Lang v. Newman, 910 N.E.2d 982 (NY 2009). · Go Syfert
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Lang v. Newman, 910 N.E.2d 982 (NY 2009). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
17 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Chase v. OHM, LLC (nyappdiv, 2010-07-29)
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chase v. OHM, LLC
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
Viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party, the record establishes that the evidence presented and the inferences to be drawn therefrom provide a valid line of reasoning from which the jury could reach its conclusion (see Lang v Newman, 12 NY3d 868, 870 [2009]; Nolan v Union Coll.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Valdez v. City of New York
N.Y. App. Div. · 2010 · confidence medium
“Evidence is legally insufficient to support a verdict if there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [people] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial” (Lang v Newman, 12 NY3d 868, 870 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
discussed Cited "see" Raineri v. Lalani
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
"Before granting a motion pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside a verdict and for judgment as a matter of law, the trial court must conclude that there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [people] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial" ( Capwell v Muslim , 80 AD3d 722, 723 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lang v Newman , 12 NY3d 868, 870 ; Cohen v Hallmark Cards , 45 NY2d 493, 499 ).
discussed Cited "see" Feinstein v. Norwegian Christian Home & Health Center, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
“Before granting a motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside a verdict and for judgment as a matter of law, the trial court must conclude that there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [people] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial” (Capwell v Muslim, 80 AD3d 722, 723 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lang v Newman, 12 NY3d 868, 870 [2009]; Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]).
discussed Cited "see" Longtin v. Miller
N.Y. App. Div. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
Where “there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [people] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial,” a verdict may be set aside as unsupported by legally sufficient evidence (Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]; see Lang v Newman, 12 NY3d 868, 870 [2009]; Revell v Guido, 124 AD3d 1006, 1010 [2015]).
discussed Cited "see" Modawar v. Staten Island Medical Group, P.C.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
“Before granting a motion pursuant to CFLR 4404 (a) to set aside a verdict and for judgment as a matter of law, the trial court must conclude that there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [people] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial” (Capwell v Muslim, 80 AD3d 722, 723 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lang v Newman, 12 NY3d 868, 870 [2009]; Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]).
discussed Cited "see" Modawar v. Staten Island Medical Group, P.C.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
“Before granting a motion pursuant to CFLR 4404 (a) to set aside a verdict and for judgment as a matter of law, the trial court must conclude that there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [people] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial” (Capwell v Muslim, 80 AD3d 722, 723 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Lang v Newman, 12 NY3d 868, 870 [2009]; Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]).
discussed Cited "see" Semel v. Guzman
N.Y. App. Div. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
A verdict is legally insufficient when “there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [people] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the evidence presented at trial” (Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]; see Lang v Newman, 12 NY3d 868, 870 [2009]; Tapia v Dattco, Inc., 32 AD3d 842 [2006]).
discussed Cited "see" Shallash v. New Island Hospital
N.Y. App. Div. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
To be awarded judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a), a defendant has the burden of showing that, upon viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [jurors] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial” (Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]; see Lang v Newman, 12 NY3d 868, 870 [2009]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bacchus-Sirju v. Hollis Women's Ctr.
N.Y. App. Div. · 2021 · signal: see also · confidence low
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a valid line of reasoning exists by which a rational jury could have found that Mosberg departed from good and accepted standards of medical care by not informing the decedent that her ultrasound revealed the presence of fluid in the cul-de-sac, by failing to order a CA 125 blood test, and by failing to refer the decedent to a gynecologic oncologist, and that such departures were a substantial factor in causing a delay in the diagnosis of the decedent's ovarian cancer and in diminishing her chance for a better outcome ( s…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Gachette v. Leak
N.Y. App. Div. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence low
Ctr ., 49 AD3d 789, 790 ; Menzel v Plotnick , 202 AD2d 558, 559 ; see also Lang v Newman , 12 NY3d 868, 870 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Donna M. Lang, Respondent,
v.
James P. Newman Et Al., Defendants, and Russell J. Firman, Appellant
New York Court of Appeals.
Jun 9, 2009.
910 N.E.2d 982
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Phelan, Phelan & Danek, LLP, Albany (Timothy S. Brennan of counsel), for appellant., Robert E. Lahm, PLLC, Syracuse (Robert E. Lahm of counsel), for respondent.
Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones Concur.
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff was transported to a hospital in January 2003 after awakening with numbness on the left side of her body, slurred speech and facial drooping. After arriving in the emergency room, she also developed a headache. Plaintiff was initially treated by defendant James P Newman, D.O., but his shift ended and defendant Russell J. Firman, M.D., assumed plaintiffs care. Dr. Firman ordered a CT scan but the test did not definitively rule out the possibility that there was bleeding in plaintiffs brain. A routine neurological examination revealed no abnormalities and plaintiff was administered medication to treat her headache. Plaintiff declined a more invasive procedure to determine if her brain was bleeding and was subsequently discharged with the final diagnosis of a migraine headache.

Shortly after her discharge, plaintiff was examined by her primary care physician, who believed plaintiff may have been experiencing a stroke. Plaintiff was sent to a hospital in Syracuse where an MRI test indicated that she had suffered an ischemic stroke on the right side of her brain. Shortly thereafter, she was admitted to a different hospital where she was given anticoagulant medication to lessen the clotting of her blood and decrease the possibility of a second stroke. As a result of her stroke, plaintiff suffered permanent injuries.

Plaintiff commenced this action against Drs. Newman and Firman, and their medical groups. Although the jury determined that Firman was not liable for failing to administer an anticoagulant drug, it found him liable for failing to admit plaintiff to the hospital and that such negligence was a substantial factor in causing her injuries. The other defendants were found not liable. Plaintiff was awarded $300,000 in dam[*870] ages for past pain and suffering. The Appellate Division affirmed over a two-Justice dissent, concluding that the verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence. We agree.

Evidence is legally insufficient to support a verdict if “there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational men to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial” (Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499 [1978]). Plaintiff’s expert testified that if Firman had admitted plaintiff to the hospital rather than discharging her, the stroke would have been diagnosed, she would have been given an anticoagulant, and the failure to administer that medicine resulted in “a little larger stroke than she should have had if she was properly treated.” Despite the fact that the expert also stated that it was “very hard to quantify” precisely how much additional damage plaintiff suffered as a result of Firman’s negligence, we cannot say that the jury’s finding of liability on this theory was “utterly irrational” (id.) or that no basis of proof existed to support the verdict. Consequently, the verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence.

Finally, Firman’s challenge to the consistency of the verdict is unpreserved and there is no merit to his contention that the damages were speculative.

Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Cipajrick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.

Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.