Sporn v. Suffolk Mktg., Inc., 438 N.E.2d 1108 (NY 1982). · Go Syfert
Sporn v. Suffolk Mktg., Inc., 438 N.E.2d 1108 (NY 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) dMY Sponsor, LLC v. Glatt
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 2023 · confidence medium
The Court of Appeals has instructed that the reach of section 5-701 (a) (10) is to be determined on a case-by-case basis ( Sporn v Suffolk Mktg. , 56 NY2d 864, 865 [1982]).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dorfman v. Reffkin
N.Y. App. Div. · 2016 · confidence medium
The Court of Appeals has, however, warned against the “pitfalls” of interpreting General Obligations Law § 5-701 (a) (10) too broadly (Sporn v Suffolk Mktg., 56 NY2d 864, 865 [1982]; see e.g.
cited Cited as authority (rule) I.R v. Merchandising Corp. v. Jay Ward Productions, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1994 · confidence medium
See N.Y.Gen.Obligations Law § 5-701(a); Sporn v. Suffolk Marketing, Inc., 453 N.Y.S.2d 393, 394 , 56 N.Y.2d 864, 865 , 438 N.E.2d 1108, 1109 (1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kenneth I. Brown v. Herman Miller, Inc.
D.C. Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Sporn v. Suffolk Marketing, Inc., 56 N.Y.2d 864, 865 , 453 N.Y.S.2d 393, 394 , 438 N.E.2d 1108, 1109 (1982). 24 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Streit v. Bushnell (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 2006 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Sporn v. Suffolk Mktg., Inc., 56 N.Y.2d 864 , 453 N.Y.S.2d 393 , 438 N.E.2d 1108 (1982) (a music album); Freedman v. Chem.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Murray Sporn, Appellant,
v.
Suffolk Marketing, Inc., Respondent
New York Court of Appeals.
Jun 10, 1982.
438 N.E.2d 1108
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL, Richard J. Reisch, Richard A. Sporn and Roger Bruce Feinman for appellant., Joseph Calderon and Richard A. Whitney for respondent.
Cooke and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Meyer Concur.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published

OPINION OF THE COURT

Memorandum.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.

Defendant Suffolk Marketing, Inc., contracted with Motown Records Corp. for the right to market an album of recordings of a certain well-known artist. Plaintiff asserts that by oral agreement he was engaged by defendant to procure these recording rights from Motown and that his efforts brought about the licensing agreement which was ultimately reached. Defendant maintained, however, that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed on the basis of section 5-701 (subd a, par 10) of the General Obligations Law, which provides in pertinent part that an oral agreement is void if such agreement “[i]s a contract to pay compensation for services rendered in * * * negotiating the purchase, sale, exchange, renting or leasing of * * * a business opportunity”. The issue in this case is whether the contract between defendant and Motown involves the sale of a business opportunity within the meaning of the statute.

In Freedman v Chemical Constr. Corp. (43 NY2d 260) we noted the potential pitfalls in making sweeping generalizations concerning the scope of the term “business opportunity” contained within the statute. The difficulties inherent in a judicial declaration of the ultimate scope of this statute require that these situations be approached substantially on a case-by-case basis. In the context of the present case, we conclude that the Appellate Division was correct in holding that the licensing agreement involved in this case constituted a business opportunity within the meaning of the statute and that plaintiff’s claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds.

[*866] Chief Judge Cooke and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Meyer concur.

Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.