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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. CODY ELLEN ALTERIO

Appellant No. 2147 MDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of November 12, 2013 In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at No.: CP-14-CR-0001903-2012

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED AUGUST 29, 2014

Cody Alterio appeals her November 12, 2013 judgment of sentence.

We affirm.

On September 10, 2012, Margie Schreffler called the Bellefonte Police ving around snorting bath salts[1] and saying something about not letting the bitch out of her trunk until she

eventually spotted her exiting a silver Nissan Altima, which was parked in ____________________________________________ 1 contain synthetic cathinones such as mephedrone. See 35 P.S. §§ 780 104(1)(iii)(17) (25), (vii)(1) (8), (viii)(1) (9). J-A18023-14 Id. at 9. Alterio admitted to Officer A this encounter, that she had recently tried bath salts. Alterio stated that her estranged boyfriend had been sneaking another woman into the trunk of her vehicle. Convinced that someone was hiding in her vehicle, Alterio requested that Corporal Igoe search her trunk. Berry, found two small clear plastic bags that are commonly used to package illegal drugs. Thereafter, Alterio consented to a search of her entire vehicle. During that search, Officer Berry and Corporal Igoe discovered fifty-seven vehicle. Six of those stamp bags contained residue that tested positive for heroin. Additionally, Officer Berry and Corporal Igoe found a small zip-top Alterio failed a standard field sobriety test and subsequently was arrested and charged with two counts of driving under the influence of a controlled substance and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. 2 A drug recognition expert evaluated Alterio and concluded that she was under the influence of bath salts and heroin. Alterio also consented to a blood test, ____________________________________________ 2 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(D)(1)(iii), 3802(D)(2), and 35 P.S. § 780- 113(A)(32), respectively.

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which revealed the presence of morphine3 forty-eight nanograms per milliliter. Alterio proceeded to a non-jury trial on June 17, 2013. During that toxicology report, which she contended was inadmissible pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(c)(4). N.T. at 45. Specifically, Alterio argued that the report was inadmissible because he Id. The trial court admitted the toxicology report into ____________________________________________

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two counts of driving under the influence of a controlled substance and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.^[5] On September 6, 2013, the trial On November 27, 2013, Alterio filed a timely notice of appeal. 6 On December 2, 2013, Alterio filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On January 15, 2014, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Rule. 1925(a). Alterio presents the following issue for our consideration: Because 75 Pa.C.S. §1547(c)(4) specifically requires the Department of Health to establish minimum levels of a schedule I, non-prescribed schedule II, and non-prescribed schedule III substances or their metabolites in blood in order for the test results to be admissible, and case law clearly defines blood as whole blood, the trial court erred as a matter of law in admitting m the testimony clearly showed what went into the chromatograph for testing was not whole blood, and no conversion factor was testified to that gave a whole blood equivalent test result. ____________________________________________

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Brief for Alterio at 1 (minor modifications for clarity). Alterio principally argues that the trial court erred in admitting the results of her blood test because the Commonwealth conducted that test on e. The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Priest, 18 A.3d 1235, 1240 41 (Pa. Super. 2011). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court mi unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown Commonwealth v. Borovichka, 18 A.3d 1242, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). Alterio was convicted under DUI subsections 3802(d)(1)(iii) and 3802(d)(1)(ii), which provide as follows: An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle under any of the following circumstances: (1) any amount of a: (i) Schedule I controlled substance, as defined in the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act; (ii) Schedule II or Schedule III controlled substance, as defined in The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, which has not been medically prescribed for the individual; or (iii) metabolite of a substance under subparagraph (i) or (ii).

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75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d) (footnote omitted; emphasis added). The admissibility of chemical testing in DUI cases is governed by 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(c). In pertinent part, that provision states: In any summary proceeding or criminal proceeding in which the defendant is charged with a violation of section 3802 or any other violation of this title arising out of the same action, the blood or urine, which tests were conducted by qualified persons using approved equipment, shall be admissible in evidence. *** (4) For purposes of blood testing to determine the amount of a Schedule I or nonprescribed Schedule II or III controlled substance or a metabolite of such a substance, the Department of Health shall prescribe minimum levels of blood in order for the test results to be admissible in a prosecution for a violation of [sub]section 1543(b)(1.1), 3802(d)(1), (2) or (3) or 3808(a)(2). 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(c) (footnote omitted). Pursuant to subsection 1547(c)(4), the Pennsylvania Department of Health has set the minimum detection level for morphine at five nanograms per milliliter.^[7] See 42 Pa. Bull. 110 (Jan. ^[7], 2012). report indicated that her blood contained forty-eight nanograms per milliliter of morphine, a level well ____________________________________________

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however, takes issue with the fact that only her blood serum, rather than her w subsection 1547(c)(4) requires that the Commonwealth establish that the (rather than blood serum) exceeded the Department detection level. Hence, we must determine whether section 1547 imposes such a requirement. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, as to which our standard of review is de novo. Commonwealth v. Van Aulen, 952 A.2d 1183, 1184 (Pa. Super. 2008). Our task in construing a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions. When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Commonwealth v. Steffy, 36 A.3d 1109, 1111 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sarapa, 13 A.3d 961, 964 (Pa. Super. 2011)). Although 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(c) indicates that the results of blood tests are admissible in DUI proceedings, and grants to the Department of Health the authority to regulate the procedures and equipment used to conduct those tests, the statute does not dictate any particular form of blood that must be tested. Instead, the statute merely refers to the generic term

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Vehicle Code.^[8] component parts, we find the term to be ambiguous. See Commonwealth v. Dagnon question that both whole blood and blood serum may be utilized to analyze a In Commonwealth v. Dagnon, 605 A.2d 360 (Pa. Super. 1992), we case, Dagnon, a motorist who had been involved in a fatal vehicle accident, was charged with, inter alia, DUI. In its prosecution, the Commonwealth -accident blood alcohol test, ____________________________________________

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Dagnon filed a pretrial motion to suppress the blood serum test results, arguing that they were inadmissible pursuant to subsection 1547(c). See blood alcohol tests to be conducted on whole blood in order to be admissible in DUI prosecutions. the Department, in performance of its regulatory function under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(c), published a list covering the year in which the within incident occurred that approved various laboratories to conduct blood alcohol tests utilizing both whole blood and blood serum. See 20 Pa.Bull. 306. Consequently, it has interpreted the term to include blood in either of those forms. Since the interpretation that an administrative agency gives to a statutory provision that it is charged with applying is entitled to deference, see Masland v. Bachman, 374 A.2d 517 (Pa. 1977), and since we find the Department reasonable, we adopt it as being in conformity with legislative intent. Dagnon, 605 A.2d at 362 (citations modified). Since our decision in Dagnon, the General Assembly has made substantive amendments to section 1547, including the addition of subsection 1547(c)(4), which directs the Department of Health to establish minimum levels of controlled substances required to be present in admissible test results. Moreover, our DUI statute has also undergone major revisions

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post-Dagnon. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731 (repealed by 2003, Sept. 30, P.L. to re-examine section 1547. It is well-settled that our task in construing a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly. Steffy, supra. In order examine: (1) the occasion and necessity for the statute; (2) the circumstances under which it was enacted; (3) the mischief to be remedied; (4) the object to be attained; (5) the former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects; (6) the consequences of a particular interpretation; (7) the contemporaneous legislative history; and (8) legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). In this instance, we base our analysis primarily upon the ation of section 1547 as demonstrated by the pervasive regulatory framework that the Department has set forth. As we noted in Dagnon, the Department of Health, as is required by section 1547, has issued extensive regulations relating to the screening of blood for the presence of alcohol and controlled substances and the procedures and equipment to be used to conduct such tests. See e.g., 28 Pa. Code 5.1 5.104. For example, the Department has complied with the dictates of subsection 1547(c)(2)(ii), which provides as follows: (ii) For purposes of blood and urine testing to determine blood alcohol or controlled substance content levels, the procedures and equipment prescribed by the Department of - 10 - J-A18023-14 Health shall be reviewed within 120 days of the effective date of this subparagraph and at least every two years thereafter to ensure that consideration is given to scientific and technological advances so that testing conducted in accordance with the prescribed procedures utilizing the prescribed equipment will be as accurate and reliable as science and technology permit. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(c)(2)(ii). Pursuant to subsection 1547(c)(2)(ii), the Department has published a list of laboratories that are approved to conduct testing for alcohol and/or controlled substances. See 42 Pa. Bull. 86 (Jan. ^[7], 2012). That bulletin is Blood and/or Serum Id. (emphasis added). Therein, the Department clearly states that some Id. Again, subsection 1547(c)(2)(ii) gives the Department of Health the authority to prescribe the procedures

whole blood or blood serum. It is well-settled that great weight and deference should be afforded to the interpretation of a statute by an ____________________________________________ Rather, our holding

-related offenses, which require percentage range. Wanner, 605 A.2d at 809; see 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)-

(c). Unlike alcohol-related offenses, the DUI controlled substance subsection at issue in the case sub judice, prohibits any amount of a controlled

3802(d)(1). For this reason, the distinction between whole blood and blood serum is immaterial for purposes of a conviction under subsection 3802(d)(1). Commonwealth v. Hutchins of non-whole blood to whole blood test results is unnecessary because

-alcohol related

DUI cases). Alterio was not charged with an alcohol-related DUI, nor does she present a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Therefore, Wanner is misplaced.

For the foregoing reasons, we are unconvinced that either the General

Assembly or the Department of Health strictly confined to whole blood without any of its constituent parts removed.

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