Indep. Prods. Corp. & Ipc Distributors, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 283 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1960). · Go Syfert
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Indep. Prods. Corp. & Ipc Distributors, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 283 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1960). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
78 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 25 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Floodbreak, LLC v. Art Metal Industries, LLC (ctd, 2022-03-04)
Treatment trajectory · 1961 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1961 1993 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 36 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Floodbreak, LLC v. Art Metal Industries, LLC
D. Conn. · 2022 · confidence medium
Independent Productions Corp. v. Loews Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960) (counseling that “the entry of a judgment by default [is a] drastic remed[y], and should be applied only in extreme circumstances”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Getty Images (Us) Inc. v. Advernet, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 2011 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir.1960).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Global NAPs Inc.
2d Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960) (stating, in dicta, that reliance on inherent power to dismiss action was improper when Rule 37 was available (citing Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 206-08 , 78 S.Ct. 1087 )).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pall Corp. v. Entegris, Inc.
E.D.N.Y · 2008 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir.1960)) (stating that entry of a default judgment is a “drastic remed[y], and should be applied only in extreme circumstances”); Cody v. Mello, 59 F.3d 13, 15 (2d Cir.1995) (recognizing that “dismissal is a harsh remedy to be utilized only in extreme situations”). “[A]ny doubt as to whether a default judgment should be entered must be resolved in favor of the opposing party.” Arthur F. Williams, Inc., 208 F.R.D. at 44 (citing Enron Oil, 10 F.3d at 96 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carmona v. Wright
N.D.N.Y. · 2006 · confidence medium
See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 , 78 S.Ct. 1087 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958); Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Arthur F. Williams, Inc. v. Helbig
E.D.N.Y · 2002 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir.1960)) (entry of a default judgment is a “drastic remed[y], and should be applied only in extreme circumstances.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marfia v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, New York Branch
2d Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir.1960), we said: “The dismissal of an action with prejudice or the entry of a judgment by default are drastic remedies, and should be applied only in extreme circumstances.” Similar references to the “most ‘drastic remedy,’ ” (Peterson v. Term Taxi Inc., 429 F.2d 888, 891 (2d Cir.1970)), used “only in extreme circumstances,” (Ali A Tamini v. M/V Jewon, 808 F.2d 978, 980 (2d Cir.1987)), and “as a last, not a first resort,” (Katz v. Morgenthau, 709 F.Supp. 1219, 1225 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) 72 Fair empl.prac.cas. (Bna) 242, 36 fed.r.serv.3d 584 Antonio Marfia, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, New York Branch and Ozer Ozman, Individually and in His Official Capacity as General Manager of T.C. Ziraat Bankasi, New York Branch,defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees
2d Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir.1960), we said: "The dismissal of an action with prejudice or the entry of a judgment by default are drastic remedies, and should be applied only in extreme circumstances." 53 Similar references to the "most 'drastic remedy,' " (Peterson v. Term Taxi Inc., 429 F.2d 888, 891 (2d Cir.1970)), used "only in extreme circumstances," (Ali A. Tamini v. M/V Jewon, 808 F.2d 978, 980 (2d Cir.1987)), and "as a last, not a first resort," (Katz v. Morgenthau, 709 F.Supp. 1219, 1225 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 892 F.2d 20 (2d Cir.…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Garcia v. Senkowski
N.D.N.Y. · 1996 · confidence medium
Com’n v. Research Automation Coro., 521 F.2d 585, 589 (2d Cir.1975); Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 731 (2d Cir.1960).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Power Constructors, Inc. v. Acres American (2×)
Alaska · 1991 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir.1960)). .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec John W. Marmoulides, and Samuel W. Ethridge Aqualec, Inc., Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst, Plaintiff-Counterclaim-Defendant v. Aqualec, Inc., Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant v. Samuel W. Ethridge, Defendant-Cross-Defendant-Appellant
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir.1960).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nilsson, Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec
9th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir.1960).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ali A. Tamini v. M/v Jewon, and Salen Dry Cargo Ab, Salen Project/liner Services, Inc., and Ahjin Shipping Co., Ltd.
2d Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 277 (2d Cir.1981); Peterson v. Term Taxi, Inc., 429 F.2d 888, 891 (2d Cir.1970); Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir.1960); Lyford v. Carter, 274 F.2d 815 (2d Cir.1960); Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir.1959); Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669, 670 (2d Cir.1957).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State SEC. Life Ins. Co. v. State
Miss. · 1986 · confidence medium
Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2nd Cir.1960); Durgin v. Graham, 372 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir.1967); accord Wheat v. Eakin, 491 So.2d 523, 526 (Miss. 1986) (disposition of cases on their merits favored over default).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Remington Products, Inc. v. North American Philips Corp.
D. Conn. · 1985 · confidence medium
Co. v. Loew’s, Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir.1960).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Imprescia v. Imprescia
Mass. · 1984 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. I960) (“The court below should have dealt with the issues pertinent to the motion to compel answers by following the specific procedures set forth in Rule 37(a) and (b) instead of ignoring these procedures and summarily dismissing the complaint, even though this *105 precipitate action is sought to be justified as being within the court’s inherent powers. . . .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Litton Sys., Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
2d Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
At the same time, because dismissal denies the party access to justice, if the party has a valid claim, dismissal would, in the case of attorney misconduct such as gross negligence, amount to a windfall to an adversary to be resorted to only when necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial system, or in similar “extreme circumstances.” Interconex, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission, 572 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir.1978); Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd. v. Standard Precision, 559 F.2d 203, 208 (2d Cir.1977); Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir.1960).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Litton Systems, Inc., Litton Business Telephone Systems, Inc., Litton Business Systems, Inc., and Litton Industries Credit Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees- Cross v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, Western Electric Company, Inc., Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., New York Telephone Company, Inc., New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, the Ohio Bell Telephone Company, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company, and Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company, Defendants-Appellants-Cross Litton Systems, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
2d Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
National Hockey League, supra, 427 U.S. at 640 , 96 S.Ct. at 2779 (refusal for 17 months to answer "crucial" interrogatories); Chira v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 634 F.2d 664, 666 (2d Cir.1980) (doing "absolutely nothing at all" to comply with discovery orders or move the case to trial); Cine Forty-Second Street, supra (refusal for three years, without moving for protective order, to comply with specific orders to answer interrogatories on damages). 139 At the same time, because dismissal denies the party access to justice, if the party has a valid claim, dismissal would, in the case of attorne…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hawkins v. Fulton County
N.D. Ga. · 1982 · confidence medium
Flaksa v. Little River Marine Construction Co., 389 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928 , 88 S.Ct. 2287 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1387 (1968); Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir.1960); 8 C.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Attorney General of the United States of America v. The Irish People, Inc. (2×)
D.C. Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960) (concluding, in an analysis of Société Internationale, that “[t]he dismissal of an action with prejudice or the entry of a judgment by default are drastic remedies, and should be applied only in extreme circumstances”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mullen v. Christiansen (2×)
Alaska · 1982 · confidence medium
See, Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 , 78 S.Ct. 1087 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1255, 1265 (1958); Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960); Zeller v. Poor, 577 P.2d 695, 697 (Alaska 1978); Champion Oil Co. v. Herbert, 552 P.2d 670, 673 (Alaska 1976) (Boochever, J., Concurring Opinion); Guard v. Benson, 438 P.2d 219, 223 (Alaska 1968); Mely v. Morris, 409 P.2d 979, 982 (Alaska 1966); Oaks v. Rojcewicz, 409 P.2d 839, 843 (Alaska 1966); Palzer v. Serv-U-Meat Co., 419 P.2d 201, 206-07 (Alaska 1966); Sanuita v. Hedberg, 404 P.2d 647, 651 (Alaska 1965).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Litton System, Inc. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
S.D.N.Y. · 1981 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Loew’s, 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960); Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1959) (subsequent history omitted); Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669, 670 (2d Cir. 1957).
examined Cited as authority (rule) The Black Panther Party v. William French Smith, Attorney General of the United States (12×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
D.C. Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s Incorp., 283 F.2d 730, 732-33 (2d Cir. 1960), also involving Rule 37, is distinguishable for the same reason.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd. v. Standard Precision
2d Cir. · 1977 · confidence medium
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Research Automation Corp., supra, 521 F.2d at 588 ; Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd. v. Standard Precision
2d Cir. · 1977 · confidence medium
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Research Automation Corp., supra, 521 F.2d at 588 ; Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Countryside Casualty Company v. Johnny R. Orr and M. L. Kennedy
8th Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S. A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 206-08 , 78 S.Ct. 1087 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958); Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960). 4 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Albion Optical Co. v. United States
Cust. Ct. · 1972 · confidence medium
Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hartman v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico
prsupreme · 1969 · confidence medium
Independent Productions Corporation v. Loew’s Incorporated, 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hartman v. Tribunal Superior de Puerto Rico
prsupreme · 1969 · confidence medium
Independent Productions Corporation v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Albert Flaksa v. Little River Marine Construction Co., Inc.
5th Cir. · 1968 · confidence medium
“The dismissal of an action with prejudice or the entry of a judgment by default are drastic remedies, and should *888 be applied only in extreme circumstances. * * * ” Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 2 Cir., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (1960). “ * * * The sanction of dismissal is the most severe sanction that a court may apply, and its use must be tempered by a careful exercise of judicial discretion. * * * ” Durgin v. Graham, 5 Cir., 372 F.2d 130, 131 (1967). 7 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Oaks v. Rojcewicz
Alaska · 1966 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960); Syracuse *844 Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F. 2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1959).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ross
S.D.N.Y. · 1965 · confidence medium
Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960); see also Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 , 83 S.Ct. 502 , 9 L.Ed.2d 502 (1963).
discussed Cited "see" Providence Gas Company v. Biltmore Hotel Operating Co.
R.I. · 1977 · signal: accord · confidence high
P. 37(b) and (d) is that the court “make such orders * * * as are just,” and “justice requires that the most drastic sanctions be reserved for flagrant cases.” 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §2284, at 767-68 (1970); accord, Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s *115 Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960).
discussed Cited "see" Hancock v. Arizona Central Credit Union
Ariz. Ct. App. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s Inc., 283 F.2d 730 (2nd Cir. 1960); SEC v. American Beryllium & Oil Corp., 303 F.Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y.1969); Westport National Bank v. Wood, 31 Conn.Sup. 266 , 328 A.2d 724 (1974); contra, Brady v. Hearst Corp., 281 F.Supp. 637 (D.Mass. 1968); Womble v. Miller, 336 A.2d 138 (Md.App.1975); Doanbuy Lease and Co. v. Melcher, 83 N.M. 82 , 488 P.2d 339 (1971); see 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2291 at 808-809 (1970).
discussed Cited "see" Mely v. Morris
Alaska · 1966 · signal: see · confidence high
See Societe Internationale, etc. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 , 78 S.Ct. 1087 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958). 10 . 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir.1960). 11 . 2B Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 917, at 136 (rules ed. Wright rev. 1961). 12 .
cited Cited "see" Parla v. Matson Navigation Co.
S.D.N.Y. · 1961 · signal: see · confidence high
See Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 2 Cir., 1960, 283 F.2d 730 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
INDEPENDENT PRODUCTIONS CORPORATION and IPC Distributors, Inc., Appellants,
v.
LOEW’S INCORPORATED Et Al., Appellees
35, Docket 26112.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Nov 2, 1960.
283 F.2d 730
Rosston, Hort & Brussel, George Brus-sel, Jr., New York City (George Brussel, Jr., and Edward Labaton, New York City, Charles A. Reich, New Haven, Conn., of counsel), for appellants., Myles J. Lane, Bernard R. Sorkin, Georgiana Koenig, New York City, of counsel, for defendants-appellees., Schwartz & Frohlich, New York City, for Columbia Pictures Corp. and Columbia Pictures International' Corp., Sidney Schreiber, New York City, for Motion Picture Ars’n of America, Inc. and Association of Motion Picture Producers., Benjamin Melniker, New York City, for Loew’s Inc. and Loew’s International Corp., Howard Levinson, New York City, for Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., Warner Bros. Pictures International Corp., and Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., Leonard Kaufman, New York City, for Paramount Pictures Corp., Paramount International Films, Inc., and Paramount Film Distributing Corp., Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon, New York City, for United Artists Corp., Eagle Lion Classics, Inc., National Screen Service Corp., Comedia Enterprises, Inc., and City Entertainment Corp., J. Miller Walker, New York City, for RKO Teleradio Pictures, Inc. (formerly known as RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.)., Simpson, Thacher & Bartlett, New York City, for Atlas Corp. (successor by merger to defendant RKO Pictures Corp.)., Royall, Koegel, Harris & Caskey, New York City, for Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., Twentieth Century-Fox International Corp. and Twentieth Century-Fox Inter-America, Inc., Adolph Schimel, New York City, for Universal Pictures Co., Inc., Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. and Universal International Films, Inc., Theodore R. Black, New York City, for Republic Productions, Inc., Republic Pictures Corp. and Republic Pictures International Corp., William B. Jaffe, New York City, for Allied Artists Pictures Corp., Allied Artists Productions, Inc., Allied Artists International Corp. and Allied Artists Distributing Corp., Frederick W. R. Pride and Charles F. Young, New York City, for West Coast Theatre Corp. and West Coast Agency Corp., Cahill, Gordon, Reindel & Ohl, New York City, for Radio Corp. of America., Michael F. Mayer, New York City, for Arthur Mayer and Council of Motion Picture Organizations, Inc., Jacobs, Persinger & Parker, New York City, for Reeves Sound Studios, Inc., Paskus, Gordon & Hyman, New York City, for Schwerin Research Corp., James L. O’Connor, New York City, on the brief, for Pathe Laboratories, Inc. and Chesapeake Industries, Inc., Spivak & Kantor, New York City (Louis Kantor, New York City, of counsel), for Richard F. Walsh, John J. Fran-cavilla and Roy Brewer, defendants-ap-pellees.
Hincks, Waterman, Moore.
Cited by 62 opinions  |  Published
WATERMAN, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff corporations allege a conspiracy to harm them in violation of the federal antitrust laws. Defendants, pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.Code Appendix, 1958 Ed.), sought to examine the plaintiffs by taking pretrial depositions of one Herbert Biberman, as the corporations’ managing agent. Plaintiffs challenged the designation of Biberman as their managing agent and sought an order under Rule 30(b) barring defendants from taking plaintiffs’ corporate deposition by Biberman. Judge Sugarman denied plaintiffs’ motion, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1959, 24 F.R.D. 19, and ordered plaintiffs to appear by Biberman. At the time and place specified in the order plaintiffs presented Biberman for examination by the defendants. Plaintiffs, however, continued to disclaim Biberman as their managing agent.

During the examination an impasse was reached when the witness, relying upon his personal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, refused to answer certain questions. Defendants, pursuant to Rule 37(a), obtained an order to show cause why the witness should not be compelled to answer the questions. The hearing on the order to show cause was brought on before Judge Sugarman, and at the outset plaintiffs’ counsel, as. at the time of the examination, disclaimed Biberman as plaintiffs’ managing agent. Thereupon, in view of this disclaimer, Judge Sugarman entertained an oral motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint and forthwith granted it, with prejudice, on the ground that the corporations had wilfully failed to appear as ordered by the court, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1959, 24 F.R.D. 360.

We reverse the dismissal order.. We are of the opinion that the plaintiffs complied with the prior order to appear and hence that the court below abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

When Biberman was presented by the plaintiff corporations at the time and place the court specified, was sworn, and submitted to examination, plaintiffs had' appeared, had fully complied with the court order, and were not subject to sanctions for failure to appear. See Cardox Corporation v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., D.C.S.D.Ill.1958, 23 F.R.D. 27. Defendants had full opportunity thoroughly to examine the witness for purposes of preparing their defenses.

The dispute which arose over the propriety of questions defendants asked Biberman at pretrial examination was properly governable by the specific provisions of Rule 37(a) and (b). Rule 37(a) provides that upon reasonable notice one may apply for an order compelling answers. Defendant so moved. Rule 37(b) sets forth the sanctions for failure to comply with a court order com[*733] pelling answers. [1] The court below should have dealt with the issues pertinent to the motion to compel answers by following the specific procedures set forth in Rule 37(a) and (b) instead of ignoring these procedures and summarily dismissing the complaint, even though this precipitate action is sought to be justified as being within the court’s inherent powers.

The dismissal of an action with prejudice or the entry of a judgment by default are drastic remedies, and should be applied only in extreme circumstances. Producers Releasing Corp. De Cuba v. PRC Pictures, 2 Cir., 1949, 176 F.2d 93, 96 (dismissal with prejudice set aside); Gill v. Stolow, 2 Cir., 1957, 240 F.2d 669, 670 (judgment by default set aside). As Chief Judge Clark stated in Gill v. Sto-low, at page 670: “In final analysis, a court has the responsibility to do justice between man and man, and general principles cannot justify denial of a party’s fair day in court except upon a serious showing of willful default.”

The lower court need not and should not have resorted to the use of its inherent power. [2] In Societe Internationale etc. v. Rogers, 1958, 357 U.S. 197, 206-208, 78 S.Ct. 1087, the Supreme Court reviewed action below that had been justified by the exercise of “inherent power.” It held that Rule 37 was the exclusive remedy for noncompliance with a production order inasmuch as Rule 37 “addresses itself with particularity to the con sequences of a failure to make discovery by listing a variety of remedies which a court may employ as well as by authorizing any order which is ‘just.’ ” Here, as well as there, a reliance upon inherent power “can only obscure analysis of the problem before us.” We are of the opinion that the rationale of Societe Internationale etc. v. Rogers applies with equal vigor to the problem here, that the lower court’s reliance upon “inherent power” is misplaced, and that complete adherence to the clearly delineated procedures of Rule 37 is required.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

1

. The language “refuses to obey” an order, if ambiguous, has been declared to be synonymous tvith “failing to comply with an order.” Societe Internationale etc. v. Rogers, 1958, 357 U.S. 197, 207, 208, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 1093, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255.

2

. The court below appears to have believed that Rule 37(d) applies only when a party fails to appear pursuant to a proper notice and does not apply -when the failure is in response to a court order. Such a distinction is unpersuasive — it would leave a gap in pretrial procedure that could not have been intended. The grounds that would excuse a failure to appear pursuant to a court order do not differ from those excusing a similar failure to appear after service of a proper notice.