William L. Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1972). · Go Syfert
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William L. Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
80 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 24 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Akhtar-Zaidi v. Drug Enforcement Administration (ca6, 2016-11-15) · Strongest negative: Arlien Woodard, D/B/A E & J Market v. United States (ca6, 1984-01-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1972 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1972 1999 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#6 7 U.S.C. § 2013 cited 4× in this case · 352 total citations of statute #3 7 C.F.R. § 272.6 cited 3× in this case · 32 total citations of statute #12 7 U.S.C. § 2022 cited 2× in this case · 198 total citations of statute #1 7 C.F.R. § 272(b) cited 1× in this case · 1 total citations of statute #2 7 C.F.R. § 272 cited 1× in this case · 12 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 26 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Arlien Woodard, D/B/A E & J Market v. United States (2×)
6th Cir. · 1984 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 [ 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 ] (1972) and Save More of Gary, Inc., 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 987 [ 92 S.Ct. 535 , 30 L.Ed.2d 549 ] (1971).
discussed Cited "but see" Broad Street Food Market, Inc. v. United States
1st Cir. · 1983 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 [ 95 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 ] (1972) and Save More of Gary, Inc., 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 987 [ 92 S.Ct. 535 , 30 L.Ed.2d 549 ] (1971).
discussed Cited "but see" Juan Francisco Ramirez and Jovita G. Ramirez v. Secretary of Agriculture and United States of America
5th Cir. · 1983 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 , 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed. 131 (1972) and Save More of Gary, Inc., 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 535 , 30 L.Ed.2d 549 (1971).
discussed Cited "but see" Hough v. United States Department of Agriculture
5th Cir. · 1983 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 , 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972) and Save More of Gary, Inc., 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 535 , 30 L.Ed.2d 549 (1971).
discussed Cited "but see" Hough v. United States Department Of Agriculture
5th Cir. · 1983 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 , 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972) and Save More of Gary, Inc., 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 535 , 30 L.Ed.2d 549 (1971).
discussed Cited "but see" Donald Kulkin, Etc. v. Robert Bergland (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
1st Cir. · 1980 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 , [ 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 ] (1972) and Save More of Gary, Inc., 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 987 [ 92 S.Ct. 535 , 30 L.Ed.2d 549 ] (1971).
discussed Cited "but see" Jedatt, Inc. v. United States Department of Agriculture
E.D. Mich. · 1980 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see, Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 878 [ 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 ] (1972) and Save More of Gary, Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert, dismissed, 404 U.S. 987 [ 92 S.Ct. 535 , 30 L.Ed.2d 549 ] (1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Akhtar-Zaidi v. Drug Enforcement Administration
6th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
“The reviewing court’s function is only to ‘determine the validity of the questioned administrative action,’ not to review the sanctions.” Id. (quoting Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300, 302 (6th Cir. 1972)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dasmesh Enterprises., Inc. v. United States
W.D. Mich. · 2007 · confidence medium
“The reviewing court’s function is only to ‘determine the validity of the questioned administrative action,’ not to review the sanctions.” Id. (quoting Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300, 302 (6th Cir.1972)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mosley v. Tennessee Department of Commerce & Insurance
Tenn. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
“Determination of a sanction to be applied by an administrative agency, if within bounds of its lawful authority, is subject to very limited judicial review.” Woodard v. United States, 725 F.2d 1072, 1077 (6thCir.1984) (citing Kulkin v. Bergland, 626 F.2d 181, 184 (1stCir.1980)); Martin v. United States, *321 459 F.2d 300, 301-02 (6thCir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 , 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anton v. United States
E.D. Mich. · 2002 · confidence medium
“Determination of a sanction to be applied by an administrative agency, if within bounds of its lawful authority, is subject to very limited judicial review.” Woodard v. United States, 725 F.2d 1072, 1077 (6th Cir.1984) (citing Kulkin v. Bergland, 626 F.2d 181, 184 (1st Cir.1980)); Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300, 301-02 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 , 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charles Goldstein, D/B/A Chucky's Drive in Grocery v. United States
6th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
“Determination of a sanction to be applied by an administrative agency, if within bounds of its lawful authority, is subject to very limited judicial review.” Woodard v. United States, 725 F.2d 1072, 1077 (6th Cir.1984) (citing Kulkin v. Bergland, 626 F.2d 181, 184 (1st Cir.1980)); Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300, 301-02 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 , 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Prunty v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Food & Nutrition Service
S.D. Ohio · 1983 · confidence medium
Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300, 302 (6th Cir.1972); cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 , 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972); see also, American National Foods, Inc. v. United States Department of Agriculture, 381 F.Supp. 1021 (M.D.Tenn.1974), affirmed without opinion, 516 F.2d 901 (6th Cir.1975); Cass Corridor Food Coop. v. United States, 512 F.Supp. 925 (E.D.Mich.1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Josephs v. Government of the United States (2×) also: Cited "see"
E.D. Pa. · 1982 · confidence medium
Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300, 302 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 , 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972); see also Save More of Gary, Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 36, 39 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 535 , 30 L.Ed.2d 549 (1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Yaghnam v. United States (2×)
D. Colo. · 1981 · confidence medium
A plain reading of 7 U.S.C. § 2023 would imply that the district court is to exercise its own trial de novo discretion in reviewing the penalty imposed, just as it is to do when reviewing the disqualification decision. 1 See Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212, 1219-21 (4th Cir. 1975) (Widener, J., concurring); Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300, 302 (6th Cir. 1972) (Edwards, J., dissenting).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cass Corridor Food Coop v. United States
E.D. Mich. · 1981 · confidence medium
E. g., Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d at 301, nn.5-6 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) James T. Cross v. United States (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
4th Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
My views on the subject are in general agreement with the dissent of Judge Edwards in Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300, 302 (6th Cir. 1972), a case arising under the same statute at issue here, and are best articulated in the dissent of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 312 , 64 S.Ct. 559 , 88 L.Ed. 733 (1944), a part of the reasoning of which has been quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Douglas in the opinion of the court in Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156 , 90 S.Ct. 827 , 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) American National Foods, Inc. v. United States Department of Agriculture
M.D. Tenn. · 1974 · confidence medium
Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 *1023 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409 U.S. 878 , 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972). 1 A retail food store such as is operated by plaintiff may be disqualified from participation in the food stamp program on a finding, made as specified in the regulations, that such store has violated any provision of the Food Stamp Act or the regulations thereunder.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harry L. Welch, T/a Harry Welch General Merchandise v. United States (2×)
4th Cir. · 1972 · confidence medium
As Judge Edwards, dissenting in Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300, 302 (6th Cir.1972), convincingly demonstrates, a trial de novo "gives to the reviewing court all the power that the court or agency below possessed, including the power to enter a disposition or judgment different from that originally entered." 20 Judge Edwards' conclusion is buttressed by the statutory direction to the district court to "enter such judgment or order as it determines is in accordance with the law and the evidence" when it finds the administrative action is invalid. 7 U.S.C.
cited Cited "see" Drive-N-Shoppe, Inc., Dba Town and Country Drive-Thru v. United States
6th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 (1972).
discussed Cited "see" Han v. Food & Nutrition Service of the United States Department of Agriculture
D.N.J. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See, however, the differing opinions concerning this scope of review which appear in Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.1972); Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212 (4th Cir. 1975); Goodman v. United States, 518 F.2d 505 (5th Cir.1975); Studt v. United States, 607 F.2d 1216 (8th Cir.1979), and Kulkin v. Bergland, 626 F.2d 181 (1st Cir. 1980).
discussed Cited "see" M. R. Damiani Corp. v. United States Department of Agriculture
S.D.N.Y. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300, 301 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 , 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972); accord, Save More of Gary, Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 36, 39 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 535 , 30 L.Ed.2d 549 (1971); Smith v. United States, 392 F.Supp. 1116, 1119-20 (W.D.La.1975); Marcus v. United States, 364 F.Supp. 374, 375 (E.D.Pa.1973); Eckstut v. Hardin, 363 F.Supp. 701 (E.D.Pa.1973); Miller, v. United States, 345 F.Supp. 1131 (W.D.Pa.1972); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. United States, 342 F.Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y.1972, P…
discussed Cited "see" Berger v. United States
D.R.I. · 1976 · signal: see · confidence high
See Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 , 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972); Save More Of Gary, Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 535 , 30 L.Ed.2d 549 (1971); Farmingdale Supermarket, Inc. v. United States, 336 F.Supp. 534 (D.N.J.1971); Marbro Foods, Inc. v. United States, 293 F.Supp. 754 (N.D.Ill.1968).
discussed Cited "see" Eckstut v. Hardin
E.D. Pa. · 1973 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6 Cir.), cert. den. 409 U.S. 878 , 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972); Save More of Gary, Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 36 (7 Cir.), cert. dismissed 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 535 , 30 L.Ed.2d 549 (1971); Miller v. United States, 345 F.Supp. 1131 (W.D.Pa.1972); Farmingdale Supermarket, Inc. v. United States, 336 F.Supp. 534 (D.N.
discussed Cited "see" Marcus v. United States Department of Agriculture, Food & Nutrition Service
E.D. Pa. · 1973 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord, Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6 Cir.), cert. den. 409 U.S. 878 , 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed. 131 (1972); Save More of Gary, Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 36 (7 Cir.), cert. dismissed 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 535 , 30 L.Ed.2d 549 (1971); Miller v. United States, 345 F.Supp. 1131 (W.D.Pa. 1972); Farmingdale Supermarket, Inc. v. United States, 336 F.Supp. 534 (D.N.J. 1971); see, Butz v. Glover Livestock Co., Inc., 411 U.S. 182 , 93 S.Ct. 1455 , 36 L.Ed.2d 142 (1973).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." J.C.B. Super Markets, Inc. v. United States of America, and United States Department of Agriculture
2d Cir. · 1976 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Martin v. United States, 459 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 878 , 93 S.Ct. 129 , 34 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972); Save More of Gary, Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 36 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 987 , 92 S.Ct. 535 , 30 L.Ed.2d 549 (1971) (judicial review limited to the merits of the case), with Goodman v. United States, 518 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1975); Cross v. United States, 512 F.2d 1212 (4th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (judicial review includes review of sanction imposed).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
William L. MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant
71-1763.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Apr 21, 1972.
459 F.2d 300
Michael Kimmel, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendant-appellant; L. Patrick Gray, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Alan S. Rosenthal, Attys., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., Charles H. Anderson, U. S. Atty., Nashville, Tenn., on brief., Richard D. Taylor, Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellee; Glasgow, Adams & Taylor, Nashville, Tenn., on brief.
Weick, Edwards, Mc-Cree.
Cited by 53 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

Michael Kimmel, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendant-appellant; L. Patrick Gray, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Alan S. Rosenthal, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Charles H. Anderson, U. S. Atty., Nashville, Tenn., on brief.

Richard D. Taylor, Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellee; Glasgow, Adams & Taylor, Nashville, Tenn., on brief.

Before WEICK, EDWARDS and McCREE, Circuit Judges.

WEICK, Circuit Judge.

Lead Opinion

WEICK, Circuit Judge.

The complaint filed in the District Court sought to review the validity of a final determination by the Secretary of Agriculture disqualifying two retail food stores owned by the plaintiff from participation in the Food Stamp Program, for a period of six months, because of violation of the Food Stamp Act of 1964[1] and regulations applicable thereto.[2]

It was undisputed that there had been repeated violations of the Act by plaintiff’s employees in both stores, in accepting food stamps in exchange for non-food items, notwithstanding the fact that when the stores were authorized to participate in the program, officials from the Department of Agriculture visited the stores for orientation purposes and gave instructions as to the law and the applicable regulations.

Complaints concerning the violations had been made to the local office of the Secretary and his agents then made an investigation and purchased ineligible items at both stores. Plaintiff blamed the occurrences on turnover of employees in his stores and on his negligence in failing to set up a program to instruct new employees when they were hired.

The District Court upheld the disqualification of the two stores but undertook to reduce the period of disqualification from six months to thirty days. It was the view of the Court that the suspension of six months ordered by the Secretary was too harsh.

The Secretary has appealed. The only question raised in the appeal is as to the authority of the District Court to modify the sanction.

Section 4(a) of the Act provides that food stamps “shall be used only to purchase food”.[3] The applicable regulation contains the same provision.[4]

Section 11 of the Act provides for the disqualification of a store from participation in the program for violation of the Act or any regulation. The period of disqualification was authorized to be fixed by regulation.[5] The regulation authorized suspension from participation in the program for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed three years.[6]

Thus, we have a clear case .of admitted violations and sanctions imposed by the Secretary well within the range of his authority, expressly conferred on him by statute and regulation.

Judicial review is provided under Section 13 of the Act[7] as follows:

“If the store or concern feels aggrieved by such final determination he may obtain judicial review thereof by filing a complaint against the United States . . . requesting the court to set aside such determination. . The suit . . . shall be a trial de novo by the court in which the court shall determine the validity of the questioned administrative action in issue. If the court determines that such administrative action is invalid it shall enter such judgment or order as it determines is in accordance with the law and the evidence.”

The statute authorizes a review only on the merits of the case, and not on the period of disqualification.

[*302] It will be noted that the review is de novo of the “final determination” of disqualification. The reviewing court is authorized to “determine the validity of the questioned administrative action in issue.” The Court did make that determination by holding that the stores were disqualified from participation in the Food Stamp Program because of the admitted repeated violations. Upon making that determination the jurisdiction of the Court ended.

The statute authorized the Court to “enter such judgment or order as it determines is in accordance with the law and the evidence” only if it determined that the administrative action is invalid. Here the Court made no such determination of invalidity.

In the Act, no authority was conferred on the District Court to change the period of suspension ordered by the Secretary, or to impose new sanctions.[8]

The sanctions imposed by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Commodities Exchange Act have been held to be not subject to judicial review. G. H. Miller & Co. v. United States, 260 F.2d 286, 296 (7th Cir. en banc 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907, 79 S.Ct. 582, 3 L. Ed.2d 572 (1959). To the same effect under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, Eastern Produce Co. v. Benson, 278 F.2d 606, 610 (3d Cir. 1960). We see no substantial difference between the review provided by these Acts and that provided by the Food Stamp Act.

We hold that the reviewing court lacked authority to change the sanctions imposed by the Secretary.

Reversed.

4

7 C.F.R. § 272(b).

8

In mentioning that the sanctions imposed by the Secretary were too harsh, the Court referred to lesser sanctions imposed in reported cases (two District Court cases), and the practice in his District of granting probation in untaxed liquor cases and in other similar criminal cases. The Court also mentioned the fact that since the disqualification, plaintiff had sold one of his stores and opened two new stores, both of which had been qualified by the Secretary under the Act. We think the comparisons were irrelevant. The fact that new stores were qualified cannot excuse violations in the other stores.

Dissent

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge

(dissenting).

Congress saw fit to provide for “a trial de novo” in the District Court. Under any normal construction of legal language, such a grant of power gives to the reviewing court all the power that the court or agency below possessed, including the power to enter a disposition or judgment different from that originally entered.

The usual definition of trial de novo is:

“trial de novo. A trial anew, a re-trial in a superior court on an appeal of the case from an inferior court.” Ballen-tine’s Law Dictionary 1300 (2d ed. 1948).

Corpus Juris Secundum heads its section on Trial De Novo with these words:

“A trial de novo is a trial had as though no action whatever had been instituted in the court below, a new trial in an appellate tribunal.” 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1524 (1958).

My brothers construe the language which follows “trial de novo by the court” as a limitation upon that term. On its face,, however, the phrase “in which the court shall determine the validity of the questioned administrative action in issue” describes but does not limit.

As I read the statute the majority’s construction reads into the statute the word “solely” which Congress saw fit not to employ.

I do not deny that there is force to the arguments of my brethren. But rather than accept what I believe to be misuse of the term “trial de novo” I would refer the Secretary to Congress to seek amend[*303] ment of the statute in the event his construction proves to represent Congressional intent.

I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.