Ins. Co./United Self Insured, Respondents
1D11-0952.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Apr 28, 2011.
Kimberly A. Hill of Kimberly A. Hill, P.L., Fort Lauderdale, for Petitioner., Hinda Klein of Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevans, Abel, Lurvey, Morrow & Schefer, P.A., Hollywood, for Respondents.
Benton, Webster, Van Nortwick.
Published
PER CURIAM.
DENIED. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Groman, 46 So.3d 1058, 1060-61 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Taylor v. TGI Friday’s, Inc., 16 So.3d 312, 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Dawson v. Clerk of Cir. Ct.-Hillsborough County, 991 So.2d 407, 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).
BENTON, C.J., WEBSTER, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ„ concur.