Forbis v. Forbis, 2009 WY 41 (Wyo. 2009). · Go Syfert
Forbis v. Forbis, 2009 WY 41 (Wyo. 2009). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
30 citation events (30 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: R. Mark Armstrong v. Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, John Corra, James Uzzell, Robert Doctor, and Dale Anderson, as Individuals In Their Personal Capacity and In Their Official Capacity. (wyo, 2013-05-08)
Treatment trajectory · 2009 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2009 2017 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) R. Mark Armstrong v. Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, John Corra, James Uzzell, Robert Doctor, and Dale Anderson, as Individuals In Their Personal Capacity and In Their Official Capacity. (2×) also: Cited as authority (quoted)
Wyo. · 2013 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
we have consistently refused to consider claims not supported by cogent argument or citation to pertinent legal authority.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Matter of the Sanction Fee of Christopher Goetz: Christopher Goetz, Defense Attorney for Jordan Ryan Borrego v. The State of Wyoming
Wyo. · 2025 · confidence medium
Regardless of whether the district court intended to hold Mr. Goetz in civil or criminal contempt at the change of plea hearing, it never signed a written judgment of contempt that was entered of record. 7 [¶20] We have recognized “[u]ntil a final order is entered, a court is free to change its mind.” Pond v. Pond, 2009 WY 134 , ¶ 12 n.1, 218 P.3d 650 , 653 n.1 (Wyo. 2009) (citing Forbis v. Forbis, 2009 WY 41, ¶ 8 , 203 P.3d 421, 423 (Wyo. 2009)) (holding the decision letter was superseded by the final order because it was not incorporated into the final order).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Casey Charles Peak v. Amanda Ann Peak
Wyo. · 2016 · confidence medium
Quality, 2013 WY 53 , ¶ 9, 300 P.3d 850, 851 (Wyo. 2013); Forbis v. Forbis, 2009 WY 41, ¶ 10 , 203 P.3d 421, 424 (Wyo. 2009).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kevin R. Carbaugh v. Nancy B. Nichols, f/k/a Nancy B. Carbaugh
Wyo. · 2014 · confidence medium
Forbis v. Forbis, 2009 WY 41, ¶ 8 , 203 P.3d 421, 423-24 (Wyo.2009) (citing Madigan v. Maas, 2005 WY 91, ¶ 11 , 117 P.3d 1194, 1197 (Wyo.2005); Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo.1987)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Armstrong v. Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality
Wyo. · 2013 · confidence medium
Forbis v. Forbis, 2009 WY 41, ¶10 , 203 P.3d 421, 424 (Wyo.2009) ("We have consistently refused to consider claims not supported by cogent argument or citation to pertinent legal authority.").
cited Cited as authority (rule) Berg v. TORRINGTON LIVESTOCK CATTLE CO.
Wyo. · 2012 · confidence medium
Forbis v. Forbis, 2009 WY 41, ¶10 , 203 P.3d 421, 424 (Wyo.2009) ("We have consistently refused to consider claims not supported by cogent argument or citation to pertinent legal authority.").
examined Cited as authority (rule) Boucher v. State (3×) also: Cited "see"
Wyo. · 2011 · confidence medium
Rolle v. State, 2010 WY 100, ¶ 33 , 236 P.3d 259, 273 (Wyo.2010) (quoting Forbis v. Forbis, 2009 WY 41, ¶ 10 , 203 P.3d 421, 424 (Wyo.2009)) ("We *355 have 'consistently refused to consider claims not supported by cogent argument or citation to pertinent legal authority.' "). [T28] The appellant also argues, however, that the above-described conduct violates the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution and Defense Function, Standard 3-3.1 Investigative Function of Prosecutor (3d ed. 1998).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rolle v. State
Wyo. · 2010 · confidence medium
We have “consistently refused to consider claims not supported by cogent argument or citation to pertinent legal authority.” Forbis v. Forbis, 2009 WY 41, ¶ 10 , 203 P.3d 421, 424 (Wyo.2009).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pond v. Pond
Wyo. · 2009 · confidence medium
Forbis v. Forbis, 2009 WY 41, ¶ 8 , 203 P.3d 421, 423 (Wyo.2009) (the district court was not bound by its oral pronouncement concerning the disposition of marital property); Madigan v. Maas, 2005 WY 91, ¶ 11 , 117 P.3d 1194, 1197 (Wyo.2005).
cited Cited "see" Schmalz v. Schmalz
Wyo. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Forbis , ¶ 8, 203 P.3d at 423 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Katherine J. Allen FORBIS, Appellant (Plaintiff),
v.
Timothy Dale FORBIS, Appellee (Defendant)
S-08-0063.
Wyoming Supreme Court.
Mar 19, 2009.
2009 WY 41
Representing Appellant: Mitchell E. Osborn, Attorney at Law, Cheyenne, Wyoming., Representing Appellee: Matthew H. Rom-sa, John M. Kuker, and James M. Peterson of Romsa & Kuker, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
Voigt, C.J., and Golden, Hill, Kite, Burke.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 87%
Citer courts: Wyoming Supreme Court (1)
GOLDEN, Justice.

[T1] Appellant Katherine J. Allen Forbis (Wife) seeks review of the district court's divorce decree which ended her marriage to Timothy Dale Forbis (Husband). Wife asserts error in the district court's division of the marital property. We affirm.

ISSUES

[12] Wife presents these issues for our review:

I. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by unilaterally rescinding its award from the Bench to he [sic] Appellant of the $14,000.00 Boat, along with other assets, after the conclusion of the Trial?
II. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by failing to award the Appellant a judgment against the Appellee for the $16,000.00 premarital funds she held for her children which were absconded by Ap-pellee during the marriage?

FACTS

[T3] The parties were married in July of 2001. This was Wife's second marriage and Husband's third marriage. The parties both owned premarital real property and, shortly after their marriage, they purchased a marital home. During the course of the marriage, Husband operated a real estate management company known as TD Real Estate, LLC, and Wife operated a home repair and remodeling business known as TD Repair, LLC, performing work primarily for TD Real Estate, LLC. The parties also invested in rental real estate through J & F Investments, LLC, [1] a business in which Husband and Wife each owned a twenty-five percent[*423] interest, and acquired several vehicles and a Crestliner boat.

[14] The marriage eventually broke down and, in October 2006, Wife filed a complaint for judicial separation. Husband responded to Wife's complaint and counterclaimed for a divorcee. The parties were unable to reach an agreement concerning the marital property, and a bench trial was held on September 24, 2007. At the conclusion of the trial, the district court announced its decision from the bench. Among other things, the district court awarded to Husband the marital home, his premarital home, TD Real Estate, LLC, and two vehicles. The district court awarded to Wife her premarital home, the parties' interest in J & F Investments, LLC, the Crestliner boat, and two vehicles. Two days later, on September 26, the district court sent a letter notifying the parties that it had erred in its oral pronouncement concerning the Crestliner boat. The district court stated that it had intended to award the boat to Husband, instead of Wife. A divorcee decree was entered reflecting the district court's decision. Wife timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[T5] The division of marital property is within the trial court's sound discretion. Hall v. Hall, 2005 WY 166, ¶ 5, 125 P.3d 284, 286 (Wyo.2005); DeJohn v. DeJohn, 2005 WY 140, ¶ 11, 121 P.3d 802, 807 (Wyo.2005); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 2004 WY 68, ¶ 9, 91 P.3d 922, 925 (Wyo.2004). We afford the trial court considerable discretion to structure a distribution scheme appropriate to the peculiar cireumstances of the case, and we will not disturb its determination absent clear grounds demonstrating that the court abused its discretion. Hoffman, ¶ 9, 91 P.3d at 925. The ultimate question in determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred is whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did. Id., ¶ 10, 91 P.3d at 925. We will find an abuse of discretion when the property disposition shocks the conscience of the Court and appears to be so unfair and inequitable that reasonable people could not abide it. Hall, ¶ 5, 125 P.3d at 286; Mann v. Mann, 979 P.2d 497, 500 (Wyo.1999).

DISCUSSION

[T6] Wife first contends the district court erred in unilaterally rescinding its award of the Crestliner boat to her and awarding it to Husband. Wife asserts that the district court clearly intended, as reflected in its oral pronouncement, that she should have the boat. She claims the district court's subsequent decision to award the boat to Husband was the result of a mistake by the district court concerning the marital assets, and she urges this Court to correct the divorce decree to reflect the district court's oral pronouncement. Husband counters that the district court's decision was not the prod-uet of a mistake but was a result of the exercise of sound discretion. Husband further contends the district court's oral pronouncement was not a final order and, consequently, the district court had the authority to modify its division of the marital property. We agree with Husband.

[17] Our review of the record reveals no evidence supporting Wife's claim that the district court's decision to award the boat to Husband was premised on a mistake concerning the marital assets. Nor do we find any record support for Wife's assertion that the district court clearly intended for her to receive the boat. The record reflects the district court simply misstated its intention regarding the boat in announcing its decision from the bench. In its letter to the parties, the district court made clear it had intended to award the boat to Husband and had, instead, erroneously awarded the boat to Wife.

[18] Further, the district court was not bound by its oral pronouncement concerning the disposition of the boat, as Wife contends. We have previously held that a district court may, in the exercise of its discretion, modify its decision regarding the marital assets until entry of the divorcee decree. Madigan v. Maas, 2005 WY 91, ¶ 11, 117 P.3d 1194, 1197 (Wyo.2005); Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo.1987). Here, the district court simply exercised that discretionary authority to correct its earlier erroneous oral ruling to reflect its intention regarding the[*424] boat. Under the cireumstances, we cannot conclude the district court abused its disceretion.

[19] In her second issue, Wife faults the district court for not awarding her a judgment against Husband for $16,000.00 in premarital funds. As best we can discern from the record, Wife invested $3,800.00 of premarital inheritance money in J & F Investments, LLC, to purchase a four-plex. J & F Investments, LLC, later sold the four-plex, and Husband and Wife received $32,000.00 in proceeds. Husband used the total proceeds to pay off debt incurred by TD Real Estate, LLC. Wife's complaint concerns what she contends is her share of the sale proceeds Husband expended.

[T 10] Our review of this issue is inhibited by Wife's failure to identify any factual or legal grounds upon which her claimed entitlement is based. Wife's argument consists solely of isolated excerpts from the trial transcript and a naked assertion that the district court "abuse[d] its discretion by not awarding to [her] the $16,000.00 she would have realized upon the sale of the real estate." We have consistently refused to consider claims not supported by cogent argument or citation to pertinent legal authority. Dunsmore v. Dunsmore, 2007 WY 202, ¶ 27, 173 P.3d 389, 394 (Wyo.2007); Odegard v. Odegard, 2003 WY 67, ¶ 29, 69 P.3d 917, 925 (Wyo.2003). We decline to deviate from that rule in this instance.

As a final matter, Husband requests that we award him attorney fees and costs pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05 for having to defend against what he claims is a frivolous appeal. Sanctions under Rule 10.05 are not generally available where, as here, an appeal challenges a trial court's discretionary ruling. Donnelly v. Donnelly, 2004 WY 72, ¶ 24, 92 P.3d 298, 308 (Wyo.2004); Dorsett v. Moore, 2003 WY 7, ¶ 14, 61 P.3d 1221, 1225 (Wyo.2003). Although we have departed from this general rule in the past, see Montoya v. Navarette-Montoya, 2005 WY 161, ¶ 9, 125 P.3d 265, 269 (Wyo.2005); Barnes v. Barnes, 998 P.2d 942, 946 (Wyo.2000), we do not consider sanctions appropriate in this case. We therefore deny Husband's request for attorney's fees and costs.

CONCLUSION

[112] We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's allocation of the parties' marital property. The decree of the district court is, therefore, affirmed in all respects. Further, we decline to impose sanctions under W.R.A.P. 10.05 in this matter.

1

. Throughout the record, the parties, as well as the district court, refer to this business as J & F Investments, LLC; however, the Articles of Organization filed with the Wyoming Secretary of State indicate the name of the business is J & F Family Properties, LLC.