United States v. Raymond G. Mendoza, 441 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1971). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Raymond G. Mendoza, 441 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1971). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
23 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1971 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1971 1998 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Herman Patayan Soriano (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Id. at 1326 (holding that a Fourth Amendment seizure had occurred). 2 Soriano challenges the reliability of French's tip, citing United States v. Mendoza, 441 F.2d 1107, 1108-09 (9th Cir.1971), for the proposition that an accomplice's tip (where the accomplice is acting as a first-time informant) must be corroborated.
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Herman Patayan Soriano (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Id. at 1326 (holding that a Fourth Amendment seizure had occurred). 2 Soriano challenges the reliability of French's tip, citing United States v. Mendoza, 441 F.2d 1107, 1108-09 (9th Cir.1971), for the proposition that an accomplice's tip (where the accomplice is acting as a first-time informant) must be corroborated.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Rajeh Kazni
9th Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
See United States v. Faulkner, 447 F.2d 869, 872 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 926 , 92 S.Ct. 974 , 30 L.Ed.2d 798 (1972); United States v. Mendoza, 441 F.2d 1107, 1108 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); United States v. Maurice, 416 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1969).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Raymond G. MENDOZA, Defendant-Appellant
26286.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Apr 28, 1971.
441 F.2d 1107
Victor Sherman, of Nasatir, Sherman & Hirsch, Beverly Hills, Cal., for defendant-appellant., Robert L. Meyer, U. S. Atty., David R. Nissen, Chief, Crim. Div., Richard L. Jaeger, Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Browning, Kilkenny, Merrill, Per Curiam.
Cited by 15 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Mendoza appeals from his conviction for possessing and passing three counterfeit ten dollar Federal Reserve notes. 18 U.S.C. § 472. He urges reversal on three grounds.

Mendoza, a Mexican-American, argues that he was not adequately warned of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), because the warnings were not given in Spanish as well as English. The testimony as to his ability to understand English was in conflict. The issue was one of credibility. The court resolved that issue in favor of the government. There was clearly substantial evidence to support the finding that Mendoza fully understood his rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived them. See Jordan v. United States, 421 F.2d 493, 496-497 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Valdes, 417 F.2d 335, 337-338 (2d Cir. 1969). Cf. United States v. Trabucco, 424 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1970).

Mendoza argues that hearsay statements of an alleged accomplice, introduced at the trial for the limited, non-hearsay purpose of demonstrating probable cause for arrest, violated his right of confrontation under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). We assume, but do not decide, that a violation of Bruton occurred. Nevertheless, overwhelming independent evidence of Mendoza’s guilt, including a full confession and positive, in-eourt identification by an eye witness, satisfies us that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1968); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); United States v. Maurice, 416 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1969); Neal v. United States, 415 F.2d 599, 600 (9th Cir. 1969).

Finally, Mendoza argues that there was no probable cause for his arrest because the arresting agent relied on information from an informant of untested reliability. The informant was, by his own admission, an accomplice in the crime. He related the underlying circumstances of the offense to the arresting agent. His story, and his description of Mendoza, were corroborated by information obtained from eye witnesses. Under these circumstances, the agent’s reliance on the informant was[*1109] justified. See Musgrove v. Eyman, 435 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 1971); United States v. Jiminez Badilla, 434 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1970); Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923, 931 (9th Cir. 1966).

The judgment is affirmed.