Coury v. Safe Auto Sales, Inc., 297 N.E.2d 88 (NY 1973). · Go Syfert
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Coury v. Safe Auto Sales, Inc., 297 N.E.2d 88 (NY 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
25 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1974 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1974 2000 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Aloi v. County of Tompkins
N.Y. App. Div. · 2008 · confidence medium
Proof that a driver left his or her authorized lane of travel and crossed into the opposing lane of traffic is some evidence of negligence, though not conclusive; this proof creates a factual issue for the jury to resolve (see Coury v Safe Auto Sales, 32 NY2d 162, 164 [1973]; Feeley v St.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tomaselli v. Goldstein
N.Y. App. Div. · 1984 · confidence medium
As with the charge on the Vehicle and Traffic Law, such a charge does not require a finding of negligence since the jury would be instructed to also consider any explanation by defendant (Coury v Safe Auto Sales, supra, p 164; Pfaffenbach v White Plains Express Corp., supra, p 135).
discussed Cited "see" Sanly v. Nowak
N.Y. App. Div. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
Such evidence^] together with the explanation given by [defendant], presents factual questions for determination by the jury” (Vadala v Carroll, 91 AD2d 865 , 865 [1982], affd 59 NY2d 751 [1983]; see Arricale v Leo, 295 AD2d 920 [2002]; Simmons v Weegar, 292 AD2d 828 [2002]; see generally Coury v Safe Auto Sales, 32 NY2d 162, 164 [1973]; PJI 2:84 [2006]).
discussed Cited "see" Feeley v. St. Lawrence University
N.Y. App. Div. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
It is well settled that “evidence of skidding and leaving the traveled portion of the highway on the driver’s own authorized lane of travel is some evidence of negligence and is sufficient to create an issue of fact for the jury to resolve” (Jump v Jump, 69 AD2d 947, 948 [1979], affd 49 NY2d 783 [1980]; see Coury v Safe Auto Sales, 32 NY2d 162, 164 [1973]).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Castro v. Klein
N.Y. App. Div. · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence low
"A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on that operator to rebut the inference of . . . negligence by providing a non-negligent explanation for the collision" ( Ahmad v Grimaldi , 40 AD3d 786, 787 ; see Tutrani v County of Suffolk , 10 NY3d 906, 908 ; see also Coury v Safe Auto Sales , 32 NY2d 162, 164 ; Pfaffenbach v White Plains Express Corp. , 17 NY2d 132, 135 ).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Fox v. Lyte
N.Y. App. Div. · 1988 · signal: see also · confidence low
This account is sufficient to give rise to an inference of negligence (see, Pfaffenbach v White Plains Express Corp., 17 NY2d 132 ; see also, Coury v Safe Auto Sales, 32 NY2d 162 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Livaccari v. Zafonte
N.Y. App. Div. · 1975 · signal: see also · confidence low
The court stated that the theory behind the decision in Galbraith v Busch (supra) had been "sapped of all practical application to the real world of motor vehicle operation” (pp 135-136; see, also, Coury v Safe Auto Sales, 32 NY2d 162 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Alexander Coury Et Al., Appellants,
v.
Safe Auto Sales, Inc. Et Al., Respondents
New York Court of Appeals.
Apr 26, 1973.
297 N.E.2d 88
Charles 8. Desmond and Edwin N. Weidman for appellants., William, F. McNulty, Joseph Messina and Anthony J. McNulty for respondents.
Jasen.
Cited by 19 opinions  |  Published
Jasen, J.

Infant plaintiff was a passenger in a car which crossed over into the opposing lane of traffic and struck another vehicle. Of the two persons in the car, the driver was killed, and infant plaintiff, who had been asleep at the time of the accident, was injured. Infant plaintiff brought suit against the owner of the car, Safe Auto Sales, Inc., and the estate of the deceased driver.

There were two trials. At the first, the only evidence as to the cause of the accident was the testimony of a driver who had been following the car in which the infant plaintiff was a passenger. He testified that the back end of the car ‘1 moved back and forth ’ ’ immediately prior to the crossing over of the car into the other lane. The defendant rested without presenting any evidence. The trial court directed a verdict for infant plaintiff and the Appellate Division unanimously reversed and granted a new trial. [1] At the second trial, and upon the same evidence, the jury[*164] returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed.

We conclude that a reversal and new trial are required solely upon the ground that the charge to the jury in the second trial was improper.

The court’s charge conveyed to the jury the impression that they could not infer negligence solely from the fact that the car crossed over the center line of the road into the opposing lane of traffic, but that they must affirmatively find from other facts in the case that the defendant acted negligently. This impression was clearly erroneous in light of our decision in Pfaffenbach v. White Plains Express Corp. (17 N Y 2d 132), in which we held that a plaintiff could go to the jury solely by demonstrating that the defendant’s vehicle crossed over the center line into the opposing lane to traffic. Since a plaintiff is entitled to have his cause of action presented to the jury merely by showing the fact of the crossing over, it follows that the jury is permitted to infer from that fact, and from that fact alone, that the defendant driver was negligent.

The jury should have been instructed that the crossing over was a circumstance for their consideration in determining whether the driver had exercised reasonable care in the operation of his vehicle, even though that fact, standing alone, did not necessarily require a finding that he was negligent. (See 1 N Y PJI [1971 Supp.], 2:84.)

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Chief Judge Fuld and Judges Burke, Breitel, G-abrielli, Jokes and Waghtler concur.

Order reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.

1

. The order granting a new trial is not reviewable upon this appeal. (CPLR 5501, subd. [a].)