Rudolph James Anderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1969). · Go Syfert
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Rudolph James Anderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1969). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 1 distinct case · …no court has the authority to impose a sentence consecutive to something that does not exist, ✓
38 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 13 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1970 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1970 1998 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Scott Lee Tinsley v. United States (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
6th Cir. · 1997 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
though uncertain at the time, depending upon a possible contingency that no sentence will result from the pending state charge, it will be made certain by the event.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Newman v. Cozza-Rhodes
10th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
Federal sentencing courts have the discretion to order a federal sentence to run concurrent with or consecutive to an anticipated state sentence yet to be imposed. 9 See Setser v. United States, — U.S. —, 132 S.Ct. 1463, 1468 , 182 L.Ed.2d 455 (2012); see also Binford, 436 F.3d at 1254 ; Anderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 492, 493 (10th Cir.1969) (rejecting argument that “no court has the authority to impose a sentence consecutive to something that does not exist”) (quotation marks omitted).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Setser v. United States (4×)
SCOTUS · 2012 · confidence medium
See Salley v. United States, 786 F. 2d 546, 547 (CA2 1986); Anderson v. United States, 405 F. 2d 492, 493 (CA10 1969) (per curiam); United States ex rel.
cited Cited as authority (rule) El Pueblo de Puerto Rico v. García Parra
prsupreme · 2005 · confidence medium
(Enfasis suplido y citas omitidas.) Anderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 492, 493 (10mo Cir. 1969).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Johnny Frank Williams
10th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Finally, while we agree with defendant that criminal sentences must be definite and certain, Anderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 492, 493 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 965 , 89 S.Ct. 1318 , 22 L.Ed.2d 567 (1969), the sentence imposed here does not violate the Anderson principle.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jude Somerset Hardesty (2×)
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Arron, 551 F.2d 1096, 1098 (7th Cir.1977); United States v. Lee, 500 F.2d 586, 587-88 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 , 95 S.Ct. 322 , 42 L.Ed.2d 279 (1974); Anderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 492, 493 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 965 , 89 S.Ct. 1318 , 22 L.Ed.2d 567 (1969); Jervis v. United States, 382 F.2d 592, 593 (1st Cir.1967).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jude Somerset Hardesty (2×)
9th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Arron, 551 F.2d 1096, 1098 (7th Cir.1977) (trial court has “inherent power” to impose consecutive sentences) (citing McKee v. United States, 289 F.2d 557 (7th Cir.1961)); United States v. Lee, 500 F.2d 586, 587-88 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 , 95 S.Ct. 322 , 42 L.Ed.2d 279 (1974); Anderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 492, 493 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 965 , 89 S.Ct. 1318 , 22 L.Ed.2d 567 (1969); Jervis v. United States, 382 F.2d 592, 593 (1st Cir.1967) (“The federal court had a clear right to recognize and accede to the state custody.”); Green v. United States, 334…
cited Cited as authority (rule) George Lewis Sloan v. Jack Cowley, Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma
10th Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Anderson v. U.S., 405 F.2d 492, 493 (10th Cir.1969).
discussed Cited "see" Dotson v. Kizziah
E.D. Ky. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heddings v. Garcia, 491 F. App’x 896, 899 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 492, 493 (10th Cir. 1969)) and United States v. Ballard, 6 F.3d 1502, 1505-07 (11th Cir. 1993). not an abuse of discretion in light of the applicable factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (b) and the sentencing court’s decision not to recommend such a designation.
cited Cited "see" United States v. Gerald Lee Eastman
9th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Anderson v. United States, 405 F.2d. 492 (10th Cir., 1969), cert. denied 394 U.S. 965 , 89 S.Ct. 1318 , 22 L.Ed.2d 567 (1969).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Heddings v. Garcia
10th Cir. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Setser v. United States, — U.S.-, 182 S.Ct. 1463 , 1468, 182 L.Ed.2d 455 (2012) (adopting the view of “a large majority of the federal appellate courts,” including this one, that a sentencing court has authority to select whether a sentence will run concurrently or consecutively with a state sentence that has not yet been imposed); see also Anderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 492, 493 (10th Cir.1969) (per curiam) (rejecting the argument that “ ‘no court has the authority to impose a sentence consecutive to something that does not exist’ ”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Leonard D. White v. U.S. Parole Commission U.S. Parole Officer Art Beeler, Warden
10th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence medium
A federal sentence, however, does not commence on the day the sentencing court imposes the sentence; rather, a federal sentence "shall commence to run from the date on which" the person convicted of a federal offense "is received at the penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of such sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (repealed, but applicable to offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987); see also Anderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 492, 493 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 965 (1969).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Francisco Buide-Gomez, United States of America v. Rosalino Garcia-Forcada
11th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 405 F.2d 492, 493 (10th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 965 , 89 S.Ct. 1317 , 22 L.Ed.2d 566 (1969); United States v. Patrick Petroleum Corp. of Michigan, 703 F.2d 94, 98 (5th Cir.1982).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Rudolph James ANDERSON, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
10102.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Apr 7, 1969.
405 F.2d 492
Rudolph James Anderson, pro se., John E. Green, Asst. U. S. Atty., filed a brief for appellee.
Murrah, Holloway.
Cited by 31 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

Anderson pleaded guilty to federal charges and was sentenced to three concurrent five year terms of imprisonment in 1965. It was further ordered “that the sentences of confinement imposed herein shall run consecutive to any confinement under which defendant is being held by state authorities.” Anderson was returned to the state authorities and was sentenced by them. He has now completed the state sentence and is in federal custody under the federal sentences imposed in-1965.

[*493] Anderson filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, contending that the federal sentence commenced immediately on imposition. The sentencing court denied relief and Anderson appeals. United States v. Anderson, 279 F.Supp. 706 (W.D.Okl. 1968).

The general rule is that the time of sentence commences to run from the date on which such person is received at the place of service. 18 U.S.C. § 3568; Miller v. Willingham, 400 F.2d 873 (10th Cir. 1968); Powers v. Taylor, 327 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1964); Williams v. Taylor, 327 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1964); Hayward v. Looney, 246 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1958); McIntosh v. Looney, 249 F. 2d 62 (10th Cir. 1957).

Many of our cases have held that a federal sentence is consecutive to the state sentence, even when no reference is made to the state sentence, absent an ambiguity. Miller v. Willingham, supra; Hall v. Looney, 256 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1958); Hayward v. Looney, supra.

In his brief Anderson contends that “no court has the authority to impose a sentence consecutive to something that does not exist.” A sentence in a criminal case must be definite and certain. Freeman v. United States, 299 F.2d 752 (10th Cir. 1962); Bius v. United States, 286 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1961); Gibson v. Looney, 258 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1958); Hill v. United States, 186 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1951); Smith v. United States, 177 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1949); Wall v. Hudspeth, 108 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1940). Though uncertain at the time, depending upon a possible contingency that no sentence will result from the pending state charge, it will be made certain by the event. See Blitz v. United States, 153 U.S. 308, 14 S.Ct. 924, 38 L.Ed. 725 (1894); Williamson v. United States, 374 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1967). No uncertainty can be said to exist here for the court clearly meant the sentence to be consecutive “to any [state] confinement” under which Anderson would become obligated, thus a stronger case than Zahn v. Kipp, 218 F. 2d 898 (7th Cir. 1955) and Zerbst v. McPike, 97 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1938), with similar facts. Even if acquitted on the state charge, the state confinement would have ended and he would then begin serving the federal sentence.

Viewing this question in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3568 and in the light of the unanimity of conclusion reached in the cases to which reference has been made, we think it is clear that the sentence imposed by the United States District Court began to run from the date Anderson was actually delivered to federal custody for service of his federal sentence. Taylor v. Baker, 284 F.2d 43 (10th Cir. 1960).

Affirmed.