United States v. Linell Gray, 421 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1970). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Linell Gray, 421 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1970). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 2008 · …lay witness's observation of abnormal acts by the accused ✓
40 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Perkins (ca5, 2024-04-25) · Strongest negative: Robert William Strickland v. Robert Francis, Warden (ca11, 1984-07-31)
Treatment trajectory · 1972 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1972 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Robert William Strickland v. Robert Francis, Warden (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 1984 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 317 (5th Cir.1970).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Perkins
5th Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
His sole case citation to United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1970), is inapposite.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ex Parte Theodore Wilkinson (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
United States v. Gray , 421 F.2d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ex Parte Theodore Wilkinson (2×) also: Cited "see"
Tex. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Paul Dana Williams, A/K/A Paul William Dana
5th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
DENIAL OF A MENTAL EXAMINATION ON DEFENDANT’S COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL While prior to Ake v. Oklahoma we cautioned against conflating the legal standards for the grant of a mental examination on competence to stand trial with those applicable to the grant of a mental examination focusing on sanity at the time of the offense, see United States v. McEachern, 465 F.2d 833, 836 (5th Cir.1972); United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 318 (5th Cir.1970), the threshold showing required to comport with due process turns out to be similar. 15 *265 Under the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Charles Joseph Hogan, A/K/A Hal Winter Michael Trupei
11th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 822 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 , 100 S.Ct. 93 , 62 L.Ed.2d 60 (1979); United States v. Fratus, 530 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 , 97 S.Ct. 130 , 50 L.Ed.2d 118 (1976); United States v. Stone, 472 F.2d 909, 913 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1020 , 101 S.Ct. 586 , 66 L.Ed.2d 482 (1980); United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 317 (5th Cir.1970); see also United States v. Birdsell, 775 F.2d 645, 648 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1119 , 106 S.Ct. 1979 , 90 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Robert Dean Clark
11th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
For example, one line of cases proposes that “[a] district court’s determination of competency in a particular case is a finding of fact which may not be set aside on review unless it is ‘clearly arbitrary or unwarranted.’ ” United States v. Fratus, 530 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 317 (5th Cir.1970)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 , 97 S.Ct. 130 , 50 L.Ed.2d 118 (1976); see also United States v. Caraza, 843 F,2d 432, 437 *1282 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 822 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 , 100 S.Ct. 93 , 62 L…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Theodore Robert Bundy v. Richard L. Dugger, Secretary, Department of Corrections, State of Florida
11th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
See United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 822 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 , 100 S.Ct. 93 , 62 L.Ed.2d 60 (1979); United States v. Fratus, 530 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 , 97 S.Ct. 130 , 50 L.Ed.2d 118 (1976); United States v. Stone, 472 F.2d 909, 913 (5th Cir.1973), ce rt. denied, 449 U.S. 1020 , 101 S.Ct. 586 , 66 L.Ed.2d 482 (1980); United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 317 (5th Cir.1970); see also United States v. Birdsell, 775 F.2d 645, 648 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1119 , 106 S.Ct. 1979 , 90 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dezso John Lokos v. Walter Capps, Warden
5th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lasiter
Mo. Ct. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
That determination “should not be set aside unless clearly arbitrary,” In re Harmon, 425 F.2d 916, 918 [3] (1st Cir. 1970), or “unless it is clearly arbitrary or unwarranted,” United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 317 [2] (5th Cir. 1970), or unless “clearly erroneous,” Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1058 (5th Cir. 1976), although the latter authority states that the appellate court “must take a hard look at the district court’s ultimate determination.” In Missouri the scope of review of the trial court’s determination is governed by Rule 73.01.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Michael Stanley Green A/K/A M. S. Greene, and Lulseged Tesfa A/K/A H. Teffa. Appeal of Lulseged Tesfa
3rd Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
See Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1299-1300 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 317 (5th Cir. 1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Lawrence Daniel Caldwell, A/K/A Thomas E. Morgan, (Two Cases). United States of America v. Eros A. Timm, (Two Cases) (2×) also: Cited "see"
D.C. Cir. · 1976 · confidence medium
The final government witness was Dr. Elizabeth Strawinsky, who concluded on the basis of Caldwell's medical records and conversations with him that he was capable of communicating with others if he chose to do so 72 See United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 317 (5th Cir. 1970); Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 236 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872 , 83 S.Ct. 123 , 9 L.Ed.2d 110 (1962) 73 See United States v. Stone, 472 F.2d 909, 913 (5th Cir. 1973).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Saingelus Saingerard
11th Cir. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 317-18 (5th Cir.1970).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Stanford
S.D. Tex. · 2011 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 318 (5th Cir.1970); Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 236 (8th Cir.1962).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Dale E. Birdsell
5th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also U.S. v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 318 (5th Cir.1970).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Matias Delerme, Jr. (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1972 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1970). 23 Although we have recently said that in reviewing a finding of guilty by a trial judge, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the government, Government of Virgin Islands v. Duvergee, 456 F.2d 1271 (3d Cir., 1972), relying on United States v. Anderson, 409 F.2d 836, 837 (3d Cir. 1969), the cases cited in Anderson in support of that proposition merely announced the general rule relating to the standard utilized to review jury verdicts. 8 24 As to findings describing historical or narrative events in a crimi…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Linell GRAY, Defendant-Appellant
26840.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Jan 20, 1970.
421 F.2d 316
David E. Crawley, III (court appointed), Louisville, Miss., for defendant-appellant., Linell Gray, pro se., Robert E. Hauberg, U. S. Atty., E. Donald Strange, Joseph E. Brown, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., Jackson, Miss., for plaintiff-appellee.
Gewin, Coleman, Dyer.
Cited by 27 opinions  |  Published
[*317] DYER, Circuit Judge.

The only issue on appeal in this proceeding to revoke appellant’s probation is whether the District Court abused its discretion when, after holding a hearing under 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244, it found the appellant mentally competent to understand the proceedings against him and to assist his attorney in his defense. We have concluded that there was an abuse of discretion by the District Court and we reverse.

In 1966 appellant Gray pleaded guilty to charges of violating the Internal Revenue Laws pertaining to a still and non-tax-paid whiskey. He was given a sentence of six years, five years and nine months of which were suspended, and he was placed on five years’ probation.

In 1968 the Government filed a petition to revoke Gray’s probation on the ground that he was then operating a still with mash and had non-tax-paid whiskey on hand. He pleaded guilty to violating his probation. Upon Gray’s being questioned concerning the voluntariness of this plea, it appeared that he had previously been in a mental institution. On motion the court ordered him examined by Dr. Waldron, a psychiatrist. Dr. Wal-dron’s written report stated that Gray was “suffering from a mental disease or disorder” known as “chronic brain syndrome”, and that he was presently insane. The report went on to say that it was Dr. Waldron’s “opinion that he [Gray] was presently unable to understand fully the proceedings against him and the consequences thereof, and that he is incompetent to assist in his own defense.”

After receiving this report in evidence the District Court ordered Gray committed to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri, for further psychiatric examination. The Psychiatric Staff there filed written findings on Gray’s mental condition and concluded that Gray was “not competent to stand trial.” Dr. Pasquale Ciccone, Director of the Medical Center, sent a letter to the District Court stating that the Staff’s “reported findings support an adjudication by the court that the subject is so mentally ill as to be unable to assist rationally in his defense or to have a rational understanding of the proceedings against him.”

In addition to this evidence Gray’s wife and brother testified that they thought something was wrong with Gray.

The Government’s evidence consisted of the testimony of five lay witnesses, four law enforcement officers and a United States probation officer. The Government’s brief accurately summarized the testimony of these witnesses as follows:

The law enforcement officers all testified that on prior occasions when they had arrested and been around the appellant he had always acted in a normal and rational manner. The Probation Officer likewise testified that appellant appeared normal and rational on the occasions when he had interviewed appellant and at the time he was preparing the pre-sentence report he had received some five or six letters from citizens in the appellant’s community attesting to his being a good citizen but none suggested any mental problem.

The trial court found that Gray was mentally competent, revoked his probation, and imposed a five year sentence.

The test of mental competency under 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244 is whether a defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 1960, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824. The finding of whether a defendant is competent or not is a finding of fact by the trial court which may not be set aside on review unless it is clearly arbitrary or unwarranted. Feguer v. United States, 8 Cir. 1962, 302 F.2d 214, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872, 83 S.Ct. 123, 9 L.Ed.2d 110.

[*318] It is true that expert opinion on competency is not binding on the trier of facts. Ibid. But it is also true that “ 'while a lay witness’s observation of abnormal acts by an accused may be of great value as evidence, a statement that the witness never observed an abnormal act on the part of the accused is of value if, but only if, the witness had prolonged and intimate contact with the accused.’ ” Wright v. United States, 1957, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 250 F.2d 4, 10, quoting from Carter v. United States, 1957, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 252 F.2d 608. (Emphasis added)

The relative weight of uninformed lay opinion and expert opinion was also considered in Fielding v. United States, 1957, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 167, 251 F.2d 878, which involved the sufficiency of the evidence to take the issue of insanity at the time of the commission of the crime to the jury. Three psychiatrists who had examined the defendant found that he was insane at the time of the crime. The Government countered this evidence with testimony from the arresting police officers and from appellant’s wife and brother that he seemed to be normal. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals said:

All of the lay testimony offered by the Government taken together was not sufficiently probative, in the face of the strong showing of insanity made by the defense, to permit reasonable jurymen to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was sane at the time of the shooting. What we have said elsewhere about an opinion of sanity expressed by an untrained lay witness having no prolonged and intimate contact with the accused [citing Wright v. United States, su pra] disposes of the testimony of the policemen in this case. The conclusions of normalcy and soundness of mind expressed by appellant’s brother and wife, stand not much higher than those of the policemen. Both were out of touch with appellant for a considerable time until just before the shooting and neither professed to have any training or experience in the judgment of sanity. Id. at 880.

We are not here concerned with precisely the same standard involved in Wright and Fielding, supra, viz., whether the evidence was sufficient for reasonable jurymen to find that the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the crime. Here we are concerned only with whether or not the finding of competency at the time of pleading guilty to the probation violation is clearly arbitrary or unwarranted. It may be that in a particular case, because of the fact that the standards are different in the determination of the sufficiency of evidence when insanity is raised as a defense and the determination of competency to stand trial, that the quantum of the Government’s evidence of sanity at the time of the crime would not be sufficient to get the question to the jury, while a judge would be warranted on the same quantum of evidence in resolving the issue of competency to stand trial in favor of the Government. Nevertheless, we find Wright and Fielding persuasive for their teachings on the comparative qualitative value to be given evidence on incompetency which is submitted by expert witnesses oh the one hand and that which is submitted by lay witnesses who have had little contact with the accused on the other.

In this case the expert testimony was unanimous that Gray was incompetent. None of the examining doctors was called to testify at the hearing; therefore, the expert testimony was unimpeached. Some of the lay testimony was also to the effect that Gray was incompetent. The only evidence to the contrary came from laymen, all of whom testified, in effect, to nothing more than that they had never observed an abnormal act on the part of Gray, and none of whom had any “prolonged and intimate contact with the accused.” Wright v. United States, supra. Their testimony is insufficient to establish Gray’s competency in the face of unimpeached ex[*319] pert testimony to the contrary. [1] It thus appears that on this record the District Court was not warranted in concluding that Gray was competent to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense.

An abuse of discretion having been found, the judgment is reversed.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

1

. We reject the Government’s contention that the expert opinions in this case are of as little value as the lay opinion because the reports containing these opinions contained little of any substantial facts upon which the opinions were based. Even if the reports were deficient in this respect the Government was not denied the opportunity to call the examining doctors as witnesses and cross examine them concerning the reports. We will not penalize Gray for a deficiency which was within the prosecution’s capacity to remedy. See Wright v. United States, supra at p. 9 of 250 F.2d.