v.
City of Gentry, etc.
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
___________
No. 96-3988
___________
Kirk D. Sykes, *
*
Appellant, *
* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the
* Western District of Arkansas.
The City of Gentry, Arkansas; The City *
Council of Gentry, Arkansas; Robert D. *
Abrahamson, Mayor, City of Gentry, *
Arkansas, *
*
Appellees. *
___________
Submitted: May 23, 1997
Filed: June 13, 1997
___________
Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.
___________
MAGILL, Circuit Judge.
Kirk D. Sykes, the former police chief of Gentry, Arkansas, appeals the district court's1 grant of summary judgment against him in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) action against the City of Gentry. We affirm.
[*2]On November 9, 1995, the Mayor of Gentry terminated Sykes without cause. The City Council considered the termination and a motion was made to override it, but failed for want of a second.
Sykes subsequently brought this action in the district court under § 1983.3 The district court denied relief, concluding that, while Sykes once had a property interest in his position, that property interest was destroyed when the Arkansas Legislature enacted § 110. Sykes now appeals.
II.
Sykes argues that his property interest in his position, created by § 504, was not lost by the subsequent enactment of § 110 because this would constitute a retroactive effect of the new statute. Because Arkansas law disfavors retroactive effects of statutes, see State v. Kansas City & Memphis Ry. & Bridge Co., 174 S.W. 248, 251 (Ark. 1914), Sykes contends that his property interest was unaffected by the change in the law.
Sykes's argument is meritless. Had Sykes been terminated prior to the enactment of § 110, he perhaps would have had an argument for retroactivity. As it is, the impact of § 110 is purely prospective. This Court has repeatedly held that a state may legislatively eliminate a previously conferred property interest in state employment. See Packett v. Stenberg, 969 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1992). "While the legislative alteration or elimination of a previously conferred property interest may be a deprivation, the legislative process itself provides citizens with the process they are due." Id. See also Gattis v. Gravette, 806 F.2d 778, 781 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he legislature which creates a property interest may rescind it, whether the legislative body is federal or state and whether the interest is an entitlement to economic benefits, a statutory cause of action or civil service job protections. By the time appellant discharged appellees, the Arkansas Legislature had removed appellees' employment position from those entitled to civil service system protections. Accordingly, the property interest previously conferred . . . had been extinguished . . . . [Because] the legislative process affords all the procedural due process required by the Constitution, the elimination of appellees' property interest in employment, although a deprivation, was not a deprivation without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution." (emphasis added)).
[*3]Any property interest Sykes had in his position was eliminated when the Arkansas Legislature enacted § 110. Because Sykes had no property interest in his position, there was no due process violation when he was terminated. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment is affirmed.
A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
[*4]