James E. Redus v. Harold R. Swenson, 468 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1972). · Go Syfert
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James E. Redus v. Harold R. Swenson, 468 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1972). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 4× by 3 distinct cases, 2018–2023 · 3 courts · …although the constitution guarantees the right to competent counsel, we cannot expect counsel to be omniscient or clairvoyant. at p. 607 ✓
21 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1973 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1973 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Childs v. Commonwealth of Virginia (2×)
E.D. Va. · 2023 · signal: cf. · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
although the constitution guarantees the right to competent counsel, we cannot expect counsel to be omniscient or clairvoyant.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Keel v. Clarke
W.D. Va. · 2021 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
although the constitution guarantees the right to competent counsel, we cannot expect counsel to be omniscient or clairvoyant.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McDonald v. Hutto
E.D. Ark. · 1976 · confidence medium
Howard v. Henderson, 519 F.2d 1176, 1178 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1036 , 96 S.Ct. 573 , 46 L.Ed.2d 412 (1975); Redus v. Swenson, 468 F.2d 606, 607 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 933 , 93 S.Ct. 1906 , 36 L.Ed.2d 393 (1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charles W. Garton v. Harold R. Swenson
8th Cir. · 1974 · confidence medium
Brown v. Swenson, 487 F.2d 1236, 1240 (CA8 1973); Redus v. Swenson, 468 F.2d 606, 607 (CA8 1972); Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (CA8 1971) (“circumstances which demonstrate that which amounts to a lawyer’s deliberate abdication of his ethical duty to his client”); e. g.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Garton v. Swenson
W.D. Mo. · 1973 · confidence medium
Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971), for example, states that before a violation of a particular defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights may be found: “the circumstances must demonstrate that which amounts to a lawyer’s deliberate abdication of this ethical duty to his client.” See also Redus v. Swenson, 468 F.2d 606, 607 (8th Cir. 1972), which quotes Robinson’s conclusion that the facts must demonstrate “such conscious conduct as to render pretextual an attorney’s legal obligation to fairly represent the defendant.” *1362 And some Eighth Circuit eases app…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Goodwin v. State
Mo. · 1973 · confidence medium
Although the Constitution guarantees the right to competent counsel, we cannot expect counsel to be omniscient or clairvoyant.” Redus v. Swenson, 468 F.2d 606, 607 [1], [2] (8th Cir. 1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) O'Neil v. State
Mo. · 1973 · confidence medium
Appellant’s attorney testified that he conferred with appellant and also with a person by the name of Porter, who was charged with appellant, and that “they knew what they wanted to do before I started talking to them.” He also stated that as a result of his conversations with appellant and the prosecutor “we came to an agreement, made a bargain and carried it out.” He also testified that he questioned appellant concerning his education and determined that he was intelligent and that he “knew what he was doing.” The trial court, in its findings of facts and conclusions of law, re…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Newman v. State of Missouri
W.D. Mo. · 1974 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Brown v. Swenson, 487 F.2d 1236, 1241 (8th Cir. 1973); Sappington v. United States, 468 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 , 93 S.Ct. 2164 , 36 L.Ed.2d 633 (1973); Kotz v. United States, 353 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1965); Russell v. Wyrick, supra; see also, Redus v. Swenson, 339 F.Supp. 571 (E.D.Mo.1972), affirmed, 468 F.2d 606, 607 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 933 , 93 S.Ct. 1906 , 36 L.Ed.2d 393 (1973).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
James E. REDUS, Appellant,
v.
Harold R. SWENSON, Appellee
72-1215.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Oct 4, 1972.
468 F.2d 606
Stanley T. Bjurstrom, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant., Kenneth Romines, Asst. Atty. Gen., John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for appellee.
Bright, Stephenson, Smith.
Cited by 18 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a denial of habeas corpus by Judge William H. Webster, District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. Petitioner, Redus, is presently serving a 20 year sentence after pleading guilty to second degree murder in the Circuit Court of the City St. Louis on November 3, 1966. On March 17, 1970, petitioner moved to have the judgment and sentence vacated in the Circuit Court of St. Louis alleging his constitutional rights had been infringed setting forth that:

(1) Involuntary statements were extracted from him during questioning ;
(2) Ineffective assistance of counsel;
(3) His plea of guilty was involuntary since it was the product of a coerced confession.

The trial court denied petitioner’s requested relief, and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the denial. Redus v. State (Mo.1971), 470 S.W.2d 539.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court which was denied by[*607] Judge Webster under date of February 29, 1972, 339 F.Supp. 571. Petitioner then sought a certificate of probable cause which the District Court denied on March 15, 1972. On April 14, 1972, we granted petitioner’s application for a certificate of probable cause.

The question dispositive of this appeal is whether the record demonstrates that petitioner understandingly and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty to second degree murder on the competent advice of counsel. Even if it were assumed that petitioner’s plea was brought about by a prior coerced confession, such a plea would not be rendered invalid per se so long as when entering the guilty plea, petitioner received competent advice from counsel. McMann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763. Here, petitioner’s attorneys both sought suppression of the allegedly incriminating statements said to have been recorded by the Circuit Attorney’s office. In view of the motion’s denial and for fear that a plea of not guilty might result in the death penalty, petitioner,, upon counsel’s advice, plead guilty to 2nd degree murder — a reaction not uncommon to one harboring suspicion of the unforeseeable outcome of a trial for 1st degree murder.

As we stated in Robinson v. United States (8th Cir. 1971), 448 F.2d 1255, 1256, in order for a Sixth Amendment assertion of denial of effective assistance of counsel to lie, the attendant circumstances must be such that counsel must demonstrate a “deliberate abdication of [his] ethical duty to his client.” There must be “such conscious conduct as to render pretextual an attorney’s legal obligation to fairly represent the defendant.” The mere assertion by petitioner that he retrospectively considers counsel’s advice to have been ungainly does little more than tilt at windmills. See McMann v. Richardson, supra, 397 U.S. at 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763. Furthermore, that a guilty plea must be intelligently made does not contemplate that all advice offered by counsel withstand the scrutiny of hindsight in a postconviction proceeding. Although the Constitution guarantees the right to competent counsel, we cannot expect counsel to be omniscient or clairvoyant. In view of the attendant circumstances and with particular emphasis placed upon the uncertainty which faced petitioner had he pleaded not guilty, we cannot label the advice rendered by counsel as incompetent.

We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the record demonstrates that petitioner understandingly and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty to the charge of 2nd degree murder upon advice of competent counsel.

It is also our view that the District Court proceeded properly in denying the writ without an evidentiary hearing. The transcript of the post-conviction evidentiary hearing indicates that petitioner was granted a full and fair evidentiary hearing at which petitioner was represented by appointed counsel. The findings of fact and conclusions of law filed by the State Trial Judge denying a writ and resolving the factual issues involved are amply supported by the record. Parrott v. Brewer, 421 F.2d 1386 (C.A.8, 1970).

Affirmed.